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CHAPTER I
1 .
INTRODUCTION
Foundations/ Problems, Objectives
Most of the research on Malaysian politics has dealt with 
national affairs.  ^ This is reflected not only in the book and 
monograph length published material but also in the professional 
and popular periodical literature and unpublished sources.
Even before the commencement of fieldwork for this project
it was clear that almost no political science research with an
2urban focus had been undertaken in Malaysia. The social 
science research on urban affairs in Malaysia has been done mainly 
by geographers, sociologists, demographers and anthropologists 
and they have, in very large part, confined themselves to study­
ing the process, consequences and problems of urbanisation. A 
few studies have described urban localities and some have surveyed
1. See, for example, K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political 
Process (Kuala Lumpur, 1967) ; Robert 0. Tilman, Bureaucratic 
Transition in Malaya (London, 1964); R.S. Milne, Government 
and Politics in Malaysia (Boston, 1967); Rupert Emerson, 
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1964) ; K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne,
The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964 (Singapore, 1967); 
M.F. Clark, "The Malayan Alliance and its Accomodation of 
Communal Pressures, 1952-1962," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 
University of Malaya, 1964. These sources, by no means a 
complete list, contain references to other material on 
Malaysian national politics.
2. The two exceptions to this generalization are Joseph E.
Pulkrabek, "Urbanisation and Politicization in Kuala 
Lumpur," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1966 
and Alvin Rabushka, "One Man,Two Votes: Ethnic Politics in
Malaya," Unpublished P h . D. Thesis, Washington University,
St. Louis, 1968.
specific conditions of urban life.1 Little is known about the 
governance of urban areas (large or small) and this holds true 
too for specific aspects of urban politics.
What is true of Malaysia applies to the study of Southeast
Asian politics in general and is probably a valid generalization
2for the larger field of the politics of the developing areas.
The studies which have dealt with urban areas in Southeast Asia
have largely focused on urbanisation along the same lines as
3those specifically concerned with Malaysia.
The position is very much the same when one examines the 
results of reasearch on urban areas in the developing countries 
in general. A recently published bibliography of material on the
2 .
1. See, for example, W.J. Bennett, "Kuala Lumpur: A Town of the
Equatorial Lowlands," Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale 
Geografie, 52 , 12 ( 1961) , pp. 327-333 ; J.C. Caldwell, "Urban
Growth in Malaya," Population R e v i e w , (January 1963), pp.39- 
50; Hamzah Sendut, "Patterns of Urbanisation in Malaya," The 
Journal of Tropical Geography , 16 (October 1962), p p . 114-130;
T.G. McGee, "The Cultural Role of C i t i e s :A Case Study of 
Kuala Lumpur," Journal Of Tropical G e o g raphy, 17 (October 1963) 
p p . 178-196 ; Hamzah Sendut, "Urbanisation," in Wang Gungwu, 
Malaysia, A Survey (New York, 1964), pp. 82-96 ; T.G. McGee,
"An Aspect of Urban Geography of Malaysia-The Movement of 
Malays to Kuala Lumpur," New Zealand Geographical Society 
R ecord, 39 (January-June 1965) , pp.7-9; Hamzah Sendut, "Con­
temporary Urbanisation in Malaya," Asian S u r v e y , VI, 9 
(September 1966) , 490-91 ; George C h o , "The Geographical Sett­
ing of Urban Areas in Western Malaysia," Geographica, 3 (1967) ,
pp. 50-53 ; Abdul Maulud Yusof, "Rural Development, Urbanism and 
the Malayan Peasantry," Geographica, 4 (1968) , p p . 84-89; E.
Cooper, "Urbanisation in Malaya," Population Stu d i e s , 5 (Nov­
ember 1951) , p p . 117-137; Hamzah Sendut, "The Structure of 
Kuala Lumpur," Town Planning R e v i e w , 36, 2 (July 1956) , pp.17-
24; Han Suyin, "Kuala Lumpur: Roofs Among the Jungle Trees,"
L i f e , 30, 6 (March 27, 1961) , p p . 46-57; Pao-Chun Tsou, Urban
Landscape of Kuala Lumpur (Singapore, 1967); T.G. McGee and 
W.D. McTaggart, Petaling Jaya: A Socio-economic Survey of a
New Town in Selangor, M a l a y s i a , (Wellington, 1967).
2. Aprodicio A. Laquian's The City in Nation-building (Manila, 
1966) is an example of one of the very few exceptions to this 
generalization.
3. See, for example, Gerald Breese, Urbanisation in Newly Develop­
ing Countries (New Jersey, 1966); Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. 
Schnore (eds.) , The Study of Urbanisation (New York, 1965) and 
T.G. McGee, The Southeast Asian City (London, 1967).
3 .
metropolis issued under the auspices of the International Union of
Local Authorities lists no specific section on urban politics.^
A very recent special issue of the Indian Journal of Public
Administration on urbanisation and urban development emphasises
2this same fact. Publications issued under the sponsorship of 
such organisations as the Eastern Regional Organisation for Plann­
ing and Housing (EAROPH) and the Eastern Regional Organisation for 
Public Administration (EROPA) further reflect the dearth of mater­
ial on urban politics.
The study of urban government in Southeast Asia has scarcely
begun and this is a point which is emphasised by Stanley Scott in
3a recent review article. There just are no comparable studies
to those which have been done in the United States on community or
4big city politics and the same situation applies to specific
5problem areas such as the politics of planning or of admini­
strative politics in the context of urban government.3 456
1. Metropolis:A Select Bibliography of Metropolitan Areas (The
Hague , 1967) .
2. "Urbanisation and Urban Development," The Indian Journal of
Public Administration, IV, 3 (July-September 1968). See also
William Bicker et . al., Comparative Urban Development: An
Annotated Bibliography (Washington,D .C . 1965) .
3. "The Study of Urban Government:First Steps Towards An Inter­
national Discipline," Public Administration Review, XXIX, 5 
(September/October 1969) , pp.546-551.
4. I have in mind such studies as Floyd Hunter, Community Power 
Structure (Chapel Hill, 1953) ; Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?
(New Haven, 1963) ; Robert E. Agger et. al.,The Rulers and the 
Ruled (New York, 1964) ; Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, 
City Politics (Cambridge, Mass. 1963).
5. For example, Alan A. Altshuler, The City Planning Process 
(New York, 1965) .
6. See Robert L. Peabody and Francis E. Rourke, "The Politics of 
Administration," in James G. March (ed.), Handbook of Organis­
ations (New York, 1965), pp.817-830.
4 .
These circumstances constituted compelling reasons for 
seriously considering a project dealing with urban politics. Very 
soon after getting to Kuala Lumpur it became clear that a single 
case study would yield the highest returns in terms of the time 
and resources available. The Federal Capital seemed the most 
logical and convenient locale to be studied. A preliminary survey 
of published secondary data sources and primary source material 
available in the National Archives suggested that the project 
should be built around, but not confined to, the institution of 
local government responsible for the management of the city. The 
object from the start was to examine a wide range of problems 
bearing on the governing of the city in the hope that such a 
strategy would yield the best basis for describing and analysing 
the nature of the urban political process.
Four issue areas (town planning, squatters, hawkers and rent 
control) were chosen for analysis on the basis of the following 
criteria: interest, controversy, newspaper coverage, participation
consequences (i.e. in terms of the number of people affected and 
the effect on resources) and the extent to which the issues were 
nominated as being important by a number of knowledgeable 
informants.  ^ Data in each of these four areas, each cast within a 
different time frame, will be presented and analysed. The role of 
bureaucrats in local, State and Federal levels of government will 
be described and their interplay with non-bureaucratic sources in 
the urban political system examined.
Decision-making in the four selected issue areas will be dis­
cussed within a framework of administrative politics against a 
background of changing advisory and quasi-legislative institutions 
The problem thus becomes one of exploring both urban politics and 
political change.
1. The question of the kinds of criteria which enter into or 
should enter into the choice of issues in community power 
studies is extensively discussed in Roy Forward's paper, 
"Issue Analysis in Community Power Studies," Paper presented 
to the 1966 Conference of the Australian Political Studies 
Association (cyclostyled) .
5 .
This study is based on the idea that:
Anyone who influences the exercise of public authority 
within and for the metropolis and its people is involved 
in urban politics. The starting point for identifying 
urban government, then, should be examination of 
functions and issues themselves to determine empirically 
what authorities are engaged in resolving conflicts and 
producing public goods and services within urban areas... 
He [the student of urban politics] is primarily 
interested only in those activities of parliaments, 
ministries, and officials that have proximate bearing on 
the development and governing of urban society. Hence, 
urban government cannot be identified as a set of 
institutions or persons. It is, rather, a set of 
activities, wherever located, that determine the 
authoritative distribution of public goods and services 
within an urban area. If urban government is thus 
defined functionally, rather than institutionally, 
research can focus on the relevant aspects of the plethora 
of actors engaged in this process. Further, urban 
politics functionally defined, encompasses the process 
of formal government, as well as the activities of non­
governmental groups and social forces that influence 
allocations by it.
The focal point around which this study is organised is the 
bureaucracy (of Federal, State and local institutions of 
government) and the data are so presented as to facilitate 
analysis within a framework which incorporates the following 
three principal axes:
1. The system of exective power: inter- and intra­
bureau cratic politics;
2. The bureaucracy and the urban community;
3. The bureaucracy and the development of
legislative institutions.
1. Annmarie Walsh, The Urban Challenge to Government (New York, 
1969), p p .222-223.
Techniques and Strategies
A total of 14 months full time research was done in Kuala 
Lumpur from December 1968 through January 1970 .^" During this 
period documentary material was examined and about a hundred 
interviews conducted.
The documents examined were almost entirely primary sources. 
They included government files at Federal, State and local levels, 
unpublished reports, housing and valuation records, budget stati­
stics, maps, town plans and the like. In addition, all English 
language newspaper files on local government for the period 1947 
through 1968 held in the Straits Times library in Kuala Lumpur 
were examined.
A wide range of informants was interviewed. Except for the 
seven Penghulu2 all interviews were conducted in English. A copy 
of the interview schedule and an accompanying explanatory note is 
attached as Appendix E.
Informants included members of the former Municipal Council; 
past and serving members of the Advisory Board of the Federal 
Capital Commission; all seven current department heads and former 
administrators who had held senior positions in the Municipal 
Council or the Federal Capital Commission; the present and former 
Commis sioners of the Federal Capital Commission; past and present 
administrators employed either at State or Federal levels of 
Government; architects, lawyers, developers and others who could 
provide insights into the urban political process generally or whc 
could provide answers to specific questions. In many cases there 
were several interviews or extended discussions with the same 
informant.
1. This period coincided with the Kuala Lumpur riots of May 13, 
1969 as a result of which Parliament was suspended and the 
Federal Capital Commission was taken over by the National 
Operations Council (NOC). All of these events are beyond the 
scope of this project.
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Besides these two main sources of data, efforts were made to 
get to know Kuala Lumpur; these included field trips to low cost 
housing projects, markets, squatter and other housing areas and 
squatter clearance and other exercises in which the Municipal 
staff was involved. Short field trips were made to other urban 
centers such as Malacca, Seremban, Klang, Ipoh and Penang on the 
West coast and all of the principal towns on the East coast.
Kuala Lumpur
8 .
There are two Kuala Lumpurs. There is the Kuala Lumpur 
represented by Parliament House and the National Monument, 
the Merdeka Stadium and Stadium Negara, the National 
Museum and the attractive complex of Moorish buildings 
on the river bank, recently enhanced by the magnificent 
National Mosque. This Kuala Lumpur is proudly metro­
politan and can stand with dignity among the cities of 
the world. Then there is the other Kuala Lumpur where 
most people work and shop, a Kuala Lumpur harking back 
to frontier days, grubby with age, wasteful in its use 
of valuable land, as constricting and unsightly as a suit 
of clothes long outgrown. The whole of the town centre, 
with its narrow, twisting side streets and its ugly shop 
houses, acts as a straight (sic) jacket on the economic 
and social life of the capital.
"Urban Renewal", Straits Times 
(editorial), June 21, 1966.
There are indeed two Kuala Lumpurs. In that bright shiny 
Kuala Lumpur represented by Parliament House must also be included 
Kenny Hills and the Lake Gardens, the houses along Circular Road 
and Ampang Road, the golf course area and Kia Peng Road and Jalan 
Stonor. This is where the rich, the very rich, the super-scale 
civil servants, government ministers, diplomatic personnel, 
resident Caucasians and other foreigners live. Here in the green 
jungle hills, in the cool shady places, is the world of neatly 
trimmed lawns and hedges, air-conditioned homes with six bathrooms 
two-car garages and two Mercedes-Benzes, and all the other modern 
conveniences and status symbols which go with being part of the 
elite.
Then there is the other Kuala Lumpur. In the hot dirty 
crowded central business district thousands of Chinese live piled 
on one another. An incomplete 1964 survey by the Municipal Health 
Department showed that there were 10,786 cubicle dwellers 
accommodated in 2776 cubicles in "crowded, squalid conditions, 
prone to tuberculosis and all other communicable diseases".'*'
To those poor people filed away on the upper floors of
1. 'KL rehousing programme to enter new phase,' Malay Mail, July
21, 1964.
9 .
broken-down shophouses in legal, though wretched, quarters, must 
be added the 140,000 squatters who lack even the minor comfort of 
the legal right to occupy their miserable huts. Tucked away in 
the back lanes behind the main streets, out of sight of everyone 
except the secret societies, the Special Branch and each other, 
one-third of the total population lives, without electricity or 
running water in most cases.
A very few of the squatters manage to get into high-rise 
'low-cost' flats, proudly labelled as Alliance Government projects 
in foot-high black letters, but even they have not escaped the 
other Kuala Lumpur. As Michael Harrington, writing of the other 
Arne ric a , says:
Only one factor in the culture of poverty is 
changed by these high rise buildings. Housing is 
no longer dilapidated. But the long schooling 
in the slums has built up a resistance to better 
times; the other elements of poverty remain; and the 
bureaucratic aspects of the new life promote 
alienation and rootlessness...
In short, most public housing, even at its best, 
fails to solve the problem of the slum and, 
above all, the problem of slum psychology...
But, perhaps most crucial, the housing policy... 
has sought the integration of the poor with the 
poor - which is to say, the segregation of the 
poor...from the society at large.^
Besides these high-rise projects festooned with wet laundry 
and bearing names like Tun Razak Mansions, there are a small 
number of single dwelling unit schemes established exclusively 
for Malays on the outskirts of the Municipality. Kampong Bharu, 
an area of 221.5 acres set aside in 1900 exclusively for Malay 
occupation, is located on the fringe of the centre of the city, 
and is the site of the 'Sunday' market on Saturday night for 
tourists and neighborhood Malays and the venue of struggling 
Malay entrepreneurs.
1. Michael Harrington, The Other America, (New York, 1966)pp.l48- 
150. A similar point of view is expressed by D.I. Buchanan in 
his 'The Fringe-Dwellers: Some Socio-Economic Problems of
Singapore's Low-Cost Housing Scheme, with Particular 
Reference to the Resettlement of Squatters, ' Geographica , Vol. 
IV, 1968, pp.60-66.
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Along with the urban poor and the elite, there is a rapidly 
dwindling scattering of middle class people who actually reside in 
the city. Most of the middle class that works and plays in Kuala 
Lumpur goes home to sleep in nearby Petaling Jaya, and the 
remainder are quickly moving to the new sections there or into new 
developments a few miles out of town. They will leave the town at: 
night to those who can afford to stay in great comfort and gracious 
style and those who cannot afford to spend 50jz* a day commuting to 
a job which pays $3.
Given enough money, time and patience you can find almost 
anything in Kuala Lumpur. Language is no great barrier; if 
English is not universally understood, then bazaar Malay is, 
although it might be a far cry from the purified National Language: 
now officially imposed as a step toward 'instant' national unity.
Modern American-sty1e supermarkets and shopping centres 
boom, supported by the growing local middle-class hunger for 
Western goods. The 50^ 5 noodle seller and sugar cane juice hawker 
make a living too, although not such a good one.
There are movies, television and radio in English, Mandarin, 
Tamil, Hindi and Malay. There are fancy nightclubs and hotel 
restaurants for tourists and local business executives and if you 
aren't full afterwards you can stop for a bowl of prawns and pigs' 
tails at the sidewalk stall. Golf courses and private clubs 
abound, and badminton is a serious sport. The one public luxury 
provided by the Municipality is an Olympic-sized swimming pool 
which is virtually unused and operates at an annual loss.
There are beggars and prostitutes too, but the 'street 
paraders' are dismissed as a universal evil and asked to stay 
off the main streets, and the beggars are labelled 'opportunists' 
and sent to rehabilitation centres where they are taught basket­
weaving .
A year in Kuala Lumpur is unforgettable. You can love it for 
its infinite variety, its eager kindness to strangers like your­
self; you can hate its sticky heat and dirt and its callousness to 
its own people; but unless you live locked in the air-conditioned
11 .
world on Kenny Hill, you cannot ignore it or leave it all behind 
when you g o .
Kuala L u mpur/ the Federal Capital of Malaysia and the capi­
tal of the State of Selangor since 1880, is located astride the 
confluence of the Klang and Gombak rivers, at the head of the 
Klang Valley (see Map 1). As can readily be seen from an examin­
ation of the map, Kuala Lumpur, Petaling Jaya, Batu Tiga, Klang
2and Port Swettenham lie in one straight line astride the main 
highway which links the capital to its port twenty miles away.
The Federal Capital is the principal population center of 
West Malaysia and the main point of entry and exit for air 
travellers. It is located within the second most important 
alluvial tin mining area in Malaysia. Appendix A lists economic 
data for Kuala Lumpur. The per capita income would probably be 
the highest for any city in Malaysia, as are the land and 
property values.
The last official census, taken in June 1957 placed Kuala 
Lumpur's population at 316,230, broken down racially as follows:
% of Total Population
Malay 47 ,615 15.0
Chines e 195,832 62.0
Indian 53,506 16.9
Other 19,286 5.9
1. For a detailed history of early Kuala Lumpur see J.M. Gullick 
'Kuala Lumpur, 1880-1895,' Journal of the Malayan Branch of 
the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XXVIII, Part 4, August 1955. 
For a more popular account Kuala Lumpur 100 Years, 1959, 
published officially by the Kuala Lumpur Municipality, is an 
excellent historical source book. Pao Chun-Tsou, Urban 
Landscape of Kuala Lumpur - A Geographical Survey, (Singapore 
1967), is also a most useful study providing geographical and 
other data.
2. Petaling Jaya is a new town, built in 1952 during the Emerg­
ency to re-house squatters. Batu Tiga, also known as Sungei 
Renggam or Shah Alam, will be the new State Capital and is 
now being developed. Klang, the fifth largest town in Malay­
sia, was the State Capital in the 19th century. Port Swetten­
ham is Kuala Lumpur's shipping link for both freight and 
passenger services.
12 .
The inter-censal increases since the first census was taken
are shown !by the following table:
Population % Chinese % increase Area of K .L .
in sq. miles
1911 46,718 - - 8
1921 80,424 60.4 70.0 17
1931 111,418 61.0 38.5 17
1947 175,961 63.5 57.9 20
1957 316,230 61.9 79.7 36
( es t .)19 7 0 550,000 - 74.0 35
It is artificial to discuss Kuala Lumpur's population by
taking a head count of only those who reside within the limits of 
the thirty-five square miles which officially constitute the city. 
If the urban fringe population and that of Petaling Jaya is taken 
into account, as it should be, then the 1970 census should show a 
total population in the vicinity of 700,000 for Kuala Lumpur and 
its immediate environs. If Appendix B is examined the position of 
Kuala Lumpur can be seen against that of other major urban centers 
within each State. It should also become clear that not only is 
Kuala Lumpur's population growing faster than that of the State in 
which it is located but it is also growing faster than the popul­
ation of West Malaysia. It is, in fact, the fastest growing 
urban area in the whole of Malaysia.
Some aspects of the racial composition of 'urban' populations 
in Malaysia should be delineated generally so that Kuala Lumpur's 
position within this urban context can be seen more clearly. In 
1957 the total population of the Malay Peninsula was 6,278,758, 
broken down as follows:
%
Malays 49.8 
Chinese 37.2 
Indians and Pakistanis 11.3 
Others 1.7
Of the total population, 2,668,000 (42.5%) lived in localities
with 1,000-9,999 inhabitants. The racial composition of these 
urban dwellers was as follows: „
Malays
Chinese
Indians and others
22.6 
63.9 
10.7
13 .
Malays
Chinese
Indians and others
21.1
62.6
12.1
These data for 1957 show very clearly the predominance of 
Chinese in urban areas; while they constitute only 37.2% of the 
total population they comprise a little over 60% of the population 
living in areas with over 1,000 people. If the statistics in 
Appendix B are examined it will also be seen that the population 
of the major West Coast towns of Georgetown, Malacca, Ipoh, Kuala 
Lumpur, Klang and Seremban are overwhelmingly Chinese. In each of 
these cases the percentage of Chinese is greater than in the State 
and in the country as a whole.'*’
Not only is the population of Kuala Lumpur principally
Chinese but the ownership of property within the city is also
heavily Chinese. If the number of rateable holdings in Kuala
2Lumpur and the value for rating purposes are taken as indices of 
property ownership, the racial breakdown is as follows:
1. These statistics have been gleaned from Timothy Thim-Fook 
Lam's unpublished paper, 'The Growth of the Chinese Community 
and Urbanization in the Malay Peninsula,' n.d.
2. Care must be taken in interpreting the annual value figure as 
this is not the same as the sum for which the holding might 
be sold. The annual value is that sum which the Municipal 
Valuer calculates a particular unit of property would reason­
ably yield in rent for any given year; at the time of writing 
16% of this was payable in city rates in most, but not all, 
cases. Privately owned vacant land is also included here, 
and its annual value also does not represent its market value. 
For a definition and discussion of Annual Value see Harry J. 
Manning, 'The Effects of Land Valuation and Property Taxation 
on CBD Redevelopment,' in P.N. Troy (ed.), Urban Redevelopment 
in Australia, (Canberra, 1967) , pp.146-176.
TABLE 1
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a
($M)
No. of holdings % Annual Value %
Chines e 13 , 398 67.7 66,223,890 71.7
Mai ay 2,875 14.5 4,619,487 5.0
Indian 2,447 12.4 7,318,936 7.9
Others 1,063 5.4 14,204,526 15.4
Total 19,783 100.0 92,366,839 100.0
aS^ource : Data provided by the Federal Capital Commission,
The number of registered voters in the four Federal and 
seven State constituencies which are substantially part of Kuala 
Lumpur is similarly largely Chinese, and in the 1969 elections 
most of these constituencies voted heavily for Opposition 
candidates. All of this is not without significance in a country 
which has, as the May 13 riots showed, deep-seated racial cleavages 
and antagonisms, some of them having origins in time long past and 
others the result of a combination of factors born of recent times. 
The predominantly Chinese component of Kuala Lumpur's population 
and that of the West Coast and other urban areas is not simply an 
interesting demographic phenomenon; it has many important 
ramifications, not the least of which are political. There is 
already an urban crisis in Malaysia,'*’ partly the result of the 
unabashed neglect of the colonial period and to no small extent 
because the emphasis during the post-independenee period has been 
on rural rather than on urban development. Kuala Lumpur exempli­
fies the state of the urban crisis in Malaysia although it does 
not seem to be the worst off of the principal towns. If Kuala 
Lumpur's problems differ from those of other urban centres, the 
differences are those of degree and not of kind.
Kuala Lumpur suffers to a moderate extent from the same
1. See Timothy Thim-Fook Lam, 'Man and his Urban Environment,' 
Geographica, Vol. 4, 1968 , pp.90-96. Although this article
deals in general terms with the wider problems of urbanisatior., 
slums and poverty, water and air pollution and stress-fi1led 
environments, the author no doubt has Malaysia in mind, even 
though only passing reference to local conditions is made.
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problems which beset many primate cities in Southeast Asia.
The fact that Kuala Lumpur may be more advanced than most cities 
in this area is of little real consequence to the people who live 
there, but it should be kept in perspective by researchers. 
Despite the growing problems of traffic, pollution, public health 
hazards, unplanned growth and a host of other specifically urban 
problems, Kuala Lumpur is not as badly beset as, say, Manila.
Its problems are recognised by the men in charge of the Municipal
bureaucracy who are anxious to grapple with them but are largely
frustrated in their efforts by factors which are essentially
politic a l .
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Background to Local Government
Prior to independence in the Federated Malay States, the
Unfederated States, the Straits Settlements and the Federation
of Malaya there were various institutions which dealt with the
broad area of 'local government'. The most important legacy of
the British was the system of district administration, each
State being divided into a number of districts in which a District
Officer (D.O.) was in charge.'*' The District was further divided
2into a number of mukim, each in the charge of a penghulu 
assisted by a ketua kampong. The entire system of district 
administration was responsible and subordinate to the State 
government.
A system of elective municipal administration was established
3 4in Penang and Malacca in 1856 and some time later in Singapore.
1. See for example, Raja Shah Kobat bin Raja Hamzah, 'The 
Changing Role of the District Officer,' unpublished paper, 
April 1967.
2. For a discussion of mukim, penghulu and ketua kampong see,
for example, the following sources: J.M. Gullick,
Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya (London, 1958); 
S. Husin Ali, Patterns of Rural Leadership in Malaya (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1966) ; Abdul Razak Abdullah, 'Penghulu2 Di-Mukim
Ayer Baloi,' unpublished Honours Exercise, University of 
Malaya, 1966; Hashim Mydin, 'Sistem Penghulu Di-Kedah,' 
Unpublished Honours Exercise, University of Malaya, 1966; 
Ishmail Yusof, 'Sistem Penghulu Di-Hulu Perak,' Unpublished 
Honours Exercise, University of Malaya, 1966; Khadijah 
Muhammad,'Sistem Penghulu Di-Daerah Klang,' Unpublished 
Honours Exercise, University of Malaya, 1965; Zainal Kling, 
'Sistem Penghulu Di Alor Gajah,' Unpublished Honours 
Exercise, University of Malaya, 1966.
3. See Penang - Past and Present 1786-1963 (Penang, 1966) ;
'Brief Notes on the History of the Municipality of the Town 
and Fort of Malacca,' unpublished, n.d. (prepared by the 
Municipal Secretary, Malacca).
4. C.F. Green, Notes on Local Government in Malaya (Kuala
Lumpur, 1915).
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The most common form of local government in both the F.M.S. and 
the Unfederated States was the Sanitary Board which was always 
wholly nominated and comprised both official and unofficial 
members. Sanitary Boards were creatures of the various State 
governments and were treated as just another of their departments. 
There were other institutions known as Rural Boards but these 
apparently only existed in Malacca, Penang and Province Wellesley; 
their legal status did not differ from that of the Sanitary 
Boards.'*'
After W.W.II some of the Sanitary Boards were changed to 
Town Boards and later to Town and Municipal Councils. These 
organisations were endowed with a measure of financial autonomy 
by virtue of the Town Boards (Amendment) Ordinance, 1954. This 
meant that the new institutions became separate statutory bodies 
with their own accounting systems which resulted in a measure of 
freedom from State control. The introduction of elections was 
accompanied by the establishment of majority elected councils. 
Municipal Councils of this sort were established in K.L. (1952) , 
in Malacca (1955) , and in Ipoh (1962) . Penang acquired a fully 
elected Council on December 1, 1956 and achieved city status a
month later; in both respects, it is unique in Malaysia.
A new form of local government was provided for by the Local 
Councils Ordinance of 1952 (No. 36 of 1952 ) , which enabled the 
establishment of Local Councils in the 'New Villages' which had 
been set up as re-settlement camps during the Emergency.
Obviously a part of the campaign to win the hearts and minds of 
the people in the fight against the insurgents, these fully elect­
ed councils had elected presidents and financial autonomy.
The various types of local authorities which existed in
2April 1965 and December 1969 were as follows:
1. See Harold Bedale, Establishment, Organisation and Supervision 
of Local Authorities in the Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 
1953); R.S. Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia (Boston, 
1967 ) , p p . 164-173 .
2. Milne, o p . cit., p.167 and figures provided by the Commission­
er of Local Government, Kuala Lumpur.
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1965 1969
Cities
Municipalities
Town Councils (financially auto.) 
Town Councils (not f.a.)
Town Boards (f.a.)
Town Boards (not f.a.)
Rural District Councils (f.a.) 
Rural District Councils (not f.a.) 
Local Councils 
New Villages Committees
1
3 
25 
11
5
32
4 
3
1
3 
27 
10
6
30
4 
3
296
181
286
no data
In the State of Selangor a total of twenty-four Local 
Councils had been established between 1953 and 1957; in the 
District of Kuala Lumpur there were seven local councils, all 
bordering on the Municipal boundary and in very large part 
surrounding the Federal Capital. The following table sets out 
pertinent data on the seven local councils located within the 
District of K .L .:^
1 . Data provided by the District Office Kuala Lumpur.
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The introduction of elections to municipal bodies in the 
post W.W.II period, with the first being held in Penang in 1951 
followed by K.L. in 1952, ushered in an era of vigorous party 
competition. Local elections in general became a testing ground 
for the various parties which were to contest the first national 
elections in 1955.
Only two years after independence and less than a decade
after the first post-war local elections, the first signs of a
deepening crisis in local government became apparent with the
national Alliance government's decision to suspend the 1959
local elections. By the time the suspension was finally lifted
in 1961, K.L. had become the first casualty of a deliberate
program by the Alliance to prevent municipal governments from
going to the opposition in an election."*" Local elections in
Georgetown, Penang were suspended in 1964 because of allegations
of corruption and management of the Council was taken over by
the State government in July 1966. The Seremban Town Council
and the Malacca Municipal Council were taken over by the State
governments in 1965 and 1966 respectively, again because of
2allegations of mismanagement. In each of these cases the 
councils concerned were controlled by opposition parties (Penang 
Labor Party; Seremban - United Democratic Party, Labor- 
Independent and Socialist Front Coalition; Malacca - Labor Party) 
and were taken over by State governments controlled by the 
Alliance. All of this had been facilitated by the active co­
operation of the Alliance controlled Federal government, which 
enacted the Local Government Elections (Amendment) (No.2) A c t , 
1 9 6 6 , retroactively dated to become effective as of January 26, 
1959. This new legislation gave State governments the power to
1. This point is fully documented in the section on 
institutional development.
2. A Commission of Inquiry was held into the affairs of the 
Johore Bahru Town Council (controlled by the Alliance) in 
1967 but no report of the Commission had been published 
by the end of 1969.
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take over the local and municipal councils when it was felt 
that such action was in the public interest.
The most important and far-reaching action affecting local 
government generally was taken by the Alliance on March 2, 1965
when all local government elections were suspended, allegedly 
because of Confrontation. In making this announcement in 
Parliament, the Prime Minister, Tungku Abdul Rahman, promised:
'The very moment peace is declared and the emergency regulations 
are withdrawn, then every preparation will be made to hold 
elections. ' ^  That promise was never kept and local elections 
have not been held since the suspension.
The decision to suspend all local elections because of
Confrontation must be viewed with considerable suspicion in
view of the Alliance government's behaviour in eliminating local
elections in Kuala Lumpur because of the fear of a Socialist
Front victory at the polls, and its suspension of local elections
in 1959 and 1960, allegedly because electoral rolls were not in
order. After the takeover of K.L., urban local authority
elections in the west coast states had clearly gone against the 
2Alliance, a fact which had caused considerable anxiety in 
Alliance circles and had been largely responsible for a resolu­
tion adopted by the Annual General Meeting of the United Malay 
National Organisation in 1962 calling for the elimination of 
elections in all state capitals. A similar resolution adopted 
by the Penang U.M.N.O. executive called on the Federal government
to abolish elections for city, town, rural, district and other 
3local councils. These resolutions and the anxiety caused by
1. 'Off: All Local Elections,' Straits T i m e s , March 2, 1965.
2. T.H. Silcock, 'Communal and Party Structure,' in Silcock and 
Fisk (eds.), The Political Economy of Independent Malaya 
(Canberra, 1963) , p p . 20-21; K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and 
the Political Process (Kuala Lumpur, 1967) , p p . 173-174.
3. Minutes of the Consultative Committee of Municipal
Corporations, September 24, 1962; 'Move to Abolish Town
Elections,' Straits T i m e s , August 6, 1964.
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opposition party gains in local elections had driven the Alliance
to establish a Commission of Inquiry to look into the future
of local councils in September 1964.1 234 This eight-man Commission
of Inquiry was disbanded shortly after its first meeting in
November 1964, allegedly because of its limited terms of
reference. This decision had in fact been taken after the
matter was fully discussed at a meeting of the National Council
for Local Government held on October 26, 1964, but was not
2publicly announced until February 1965.
The Royal Commission which replaced this first Commission
of Inquiry was formally appointed on June 25, 1965 and
3publicly announced on July 24, 1965. Its terms of reference
were as follows:
(i) to enquire into and to consider whether the 
continued existence of any category or 
categories of local authorities, and in 
particular any local authorities in which 
the capital of a State is situated, serves 
any useful purpose;
(ii) to report on the foregoing matters and to make 
such recommendations as in their opinion the 
circumstances require, taking into consideration 
the adequacy or otherwise of the existing laws 
with regard to local authorities, namely, the 
Municipal Ordinance S.S. Cap. 133, the Town Boards 
Enactment, 1938, the Town Boards Enactment Trengganu 
(Cap. 64), the Town Boards Enactment F.M.S. Cap.
137 as made applicable to Perlis (by the Town 
Boards (Application to Perlis) Ordinance 1962) 
and to Kedah (by F.M. Ordance No. 5^/56), and 
the Local Councils Ordinance, 1952.
Six of the eight members of the first Commission were re­
nominated to the Royal Commission of Inquiry chaired by
1. 'Probe into Government Pay and Local C o u n cils,' Straits
Time s , September 3, 1964.
2. 'Local Councils Probe Scrapped - A Royal Commission to
be set up i n s t e a d , ' Malay M a i 1 , February 10, 1965.
3. Gazette Notification No. L/N 291, July 29, 1965.
4. Ibid.
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Senator Athi Nahappan, a prominent member and official of the 
Malayan Indian Congress, the third party of the Alliance. The 
Royal Commission held its first public hearings early in October 
1965 and continued through June of the following year. It 
was not until April 1967, however, that the Commission got 
down to the business of its own confidential deliberations 
preparatory to framing its report. All of 1968 was spent in 
putting the report together; this task was completed in 
January 1969 and the fifteen volume Report was sent to the Cabinet 
before submission to Parliament. The Report was not submitted 
to Parliament or made available to the public before the 1969 
elections and, with the May 13 riots and the consequent suspen­
sion of Parliament, the chances of the report ever seeing the 
light of day seem remote, particularly since Nahappan and his 
colleagues did recommend that all State Capitals should have 
Councils, two-thirds of the members of which would be elected.^
There are two institutions associated with local 
government, the Consultative Committee of Municipal Corporations 
and the National Council for Local Government.
The initial attempt to form an Association of Municipal
Corporations to include all local authorities was first made
by the Member for Local Government, Housing and Town Planning
at the instigation of the President of the K.L. Municipal
2Council in February 1955. After preliminary negotiations
between State, Federal and local agencies it was agreed that
the proposed association should not include Town Councils or
Rural Boards and that membership should be open only to the
3Municipalities of Penang, Malacca and K.L. It was not until
1. 'Notes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Royal Commission of
Inquiry to Investigate into the Workings of Local 
Authorities, ' Kuala Lumpur, July 3, 1967.
2. State Secretary, Selangor to the Secretary to the Member
for Local Government and Housing, (10) in Sei. Sec. 942, 
February 18, 1955.
3. Acting Secretary to Member for Local Government and Housing
to State Secretary, Selangor, LG. 68/32 in (11) in Sei. Sec. 
942, June 16, 1955.
August 8, 1957, that representatives of these three municipalit­
ies met for the first time and decided, in view of the exclusion 
of other local authorities and obscure legal objections raised 
to the term 'Association', that the name 'Consultative Committee 
of Municipal Corporations' (CCMC) be adopted.
The three founder Municipalities were joined by Ipoh after 
it attained Municipal status at the end of May 1962. Although 
the Commissioner for Local Government or his representative has 
always attended meetings of the CCMC, no representative of any 
of the State governments of Selangor, Penang, Perak and Malacca 
has ever attended its meetings on a regular basis, an important 
point since the last three states are responsible for the 
Municipalities of Georgetown, Ipoh and Malacca.
The aim of the CCMC was to consult on all matters of 
mutual concern. If it was envisaged that policies for major 
urban problem areas such as planning, urban renewal, squatters, 
transportation, sewerage, housing and so on would be discussed, 
this did not happen. The quarterly meetings soon degenerated 
into discussions on how to keep Municipal laborers' wages 
uniformly low and how to negotiate with the Municipal Employees' 
Trade Union. A content analysis of all agendas for meetings 
held between 1957 and 1968 revealed a preoccupation with very 
minor matters. An organisation which might have dealt with some 
of Malaysia's most critical urban problems simply became what 
one former senior official of the K.L. Municipality called 'a 
bloody waste of t i m e ' .
The National Council for Local Government was established 
in May 1960 with the aim of unifying policy and law regarding 
the administration of local government.1 Section 95A of the 
Constitution provides that:
1. Its establishment was provided for by amendment to
Constitution - see Federal Constitution, Reprint N o . 13, 
1968, Article 95A, p p . 103-4.
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5. It shall be the duty of the National Council 
for Local Government to formulate from time to 
time in consultation with the Federal Government 
and the State Governments a national policy for 
the promotion, development and control of local 
government.. .and for the administration of any 
laws relating thereto;
6. It shall be the duty of the Federal Government 
and the Government of any State to consult the 
National Council for Local Government in respect 
of any proposed legislation dealing with local 
government and it shall be the duty of the 
National Council for Local Government^to advise 
these Governments on any such matter.
The Council's membership comprises one representative 
from each of the States appointed by the Ruler or Governor and 
not more than ten representatives appointed by the Federal 
Government. It is required to meet at least once a year.
The Council is chaired by 'a Minister', in recent years the 
Minister for Local Government and Housing. As far as can be 
ascertained the Council started off without any clear idea 
of what its role might be or of what precisely the problems 
of local government were. The appointment of the Royal Comm­
ission on Local Government underlined the fact that the 
National Council for Local Government had failed in whatever 
task it had been assigned, particularly in the matter of new 
legislation. The Council still exists on paper.
1 . Ibid .
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Within the thirty-five square miles which constitute the 
Municipal area of Kuala Lumpur there are a number of different 
levels of government and each of these might be said to be more 
or less associated with governing the Municipality. It is 
the Federal Capital Commission, however, which is primarily 
responsible for the management of Kuala Lumpur.
Because the Municipality is located wholly within the 
District of Kuala Lumpur the Selangor State Government 
exercises proximate control over certain matters, particularly 
land, through the District Officer and his subordinates. The 
District of K.L. is divided into seven mukim, within each of 
which a penghulu, assisted by several ketua kampong and their 
committees of ten, is responsible for minor day to day 
administrative matters.
As seven state legislative assembly constituencies (Ampang 
Sentul, Pantai, Salak, Bukit Nanas, Kampong Bharu and Penchala) 
are located substantially within the Municipal limits, it can 
be said that the assemblymen elected from these constituencies 
have certain obligations to their constituents; thus, in­
directly, the State Government is again, this time in an ambig­
uous sense, implicated in the affairs of the citizens of Kuala 
Lumpur.
Although the partly elected Municipal Council was eliminated
2for partisan political reasons, the publicly stated justifi­
cation for this course of action had been that Kuala Lumpur's
1. This area has grown from 8 sq. miles in 1903, to 17 sq. miles
in 1912, to 20 sq. miles in 1934 and to 36 sq. miles in 1947; 
its present 35 sq. miles was demarcated in 1957. See Selang­
or Government Notifications 521/03; 827/12, 5512/34, 1380/47,
468/50 and 692/57. See Maps 6 and 7.
To complicate matters the present Municipal area also includes 
a number of village areas or peri-urban pockets known as Sung- 
ei Besi, Serdang 10^ miles, Puchong, Petaling, Kepong, Ampang 
and Batu Caves, all of which lie beyond its boundaries.
2. This will be fully documented in the section which discusses 
the events and circumstances surrounding the Alliance govern­
ment takeover of the Council.
special status as the Federal Capital entitled it to the direct 
control of the Federal Government, accountable on paper at least 
to the nation at large through Federal Parliament. Since the 
establishment of the Federal Capital Commission in 1961, the 
Federal government has thus been more directly involved and 
more closely associated with the management of the city.
The present and past relationship between the Municipality 
on the one hand, and Federal, State, District and sub-district 
(mukim and other) levels of government on the other will not be 
systematically investigated here, although in discussing specific 
issues in detail, instances of co-operation, but more frequently 
of unresolved conflict, will be seen. The views of the 
Commissioners of the Federal Capital, department heads and 
Advisory Board members on the subject will also be cited. Of 
course the relationships between the Municipality and these 
various levels of government have not been static; they have 
changed in the past and continue to do so. Before W.W.XI 
the Sanitary Board had very limited legally defined powers end 
was very much subordinate to the State. As the Sanitary Board's 
status was altered, its relationship with the State changed, both 
legally and functionally. When the Municipal Council became; the 
Federal Capital Commission by legal fiat in 1961, all remaining 
legal ties with the State were severed and for the first tirme 
the Municipality came under the direct control of the Federail 
government. Relationships between the Municipality and oth&r 
State-controlled levels of local government physically located 
in the municipal area have probably never been close. In the 
post W.W.II period certainly, neither the Town Board, the 
Municipal Commission nor the Municipal Council had any formal
27 .
Reference is here made to the Malay Agricultural Settleiment 
(also known as Kampong Bharu), an area of 221.5 acres 
located in the heart of Kuala Lumpur and set aside in 1900 
as an area reserved for Malays - see Selangor Gazette 
Notification No. 20 of January 12, 1900. Also see Haji
Mohamed Din bin Ali, 'Memorandum on the Malay Agricultural 
Settlement Kampong Bahru, Kuala Lumpur,' unpublished 
1961.
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links with the District Office or lower levels of administration 
under the jurisdiction of the District Officer. In this parti­
cular respect the Federal Capital Commission has been in very 
much the same position; minor matters of mutual concern are 
occasionally discussed with the District Officer but the 
relationship is a distant one. By and large, the State 
government and the Federal Capital Commission have become 
increasingly compartmentalised with consequent adverse affects 
on the extent of their co-operation. This might have been 
avoided to some extent if a resolution carried by the State 
Legislative Assembly that one of its members be appointed to the 
Advisory Board of the Federal Capital Commission had been accept­
ed by the Federal government, when it was made in 1964.^ This 
was not done and liaison between the two groups is accomplished 
on an informal basis by an individual who happens to serve on 
both bodies. This arrangement has proved unsatisfactory.
1. Official Report - Selangor State Legislative Assembly 
Debates, July 13, 1964, p.45. ^
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CHAPTER II
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The Sanitary Board
In August 1949 the President of the Kuala Lumpur Municipal 
Commission in a confidential letter to the Chief Secretary 
of the Federation of Malaya summarised some of the developments 
associated with various attempts made to convert the Sanitary 
Board"*- into a Municipal Council. Hammett, the President of the 
Municipal Commission which had come into existence in March 1948, 
was writing in reply to a request for comments on a draft letter 
being prepared for distribution to the Mentri2 Besar (Chief 
Ministers) and British Advisers of all States:
...I cannot agree with the statement that 
'the formation of the Kuala Lumpur Municipality 
was the climax of over twenty years of publie 
agitation'. It was as long ago as 1920 that the 
Acting Chief Secretary (afterwards Sir 
Frederick James) started investigating the 
possibility of running Sanitary Boards on 
Municipal lines. I enclose a copy of the Under 
Secretary's letter dated 20th August, 1920, to 
Secretary to Resident, Selangor. This led to a 
spate of correspondence which I think you will 
find still available in Selangor Secretariat 
files. Numerous Committees followed one after 
the other, the Kenny Committee, the Allan 
committee, the Millington Committee and the 
Adams Committee all of which functioned between 
the years 1920 and 1936. The only 'public 
agitation' occurred I think in the late twenties 
and early thirties when John Hands and the 
Selango^ Rate-Payers' Association took up the 
cudge1.
1. J.M. Gullick in his 'Kuala Lumpur, 1880-1895,' J ournal o f 
the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol.
XXVIII, Part 4 (August, 1955), p.96 says that the Sanitary 
Board was established in 1890 and that the 'tasks assigned 
to the Board...were cleaning, and lighting the streets 
administration of markets, "compulsory cleaning and white­
washing of houses, the upkeep of roads and streets and the 
destruction of jungle etc.," the metalling of streets,con­
struction of brick drains, widening of roads and erection of 
sign posts'.
2 Hammett to del Tufo, (2) in KLM.(C) 15/49, August 4, 1949.
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Hammett's historical footnote was accurate as far as it 
went but it was not complete. One of the earliest references 
to changing the status of the Sanitary Board to that of a 
Municipality was made in 1912 when the question had been raised 
by the Board and when Douglas, then its Chairman, had written:
Personally I have always been in favour of a 
Sanitary Board as opposed to Municipal control 
in the tropics but I am inclined to change my 
opinion and to recommend that Kuala Lumpur should 
be made a municipality, as the Government has 
under the Singapore Ordinance kept a fairly 
close control of health matters - and I am 
satisfied now that the Revenue of the Board could 
be easily expanded and meet nearly all 
expenditures.
Hammett's omission, however, was a failure to acknowledge
a major report on the problem of converting the Kuala Lumpur
Sanitary Board into a Municipality made in 1915. Entitled
2'Notes on Local Government in Malay', it was written by C.F.
3Green, chairman of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board.
This report not only discussed the historical background 
to what had, even by 1915, come to be known as 'municipalising' 
the Sanitary Board but also recommended communal elections:
It is suggested that the Board should consist at the 
beginning of 2 members chosen by the Europeans of the 
locality, 2 members chosen by the Chinese of the 
locality, 2 members chosen by the resident Malays,
1 member chosen by the resident Tamil or Indian pop­
ulation, 1 member chosen by the remaining
1. Douglas to Secretary to Resident, Selangor, (1) in Sei.
Sec. 4939/1912, October 15, 1912. The Board had proposed
that an Inquiry should be held into the question but the 
Acting Secretary to Resident, Selangor had replied saying 
that a 'case for the appointment of a commission had not 
been made out'; see (3) in Sei. Sec. 4939/1912, December 
24, 1912.
2. Printed at the Commercial Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1915.
A copy is to be found in Sei. Sec. 464/1916.
3. Green had been working on the report in July, 1914; see 
Green to Secretary to Resident, Selangor, (4) in Sei.
Sec. 5219/1913, July 3, 1914.
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nationalities, and 2 jfficials chosen 
by the Government,...
Green was not just content to advocate an elected majority
on his proposed Municipal Council; he went further and justified
at considerable length the adoption of the elective principle
2at both local and central government levels. Besides providing 
historical material and general and specific arguments in 
support of elections, Green's report critically examined the 
nature of bureaucratic government in Malaya/the relationship 
between local and central governments and the constitution and 
working of Sanitary Boards.
Green's 'Notes on Local Government in Malaya' was discussed
at a meeting of the Sanitary Board held on November 17, 1915.
Only one member, Khoo Keng Hooi , was in favour of introducing
the elective principle at an early date; the other members,
although in favour of the principle, considered introduction 
3premature. Five written statements on the Report were submitted 
elaborating this view; these were all considered by the Board 
and later forwarded to the Secretary to Resident, Selangor 
who replied:
In my letter No. 13 of the 7th August, 1913 I 
advocated the establishment of a Municipality 
for the town of Kuala Lumpur. I am no longer of 
that opinion and, as will appear from your 
letter No. 14 in 3426/13 of the 9th October, 1913 
I was misinformed as to the wishes of the 
unofficial members. I still hold that it would 
be to the advantage of government if the Kuala 
Lumpur Sanitary Board were granted a greater
1. Green, Notes on Local Government in Malaya, p .3.
2 . Ibid. , p p .7 , 10.
3. Green to Secretary to Resident, Selangor, (1) in Sei. 
Sec. 464/1916, January 18, 1916.
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measure of responsibility...
C.F. Green's recommendations were rejected, in fact, at
two levels. The British Resident, Selangor, had refused to
support them and the majority of the unofficial members of the
Board, whose views no doubt strengthened the hand of the
Resident, resisted Green's major proposals. To no small extent
the rejection of the Report was due to what the Protector of
Chinese referred to as 'municipalising' the Board, a matter which
2he argued was essentially one of finance. The spectre of 
municipalisation and its relationship to finance continued to 
haunt the debates on converting the Sanitary Board into a 
Municipality for the next thirty years.
The rejection of Green's report did not affect his 
credentials, and in 1920 he was one of the three members
1. Broadrick to Chief Secretary, FMS, (2) in Sei. Sec.
464/1916, February 12, 1916. See also Stonor to Chief
Secretary, FMS, (13) in Sei. Sec. 1891/1913, August 7,
1913: 'In conclusion I recommend that the KL Sanitary
Board be put on the footing of a municipality and have its 
own professional officers and its own estimates of Revenue 
and Expenditure. Moreover, in support of this I would
urge that service on a municipality affords to gentlemen not 
in government service a valuable training in public affairs, 
opportunities for which are, I venture to think, somewhat 
lacking in the FMS.' Brockman, the Chief Secretary replied 
as follows: 'Before His Excellency is able to consider
the proposal he desires that you will show whether, if 
there were a Municipality at K L , it would be self-supporting,' 
- (12) in 3426/1913 in (21) in Sei. Sec. 1891/1913, August
2 5, 191 3.
2. Green to Secretary to Resident, Selangor, (1) in Sei.
Sec. 464/1916, January 18, 1916.
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appointed to the 'Kenny Committee'. Green had changed his 
mind on the question of establishing municipalities because we 
find the Committee saying:
The stage of change from a Government or semi-
Government Department to a Municipality
analogous to those of Singapore and Penang is
usually considered to be that at which a
Sanitary Board is able to meet all the
requirements of a Municipality from its
revenue or from loans. This stage has not, as
yet, been attained by any of the Sanitary Boards in the
F.M.S. A half-way house of some kind is
required and we recommend that each Sanitary
Board be given control over the expenditure of
the revenue it collects similar to that which
obtains in the Municipalities of the Colony,
while all supplementary provision necessary for
the carrying out of its duties be met by grants-
in-aid allotted in the manne^ provision is made
for a Government Department.
The Committee went on to recommend that as the revenues 
of the Sanitary Board increased, it could be made to 'merge 
imperceptibly into a Municipality as it appliefd] less and
1. The membership of the Committee comprised W.E. Kenny,
Director of Public Works, FMS; C.F. Green, Chairman, Kinta 
Sanitary Board and F.E. Taylor, Chairman, Sanitary Board,
Kuala Lumpur. The Committee's report, issued in October,
1920, is entitled: 'Report by the Committee appointed in
C.S.O. No. G.4420/20 to make recommendations for facilitating 
the conversion of Sanitary Boards into Municipalities' (copy 
available in Sei. Sec. 4250/1920) .
The Committee had been appointed at the suggestion of the 
Acting Chief Secretary, Mr (later Sir Fredrick) James - 
see (1) in Sei. Sec. 4250/1920, August 23, 1920. James
himself expressed the opinion in this letter that he felt 
that 'the time had not arrived for the formation of Muni­
cipalities in Kuala Lumpur and in Ipoh...(but) that something 
might be done in constituting the Sanitary Boards both of 
Kuala Lumpur and Ipoh on the lines of a Municipality'.
James held this view because he was of the opinion that 'a 
Municipality is supposed to live on its own revenue and on 
its own power of borrowing without having recourse to 
Government's assistance'.
2. 'Report by the Committee appointed in C.S.O. No. G .4420/20 . . . ,
p . 1 .
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less for grants-in-aid'.1 *345 Pending this gradual transition from
greater to lesser and finally to no financial dependence on the
Central Authority, Sanitary Boards were to be called Urban
Boards because the word 'Sanitary' did not correctly describe
2the various activities of Sanitary Boards. Unlike the Green
Report of five years before Kenny and his colleagues said
nothing of elections or of the manner in which representation
on their proposed Urban Boards was to be given. They did
discuss 'allocation of additional sources of revenue, assessment
of State land and buildings, grants-in-aid for capital
expenditure, vesting of property in Urban Boards, staff, part
payment of certain salaries by the Central Government and
3control of Sanitary Board areas'.
The Kenny Report was forwarded to the Secretary to
4Resident, Selangor early in October 1920. It was the subject
of two official memoranda, one by W.G. Maxwell dated April 13,
1921 and the other by O.F. Stonor, Acting British Resident,
5Selangor, dated December 7, 1921. The unofficial members of
the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board discussed the report on June 13, 
1921 and two days later it became the subject of further
1 . Ibid. , p .1.
2 . Ibid. , p .2.
3. Ibid. , pp.2-4. On the subject of control of Sanitary Board 
areas, Taylor (the Chairman of the K.L. Sanitary Board) did 
not agree with the recommendation that all the Sanitary (or 
Urban) Boards in any one State should be presided over by 
one Chairman; i.e., an arrangement whereby the Chairman of 
the K.L. Sanitary Board, for example, would be Chairman of 
all Boards in Selangor: see Taylor to Secretary to Resident,
Selangor in Sei. Sec. 4250/1920, October 5, 1920.
4. See (9) in SBKL 1000/20 in Sei. Sec. 4250/1920, October 5, 
1920 .
5. See (9) in Sei. Sec. 4250/1920 and Sei. Sec. 5033/1921.
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discussion at a meeting of the Board. The Board at its meeting
on June 15 went on record as being 'unanimously of the opinion
that while it [wasJ desirable that Municipalities should
eventually take the place of Sanitary Boards in certain towns
in the Federated Malay States, the present time [was] inopportune
2for the change'. The Board went further; it suggested that 
a number of points be considered in connection with the future 
change to Municipalities:
(a) The veto of either the Chief Secretary,
Federal Council, or a Special Federal Officer to 
replace that of the Resident to obviate different 
rulings on the same points by different Residents.
(b) Unofficial members to be nominated by the 
various recognised public bodies (such as Chambers 
of Commerce, Chinese Advisory Board etc.).
(c) Officers of the Board to be present at meetings, 
but not to vote.
(d) The basis of valuation for taxation to be 
site value of the land.
(e) Main thoroughfares to be partly upkept by 
Government as is done in England.
(f) Government to pay grant-in-relief in lieu <^ f 
rates on certain Public Offices and Buildings.
At the pre-Board meeting caucus held by unofficial members on
June 13, a recommendation that 'the first Municipalities to be
4formed should be at Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Seremban and Klang' 
had been adopted, but it was not raised at the official Board 
meeting.
The official memorandum initialled by W.G. Maxwell and 
dated April 13, 1921, suggested that 'it [was] out of the
question to consider the advisability of constituting 
Municipalities in any places except Kuala Lumpur, Taiping,
1. (9) in SBKL 131/1921 in 
22, 1921, Appendices A &
(12) 
B .
in Sei. Sec. 4250/1920, June
2 . Append!x ' A 1' attached to (12) i n Sei. Sec. 4250/1920.
3 . Ibid.
4 . Appendix ' B 1' attached to (12) i n Sei. Sec. 4250/1920.
36 .
Ipoh and Seremban', and went on to lay down nine conditions for 
the establishment of Municipalities:
(1) The Municipality may prepare its own budget 
of revenue and expenditure, and for that purpose 
may raise or lower the house assessment as it 
thinks fi t .
(2) The revenue must at least be equal to the 
expenditure.
(3) The Government will pay in respect of all 
quarters occupied by its officers, excepting 
police barracks, assessment at the rate payable 
by private owners.
(4) No assessment on public buildings, such as 
Government offices, post office, hospital, 
police stations, etc.
(5) The Government to pay assessment upon the 
capital value of its vacant land in the Sanitary 
Board limits, provided that no assessment will 
be paid upon lands which have been reserved for 
public purposes.
(6) The Railway to pay assessment upon such terms
as the Chief Secretary may consider fair and proper.
(7) The cost of maintenance of roads by Public 
Works Department would fall upon the Sanitary Board.
(8) In case of Kuala Lumpur and Seremban, the whole 
of the salaries of the staff would fall upon the 
Sanitary Board; but in the case of Ipoh (where the 
Kinta Sanitary Board has many towns, as well as Ipoh, 
under its control), the cost to be debited to Ipoh 
would be a proportion only on the cost of the 
salaries.
(9) To be strictly fair the Sanitary Board should pay 
to the Government something in respect of the leave 
pay, pensions, passages, etc. of the staff, but for 
the present this question might stand over.
No action, however, was taken to implement such a 
municipalisation program for either Kuala Lumpur or any of 
the other three Sanitary Board areas mentioned. It appears that 
the whole question was allowed to lapse until O.F. Stonor,
Acting British Resident, Selangor, raised the matter again in
1. (9) in Sei. Sec. 4250/1920.
2 . Ibid .
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December 1921. Stonor's memorandum placed on record his
'complete dissent from [the] view...that expenditure on
Sanitary Board Services ... in the towns of the FMS should
be limited to the amount of the Revenue...accruing to the 
2Boards'. His argument in the main advanced the idea that
Sanitary Board services and finances should be left alone
until 'we are prepared to consider the institution of some form
3of Municipal Government'. It is obvious from Stonor's
memorandum that he did not consider municipalisation a
proposition which could reasonably be entertained 'especially
4during the present period of financial stress'. His real
position appears ambiguous; on the one hand he was not against
municipalisation as such but his reference to '...agitation...
carried on by a few non-officials - encouraged by one or two
officials ... supported by the Press - in favour of the creation
5of Municipalities in some of the larger towns' is couched 
in such caustic language that it constitutes grounds for 
suspecting that he was antagonistic to the very idea of 
converting Sanitary Boards into Municipalities. The difference 
of opinion between the two official memoranda probably con­
stituted a sufficient basis to postpone any decisive positive 
action being taken. Those concerned, officials and unofficials 
alike, had made their feelings known; it was time for another 
wait.
Six months later, in June 1922, the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary 
Board unanimously resolved 'that the Sanitary Boards in the 
Chief Towns of the F.M.S. should now be called Municipal
1. 'Memorandum by the British Resident, Selangor concerning 
Sanitary Board Revenue and Expenditure,' Sei. Sec. 5033/ 
1921, December 7, 1921.
2 . Ibid.
3 . Ibid.
4 . Ibid.
5. Ibid.
B o a r d s '. This information was passed on to the Secretary to
Resident, Selangor who referred it to the Under Secretary,
Federated Malay States, mentioning in the process that 'inasmuch
as the Sanitary Boards are not Municipal Boards the Resident
2thinks that it would be a mistake to adopt the p r o posal'. The
Acting Under Secretary to Government, F.M.S., agreed with the
Resident that 'it would be a mistake to adopt the proposal now
put forward by the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board' and for good
measure went on to say that 'until any Sanitary Board is
financially self supporting it would be improper to constitute
it as a Municipality, and still more to give it a title
3that would convey a wrong impression'. This information
was passed on to the Sanitary Board which argued that its
suggestion was perhaps misunderstood and sought a compromise
by suggesting that perhaps 'Government would agree to the
4designation "Town Board" for Kuala L u m p u r ' . This was an
unfamiliar new development for the Secretary to Resident; he
stalled but finally replied that the Town Board designation
5could not be accepted. The Chairman of the Sanitary Board
explained again: they didn't want to be a Municipality;
they just wanted to be called a Municipal Board.^ Other Sanitary
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1. Chairman, Sanitary Board, KL to Secretary to Resident,
Selangor, (1) in Sei. Sec. 2439/1922, June 20, 1922.
2. Secretary to Resident, Selangor to Under Secretary,
FMS , (2) in Sei. Sec. 2439/1922 , July 3 , 1922.
3. Acting Under Secretary to Government, FMS to Secretary to
Resident, Selangor G. 1427/22 in (3) Sei. Sec. 2439/1922, 
June 24, 1922.
4. Chairman, Sanitary Board, KL to Secretary to Resident,
Selangor, (5) in SBKL 782/1922 in (7) in Sei. Sec. 2439/22, 
August 29, 1922.
5. Secretary to Resident, Selangor to Chairman, Sanitary 
Board, K L , (9) in Sei. Sec. 2439/1922, September 4, 1922.
6. Chairman, Sanitary Board, KL to Secretary to Resident, 
Selangor, (10) in Sei. Sec. 2439/1922, September 6,
1922 .
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Boards were then consulted and the majority indicated that they 
were 'not in favour of a change of title at present'. ^  The 
Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board decided not to press the matter.
But the municipalisation debate continued, mostly between
2bureaucratic spokesmen for rival schools of thought. The 
major concern of Selangor Secretariat officials was to get on 
with the job, but only in a very narrow legalistic/financial 
sense. The approach to the problem was essentially a 
question of balancing the books - was a self-supporting Muni­
cipality for Kuala Lumpur financially feasible? To answer this
question the first Millington Committee was appointed in 
3early 1924.
The terms of reference of the Committee were:
To examine into (sic) the present financial 
position of the Sanitary Board, Kuala Lumpur, 
and prepare an estimate of its position in the 
event of it being converted into a Municipality 
controlling all proper Municipal Services other 
than water and electricity.
And further to consider what increased 
expenditure whether ordinary or special would 
be likely to be involved by the natural
1. Chairman, Sanitary Board, KL to Secretary to Resident,
Selangor, (12) in Sei. Sec. 2439/1922, October 31, 1922.
2. Two key files, Sei. Sec. 5194/23 and 4551/25, which might 
have shed considerable light on the debate, could not be 
examined. All of the enclosures in the first file were 
missing except for the minute section; the second, Sei.
Sec. 4551/25, could not be traced at all.
3. It has been presumed (by Hammett, for example) that there
was only one Millington Report; there were in fact two. The 
first Committee report under W.M. Millington is dated 
October 24, 1925 and was published as Federal Council Paper
No. 13 of 1925. The second Millington Committee report is 
dated October 22, 1926. Not only were the terms of reference
of these committees different but the membership of each 
(except for Millington and Khoo Keng Hooi who served on 
both) was also different. Members of the first committee 
were: W.M. Millington (Chairman), G.P. Bradney, A.S. Small,
K. Keng Hooi. Millington was Chairman of the Sanitary 
Board at the time.
40 .
expansion of the town of Kuala^Lumpur over a 
period of the next five years.
This was not a Committee whose task it was to discuss, 
or make recommendations concerning, the conversion of the 
Sanitary Board into a Municipality. The Committee's task was 
as specific as it was clear: it was simply to look at the
Board's financial position at a particular point in time and to 
'prepare an estimate of its position in the event of it being 
converted into a Municipality...'2
The Committee found that by a judicious increase in the 
3rates and allocation of certain revenue sources to the Board, 
a Municipality would have no difficulty in being self-sustaining. 
The way now seemed clear for the conversion of the Kuala Lumpur 
Sanitary Board into a Municipality.
From a synopsis of developments relating to the conversion 
of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board to a Municipality appearing 
in (3) Sei. Sec. 5282/26 it is known that the Millington Report 
was circulated during November 1925 among various administrative
1. Federal Council Paper No. 13 of 1926, p.cl71.
2 . Ibid.
3. On this point the Report reads: 'It is, of course, under­
stood that the normal procedure for a Municipality in need 
of aditional revenue for general purposes is to increase 
the rates. Kuala Lumpur is in a favourable position as 
the present rate of .75 per cent on the unimproved value 
of all lands which yields the same as a rate of 9 per cent 
on annual values is undoubtedly low. Singapore general 
assessment is 12 per cent on annual values and the Penang 
rate is 18 per cent.' Ibid. , p.cl72.
In 1921 a reference to low rates had also been made when the 
Kenny Report was being discussed: 'It will not perhaps be
out of place for me to mention that one of the great 
difficulties experienced by Sanitary Boards in making their 
budgets balance is due to the fact that the house assessment 
and assessment on vacant lands are extraordinarily low'; 
see (9) in Sei. Sec. 4250/1920, April 13, 1921. (Emphasis
added.)
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of ficers :
.The Resident (Mr. Stonor) forwarded the Report 
to the Chief Secretary - vide (4) Sei. Sec. 4551/25;
.The Sanitary Board's comments on the Report are 
contained in (6) Sei. Sec. 4551/25;
.The Resident(Mr Stonor) communicated his observations 
to the Chief Secretary in (7) Sei. Sec. 4551/25; 
he also communicated further observations in a 
confidential memorandum (vide Confidential 135/25);
.The Chief Secretary's (Sir G. Maxwell) views^are 
contained in (8) and (10) Sei. Sec. 4551/25.
It is also known from the same source that in January 
1926 'the Sanitary Board welcomed the proposal to appoint a 
Second Committee to advise in what manner the Kuala Lumper
Sanitary Board should be converted into a Municipality'.
3Thus the second Millington Committee came into being.
The State Government, Selangor had in fact agreed to the
conversion of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board into a Municipality
4subject to a number of conditions and assumptions. The 
second committee under Millington was appointed:
1. (3) in Sei. Sec. 5282/1926. It will be noted that
mention has already been made above of the fact that Sei.
Sec. 4551/1925 could not be traced at all. The 
synopsis merely listed those officials who dealt with the 
Report in one way or another; their detailed views, 
unfortunately, are not known.
2 . Ibid.
3. This second committee comprised W.M. Millington, Chairman, 
H.B. Talalla, David Freeman, Khoo Keng Hooi and Walter Smith. 
(6A ) in Sei. Sec. 5282/1926 .
4. L.A. Allen, Acting Secretary to Resident, Selangor to
Chairman, Sanitary Board, K L , (20) in Sei. Sec.
4551/1925, March 15, 1926 attached as Appendix 'B'
under cover of (11) in Sei. Sec. 5282/1926, April
21, 1926.
42 .
(a) To advise in what manner and by what 
legislative provisions the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary 
Board should be converted into a Municipality; 
and whether it would be desirable that such 
conversion should be effected at one time or by a 
gradual process;
(b) To make recommendations as to the
constitution of such a Municipality, the number of 
its representatives and the method of their 
appointment (by nomination, or election or other 
method) ;
(c) To define the relations between the 
Municipality and the Government, with particular 
regard to those between it and the Health Branch of 
the Medical Department;
(d) To define the position of the Federal or State 
officers seconded for service with the Municipality;
(e) To define the relationship between the Public 
Works Department and the Municipality;
(f) To define the relationship between the Town 
Planning Department and the Municipality; and
(g) To indicate^the probable effect of any conversion 
upon the rates.
The second Millington Committee Report is dated October 
22, 1926. Its most important recommendations were:
1. that the conversion to a Municipality should 
be by a gradual process;
2. that 'after three years the question of full 
municipal control be considered' - it was hoped 
that in this period the Sanitary Board would have 
evolved the kind of administrative infrastructure 
allowing it to adjust to its new municipal burdens; 
and
3. that the next appointments to the Board should 
comprise '3 members nominated by the Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce, 2 by the European Chamber of Commerce,
1 by the Committee for the Malay Settlement and the 
remainder by the Resident, with the proviso that 
if possible two members be elected by land-owners 
paying rates of more than $25 per annum and tenants
______________
1. Sei. Sec. 425/1926 attached as Appendix 'A' to (11) 
in Sei. Sec. 5282/1926, April 21, 1927. See also
(2) and (3) in Sei. Sec. 424/1926, February 16, 1926
and March 6, 1926.
L
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paying rent of more than $75 per annum' .
The State Government accepted the first two of the three
substantive recommendations made by the Committee but did not
go along with the proposal to alter the system of nomination of
members of the Board; the other recommendations of the Committee
2were accepted in large part. Under the circumstances even the 
most ardent supporters of municipalisation would just have to 
sit the three year period out.
The issue was not completely ignored in the intervening
period. H.B. Talalla, an unofficial member of the Board,
sought information in August 1928 on the progress being made on
the municipalisation of the Board and as a result of his inquiry
each member of the Board was supplied with a memo prepared by 
3the Chairman. But when the three year period specified in the 
Second Millington Report elapsed, the question was not raised
1. Millington, e t . al., 'Report of the Committee appointed 
to advise in what manner the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary 
Board should be converted into a Municipality,' (6A)
in Sei. Sec. 5282/1926, October 22, 1926 copy attached
to (11) in Sei. Sec. 5282/1926, April 21, 1927.
2. Acting Secretary to Resident, Selangor to Chairman,
Sanitary Board, K L , (1) in Sei. Sec. 5282/1926, April
21, 1927.
3. Sanitary Board, K L , Minutes of Meeting held September
26, 1928 in Sei. Sec. 114/1928. The memo to which
reference is made here was not included in this file.
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immediately. Khoo Teik Ee, another member of the Board,
finally raised the matter in 1931 by referring specifically
to the decision to reopen the municipalisation issue after
three years. A committee comprising the Chairman of the Board,
W.J.P. Grenier, John Hands and Khoo Teik Ee was appointed to
2look into the matter, but the committee took no action.
Then, in October 1932, a second change of name battle 
was launched. The matter was raised in the same fashion as 
before. The Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board unanimously adopted 
a resolution 'that government be asked to change the name of
1. Cowgill, Chairman, Sanitary Board, KL to Secretary to
Resident, Selangor: 'The period of three years elapsed
in 1930, and in 1931 a Committee of the Board was 
appointed "to consider and report on the question".
This committee certainly never reported on the question 
and my information is that they did not even go so
far as to consider it. It is fair to suppose that the 
graver preoccupations of the slump, then at its depth, 
left no inclination for municipal reforms on a wide 
scale.' (16) in Sei. Sec. 5282/1926, January 16, 1935.
See also Malay Mail, January 10, 1935 in which Mr. H.S.
Lee is reported as saying, 'I suppose on account 
of the slump the question was s helved.' In Sei. Sec. 
5282/1926 there is a minute dated 9. V. 31 which reads:
'I see...that the question of converting the KL Sanitary 
Board into a Municipality was postponed for a period of 
three years which expired in April 1930. Did the 
Sanitary Board raise the question again last year or not? 
I have no desire to raise it myself, but if there were 
any papers last year I would like to see t h e m . ' The 
undated sequel reads: 'Thanks. I have read through
the papers. I do not propose to take any further action 
at this unpropitious juncture. '
2. SBKL 410/32, October 12, 1932.
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the K.L. Sanitary Board to K.L. Town C ouncil'. Then came 
the usual justification by the Chairman of the Sanitary Board 
to lend weight to the resolution:
As far as I have been able to ascertain, the 
functions originally performed by this Board 
were to look after conservancy and improvement 
of the town from the health point of view.
Owing to the development of the town and the 
increase in functions devolving on this Board I 
consider the time has come when consideration 
may be given to the proposal that its name be 
changed.
The Secretary to Resident saw no reason why the change
should not be made and informed the Chairman of the Sanitary
Board accordingly but asked that the matter be 'postponed
until the end of the year, as financial and retrenchment
matters [were] fully occupying the time of all Senior 
3Officers...' Early in the New Year, the British Residents
in Perak, Negri Sembilan and Pahang were asked for their
reactions to changing the names of Sanitary Boards to Town 
4Councils. The Acting Secretary to Resident, Negri Sembilan,
1. Chairman, Sanitary Board, KL to Secretary to Resident,
Selangor, (3) in SBKL 2081/32 in (1) Sei. Sec. 2443/32, 
October 19, 1932. The original motion moved by John
Hands (an unofficial member of the Board) and seconded 
by the Protector of Chinese read: 'That government be
asked to change the name "Sanitary Board" to "Town Board" 
and that the Boards in the capital towns of each state be 
known as "Town Councils".' This motion was amended by 
W.J.P. Grenier (seconded by Lai Tet Yoke) to read: 'that
government be asked to change the name of the KL Sanitary 
Board to KL Town Council'. The amendment was carried by
8 votes to 2 (see SBKL Minutes, October 12, 1932) .
2. (3) in SBKL 2081/32 in (1) Sei. Sec. 2443/32, October
19, 1932.
3. Secretary to Resident, Selangor to Chairman, Sanitary
Board, K L , (2) in Sei. Sec. 2443/1932, October 25, 1932.
4. Secretary to Resident, Selangor to British Residents
Perak, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, (4) in Sei. Sec. 
2443/32, January 10, 1933.
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fully supported the proposed change pointing out in the
process that 'Sanitary Board [was] a horrible term - one would
almost prefer "Privy Council! " 1 2345 The Resident of Pahang was
less enthusiastic. He agreed that the name 'Town Council might
appropriately be applied to Sanitary Boards in large towns like
K . L . ...[but did] not think that any change [was] necessary for
2towns in P ahang'. Perak favoured no change at all: 'The
Resident sees no necessity for a change for which there is 
clearly no demand in this State, and which would necessitate 
not only the amendment of enactments, bye-laws and printed 
forms on an extensive scale, but also numerous notice boards and 
inscriptions on vehicles and other articles . ' ^
In view of the lack of unanimity on the question the
Secretary to Resident, Selangor, asked the Chairman of the
4Sanitary Board if he wanted to press the matter. The Sanitary
Board indicated that it wished to have its name changed to
5' KL Town Council. ' The matter was then discussed at the 
Conference of Residents on May 15, 1933 when it was decided
that 'in view of the fact that the legislation necessary to 
change the name would apply to all other Sanitary Boards and
1. Acting Secretary to Resident, Negri Sembilan to
Secretary to Resident, Selangor, (2) in NSG 35/33 in 
(5) in Sei. Sec. 2443/32, January 13, 1933.
2. Secretary to Resident, Pahang to Secretary to Resident, 
Selangor, (2) in Phg. Sec. G. 89/33 in 6) in Sei.
Sec. 2443/32, January 20, 1933.
3. Secretary to Resident, Perak to Secretary to Resident,
Selangor, (6) in Pk. G. 76/1933 in (7) Sei. Sec. 
2443/32, February 28, 1933.
4. Acting Secretary to Resident, Selangor to Chairman,
Sanitary Board, K L , (8) in Sei. Sec. 2443/32, March
2 , 1933 .
5. Chairman, Sanitary Board, KL to Secretary to Resident,
Selangor, (8) in SBKL 2081/32 in (9) in Sei. Sec. 
2443/32, March 15, 1933.
that the Residents were not unanimous that the change was 
d e s i r a b l e t h e r e  was not sufficient reason to amend the 
Sanitary Boards Enactment'.1 234
Unlike the docile acceptance which characterised the
mood of the Board in 1922, the decision of the Conference
of Residents on this occasion was not received with nearly as
much equanimity. John Hands, the original sponsor of the
resolution asking for the change of name and reputed to be the
most outspoken critic of the Government, aired his case in the
Malay Mai1 . He quite correctly emphasised that his 'proposal
was not to alter the names of other Sanitary Boards but that of
only Kuala Lumpur' and went on to say that 'the Government
decision [was] a fine display of masterly inactiyitv and
excellent specimen of the barnacles of centralisation on civic 
2progress'. The Board informed the Secretary to Resident that
another resolution had been passed asking that trie name of the
Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board be changed to Kuala Lumpur Town 
3Council. When no reply was received by February 8, 1934 a
remainder was sent to the Resident. The Secretary to Resident'
reply was as terse as it was final: 'I am direc;ed..•to
inform you that it is not proposed to introduce Legislation to
4alter the name of the K.L. Sanitary Board' . The Kuala Lumpur 
Sanitary Board (and all other Sanitary Boards in the F.M.S.) 
continued to be known by this name until after t'ie Japanese 
Occupation.
Once this indirect approach toward municipaLisation 
reached a dead-end, as it finally did with the Secretary to
1. (12) in Sei. Sec. 2443/32.
2. Malay M a i l , July 22, 1933.
3. Chairman, Sanitary Board, KL to Secretary to Resident, 
Selangor, (10) in SBKL 2081/32 in (14) in Sei. Sec.
2443/32, August 3, 1933.
4. Secretary to Resident, Selangor to Chairman, Sanitary
Board, K L , (16) in Sei. Sec. 2443/32, February 2 4 , 1934.
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Resident's letter, the stage was set for a more direct, 
though no more successful, effort to get back to the problem 
of implementing the decision which had been recommended 
seven years previously by the second Millington Committee and 
accepted by the State Government.
It was John Hands, by now a veteran of the municipalisation
question, who raised the matter anew. At a meeting of the
Sanitary Board held on January 9, 1935 Hands proposed that
'steps be taken immediately toward converting the Kuala
Lumpur Sanitary Board into a Municipality'.  ^ in the ensuing
debate John Hands skilfully and accurately reviev^ed the
background to the question going back to 1920; his political
2homework had been done well. H.B. Talalla, who had been a
3member of the second Millington Committee in 1927, and who
had quite clearly agreed to its recommendations, now not only
denied that he had been on the Committee or that there had
ever been a recommendation supporting the idea of converting
the Board into a Municipality but also went on to say: 'I
would like to advise my colleagues that we have a nice thing -
we had better stick to it - and the question of a municipality
should not be reviewed for another five years. I have studied
4the question for ten years and this is how I feel about i t . '
In any event, it was John Hands' view which prevailed,
his motion being carried by five votes to three, with the
5officials having been instructed to abstain.
1. Malay M a i l , January 10, 1935. See also Cowgill to
Secretary to Resident, Selangor, (16) in Sei. Sec.
5282/26, January 16, 1935.
2. Malay M a i l , January 10, 1935, cites extensively from
the minutes of the meeting held on January 9, 1935.
3. (6A ) in Sei. Sec. 5282/26.
4. Malay M a i l , January 10, 1935. See also Cowgill to Secretary
to Resident, Selangor, (16) in Sei. Sec. 528:2/26, January 
16, 1935.
5. Cowgill to Secretary to Resident, Selangor, (16) in Sei. Sec.
5282/26, January 16, 1935.
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In forwarding a resume of the proceedings of the Sanitary 
Board meeting of January 9 to the Resident, Cowgill, who was 
the Chairman of the Board, referred in passing to the fact 
that Hand's resolution ’re-open[s] a question which has occupied 
the attention of government at intervals since the year 1920' 
and then went on to refer to the decision which had been reached 
in April 1927 vide the Secretary to Resident's letter (11) 
in Sei. Sec. 5282/26.“*"
Cowgill expressed the view that despite the fact that
Hand's resolution had been carried, judging from the tenor of
the debate it could not be 'taken as a strong or well-
considered expression of unofficial opinion in favour of this 
2change'. He proceeded with a candid statement of his own
position: '...in forwarding this resolution I am bound to say
that, had I been in a position to speak and vote upon it, I
3should have spoken and voted in support of i t ' . And on that 
note he asked the Resident for further instructions:
For the present I would ask for an expression of 
Government's attitude towards this matter in 
general. If on general grounds of policy 
Government is not prepared to consider the grant 
of municipal status to Kuala Lumpur at the 
present time, there is nothing to be gained by 
further discussion: if on the other hand
Government is prepared to stand by the policy 
initiated in 1927, the occasion would appear 
to demand a re-assertion of this policy, and 
an examination of the steps which remain to be 
taken to bring it to full fruition.
It was as a result of these representations that further 
action was taken.
Over the next five-year period a total of five
1. Ibi d ., p.l.
2 . I b i d ., p . 2 .
3 . I b i d . , p . 3 .
4 . Ibid . , p . 3 .
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reports and a considerable amount of correspondence dealt with 
the subject of municipalising the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board. 
The five reports as listed in the Ward Report'*' are:
1. A memorandum by Mr J.V. Cowgill, Chairman,
Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board, dated July 20,
19 3 5;
2. The Adams Report dated April 21, 1936;
3. A memorandum on the Adams Report by the 
Unofficial Members of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary 
Board;
4. A memorandum by S.W. Jones, British Resident,
Selangor, dated July 14, 1937;
5. A memorandum by S.N.^King and Mr Nelson Jones
dated November 20, 1939.
An examination of these documents shows clearly that the 
question was no longer that of municipalisation; the acceptance 
of that end had been established in 1927. Neither was there 
any consideration of forms of representation. What was 
being argued now was the means to be employed in bringing 
m u n i c i p a 1isation to 'full fruition', as Cowgill had put it.
The conflict mainly involved finance, a case of State versus 
local government interests with strong urban versus rural 
overtone s .
By Febtuary 1939 the State Government had pretty much
4decided to allow the Sanitary Board to become a Municipality,
but even by May 1939 no decision had been reached on the methods
5by which the Municipality would be financed. Compromise
1. W.A. Ward e t .a 1 . , Report of the Committee Appointed to
Consider the Establishment of a Municipality for Kuala L umpur, 
Malayan Union Paper No. 7 of 1947, January 10, 1947.
2 . Ibid ., p . 1 .
3 . (42) in Sei. Sec. (C) 24/1935 , July 14, 1937 (Jones Report)
4 . Th i s statement in S.W. Jones ' memorandum which reads : ' The
State is handing over the Municipality a town to which 
it has contributed millions,' would tend to substantiate 
the view expressed here: see (14) in Sei. Sec.(C) 33/39,
February 23, 1939.
5. British Resident, Selangor to the Federal Secretary, F M S , 
(16) in Sei. Sec.(C) 33/39, May 16, 1939.
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seems finally to have been negotiated by S.E. King, the State 
Treasurer, and Nelson Jones, the Acting Chairman of the Sanitary 
Board, and their joint Report dated November 20, 1939 sets
out the terms of their agreement and the administrative 
means to effect the transfer of funds to the new Municipality.'*'
But by this time war had already broken out in Europe and
with Japan's entry on the side of the Axis Powers, Malaya
itself became a battlefield. Landings were made at Kota Bharu
on December 8, 1941, and about Christmas Kuala Lumpur had its
2first air raids. By January 11, 1942 Kuala Lumpur had fallen
to the Japanese. The Sanitary Board was still a 'Sanitary Board'
The Sanitary Board system was best described by C.F. Green
...an extreme form of bureaucratic local government, 
if, indeed, it can be called local government 
at all. The Sanitary Boards are rather branches 
of the Central Government. The Chairman is a 
civil servant looking to the Central government 
for promotion. The Board itself has more 
officials, i.e. Government^ Servants, amongst its 
members than Unofficials. The unofficial members 
are chosen by the Resident, year by year, for the 
current year. Unles| docile the member tends 
not to be re-elected next year. The Resident and 
the Government through the Resident are not only 
given to supreme control in certain matters by the 
Sanitary Boards Enactment, but are able to exercise 
intimate supervision, and have the deciding voice 
in the minutest detail through this authority 
over the Chairman and the Official members as Civil 
Servants. The Sanitary Board is, in fact, as much 
a Department of the Central Government, as the 
Chinese Protectorate, the Land Office, the Police, 
or any other Government Department.
1. S.E. King and N. Jones, M e m o randum, (Confidential) ,
November 20, 1939.
2. Kuala Lumpur 100 Y e a r s , (Kuala Lumpur, 1959) , p.24.
3. As far as can be determined, the position was reversed 
in 1922 when the unofficials outnumbered the officials - 
see (2) in S B K L . 1047/1922, October 27, 1922.
4. This should read 're-nominated' or re-appointed'.
5. C.F. Green, Notes on Local Government in Malaya (KL,
1915) , p .1 .
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The official policy of representation on the Board from 
the very beginning was to allocate unofficial positions to all 
of the major ethnic groups living in K.L. In 1890, for example, 
the unofficials comprised one European, two Malays and two 
Chinese; the first Tamil member was appointed in 1895 .'*' When 
in later years the unofficial membership was fixed at six, there 
were two Europeans, two Chinese, one Malay and one Indian. When 
the unofficial membership was increased (the actual number 
seemed to fluctuate between nine and ten) there were three 
Europeans, three Chinese, two Malays and two Indians, care 
always being taken to allocate one seat to either a Singhalese 
or a Ceylon Tamil and the other to a 'real' Indian.
This emphasis on communal representation is misleading. 
Indians, Chinese, Europeans and Malays who were appointed to the 
Board did not represent the interests of their respective 
ethnic communities. Their racial backgrounds were largely 
incidental and only occasionally relevant; in the main they 
represented that thin upper layer of colonial society into 
which they had gained admission either through wealth or 
professional standing. A glance at some of the members who 
served on the Board during the 1920s and 1930s verifies this. 
Dato' Lee Kong Lam, MSC, JP was a prominent planter; Choo Kia 
Peng was a miner and landowner, a member of the Federal Council 
and the son-in-law of Loke Yew, one of K.L.'s biggest landowners; 
Khoo Keng Hooi was an attorney; H.B. Talalla was a wealthy 
self-employed sanitary engineer; Khan Ah Chong was a cinema 
proprietor and prominent Rotarian; Lae Tet Loke, a law clerk 
turned tin miner who was also a member of the Federal Council; 
Loke Chow Thye, J P , a prominent landowner; Dr E.T. MacIntyre, 
a well known medical doctor; M. Cumar as ami was a lawyer; Yap Tai 
Chi, JP , was a businessman in the service station trade; Khoo 
Teik Ee, a very wealthy lawyer and another son-in-law of the Loke 
Yew family; A .H . Flowerdew, a self-employed mining consultant; 
J.R. Vethavanan was an architect-cum-engineer; Law Yew Swee, a
1 . Gullick, o p . cit., 1955, p.96.
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businessman in the import-export trade; Dr H.M. Soo, a medical 
doctor; Khoo Boo Gong, landowner and tin miner; Sir Henry S. Lee, 
a prominent tin miner and later founder-member of the M C A ;
David Freeman and R. Madge, partners in the law firm of Freeman 
and Madge; J.L. Sime of the Straits Trading Co. Ltd; W.J.P. 
Grenier, head of a secretarial service and the official 
representative of the Selangor Property Owners' and Ratepayers' 
Association. 1 2
It would probably be fair to say, as Green did in 1915, 
that these men were basically docile, except when it came to 
defending or advancing the interests of the mercantile 
community, a group to which most of them belonged or with which 
they had connections. Most of them were gentlemen politicians, 
quick to defend the status quo and only marginally interested 
in the immediate and future problems of a rapidly growing town. 
Theirs was primarily an advisory role defined by statute 
but they were not barred from initiating certain measures if 
they chose to do so. Even after the unofficials constituted a 
majority of the members of the Board in 1922 theirs remained a 
largely passive advisory role with perhaps the occasional veto 
of some measure which might have adversely affected the interests 
of the mercantile community.
The failures of the Sanitary Board system were many. Its 
most spectacular shortcoming, and the one most costly in the 
long run, was the lack of town planning. Despite the fact that 
the Board, the State Government and the F.M.S. Government had 
been warned of the consequences of haphazard urban growth, 
nothing was done. The argument that there was no money for cap­
ital intensive projects is explained by the simple fact that
the assessment rate, the Board's main source of revenue, was kept
2very low largely as a concession to property owners. In
1. In 1933 the Selangor Property Owners' and Ratepayers'
Association successfully petitioned the British Resident to 
have representatives on the Sanitary Board - see (4) and (5) 
in Sei. Sec. 1416/1933, October 23 and December 16, 1933.
2. See Federal Council Paper No. 13 of 1926, p. c.172; (9) in
Sei. Sec. 4250/1920, April 13, 1921.
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addition, the local authority did not have the powers to raise 
funds from sources other than the local assessment rate - a 
state of affairs which gave it little leeway to attend to 
anything more than matters connected with public sanitation, 
road building on a modest scale, administration of markets, 
enforcement of minimal building by-laws and other simple care 
and maintenance chores.
The Town Board, Municipal Commission and Municipal Council
In June 1943 the Japanese Military Administration
abolished the Sanitary Board and replaced it with a form of
administration of their own . ^  The Japanese surrendered on
September 13, 1945 and the British Military Administration
2(B.M.A.) took over. Under this Military Administration, a
Town Re-Organisation Department was established, and it appears
3that it continued to function until the end of March 1946.
It is certain, however, that 'the name "Town Board" replaced
the former title of "Sanitary Board" by B.M.A. Gazette
4Notification No. 99 of December 31, 1945 ; ' the Town Board
itself was not established until April 1, 1946 by which time
5civilian administration had been reinstated. The change of 
name to 'Town Board' was simply a change of name; the new 
Town Board continued to function under the old Sanitary 
Board legislation, and its membership continued to be wholly 
nominated.^ This time there were no tortuous discussions on 
the name change such as had occurred earlier. A caretaker 
military administration, for reasons unrecorded and thus
1 . Ibid. , p . 105.
2 . Ibi d . , p .2 4.
3. Report of the Kuala Lumpur Town Board from 1st April 
1946-31st December 1946 , (cyclosty1e d ) , 1946, p.13.
4 . Ibid. , p .11.
5 . Ibid. , p .9; Kuala Lumpur 100 Y e a r s , p .2 4.
6. The system of 'majority unofficial' representation 
on the Board was retained.
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unknown, simply gazetted the change and the Sanitary Board, 
established in 1890, became the Kuala Lumpur Town Board.
The Malayan Union Government wasted no time in making
arrangements to establish Kuala Lumpur as a Municipality.
In June 1946 the Governor, Sir Edward Gent, at a dinner
given in his honour by the Chinese community in Selangor,
referred to 'the early development of Kuala Lumpur into
a Municipality 1 2. The appointment of a committee to
consider the establishment of a Municipality for Kuala
Lumpur was announced at the meeting of the Advisory Council
2on July 30, 1946. The report of the Committee is dated
January 10, 1947. The problem which had occupied the attention
of bureaucrats and a handful of leading citizens for over 
thirty years had finally been settled in less than six months.
The principal recommendations of the Committee were:
1. that a Municipality be established to replace
the Town Board at an early date, January 1, 1948
being suggested as the appropriate date;
2. that 'eventually the aim should be that two- 
thirds of the number of Commissioners should be 
elected by popular ballot and one-third nominated 
by the Resident Commissioner, the latter's 
nominees representing those sections of the 
community which failed to obtain representation by 
b a l l o t ' ;
3. specification of qualifications for Municipal 
Commissioners and electors, frequency of elections 
and new legislation; and
4. pending settlement of the Malayan Union citizen­
ship question, the compilation of an Electoral Roll, 
and the division of the Municipal Area into Wards,
1. 'K L 's Municipality Status,' Mai ay M a i l , June 25 , 1946.
2. W.A. Ward et a1 . , o p . c i t . , (hereafter 'The Ward 
Report') , p.l. The members of this Committee were:
W.A. Ward, Resident Commissioner, Chairman; Col. (later 
Sir) H.S. Lee; R. Ramani; W.J.P. Grenier (representing
the Selangor Property Owners' and Ratepayers' Association); 
W.N. Gourlay, Commissioner of Lands and J.D.M. Smith,
Deputy Financial Secretary.
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the Commissioners be nominated as follows:
3 by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce;
2 by the European Chamber of Commerce;
1 by the Indian Chamber of Commerce;
1 by the Indian Association;
1 by the Ceylonese Association;
1 by the Selangor Rate-Payers Association;
1 by the Committee of the Malay Settlement;
and the remaining 5 by^the Resident Commissioner or
the Sultan in Council.
The Committee also dealt with questions of staff, the
Malay Agricultural Settlement (Kampong Bharu) and finance.
On the subject of finance, the Committee reviewed the
suggestions in the various reports made between 1936 and 1939
and simply went on to make its own recommendations, suggesting
that if its calculations were awry, the Government (presumably
the Central Government) would have to make up any unforeseen
2deficit in the form of a grant-in-aid. Public reaction to
the report, as far as could be ascertained, was minimal. J.R.
Vethavanam, a member of the Town Board and a former member of
the Sanitary Board, voiced his opposition to 'communal and
3vested interest representation'. J.A. Thivy, President of the 
Malayan Indian Congress is reported in the Malay Mail as 
saying: 'Unless the genius of our lawmakers, which has hither­
to always handed over the shadow and retained the substance of 
political power, bases this municipality on the proper 
principles of democratic self-government, the people of Kuala 
Lumpur will never know what is municipal legislation or even
4have the privilege of learning what it is by their mistakes.'
1. The Ward Report, sections 7, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24 and
25 through 30. See also Malay Mail, March 10, 1947.
2. Ibid., Section 82.
3. 'Municipal Plan Under Fire-racial representation policy
opposed,' Malay Mai1 , April 16, 1947; 'Municipalisation
of Kuala Lumpur Preliminary Move: Town Board Concludes
Business,' Malay Mail, March 10, 1948.
4. 'First test of progress - KL Municipality is long
overdue,' Malay Mail, January 15, 1947.
The bill incorporating the necessary legislation to
effect the conversion of the Town Board to a Municipality was
passed by the Legislative Council on February 25, 1948.^
Without fanfare or public ceremony, the barely two-year-old Town
Board was replaced by the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Commission on
2March 15, 1948. The Straits Times carried a two-page article
in its issue of March 15 reviewing some of the developments
3associated with the municipalisation effort, and the following
day made news of the fact that Kuala Lumpur's change of status
4had gone by unnoticed.
The first meeting of the Municipal Commission was held
on March 24, 1948. His Highness the Sultan of Selangor opened
the meeting saying: 'Our aim in this country is to educate
the people to assume the highest measure of responsibility in
local administration and the founding of this Municipality is
5undoubtedly a big step towards achievement of this aim.
The Commissioners apparently took his words seriously, and 
most of the pressure to force the pace towards holding the
6first elections for two-thirds of the members came from them,
1. 'New Bill, ' Straits Times, February 26, 1948.
2. Kuala Lumpur 100 Years, 1959, p.109.
3. Harry Miller, 'First Municipality in the Malay States,'
Straits Times, March 15, 1948.
4. 'Status is not noticed,' Straits Times, March 16, 1948.
5. KL Municipal Commission Minutes, March 24, 1948.
See also 'Historic Inauguration of Kuala Lumpur 
Municipality,' Malay Mai1 , March 24, 1948.
6. 'Elected Municipality is KL ambition,' Malay Mai1 ,
January 16, 1949; KLMC Minutes, February 16, 1949,
p .3; KLMC Minutes, September 21, 1949, pp.4-5;
KLMC Minutes, January 18, 1950, p.3.
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amidst conflict over qualifications for municipal electors,
talk of 'instilling among the future electorate the sense of
2civic responsibility' and Federal Government announcements of
plans to set up municipalities in more populous town board 
3areas. This flurry of official and unofficial activity, it
should be remembered, was occurring at a time when a State of
4Emergency had already been declared in the country and the new
Municipality itself was being subjected to this kind of
critical evaluation by its Deputy President:
The fact is that although the proposal for 
forming a Municipality in Kuala Lumpur dates back 
for almost 30 years, the actual creation was done 
in rather a hurry and - let it be whispered - 
there are several flaws in the actual Gazette 
Notification (Sei. G.N. No. 64 of 13th March,
1948) in which the limits of the Municipality 
were defined...since March, 1948, we have been 
working on hybrid legislation consisting partly 
of the Straits Municipal Ordinance and^partly of 
the Town Boards Enactment and By-laws. Although 
it was intended that this should be a temporary 
expedient only, we are still without a proper 
Municipal Ordinance and in my opinion the 
working of the Kuala Lumpur Municipality, from a 
legislative point of view, is distinctly
1. KLMC Minutes, May 31, 1951, pp.4-7; KLMC Minutes,
May 31, 1951, pp.8-9; 'KL to Study Plea to Sultan,'
Straits Times, June 1, 1951; KLMC Minutes, June 29, 1951, 
pp.2-3; KLMC Minutes, July 31, 1951, pp.4-5; 'The
Voter in K.L.,' Straits Times, (editorial), July 5, 1951.
2. KLMC Minutes, February 16, 1949, p.3; KLMC Minutes,
September 21, 1949; 'Still Apathy in K L ,' Straits
Times, September 22, 1949.
3. Chief Secretary to all Mentri2 Besar and all British
Advisers, F S . 01297/49 in (3) in KLM. (Confidential)
15/49, September 9, 1949; 'Step towards Local
Elections,' Straits Times, September 29, 1949.
4. The State of Emergency for the whole of the Federation of
Malay had been declared on June 18, 1948; see Lucian W. Pye,
Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1964), 
p . 89 .
5. When research for this project was completed in January 
1970 the Federal Capital Commission was still working 
under this 'hybrid legislation'.
59 .
unsatisfactory.
The insurgency on the one hand and growing demands for 
independence on the other, no doubt forced the British to some 
extent to proceed with implementing their promise of Municipal 
elections, an action which was probably calculated to have a 
two-pronged effect. It would somehow help in the propaganda 
war against the insurgents and at the same time lay part of the 
groundwork for future political advancement. As far as the 
'distinctly unsatisfactory' working of the Municipality was 
concerned, that would present no serious problem to the past 
masters of muddling through.
The administrative and constitutional arrangements
for the conduct of the first elections and the establishment of
the Municipal Council were duly made on March 27, 1951, laid
2before the Council of State and approved on May 1, 1951.
Elections for twelve seats in four three-member constituencies
were held on February 16, 1952. Thereafter elections were held
in 1953, 1954, 1956, 1957 and 1958.^ A field of thirty-two
4candidates contested the elections, and three Malays, three
5Indians and Chinese were elected. The three Malay and six
1. Hammett to del Tufo, (2) in KLM . (C) 15/49, August 4,
1949 .
2. Constitution of the Municipality of Kuala Lumpur,
March 27, 1951, p.l.
3. The 1955 elections were uncontested. See Appendix C.
4. Federation of Malaya Government Gazette (Selangor).
February 28, 1952, pp.95-99.
5. Bungsar (a predominantly Indian Ward) returned the 3
Indian candidates; Sentul (where the majority of 
registered voters were Malays) returned 3 Malay 
candidates and Imbi and Petaling Wards, largely Chinese, 
returned 3 Chinese candidates each. (For detailed 
results see Federation of Malaya Government Gazette 
(Selangor) , February 28 , 1952 , pp.95-99).
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Chinese victors were members of the UMNO-MCA;  ^ two of the three 
Indians were members of the Independence of Malaya Party and the 
third, S.C.E. Singam, a man who was to leave his mark on 
Municipal affairs, was the lone independent in the entire field 
of thirty-two candidates. The six nominated councillors 
comprised one Malay, two Europeans, one Eurasian, one Ceylonese 
and one Indian Muslim.^
The first meeting of the Council was held on February 19,
1952; and even before the stenographers had taken down the
wise, but unrealistic, advice of His Highness the Sultan about
'a municipality not having government and opposition benches
3or a cabinet formed by the majority p a r t y ' , the nine UMNO-MCA 
members had not only begun to think of themselves as occupying 
the Government benches but they had also constituted themselves 
into a 'cabinet' and held a pre-Council meeting to decide what 
was to happen at the actual meeting, a practice which members 
of this party continued to follow for seven years before their 
leaders, faced by imminent rejection at the polls, decided to 
do away with elections altogether.
One of the planks in the platforms of both the MCA and 
the Labour Party in the February 1952 elections was that the 
Kuala Lumpur Council should become fully elected with an 
elected Mayor. The MCA advocated that this should be
1. United Malay National Organisation-Malayan Chinese
Association. Together with the Malayan Indian Congress, 
this preliminary coalition was broadened in the formation 
of the Alliance a couple of years later. For more 
information on the Alliance the following sources might 
be consulted: M.F. Clark, 'The Malayan Alliance and its
accommodation of communal pressures, 1952-1962,' 
unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 1964;
K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary 
Election of 1 9 6 4 , (Singapore, 1967) , esp. p p . 31-58.
2. 'The Sultan Names Six for Council,' Straits T i m e s ,
February 19, 1952.
3. KLMC Minutes, February 19, 1952. Note that all KLMC
Minutes from this date onwards are Kuala Lumpur 
Municipal Counci1 , rather than Commis s i o n , minutes.
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accomplished 'by a gradual process'; the Labour Party supported
a deadline of January 19 5 5.’*’ Singam, the lone independent,
2supported a fully elected Council with city status. The
UMNO and IMP remained uncommitted on the issue until after the 
3elections. The related questions of a fully elected Council, 
a Mayor and city status for Kuala Lumpur were to dominate the 
deliberations of the Council for nine years. The highlights of 
the nine-year wrangle are worth examining.
At the very first meeting of the Council Inche Mohd.
Salleh bin Hakim, speaking on behalf of the UMNO Councillors,
expressed the hope that the Council would become fully elected
the following year; his colleague, Ong Yoke Lin, expounded
4similar views on behalf of the MCA.
5It was Ong Yoke Lin, then Alliance whip, who made the 
first major speech on the subject of a fully elected council 
at a meeting on May 31, 1955.  ^ All of the eleven Alliance
1. "MCA to back non-Chinese at Polls - Ban Politics in
Council Demand,' Straits Times , January 4 , 1952;
'Nine-point Labour Manifesto,' Straits T i m e s , January 
12, 1952 and 'Labour Wants a Mayor by 1955,' Straits
T i m e s , February 3, 1952. See also 'Alliance Pledge:
Mayor, Elected Council for Capital,' Straits T i m e s ,
November 16, 1956.
2. 'Two will fight for better housing, ' Straits T imes,
January 12, 1952.
3. The 18-point UMNO Manifesto (Straits T i m e s , January 9,
1952) did not mention the issue. It is possible that these 
parties discussed the issue and took a position on
it in the course of the campaign but no documentation 
in English lanugage sources could be found to support 
this.
4. KLMC Minutes, February 19, 1952, p.2.
5. At this writing Malaysia's Ambassador to the
U . S . A .
6. KLMC Minutes, May 31, 1955, pp.3-7.
Note: At this time all 12 elected members belonged
to the Alliance.
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members present voted for his resolution, with the six 
nominated members casting their votes against it."^
The seven-member committee appointed in keeping with the
terms of the Ong Yoke Lin resolution became known as the
Constitutional Committee into which the City Status Committee
2was merged on January 11, 1956. The tenor of the committee's
deliberations reflects the manner in which they were trying to
3follow English practice. The second occasion on which the
committee met in 1956 was towards the end of February when it
appeared that most of the necessary arrangements were well
in hand except for one new delicate matter which the Honourable
Inche Abdullah bin Haji Mohd. Yassin had raised. The Honourable
Inche Abdullah suggested that 'the same constitutional status ,
should apply to the Mayor and Deputy Mayor as was provided
for in the State Constitution as regards the Mentri Besar and
the State Secretary, namely that they be Malays and of Islam 
4religion. ' The committee took the easy way out and deferred 
consideration of the proposal until the next meeting when it 
was raised again. The decision reached by the committee was 
almost a non s equitur: ' . . .it was agreed that the constitutional
proposals which had been considered should remain in abeyance 
until after Merdeka when they could be raised again at the
1. 'All-elected Council (Plus a Mayor) is Alliance Aim
in KL , ' Straits T i m e s , June 1 , 1955 ; 'Battle -
Its 11-6 for Mayor and Elected Members Only,' Straits 
Times , June 2 , 1955 .
2. York to All Municipal Councillors, (29) in K L M . (C)
198/55, December 29, 1955; Constitutional Committee
Minutes (Confidential), January 11, 1956.
3. A fact which had not evaded the notice of the Legal 
Adviser, Selangor, to whom the matter was referred. 
See Clough to President, Municipal Council, (27)
in K L M . (C) 198/55, November 30, 1955.
4. Constitutional Committee Minutes (Confidential),
February 23, 1956.
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request of any member of the C o u n c i l . ' Thus the question of a 
fully elected council and the related problems of a Mayor and 
city status were deferred for ultimate consideration by a post­
independence non-colonial Government.
2V. David (Socialist Front - Bungsar W a r d ) , elected to the
Council in December 1957, raised the question of a fully
3elected council in his maiden speech, thereby setting in 
motion the committee machinery to recommence formal deliberations 
from where they had been left off in March 1956. The 
Constitutional Committee was reconvened and met on January 27, 
1958. The second stage was about to begin.
The Constitutional Committee met on twelve occasions during
the next two-year period, six times during the course of each 
4year. Initially, an attempt was made to separate the city
5status issue from the fully elected counci1/Mayor problem,
so that city status could be conferred on Kuala Lumpur at a
time to coincide with the centenary celebrations, first
scheduled for January 1, 1959 but ultimately postponed to June
6of that year. The co-operation of the State Government
was sought in this matter but it insisted on city status being
7conferred only after the Council became fully elected.
1. Constitutional Committee Minutes (Confidential),
March 27, 1956. This was the only item on the agenda,
the meeting only lasting 15 minutes.
2. The first Socialist Front candidate elected to the 
Council and at that time the only Opposition party 
councillor.
3. KLMC Minutes, December 2 3 , 1957 , pp . 2 , 8; at the same
meeting G.V. Thaver also raised the issue; see Ibi d ., p.6.
4. In 1958 the Committee met in January, twice in March and 
once in April, May and October; in 1959, meetings were 
held in January, February, April, twice in May and finally 
on July 2.
5. Constitutional Committee Minutes (Confidential), January 27, 
1958 .
6 . I b i d .
7. Constitutional Committee Minutes (Confidential), October 23, 
1958 .
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A second attempt to get the State Government to change its
mind was unsuccessful, the State Secretary Selangor reiterating
that the two events should not be linked and that conferment of
city status should take place only after the establishment of
a fully elected council, the view also held by the Minister
of the Interior and Justice and endorsed by the Cabinet.^
The committee plaintively took note of this and the centenary
celebrations were duly held without Kuala Lumpur being given 
2city status.
At the third meeting of the Constitutional Committee
held March 19, 1958, details relating to the fully elected
council were spelt out in a separate schedule and accepted with
December 1958 set as a target date for elections to the fully
3elected council. Hawkins, the Supervisor of Elections,
confirmed in late May that the elections could be held in 
4December, and the Constitutional Committee agreed that the 
best method of expediting things would be for a joint committee 
of Municipal and State Government representatives to work to­
gether on the various problems which would have to be solved
5before the fully elected council could become a reality.
Having communicated this proposal to the State Secretary, 
Selangor, York, the President of the Council and Chairman of
1. Constitutional Committee Minutes, February 17, 1959.
It is obvious from this that the very highest levels 
of the government were involved in behind the scenes 
discussions on this subject.
2. At this writing K.L. is still not officially a city.
3. Constitutional Committee Minutes (Confidential),
March 19, 1958.
4. Hawkins to President, Municipal Council, (86) in KLM.
(C) 198/55, May 22, 1958; Constitutional Committee
Minutes (Confidential), May 23, 1958.
5. A letter encompassing this proposal and Hawkins' time
table for getting ready the administrative machinery 
to enable elections to be held in December 1958 was 
sent to the State Secretary vide (87) in KLM.(C) 
198/55, June 2, 1958.
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the Constitutional Committee, did not reconvene the Constitution­
al Committee until the end of October 1958 (i.e., after a lapse
of five months) and announced at that meeting that as no 
official reply had been received from the State Government it 
was not going to be possible to have a fully elected Council by 
January 1 , 1959."*" There was not very much that the committee
could do but acquiesce, and no one even asked York why the 
Constitutional Committee had not met for five months.
This initial set back was certainly not due to any lack
of effort on the part of the Alliance councillors. For example,
Y.T. Lee, Abdullah Yassin and Tharmalingam (Alliance Whip)
2had conferred with the State Secretary in March 1958, and
in September a number of Alliance Councillors had met York
and expressed considerable concern as to the lack of visible
progress being made in regard to their resolution for a fully
3elected council. Early in October the Alliance Councillors
4had made a request through York to see the Mentri Besar.
The State Government finally took action in October 1958, 
five days before the Constitutional Committee had met for the 
last time that year, when the State Executive Council decided 
to appoint a Special Committee to examine the proposals by 
the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council for a fully elected council 
with the following terms of reference:
(i) To examine the present constitutional 
arrangements of the Municipality of Kuala Lumpur;
(ii) To examine the request and recommendations 
of the Municipal Council for the amendment to the 
Constitution of the Kuala Lumpur Municipality to 
provide for a fully elected Council;
(iii) To advise on the implications and
1. Constitutional Committee Minutes (Confidential),
October 23, 1958.
2. Sei. Sec. (C) 340 , Minute dated March 11, 1958.
3. York to State Secretary, Selangor, (90) in K L M . (C)
198/55, September 30, 1958.
4. (92) in K L M . (C) 198/55, October 11, 1958.
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responsibilities which the State Government may 
be expected to assume on accepting the principle 
of a fully elected Council, taking into special 
consideration the position of Kuala Lumpur as the 
Federal Capital; and
(iv) To make recommendations on the legal and 
administrative measures considered necessary^in 
relation to such recommendations and advice.
The Report of the Special Committee recommended a fully 
elected council as being justified and in accordance with the
2general advance towards fully elected and democratic Councils, 
The Executive Council of the Selangor State Legislative
3Assembly adopted the Report at its Meeting on May 23, 1959,
and six weeks later, on July 2, it was discussed and adopted, 
subject to two sets of proposed changes, at the last meeting 
of the Constitutional Committee. The Minutes of the 
Constitutional Committee were unanimously confirmed at a full 
Meeting of the Council held on July 31, 1959.
York had received official notification of the State 
Government's acceptance of the Report fully a month before 
it was discussed by the Constitutional Committee; his reply t} 
the State Secretary dated the same day urged implementation 
of the Special Committee's recommendations by January 1, 1960
1. 'Report of the Special Committee Appointed to Examine
the Proposals by the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council for 
a Fully Elected Council (Confidential),' Unpublished, 
1959, p.l. Members of the Committee were: The
Honourable Inche Abdullah bin Haji M o h 'd Yassin, J.P. 
(Chairman); the Hon'ble the State Secretary, Selangor; 
the Hon'ble the Legal Adviser, Selangor; the Hon'ble 
the President, Municipal Council, K L ; Tuan Haji 
Ismail bin Panjang Aris (representative of the Ministry 
of Interior and Justice). See also (81) in Sei.
Sec. (C) 340, September 3, 1959 ; (68) in Sei. Sec. (C)
340, June 2, 1959.
2. Report of the Special Committee..., p .2.
3. Mahyuddin bin M o h 'd Zain to Yang di-Pertua, Perbandaran,
(68) in Sei. Sec.(C) 340, June 2, 1959.
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and that the Report be released to the Press. The State 
Secretary, in his reply about two months later, authorised 
release of the Special Committee Report to the Press but was 
strangely silent on the question of the date of 
implementing the fully elected council proposal.2
About a month after the Council had endorsed the Special 
Committee's recommendations and the State Secretary had 
authorised releasing the Report to the Press, the Minister of 
Interior and Justice summoned the Mentri Besar and the State 
Secretary, Selangor to a meeting. The State Secretary later 
minuted the discussion: 'On August 25 , 1959... [the Minister]
told us of his fears of what might happen if the Municipality 
was (sic) a fully elected Council. The Socialist Front Organ­
isation had managed to put on the electroal roll thousands of 
people who might have no qualifications to vote. The Minister 
suggested that in view of the above Kuala Lumpur should remain 
a partially elected Municipality for the time being. We agreed.'
The implication is clear; the 'thousands of people' who 
had been put on the rolls by the Socialist Front would 
presumably vote for that party in any Municipal election (as
4indeed they had just done in the State and Federal elections) 
and the Alliance would lose control of Kuala Lumpur. Such a 
situation could not be allowed.
The following day the Minister made it official. In a 
letter sent under secret cover to the State Secretary, the 
Commissioner of Local Government wrote:
1. York to Y.B. Setia Usaha Kerajaan, Selangor, (17)
in KLM.(C) 198/55 (Part II), June 2, 1959.
2. Sha'ari bin Harun to Yang di-Pertua, Perbandaran, K L ,
(79) in Sei. Sec.(C) 340, July 27, 1959.
3. (81) in Sei. Sec.(C) 340, September 3, 1959. Emphasis
added.
4. T.E. Smith, 'The Malayan Elections of 1959,'
Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (March 1960) , 
pp.38-47 at pp.41-42.
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I am directed by the Minister to refer to the 
meeting which took place in the Minister's 
office on 25th August, 1959 at which the Hon'ble 
Menteri Besar, Selangor and yourself were 
present and to inform you that the Minister 
requests that the Selangor government will 
discontinue all further action to amend the 
constitution of the Kuala Lumpur Municipal 
Council to provide for a fully elected Council 
with effect from 1st January 1960, notwithstanding 
the recommendations in the above Special Committee 
Report.
In view of the fact that it is the intention of 
the Federal Government to recommend to the State 
Governments in the early part of 1960 certain 
important changes in the electoral qualifications 
and other arrangements for local authority elections, 
it is the desire of the Minister that the 
Constitution of the K.L. Municipal Council should 
remain unchanged for the time being. The Minister 
hopes that the Selangor Government recognising 
the Federal Government's special interest in K.L. 
as the Federal Capital, will agree to the request 
contained in this letter.
2. I am also to mention that, as discussed at the 
meeting referred to above, it is the Minister's 
wish that steps should be taken to defer 
local authority elections this year, and to say 
that I shall address^you further on this subject 
as soon as possible.
Two weeks later a memorandum was circulated under secret
cover from the Minister of Interior and Justice suggesting
that the 1959 elections for local government councils be
deferred for one year because 'electoral rolls for Local
2Authority elections ... are not satisfactory'.
The Secretary to the Elections Commission took strong 
exception to the allegations and replied:
1. J. Love, to the State Secretary, Selangor, MIJ.0
1019/20 (Secret) in (80) in Sei. Sec.(C) 340,
Augus t 2 6 , 1959.
2. Memorandum from the Minister of the Interior & Justice,
'Local Authority Elections (Secret) , ' 1959 , MIJ. Y.
502/7 in (IB) in Sei. Sec.(C) 1133, September 10, 1959.
69 .
The Elections Commission now wishes to stress 
that the views it expressed were made for no 
other reason than to ensure administrative 
efficiency in the conduct of any local authority 
elections which it were to undertake, and further 
that in expressing its opinions on the state of 
local authority electoral rolls, the Commissioner 
was referring only to those local authorities for 
which it has not yet accepted responsibility; no 
reference was therefore intended to the 
Municipalities of K.L. and Georgetown, the 
electoral rolls of which have for some time been 
maintained by the Commission...
The Commission wishes to request that in no public 
statements and in the wording of no legislation to 
be passed to provide for the implementation of 
Government's proposals, should any reference be made 
to the Elections Commission or to give the impression 
that the Commission has Recommended the present course 
of action to government.
This protest had no effect. By the end of September
the Opposition members of the Municipal Council were attacking
the agreement between State and Federal government to
postpone the December elections, a decision which had been
2announced in the Press but not to the Council. The Alliance
whip, Tharmalingam, defended the action, reiterating Government's
claim that the electoral rolls were not in order, despite
the clear statement to the contrary which they had received
3from the Elections Commission. Tharmalingam's statement is 
the first indication by the Alliance faction in the Municipal 
Council of a departure from its previous support for a fully 
elected Council at the earliest possible date.
At the same meeting V. David said that 'reliable inform­
ation had reached him that the Minister of Interior and Justice 
was actively considering the possibility of abolishing the 
Municipality and bringing the municipal departments under
1. F. Lees, Secretary, Elections Commission, E.C. (S)
11 (2) (Secret), in (7) in Sei. Sec.(C) 1133,
September 1959. (Emphasis added.)
2. KLMC Minutes, September 30, 1959, p.6.
3. Ibid. , p .13 .
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his control' . Two days later the Deputy Secretary of 
that Ministry denied that Government was considering such a move. 
When Kuala Lumpur became the Federal capital, the Federal 
Government would be responsible for Kuala Lumpur (as provided 
in the Federal Constitution, Article 154, clauses 2 and 3) 
but this would not take place for many more years. As it 
turned out, 'many more years' lasted six months.
The next few months were marked by a continued pursuance 
of the subject of a fully elected council by the Opposition 
and increased evasion by the Alliance Councillors and the
3President of the Municipal Council. In November, the 
elections were officially suspended.4
When Parliament reconvened in April 1960, the Alliance 
Government moved swiftly. The first step was to amend the 
Constitution. Article 154 had reserved to Parliament the 
exclusive power to make laws with respect to the boundaries 
of the federal capital, but not with respect to the Municipality 
of Kuala Lumpur 'until such date as may be appointed by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong with the concurrence of the Ruler of the 
State of Selangor in pursuance of arrangements made between 
the Federal Government and the Government of the State for 
the establishment elsewhere of the State capital'. Now 
the Alliance Government moved to delete the proviso, thus 
giving itself the power to make laws in respect to the 
Municipality from August 8, 1960, the date the Constitution
1. Ibid. , p .11 .
2 . 'Municipal Council in Kuala Lumpur Won' 
Straits Times, October 2, 1959.
t be Abolished,
3 . KLMC Minutes, October 30, 1959, pp.5-8;
February 29, 1960, p.12.
KLMC Minutes,
4 . Selangor Gazette Notification No. 781, 
1959 (Suspension of Elections Order).
November 2 6,
5 . Federal Constitution, Part XII. Notes on Article 154,
facing p.151, Reprint No. 13 of 1968.
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Amendment came into force. Then, in the same week in April,
the Federal Government introduced and passed the Local
Government Elections Bill which paved the way for local authority
elections to be held the following year, but assigned the
administration of the Municipality of Kuala Lumpur to the
Federal Government. Said the Minister of Finance, Tan Siew
Sin: 'A Federal capital is too serious a thing to be made
2subject to party politics.' At least to two-party politics!
The following day there was an ordinary meeting of the Council.
Alliance members who had two years earlier pressed for a
fully elected Council now said that 'an elected form of
3government did not suit local authorities' despite the fact 
that the Act they were defending provided for the reinstatement 
of local council elections, with the express exception of 
Kuala Lumpur.
From May through August 1960, Opposition Councillors 
introduced a barrage of motions aimed at finding out precisely 
what plans the Federal Government had for Kuala Lumpur
1 * 1bid.
2. 'House Approves Bill for Uniform Local Polls Starting
Next Year,' S traits Times, April 26 , 1960. This was
the view to which York, the President of the Council, 
also subscribed. Earlier in the year he had written:
'My own view is that the use of Party symbols (in 
local authority elections) should either be discouraged 
or prohibited by legislation. The present tendency is 
for members of minority parties not represented at 
national or State level when elected to City or Municipal 
Council to use it as a forum for furthering the ends of 
their political parties and use Council meetings for 
their own party propaganda purposes. It will be 
appreciated that the use of the City and Municipal 
Councils for party purposes in this way do not assist
at all in advancing the material life of the town. . . ' 
(York to Y.B. Setia Usaha Kerajaan, Selangor in (18) 
in KLM. 480/54 , Part III, in (17) in Sei. Sec. (C)
883, June 8, 1959.
3. KLMC Minutes, April 28, 1960, p.8.
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Municipality. Needless to say, they were all defeated, but the
debates caused the Alliance Councillors to contradict their
own election manifestoes and previous stance on the question
of a fully elected council and this was the clearly stated
2purpose of the Opposition's motions. At the same time, the
Opposition had a chance to voice its belief that it was fear of
a Socialist Front election victory in Kuala Lumpur which
motivated the takeover by the Alliance Federal Government.
3This allegation was hotly denied each time it was made.
While the Councillors were sparring with each other, 
they were officially ignored by those who were deciding their 
fate. At no time was the Council ever informed as a body 
as to Government's plans for its future, let alone consulted. 
Information, for the Opposition at least, came from Press 
releases and Parliamentary debates at which V. David, a 
Socialist Front M.P. as well as Municipal Councillor, was 
present. There also seems to have been a leak from the 
inside, for the Oppostion Councillors often had information 
from 'reliable sources' as to Government's future course of 
action, which was usually correct and always denied.
In September 1960 Parliament met again and passed the
4Federal Capital Act which still governs Kuala Lumpur. Under 
its provisions the powers hitherto held by the Municipal 
Council were invested in a Federal Capital Commissioner re­
sponsible to the Minister of Interior and Justice (subsequently 
the Minister of Local Government and Housing) and assisted by
1. KLMC Minutes, May 30, 1960, pp.7-12; KLMC Minutes,
June 29, 1960, pp.6-7; KLMC Minutes, July 28, 1960,
pp.11-14; KLMC Minutes, August 29 , 1960, pp.3-13.
2. KLMC Minutes, August 29, 1960, p.12.
3. During the interviews in 1969 with some of the people 
involved, they were quite willing to admit that this 
allegation had in fact been true.
4. 'Senate Approves Bill for the Take-over of K L ,' Malay
Mail, September 20, 1960.
an appointed Advisory Board.
In moving the Bill, Dato' Suleiman, then Minister of 
Interior and Justice, quoted the Reid Commission report:
We do not think it practicable to make Kuala 
Lumpur federal territory and we have no 
presentation that this should be done. But we 
think that the Federation ought to be able to 
control the development and administration of its 
capital and seat of government. We therefore 
recommend that the Federation and not the State 
of Selangor should have the power to legislate 
with regard to local government and town planning 
of Kuala Lumpur, and that for administration 
that Municipality should be directly under the 
Federation.
Government's action in proposing the Bill was merely intended
to implement the Commission's recommendations, according to 
3the Minister. But the Minister did not explain why no
attention had been paid to the recommendation, which was made 
4in 1957, until after the clear urban trend to Socialist
5Front candidates in the elections of 1958 and 1959. Nor
did he mention that in every election campaign after the
recommendation had been made the Alliance had come out in
6favour of fully elected local governments. And it was after 
the Reid Commission suggestions that the Alliance Municipal 
Councillors and State Assemblymen, from 1957 to mid-1959, 
played such an active role in working for a fully electei
1• Federation of Malaya, Act of Parliament, No. 35 of 1360, 
October 13, 1960.
2. Excerpt from the Reid Commission Report quoted in 
Parliamentary Debates (Dewan Ra'ayat), Vol. II,
No . 22 , p . 2494.
3. Parliamentary Debates (Dewan Ra'ayat), Vol. II,
N o . 22, p . 2494 .
4. H.E. Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia, 19 6 8, p . 13.
5. T.E. Smith, op . cit., pp.41-42.
6. KLMC Minutes, August 28, 1959, p.7; KLMC Minutes,
September 30, 1959, p.ll; KLMC Minutes, April 28,
1960 , p.7.
Council. In any case, the Reid recommendation said nothing 
about the elimination of local government elections in Kuala 
Lumpur. Just as the State of Selangor had exercised its power 
to legislate in Kuala Lumpur through the Municipal Council, 
so too could the Federal Government have allowed the Council 
to continue, reserving to itself the powers of appointments 
and vetoes which had been reserved to the State.
Although the Federal Capital Act was passed and approved 
by the Senate on September 20, 1960, no time-table was made
public for the take-over. At the next Municipal Council 
meeting, the Councillors 'in view of [their] impending retire­
ment' passed a motion in rather dubious taste thanking themselves 
and past Councillors for 'their valuable and worthy services' .
At the same meeting, the President tabled an answer to a 
query by Socialist Front Councillor S.S. Nayagam as to whether 
there had been any correspondence between Municipal authorities 
and Federal authorities regarding the transfer of Kuala Lumpur. 
The President replied that the correspondence received was
classified and could not be communicated to any persons not
2authorised to deal with classified correspondence. In any
case the Opposition was told quite smartly by the Alliance whip
that they were 'mistaken in thinking that Parliament or the
State authorities should have consulted the Council regarding
3the taking-over of Kuala Lumpur town by the Ministry'.
The next month Nayagam moved that the Council 'deplores
the refusal on the part of the President ... to release such
correspondence received from the Federal Government... relating
4to the takeover of the Federal Capital...' The President 
replied that the correspondence was carried out in his personal 
capacity and not as President of the Council; Mr. Nayagam thought
1. KLMC Minutes, September 29, 1960, p.3.
2. Ibid., Appendix A.
3 . Ibid. , p .4 .
4 . KLMC Minutes, October 31, 1960, p.10.
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that seemed strange, but the motion failed.
In December 1960 the Socialist Front Councillors tried a
different tack. Quite apart from the question of transferring
authority, they called upon the Prime Minister 'to review the
whole question of Municipal Elections for this Federal Capital'.
As Nayagam pointed out, there was still a clause in the
Constitution (Part VII, Article 113, Clause 4) which provided
that 'the Elections Commission shall also conduct elections
3to the municipal council of the federal capital...' But 
this motion, like all its predecessors, was negatived.
In January, a motion questioning the constitutionality 
of Government's action in discarding elections was introduced.
It failed.^
The February 1961 meeting of the Municipal Council was 
atypical in that the Opposition failed to introduce any motion 
pertaining to the takeover. It was even more unusual that there 
was no announcement that the following meeting would be the 
last, and that the Federal Capital Commissioner would be in 
office from April 1, 1961. Surely the decision had already
been taken by this date and was known to some members of the 
Council, three of whom were appointed to the Advisory Board, and 
to the President, who was to become the first Federal Capital 
Commissioner. Yet there is no record of any official notifi­
cation to the Council of the date of their demise. The 
earliest public announcement located is a newspaper cutting 
dated March 19, 1961 stating that 'the Federal government takes
1 . Ibid. , p .14.
2. KLMC Minutes, December 22, 1960, p.3.
3. Federal Constitution, Reprint No. 13 of 1968 (Notes 
facing p.118). Parliament replaced this clause in 
1962 , deleting all mention of the Federal Capital.
4. KLMC Minutes, January 31, 1961, p.12.
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over K.L. next month'. The next reference is a statement
on March 22 by Nayagam that he would leave it to his party
(i.e., the Socialist Front) to decide if he should accept
2the nomination to the Advisory Board. They must have
decided pretty quickly because ten days later, S.S. Nayagam
3was named as a member of the first Advisory Board, despite
his statement nine months earlier that it would be 'below
their (Socialist Front) dignity to serve on that body merely
because it would be nominated and they would never accept
4such nomination'.
The Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council met for the last time
on March 29, 1961 and spent an hour and a half in fond
5regrets and bright hopes for the future. On April 1, 1961
the Federal Capital Commission came into being, and the 
question of elections for Kuala Lumpur was resolved.
Of both the Town Board and the Municipal Commission 
not much need be said. The Town Board was merely a con­
tinuation of the Sanitary Board, helping in a smooth return 
to normalcy after the Japanese surrender and preparing the 
way for the Municipal Commission.
In a new era of demands for rapid political change 
(though not specifically for change in local government), 
the Commission, too, was simply a transitional constitutional 
de vice .
In reviewing the first year of the Municipal Commission's 
existence, the 1948 Annual Report of the Kuala Lumpur
1. 'Over to the Government' , S unday Time s , March 19,
1961 .
2. 'Nayagam to leave decision to Party,' Malay Mail, March
22, 1961.
3. Federal Government Press Release, Department of
Information (Interior), 3/61/204.
4. KLMC Minutes, August 29, 1960, p.8.
5. 'Tributes at Municipal Council's Last Meeting,'
Maiay Mail, March 30, 1961.
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Municipality says:
The old Town Board, as a State Department, was 
closely connected with other State Departments 
notably the Public Works Department and there 
remains an extensive 'sorting-out' process 
which will take some time to complete.
It may be said, with some reason, that to the 
majority of the citizens of Kuala Lumpur the 
new Municipality is but the old Town Board 
dressed in the new fashion. It is still the 
'Pejabat Bandar' - the same old office where 
one pays one's rates and bills for water, 
conservancy and the like. If one writes to the 
papers with a view to airing a complaint, one 
may indeed refer nowadays to the 'City Fathers', 
but in actual fact there is, outwardly at least, 
little difference from the old Town Board. The 
Commissioners are 'nominated' and 'appointed' 
much as they were before. Meetings are held 
once a month in the Town Hall and much the 
same things come under discussion. There is 
little if any realisation on the part of the 
general public that the creation of a Municipality 
is the first step in granting a measure of local 
self-government. Here lies the seed which, if 
properly nutured, will grow in time into the 
tree whose branches will shelter the new 
Malaya. It is in the nursery of local self- 
government ^hat Malaya's future administrators are 
being born.
Although the establishment of the Municipal Commission 
brought no immediate clean break with the State and little 
recognition from the citizenry of Kuala Lumpur's new system 
of local government, the Commission was different from the 
Board in a number of ways:
1. Unlike the Board which was made up of representatives
of the bureaucracy and a majority of appointed unofficial 
2members, the Commissioners were all appointed and the lone 
representative of the bureaucracy was now the President who,
1. 'Report of the Kuala Lumpur Municipality for the Year 
1948,' (cyclostyled, n.d.), p.2.
2. In 1946 there were six official members (the Chairman, the 
Health Officer, the Town Engineer, the Collector of Land 
Rents, the Chief Police Officer and the Secretary) and nine 
unof ficials .
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by reason of his position, was also chairman of the eight 
standing committees. In addition, the economic basis for 
selection of the members became more apparent, with the 
membership listed as follows:
3 from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce;
2 " the European Chamber of Commerce;
1 " the Indian Chamber of Commerce;
1 " the Indian Association;
1 " the Ceylonese Association;
1 " the Ratepayers' Association;
1 " the Committee of the Malay Settlement;
5 nominees of the Resident Commissioner or 
Sultan-in-Council.
2. The Municipal Commission became 'financially autonomous' 
in the sense that it was no longer treated for accounting 
purposes as a department of the State government. In reality, 
the Commission's fate was still very much tied up with that
of the State Government whose creature it still was and with 
which it had still to deal in such matters as valuation policy' 
and other questions of a financial and administrative nature.
3. Its legal powers were enlarged by reason of the fact 
that it now operated under the provisions of the Town Boards 
Enactment and By-laws and parts of the Straits Municipal 
Ordinance.
It should be noted that the establishment of the Municipal 
Commission was a matter that was being imposed from above by a 
colonial government trying to push the pace in the general 
direction of some kind of responsible local government.
There was certainly no popular demand for local government 
reform at this point in time and there would only have been a 
very few people who would have had any idea of what local 
government was or should be about.
In the four-year life of the Commission some of its 
members, notably K.K. Benjamin, raised questions about some 
of the town's most pressing problems: housing, planning,
the resettlement of squatters and hawkers, public health and 
so on. The Commission itself could do little to solve any
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of these problems, but many of the Commissioners clearly saw 
the tremendous backlog of urban problems which previous 
administrations had bequeathed and which now required urgent 
action. There was no lack of good intentions or of enthusiasm, 
often embodied in eloquent speeches and essentially sensible 
resolutions. The Commission's main contribution lay in 
delineating the problems to be tackled and in establishing a 
rough order of priorities for its successor to consider.
The establishment of the Municipal Council in 1952 meant
one fundamental change. Whereas the fifteen Commissioners had
all been nominated, twelve of the eighteen Municipal Councillors
were elected and six appointed by the Ruler (of the State of
Selangor) in Council. The President of the Council continued
to be appointed"^ and served in the same position he occupied
as President of the Municipal Commission: permanent executive
head of the bureaucracy, President of the Council and Chairman
2of all standing committees.
The legal powers of the Council were very much the same 
as those of the Commission. Although the Council was supposed 
to be financially autonomous, this was not really so. Sections 
12A (d) and (e) of the Town Boards Enactment provided that:
All estimates of revenue and expenditure 
shall be submitted for approval to the 
Ruler in Council.
Save with the sanction of the Ruler in 
Council no payment out of the Fund 
(Municipal Revenue Fund) shall be made 
otherwise than in accordance with the 
approved estimates of revenue and
1. Section 17 of the Council's Constitution gave the 
Ruler power to appoint the President after consultation 
with the Councillors. The President so appointed 
could be a member of the Council or anyone else selected 
by the Rule r .
2. He only exercised this right to be Chairman with those 
committees which he considered to be important; the 
others were chaired by representatives of the majority 
party.
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expenditure.
The Council did not have legal powers to raise loans on 
its own initiative and any activity in this respect had to be 
approved by the State government and, after independence, by 
the Federal government.
It had certain powers to levy an assessment rate,
its main source of revenue, and administrative and political
jurisdiction in respect of fire services, control of street
stalls and hawkers, streets and buildings, town improvement
2and town planning. The power to impose rates was subject
3to prior approval by the Ruler-in-Counci1.
The bulk of the Council's deliberative work was designed 
to be accomplished in committees. Barrett, President of the 
Municipal Commission, was the architect of the committee system.
1. See Town Boards Enactment of the FMS (Cap. 137).
2. These powers were provided for in the Town Boards 
Enactment of the FMS (Cap. 137), first enacted in 1930. 
Certain sections of the Municipal Ordinance (Cap. 133) 
also applied.
3. Sei. Sec. File 975. After the general revaluation in
1960 Kampong Bharu was also revalued like all other 
K.L. properties, but the actual rate had been reduced 
from 6% to 4%. Of course revaluation of the annual 
value of Kampong Bharu property had been carried out 
in accordance with the provisions of the Town Board 
Enactment (Cap. 137) and had increased. The State had 
been consulted and agreed to revaluation but with a 
concessionary rate. A storm of protest came from 
Kampong Bharu residents generally and from officials 
of the Malay Agricultural Settlement Board. Petitions 
were sent (See '500 Protest Against New Rates,' Straits 
Times, November 21 , 1960) . The Selangor State Government
Executive Council refused to approve the 1961 rates if 
the Kampong Bharu revaluation was to stand. Vide York's 
letter 2/KLM.416/55/1, January 10, 1961; it was
agreed that for valuation purposes Kampong Bharu 
would be charged at 4% on 1960 values (i.e. , residents 
would actually pay less in 1961 than in 1960) .
4. E.C.G. Barrett, 'Suggested Changes in the Committee
System when the Municipal Council is Inaugurated,' 
(unpublished memorandum), (2) in K L M . 2165/51, February
12 , 195 2.
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He proposed that seven committees - Health , Public Works,
Town Planning and Building, Assessment, General Purposes,
Establishment and Finance - be established.^ Each Councillor
was to be represented on one or two committees so that, in the
tradition of municipal government in the U.K., he could become
a specialist in one or two aspects of the Council's work
as it was generally recognised that no Councillor would have
time to acquaint himself fully with every aspect of municipal 
2administration. Barrett envisaged this committee-centred 
system working in such a way that:
...the Councillors as a whole will be brought into 
close touch with every aspect of Municipal 
administration and that individual Councillors 
interested in particular aspects will be able to 
discuss the full background and details of their 
problems round a table with fellow Councillors 
with similar interests and with the Municipal 
Officer whose work and experience is intimately 
concerned with their problems.
The structure of Barrett's committee system meant that:
The Finance Committee, with its control of all 
expenditures, stands at the top of the pyramid.
The Health Committee, for instance, may ask it 
direct for budgetary provision for a new lorry 
but, if it requires an extra appointment of 
Health Inspector, it will have^to address the 
Establishment Committee first.
The committees having made their recommendations, the function 
of the Council was simply to confirm them. Occasionally, of 
course, matters could be referred back to a committee as a 
delaying tactic or as a genuine move for reconsideration.
1. In fact, an eighth committee, Sewerage, was established 
when the Council came into being. By 1960 the number 
of committees had doubled and since that time have 
continued to increase.
2. Barrett, o p . cit., p.l.
3 . Ibid. , p.l.
4 . Ibid. , p .2.
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It was this organisational structure which was 
initially adopted and the process outlined by Barrett was 
generally followed. But the effect of implementing such a 
system was that the committees became an arm of the 
bureaucracy whose officers, by reason of their tehnical 
expertise, assumed the role of guiding, and thus controlling to 
some extent, their elected couterparts. By having a large say 
in what came before committees and by ordering priorities in 
accordance with those standards which it thought desirable, 
the bureaucracy was able to exercise a large measure of control 
over what the committees recommended for confirmation by the 
Council. In this process little real debate took place in the 
Council on matters decided in committee. Committee reports 
were tabled and generally approved as a matter of course.
The majority Alliance party dominated the committees and always 
voted en bloc not only to confirm decisions reached in committee 
but also to defeat opposition party motions whenever they were 
made. The Council still remained a forum for debating other 
issues and for answering questions raised by members who 
wished to show their constituents that they were on the job.
In these respects the Council was a fairly ordinary deliberative 
body .
The Municipal Councillors
It has already been shown that the unofficial membership 
of the institutions which preceded the establishment of the 
Council was dominated by commercial interests. Was this also 
true of the Municipal Council?
A total of 51 people served as Councillors between 1952 
and 1961, 26 as elected members and 25 as nominated members.^
1. Of this universe, sixteen were interviewed. Those not 
interviewed included at least six who were deceased. 
The others were unavailable because of ill health or 
because their whereabouts were unknown. Most of the 
unofficial nominated members had left the country.
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During its entire life, the Council had only one President,
A.D. York, who became the first Commissioner of the Federal 
Capital in 1961.
From interview data, and bio-data on most of those former 
Council members not available for interviews, it is clear 
that in terms of socio-economic background most of the 
elected and nominated members were not significantly different 
from their predecessors who had served on the Sanitary and 
Town Boards and the Municipal Commission. The men of the 
majority party who were entrusted with the business of the 
Council were mostly established members of the business 
community, all of them high up in the official councils of the 
three parties which constituted the Alliance. These were 
not the radicals in local politics and the party they represent­
ed was essentially conservative. Very much the same has to 
be said for the nominated members who were chosen by the 
F.M.S. Chamber of Commerce and similar organisations.
The composition of the Council was different in one 
respect: the electoral process did make it possible for non­
establishment figures like Singham (Ind.), Devaser (IMP), 
and later V. David and S.S. Nayagam (Socialist Front) to hold 
seats. Of all of them Singham was probably the most articulate 
and best prepared spokesman. As members of the Opposition 
they were generally treated with contempt by Alliance Councillors.
There can be little doubt that the Council launched a 
number of faltering, but promising programs. Ma1ayanisation, 
the phasing out of expatriate staff and their replacement by 
local officers, received prompt support at the municipal level 
and was speedily implemented. A start in low-cost housing was 
made but from the outset there was too little in the way of
1. In this context the Socialist Front can be described 
as a combative party - see Fred Riggs, Adminis tration 
in Developing Countries (Boston, 1964) , pp.229-230 .
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long range planning/ What housing was being constructed 
was certainly spectacular and no doubt impressed foreign 
visitors but it was costly and not geared to the needs and 
ability to pay of those who qualified for such accommodation. 
There is no question, as the section on planning will show, 
that York recognised the problems of town planning and did his 
best to solve them but eventually failed. The promise of 
further constitutional change which would have been an important 
step towards laying the foundation for local government was 
sabotaged by the Alliance for no other reason than that it
2felt it would have been defeated in a free and open election.
The presence of Opposition members on the Council and the 
recognition of the power of hawkers to influence their 
electoral fortunes forced the Council to come to terms with 
the hawkers; harassment continued but avenues for redress of 
some grievances began to be opened up.
In matters of public health and public works, progress 
was apparent in the form of a $M15 million sewage scheme.
A commendable step had been taken in a full scale revaluation 
of all properties in the town in 1958, but there was still no 
recognition of the possibilities of using assessment policy as 
a fiscal tool in channelling resources into urban development. 
The establishment of a Local Education Authority which gave the 
Municipality administrative control of primary schools in 1958 
was shortlived, a casualty of inter-governmental rivalry.
There were other areas in which the Council played an 
important, though less direct, role. It was a training ground 
for a number of people who later went on to State Assembly and 
Federal Parliamentary positions. More important than this, 
elections and a partly elected Council created a bond, however 
tenuous, between the governors and the governed. At least a
1. S.N. Kuppusamy, 'The Low Cost Housing Programme of the 
Commissioner of the Federal Capital' (unpublished 
Honours exercise), University of Malaya, n.d. circa 1968.
2. This is fully documented in the preceding section.
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section of the citizenry, never very much interested in 
municipal politics judging from voter turnout figures, was 
learning to play a political role. The frail lines of 
communication between elected representatives and their 
constituents which began to be established during this period 
augured well for the future development of local government in 
K.L. All of this was destroyed with the abolition of the 
Council and elections. When Alliance hegemony was threatened 
in other urban areas this pattern was repeated until the entire 
fabric of local government was all but destroyed.
Although there were no prosecutions for corruption 
during the Council period, there can be little doubt that the 
allegations of corruption which were made from time to time 
both inside and outside of the Council were not without 
foundation. This subject will be discussed in greater detail 
in the section on development control.
The era of partly elected municipal government spans two 
periods of almost equal duration before and after independence 
in 1957. It was a time of unprecedented growth in urban 
population and the consequent rapid build-up of problems which 
the municipal administration clearly saw but could do little 
about. A State government barely able to cope with its own 
problems and a Federal Government not really interested in 
urban problems as such, allowed the problems of the city to 
drift.
in taking over the government of K.L., the Federal 
government promised to give the city the financial support 
and attention befitting a national capital, an undertaking 
it failed to keep.
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C H A PTER III
THE FEDERAL CAPITAL COM M I S S I O N  
The C om mi ssioner
The Federal Capital Act (No. 35 of 1 9 6 0 ) p r o vided that the 
C o m m i s s i o n e r  of the Federal Capital of Kuala Lumpur would have 
all the powers and duties formerly allotted to the Councillors 
and Pr es ident of the Municipal Council. This c oncentration  
of p o we r in the hands of one appointed official was criticised  
by O p p o si tion members of P a r l i a m e n t  during debate on the bill. 
They q u e s tioned the power to issue directives which was reserved 
to the Minister charged with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for the Federal 
Capital and expressed fear that either the Mi nister or the 
C o m m i s s i o n e r  could become a dictator. Dato' Suleiman bin 
Abdul Rahman, then the Min i s t e r  concerned, assured Parliament 
that he would not be a dictator. As for the Commissioner,
Dato' Su leiman said: 'Whether a p e r s o n  would be a dictator or
not depends on the pers o n a l i t y  of the person; and here we will 
see to it that no person who has the p e r s o n a l i t y  of a 
di ct at or  will be the Commissioner. ' ^
The extent to which Dato' S uleiman's assurances have 
been ho no ured is fairly easy to assess on the basis of records 
of the 'directives' from the two Ministers who have been charged 
with r e sp onsibility for the capital, and on ope n - e n d e d  depth 
inter vie ws with the three men who have served as Commissioner.
Doc uments clearly indicate that none of the Commissioners 
could po ssibly be accused of dictatorship. However the 
r el at io ns hip between the Minister, and thereby the Federal 
Government, and the Federal Capital Comm i s s i o n  is another 
m a t t e r .
The consensus seems to be that be tween 1961 and the 
est ab l i s h m e n t  of the new Ministry of Local Government and 
Hous ing  in mid-1964, the C o m m i s s i o n e r  was given a free hand
1. P a r l i amentary D e b a t e s , Dewan Ra'ayat, Vol. II., 
p . 2598 .
No . 2 2,
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and was subject only to occasional broad directives from the 
Minister of the Interior. After the transfer of ministerial 
responsibility in mid-1964, it is generally agreed that the 
new Minister, Khaw Kai-Boh, insisted on a greater measure of 
ministerial control and direction in municipal affairs and 
that the periodic ministerial directives of a general character 
were supplanted by ministerial interference, as the Commissioners 
saw it, in the day to day running of Kuala Lumpur. The record 
is quite clear on this point: in planning, urban renewal,
valuation policy, squatter clearance, housing and less 
important problems of city government, the hand of the 
Ministry has been very much in evidence. This is not to say 
that ministerial intervention has solved any problems? on the 
contrary, as several informants pointed out and as can be 
verified from relevant records, ministerial involvement in 
the business of running the city has been largely negative.
More often than not the Minister has either acted to prevent 
the Commissioner from taking a certain course of action^ or 
intervened on behalf of special interests to secure certain 
kinds of privileges.^
The relationship between the State of Selangor and the 
Federal Capital Commission was somewhat strained, according 
to the Commissioners, particularly on the question of the 
provision of land for public housing, which is the main subject 
of mutual concern. Two of the three said that because of 
previous State positions they had held, they had easy access 
to and good personal relations with the State Secretary and 
that business could be transacted relatively easily on the 
telephone or in short informal meetings. One of them said 
that after 1961 the State government had become difficult to 
work with.
There was general agreement that the most important 
problems facing the Municipality were those that had to do
1. For example, the 1969 revaluation implementation.
2. This has been particularly evident in planning.
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with planning, squatters, traffic, hawkers and the internal 
inefficiencies of the administrative setup. Two of the 
Commissioners complained of the lack of co-operation they got 
from the Secretary's department, pointing out that it did not 
function as a Secretariat to co-ordinate the work of all other 
departments.
Asked for an overall evaluation, one of the interviewees 
said that during his time the new system worked very well 
but the other two implied that it had not lived up to expectations. 
One of the Commissioners said he definitely favoured the present 
system because 'if you have elections only self-interested 
people get elected and the good of the community as a whole 
suffers' The other two expressed support for at least a 
partly elected body with a veto power over council decisions held 
by the President or some other responsible individual. All 
three said outright that most of the official members of the 
Advisory Board were unsatisfactory because they rarely attended 
meetings in person but sent junior staff and were just not 
interested in the problems facing the city; they each singled 
out a couple of the unofficial members who were particularly 
outstanding and generally thought more highly of the unofficial 
members as a whole than of their official counterparts.
The interviews and examination of official documentary 
material together constitute a basis for some evaluation 
of the role of the Commissioner. Ultimately it must be 
concluded that despite the power the Commissioner has on paper, 
what happens in Kuala Lumpur depends on the will of the 
national Alliance government. Through the responsible Minister
1. This seems a very common form of political cynicism in 
the Municipality, the idea that elected representatives 
are always out to line their pockets and those of 
their backers. This view is usually accompanied by 
the belief that appointed officials are somehow above 
such things. This particular informant felt that 
appointed members should replace elected members in the 
State Legislative Assembly also but he was unable to 
offer any solution to the final problem of who does 
the appointing.
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it dictates '...the policy to be fo11owed...in relation to 
matters which appear to him to affect the interests of the 
municipality'.1 What constitutes the 'interests of the 
municipality' is left to the Minister to define. Any serious 
effort to deal with the major problems of planning and 
squatters in the interests of the general community and certain 
under-privileged sections thereof must unavoidably conflict 
with the interests of other sections of the community; it is 
within the power of the Minister to decide whose interests are 
the interests of the Municipality. As long as the Alliance 
government relies for its main support on allowing laissez- 
faire private enterprise the free run of the city and the nation, 
the decision is a foregone conclusion. Any scheme which 
interferes with vested interests is simply bad politics and 
cannot be allowed. Therefore new and higher property valu­
ations cannot be implemented, particularly in an election year. 
Factory owners in a new area where there is no housing at all 
cannot be asked to provide quarters for their labourers in 
order to prevent squatting. Development planning which 
curtails property owners' rights is pigeonholed. The list is 
endless.
This is no accident. As was very clearly shown earlier the 
creation of the FCC was a move by the Alliance Government to 
insure that the Opposition could not take control of the city, 
with the Alliance maintaining its hold through Federal control 
(the assumption perhaps being that Parliament was impregnable 
because of gerrymandering). The Federal Capital Act enabled 
the Alliance to maintain control of Kuala Lumpur, and it would 
be absurd to suppose that the power to make basically political 
decisions would be handed over to an apolitical Commissioner.
As demonstrated above, these powers are very clearly reserved 
to the Federal government, embodied in the Minister.
What then is left to the Commissioner? In the words of
1. Federal Capital A c t , (No. 35 of 1960) .
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one of them, 'I am a combination of mayor and town clerk.'
He is the man who makes routine administrative decisions on 
establishment matters; he signs the letters and greets the 
visitors. He informs the Advisory Board on selected issues; he 
serves as a link between his own bureaucracy and the Ministry. 
His job is to apply policy, not make it. He is, in the final 
analysis, a care and maintenance man. And as far as the commun­
ity in general is concerned, he is invisible.
All of this is not to deny the power of an individual 
to shape his role to some extent. Perhaps an aggressive dynamic 
personality, a 'leader of men', might be able to inspire the 
municipal bureaucracy to mass behind him in the face of the 
Alliance government's conservative bias. But this requires 
qualities that it would be unfair and unrealistic to expect 
from senior civil servants especially chosen because they have 
learned over the years exactly where they fit into the system.
The Heads of Department“^
Directly under the Commissioner of the Federal Capital
in the administrative organisation of the Municipality are
the seven municipal department heads. They are the Municipal
Secretary, the Municipal Treasurer, the Municipal Engineer,
the Municipal Health Officer, the Municipal Architect, the
Municipal Valuer, and the Municipal Planner. The size of their
2departments, including daily rated labourers, was as follows:
Department
Secretary (inc. Fire Brigade)
Treasurer
Engineer
Health Officer
Architect
Valuer
Planner
N o . of Staff
199
170
950
1800
92
33
28
1. This section is based in large part on interview data.
The bibliography lists the informants by code nurnber 
and the dates on which each interview or re-interview 
was conducted. See Appendix E for a copy of the interview 
schedule and other information.
2. Data provided by Establishment Officer, Federal Capital
Commission, 1969. For other related data see Appendix F.
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Although the seven heads are theoretically on an equal 
footing, having the same job classification, the two with 
the smallest departments are paid on a lower scale. As is 
common in this kind of administrative set-up, the Secretary 
is expected to be primus inter pares and to serve a co­
ordinating function among all departments and the Commissioner.
All seven departments heads were interviewed. Four were 
Chinese, two, Indians and one, Malay; they were all male.
Their ages ranged from 31 to 50 with a mean of 41.7 years.
The mean age at which they became department heads was 36.
The mean number of years spent in Municipal service before 
being promoted to head was seven years, but this differed 
considerably for each individual. Three of them had come up 
through the ranks after serving eleven, fifteen, and sixteen 
years each before reaching the top position in their departments 
and had gained their professional qualifications through in- 
service training schemes. Two had been promoted from a 
deputy's position in which they had first been employed three 
years before. Two came directly into their positions from 
outside employment. The average number of years that these 
individuals had held their top positions was six with a range 
from one to sixteen years.
Only one of the informants was born outside of Malaya/ and 
he had been born in Singapore; three were born in Kuala Lumpur 
itself/ one elsewhere in Selangor and two in the neighboring 
state of Negri Sembilan. All but one had lived in Kuala 
Lumpur for more than ten years, three having lived in the 
Federal Capital since birth. Four of the informants' fathers 
had also been born in Malaya,two in India and one in Singapore.
Five of the informants had learned English as a second 
language. Six of the seven had gone to English medium primary 
schools and all of them had completed their high school 
education in the English 'stream'. All had tertiary level 
professional training; amongst the seven there was one lawyer 
and two university graduates, one with a post-graduate degree.
All seven had at one time or another studied abroad, mainly 
at institutions in Australia and the U.K.; there was only one 
graduate of an American university. In terms of formal 
educational qualifications these Malaysian department heads 
were in no way less qualified than their expatriate 
prede ces sors.
All were higher in the socio-economic scale than their 
fathers whose occupations had included padi planter, hospital 
assistant, government clerk, furniture rental proprietor, 
hospital chemist and court interpreter. The department heads 
can collectively be described as upper middle class within the 
Malaysian context and their fathers, as a whole, represent­
ative of a smaller nascent middle class of a generation ago.
All seven informants were bilingual in Malay and English 
and six could speak from one to four other languages or 
dialects.
Only one department head was single; the others were 
married with four or five children each. Although only two of 
the seven lived in homes that they owned and the other five 
occupied houses provided by the Municipality, at least three 
of the latter and one of the former owned houses which they 
rented out. All of them owned cars.
Four of the respondents said their gross monthly income 
from all sources exceeded $M3,000 a month and the other three 
placed it at between $M2,000 and $M2,500 per month.
None of the informants had taken his first full time job 
with the Municipality; six had worked briefly for some other 
government agency before joining the service and one had 
come to the Municipality from a non-government employer. Asked 
why they had decided to work for the Municipality, four 
mentioned security and financial reasons, one because he was 
on a five-year government bond and the sixth because he wanted 
to avoid becoming a judge. The seventh respondent did not 
give any special reason. All of the informants said that they
had no regrets abort the choice they had made and would do it 
again.
Asked what they liked most about their jobs, the 
informants' replies ranged from the 'creative, challenging, 
can see results' type to the more pragmatic 'stationed in town, 
educational opportunity for the children better in town'.
Two of the informants said they had no complaints about their 
jobs; one complained about the fact that there were no prospects 
for promotion and the others mentioned administrative problems 
and what they described as 'political interference from the 
outside' and the frustrations that resulted from this.
Only one of the seven could not be described as a 
'joiner'; the others were members of several public affairs, 
professional, social and cultural organisations.
The department heads' view of themselves ;^
Each of the informants was asked the following questions:
'How would you describe the job of being a 
Department Head? What are some of the 
most important things that you do? Are there 
some things that you feel you should do but that 
you cannot; why is this and what are some of 
these things? What are some of the most 
important problems that you face as head of 
department?'
These particular questions were designed to give some 
insight into the department head's perception of his role, 
his relationship with his colleagues and the Commissioner of 
the Federal Capital and in general, to get some idea of how 
the bureaucratic world was perceived and evaluated.
1. Besides the interview data, a substantial part of this 
section is based on the evidence given by department 
heads to the Sub-Committee appointed by the Advisory 
Board to consider the Preliminary Survey Report of the 
Management Consultants, Messrs W.D. Scott & Co. Pty 
Ltd. Five meetings were held between February 23, 1967
and May 9, 1967; see KLM 395/65. The Minutes of these
meetings were a summary only and not a verbatim record 
of the proceedings.
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In giving evidence before the Organisation anc
Management Study Sub-Committee, Haji Ismail, then
Commissioner, had said that the whole municipal organisation
was very sick and that something must be done, and done quickly,
to cure it of its ills.’*’ None of the respondents in the course
of the interviews described the Federal Capital Commission
quite so bluntly but they all shared the view that not only
did their own departments fall short, in varying degrees, of
a desired level of efficiency, but that relationships between
departments also left a great deal to be desired. In 1967
the frustration with departmental and overall inefficiency was
so great that most of the department heads who gave evidence
before the 0. & M. Study Sub-Committee were prepared to favour
2a three-and-a-half year survey that would cost $A207,000,
although not all of them felt in any way certain that such a
survey could cure the administration of its ills unless it
was accompanied by drastic measures such as dismissal of
'deadwood1 23 staff, wholesale retrenchment of large sections of
the daily rated work force and the elimination of political
interference. No one was quite sure how the latter could be
accomplished, but at least three were strongly of the
opinion that political interference, particularly by Alliance
3office holders, interfered with good administration.
It is against this background that the responses of the 
informants must be viewed.
All of the respondents felt that their primary duty was 
to see that their departments were properly run, by which they
1. Ibid., March 24, 1967.
2. By February 1969 this survey was still being considered by 
the Minis try.
3. They were voicing a conviction put more succinctly by 
Nathan Long, 'Attempts to solve administrative problems 
in isolation from the structure of power and purpose
in the polity are bound to prove illusory.' (Nathan 
Long, 'Power and Administration,' in Robert T. Golembiewski 
et a l . , (editors) Public Administration, 1966 , pp. 305-313 
at p . 313.)
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meant the efficient handling of day to day chores.
Most of them were concerned about long range policies and felt 
that this was a matter for interdepartmental consultation 
which was sorely lacking; some felt that such a state of 
affairs existed because of a lack of leadership by the Comm­
issioner and/or the Secretary. It was generally recognised 
that there were serious personality clashes between certain 
heads and between the Commissioner and at least one department 
head.
While the informants saw their main role in narrow 
departmental efficiency terms, this was not the only role they 
saw for themselves. They did not see themselves merely as 
static managers, as the recipients of instructions from the 
Commissioner and the givers of orders to their subordinates.
At least two of the informants not only saw their role as 
policy makers for their own and other departments but were 
in fact so involved; this was primarily made possible by 
the confidence in which they were held by the Commissioner, 
and in the case of one of them, the fact that he had the e^r 
of the Minister and was held in high regard by almost all of 
the members of the Advisory Board. Those other department 
heads who thought policy making was part of their role resented 
the confidence in which two of their colleagues were held but 
felt that it would be impolitic and in bad taste to force 
themselves into spheres of activity where they seemed to be 
unwanted. All but one of them were prepared to accept their 
de facto inferior position by working through and with their 
colleague who was closest to the Minister, the Commissioner and 
the Board to achieve some of their own objectives. Although 
they did not say so specifically they all implied that this 
provided a satisfactory strategy for survival and represented 
the best that could be made out of the present situation. One
1. For example the Treasurer had told the 0. & M. Sub-Committee
on March 1, 1967 that 'the most important part of the
exercise was to train the existing Municipal staff in 
office management and organisation methods'.
96 .
of the department heads felt very strongly that this was 
wrong in principle and to a great extent had adopted a posture 
of non-co-operation. Most of his colleagues drew attention to 
this attitude which they contended was largely responsible for 
the low l'evel of co-operation between department heads 
generally.
It is interesting to note and important to emphasise that
the department head ('A') who was considered to be closest to
the Commissioner believed that he had a duty to sell programs,
identify problem areas and suggest solutions to most questions
facing the Municipality; his catholic concerns are in contrast 
with the more specific departmental preoccupations of the 
colleague ('B ') who was also supposed to be held in high esteem 
by the Commissioner. 'A' was careful not to impinge on 'B's' 
territorial concerns; each said he held the other in high esteem; 
but their relationship was not what might be described as 
'close', which was probably because 'A' was a very senior 
department head and 'B' a relative newcomer. They were not 
power hungry conspirators. Both, however, clearly recognised 
their unequalsubordinate status vis-a-vis the Commissioner 
and the Minister, and each had worked out for himself what 
issues he could push and how far he could go.
The informants almost unanimously agreed that the most 
important problem that they faced concerned the quality of 
staff in the whole municipal administration, and all but two 
felt that if this problem could be solved, everything would be 
fine. The principal dissenter from this view thought that 
his main problem was insufficient power to implement decisions 
affecting his own department. The other informant, who agreed 
that getting high quality personnel was his main problem, said 
that even if this were solved, local politics would still remain 
an important problem for his department.
All except one department held regular meetings involving 
the top three or four people in the department. In all but 
one of these cases the department head himself was in
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attendance. There were also frequent unscheduled meetings 
between department heads and subordinates on specific matters 
as and when they arose. The frequency of the scheduled meetings 
varied from once to twice a month. All of the relevant 
respondents described the meetings as being useful. Responses 
to interview questions, confirmed by personal observations, 
showed that all of the department heads were readily available 
to their immediate subordinate staff and except for one 
department, it can be said that department heads and those 
immediately below them worked closely together.
In all of the departments save one, the head relied mostly 
on a single deputy or on a number of high-ranking staff 
members. The exception named his stenographer as the person 
he relied on most of all.
Five of the seven informants expressed the view that the 
regularly scheduled meetings between the department heads and 
the Commissioner were either unimportant or a waste of time; 
the same five said unequivocally that the meetings did not 
deal with important problems and all but one said that they 
did not look forward to these meetings. Most of the informants 
felt that the monthly meetings could serve a very useful purpose 
provided that crucial questions were put on the agenda and 
some determined leadership provided the atmosphere necessary 
for such high level consultation.
When the respondents were asked to name the colleague 
they respected most of all three said that they respected 
them all equally, two nominated the Treasurer, one voted for 
the Architect and one said that he respected none of them.
All seven respondents said that some department heads were more 
powerful than others, and when asked to name the most powerful 
five of them named the same colleague (included the person 
named, who was aware of this reputation and did not repudiate 
it) and two refused to name anyone specifically. Three of the 
five named another colleague who was an up-and-coming power 
wielder. In reply to the question about what made a department
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head powerful all of the respondents either said flatly or 
implied that knowing the Commissioner well and being close to 
him was the most important single resource that was a 
prerequisite for being powerful.
Six of the seven informants named the individual who 
had been generally chosen as the most powerful as also being 
the department head who was closest to the Commissioner.^
One of the informants with a long record of service with the 
municipal bureaucracy said that being close to the Commissioner 
was not necessarily a permanent thing. The department heads 
were like the 'old man's' seven wives; some were held in 
greater favour than others and occasionally the order changed.
As far as their relationships with the Commissioner were
concerned all of the informants said they felt free to take
problems to him, but this accessibility did not mean that their
representations to him were always productive or that he was
always ready to make decisions; indeed, in the case of really
substantive issues, the Commissioner was generally accused of
2refusing to make any decision at all. In describing the nature 
of the relationship between themselves and the Commissioner the 
respondents ranged from an enthusiastic 'very close, excellent,' 
to a lukewarm 'he doesn't bother me, I don't bother him,' 
'businesslike, guarded,' with three of each and one cautious 
'good, still feeling my way' reply. Five of the seven said 
outright that the department heads and the Commissioner did not 
work together as a team but did not imply that this was
1. The nominee himself said that he was close to the 
Commissioner because the nature of his duties required 
such a relationship. He insisted that the Commissioner 
did not play favorites. The colleague who was reputed 
to be the second most powerful pointed out that any 
head of department who wanted to could be close to
the Commissioner. (The reputation for power should not 
be confused with actually being powerful. Evidence of 
another kind would have to be adduced to prove that.)
2. Only one of the seven was particularly bothered by 
this, and he said that he had just about given up 
going to see him except about fairly routine matters.
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necessarily the fault of the Commissioner; the other two felt 
that there was teamwork.
Asked for an evaluation of the official and unofficial 
members of the Advisory Board, four respondents gave the latter 
an excellent rating and two rated them as good. The seventh 
said, 'some do constructive work and some are opportunists, 
but the majority are aware of their responsibility.' They 
were much less happy with the official members with three each 
going for a 'fair' or 'poor' rating, and one informant saying 
that the relevant ministries were not represented. When asked 
to rate the interest of the Advisory Board as a whole in the 
problems of Kuala Lumpur two informants gave an unqualified 
'interested' rating and the third a mere 'mildly interested.'
The remaining four insisted on giving separate ratings for the 
officials and unofficials with the former being evaluated 
this time as 'not interested at all' and the latter as only 
'interested.' When these informants were asked if they felt 
that members of the Board did a great deal of work in preparing 
for meetings most of them said that on the whole they didn't 
think so, although two respondents pointed out that there were 
one or two unofficial members who seemed to be both conscientious 
and well prepared. Only one informant said unequivocally 
that members of the Board as a whole were quite conscientious 
and generally well prepared.
The single most frequently cited criticism of the official 
members was that they were often either absent from meetings 
or that they sent deputies who were generally junior officers.
To add to the problem different deputies were frequently sent 
so that this affected the extent to which discussions of agenda 
items could be intelligently followed.
In answering the question relating to the overall 
performance of the Federal Capital Commission since its 
establishment in 1961, only one head of department said that 
it had worked very well; the other six responses were split 
evenly between an unenthusiastic 'not too badly but not as
100 .
well as expected' and a 'poor' rating. One of the most 
disappointed respondents put it this way: 'It has not turned
out to be as autonomous as expected; we thought it would be 
more efficient without politicians but now no one will make 
decisions and many levels must be consulted. There is too 
much outside political interference.'
Four of the respondents were of the opinion that the 
former system was better and three of them unhesitatingly 
favoured a fully elected Council, with the fourth agreeing 
subject to the proviso that the educational qualifications for 
candidates should be raised. Of the three who felt that the 
Advisory Board system was better, two would not favour any 
kind of an elected body and one said that he supported a partly 
elected Council of seven elected and five nominated members.
But most interesting are the reasons offered in support of 
the various opinions. The three who opposed the present system 
and who supported a fully elected Council said:
'Easier to satisfy grievances of elected 
members...they could understand problems and 
make decisions; now the Commissioner will 
not decide and sends everything to the 
Ministry.'
'It is democratic . . .whatever the shortcomings... 
you know what the public wants.'
'Commissioner and department heads have too 
much power . '
The two who unreservedly favoured the present system and 
who opposed any form of an elected body put it this way:
'K .L . is the capital of Malaysia and should represent 
all . . .people don't know what they want...'
'We need some system of feedback...an ombudsman of 
sorts...but not elections.'
In order to round off the informants' evaluation of the 
Advisory Board and of the Federal Capital Commission system, 
they were asked to name some of the most important problems 
facing the FCC. Three specifically urban issues - squatters, 
hawkers and planning - were the most frequently mentioned,
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followed by problems of health and sanitation and personnel 
and management. Lack of finance, interestingly enough, was 
raised by only one informant.
When asked to evaluate the performance of the FCC over 
the last five years on three specific problems, five of the seven 
gave squatter clearance a performance rating of poor or very 
poor. One said that while squatter clearance had not been 
carried out effectively, he did not see this as necessarily 
bad if you couldn't offer them anything else. The seventh 
though that progress had been good.
In regard to planning the position was almost identical, 
with five saying it had been poor or very poor, one saying it 
wasn't his department's business, and the last evaluating 
the performance as good. The low-cost public housing program 
elicited more favorable comments, with one excellent rating, 
three good ratings, two poor or very poor, and one person 
saying that it was the problem of the Ministry and not the FCC.
Part of the work of the Municipality brings it into 
contact with State and Federal agencies of government. The 
department heads were asked to describe the relationship, 
as they saw it, between the Federal Capital Commission and the 
State and Federal Governments (i.e., the Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing). Relations with the State were 
described by six informants as poor and one offered no opinion. 
The Ministry, on the other hand, rated an 'excellent' from two 
informants, two 'goods' and three 'bads'. Those who said that 
relations between the Ministry and the FCC were poor felt that 
the Ministry was too busy with other problems and did not have 
anyone on the staff who understood the nature and complexity 
of urban problems. As for the principal area in which it did 
take an interest, planning, this took the form of interference 
on behalf of powerful vested interests rather than concern 
for planning policy in general, a state of affairs borne out 
in large part by the section on planning.
Those who described the Municipality's relationship with
102 .
the Ministry as 'excellent' or 'good' gave various reasons.
The department head who had been rated the most powerful said 
the Minister was very cordial and approachable and had 
given him backing and encouragement. Another reasoned, half 
facetiously perhaps, that since the Commissioner was the 
Minister's man, relations must be good. The other two offered 
no specific reasons.
Two sets of questions were asked about interest groups 
and powerful individuals. All but two heads said that there were 
pressure groups with which the FCC had to deal and when asked 
to name some they listed the Selangor Hawkers' and Petty Traders' 
Association, political parties, Chambers of Commerce, the 
Selangor Property Owners' and Ratepayers' Association, and the 
newly formed Malay Hawkers' Association led by Tengku Muhyideen, 
a member of the Royal House of Negri Sembilan. The general 
view expressed was that these groups were only occasionally 
active, with the hawkers being the most powerful. At least 
one, the Selangor Property Owners' and Ratepayers' Association, 
was considered defunct. None of the respondents seemed to be 
clear as to precisely what made these groups powerful and 
gave the impression that when these groups did become involved 
in matters affecting the Municipality they worked through the 
Minister or his colleagues who were high up in the ruling 
party and did not bother going through Municipal officials. As 
far as powerful men behind the scenes were concerned four said 
that there were such men who operated in Municipal politics but 
when they were asked to name some, there were only general 
categories like 'businessmen and politicians', 'Alliance men 
trying to deliver goods' . It was only after a series of re­
interviews that names were forthcoming. Here again, the 
implication seemed to be that 'influence peddlers' worked 
through the Ministry rather than through Municipal officers.
While this could have been a ploy to shift the focus of attention 
away from the Municipality (on the assumption that nobody 
likes to agree that he is subject to manipulation or pressure) 
other information available tends to support the view expressed
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here.
The two informants who said at the main interview that 
they had not heard of any powerful men, after closer acquaint­
ance provided names and gave examples of how powerful individ­
uals operated. Powerful men in the community were considered 
to derive their power from two sources: they had money and
they supported the ruling party. Only one informant did not 
respond to this question at all.
All informants felt that interest groups could play a 
useful role in municipal affairs provided they worked for 
general development and the good of the community. The 
activities of powerful men were considered by those who 
acknowledged them as one of the facts of life; they interfered 
with good administration but there was little that could be 
done about it.
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The Advisory Board
Under the provisions of the Federal Capital Act (No. 35 
of 1960) the Advisory Board of the Federal Capital was establish­
ed 'to advise the Commissioner upon such matters connected 
with the administration of the municipality as the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong may by order prescribe , and upon any questions
2referred to the Board by the Minister or the Commissioner'.
It is important to recognise that the law does not require 
that the Advisory Board be consulted on all matters concerning 
the FCC, and what is to be referred to them for advice is left 
to the discretion of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the responsible 
Minister and the Commissioner.
In any case the Commissioner is free to act in opposition
to the advice given to him by the Advisory Board provided
only that he includes in the minutes the grounds and reasons
3for his decision.
The Board consists of the Commissioner of the Federal 
Capital, six official members and five unofficial members.
The official members are the Secretary to the Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing, the Secretary to the Treasury, 
the Secretary to the Ministry of Education, the Principal 
Establishment Officer, the Secretary to the Ministry of Health 
and Social Welfare, and the Secretary to the Ministry of Works, 
Posts and Telecommunications. The unofficials consist of persons 
who do not hold any full time office in any of the public 
services and are appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for a 
term not exceeding three years. Unofficial members are
1
1. This section is based on interview data. The bibliography 
lists the informants by code number and the dates on 
which each interview or re-interview was conducted. See 
Appendix E for a copy of the interview schedule and other 
information.
2. Federal Capital Act (No. 35 of 1960) .
3 . Ibid.
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eligible for re-appointment.
Since the Board was established in April 1961, a total
2of thirteen unofficial members have served on it. Six of 
these members have been Chinese, four, Indian and three, Malay. 
The overall mean number of years on the Board was three with 
a range of one to seven years. The mean overall age at the 
time of appointment to the Board was 46.5 years (range 31-61, 
N=13). The mean age for the first five appointees when nominat­
ed in 1961 was 53.2 years (range 41-61); the five who 
constituted the unofficial membership of the Board in 1969, 
however, were a considerably younger average of 40.2 years 
(range 33-53) at the time of their appointment.
Four of these informants received their primary education 
in non-English language schools, two in Malay and two in 
Chinese. All except one subsequently attended English medium 
secondary schools. Of those who had either attended or 
completed secondary school, five received no further formal 
education beyond this level; two had begun a university degree 
but had not completed it and the remaining five were university 
graduates - three lawyers, one architect and a chartered 
accountant. The educational profile of the first five appointees 
differs considerably from the five who were members of the 
Board in 1969. Among the first five there was one university
1. Federal Capital (Advisory Board) Regulations, 1961.
2. In late 1969 two new nominees were appointed to the Board 
to replace Senator Athi Nahappan who had served since 1964 
and Mr James Lee who had been appointed in 1966. The
new nominees were interviewed but the analysis does 
not include them. Eleven of the thirteen members who served 
on the Board between 1961 and 1969 were interviewed. One 
former member was deceased, and the other who was not 
interviewed had attended only two of a total of nine 
meetings during his term. No women have ever been 
appointed, although the regulations do not disqualify 
them. This situation is unlike the days of the Municipal 
Council, when Mrs T.R. Marks served as a nominated councillor 
for seven years and Mrs Devaki Krishnan served two terms 
as an elected member.
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graduate, three with secondary degrees or at least some high 
school background and one who had taken some university course 
work by correspondence and had failed; in the 1969 group there 
were two lawyers, an architect, a chartered accountant and 
one member who had begun, but had been forced to abandon, a 
university degree.
Of the eleven interviewed, only one had lived in Kuala 
Lumpur for between eleven and fifteen years; the others had 
lived in the capital for over twenty years. Five were born 
outside of Malaya and, of the remaining six, four were born 
in Kuala Lumpur and the other two outside the State of Selangor 
Fully eight of the eleven informants' fathers were foreign born
The two Malay members spoke English as their only 
foreign language. All five Chinese informants spoke Malay, 
English and between one to four Chinese dialects. The four 
Indians spoke Malay, English and Tamil; one spoke Gurmukhi as 
well.
All but one of the eleven informants provided occupational 
data for themselves and their fathers. The sons of small 
shopkeepers, clerks, and small rubber estate owners had 
become professional men, hoteliers, teachers, and big business­
men and members of several boards of directors. Not only 
had they surpassed the occupational status of their fathers 
but nine of the thirteen had been the recipients of State and 
Federal awards in recognition of services rendered.
Of the ten who provided income data, eight claimed to make 
more than $M3000 a month,“*" one slightly less than $M1000 a 
month and one placed his monthly income between $M2001-2500.
Ten of the eleven informants were married with families 
ranging from three to fourteen children, and all of them, as 
would be expected, were car and home owners. While the fathers
1. The income scale from $M1000 a month up through $M3000 
at intervals of $500 proved to be too low for this 
group.
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came from a nascent middle class of a generation ago, the sons 
can certainly be described as part of the new Malaysian elite."*"
Of the thirteen appointees, nine had been or still were
members of one of the constituent parties of the Alliance;
at least six of these had at one time or another held some
formal positions of leadership in one of these parties or the
2Alliance itself. Only one member of any of the opposition 
parties has ever been a member of the Board, Labor Party man 
S.S. Nayagam who served from April 1, 1961 to March 31, 1964.
Of the remaining three, one said he had never been a member 
of the Alliance, although he had been asked to accept a 
position on the Board by Tan Sri T.H. Tan, a very highranking 
official of the Alliance. The other two informants had also 
never had any formal partisan association with any political 
party. Of the nine Alliance men, four had successfully run for 
the K.L. Municipal Council, one had run for the Municipal 
Council in 1952 as a member of another party, and lost, and one 
had been appointed to the Municipal Council after having been 
rejected at the polls. At least one had been elected to the 
State Legislative Assembly, one had been elected to Parliament 
and three had been appointed Senators in the National Parliament. 
The one opposition man had been elected to the K.L. Municipal 
Council shortly before its demise, and the three unaffiliated 
members had never run for public office or been nominated to 
any legislative body.
In making appointments to public or even private bodies, 
it has long been the policy in Malaysia to try to maintain some
1. Mr. S.S. Nayagam, the only bona fide opposition party 
member to serve on the Board would, no doubt, dissociate 
himself from the elite label on both economic and philo­
sophical grounds.
2. The appointment of Dennis Goonting and Bernard T.H.
Wang in late 1969 continued the pattern of appointing 
members of the Alliance or individuals having close 
connections with high ranking Alliance officials. With 
these appointments the Board does not have an Indian 
unofficial member on it for the first time since it was 
e s tab 1ished.
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semblance of racial balance in recognition of the multi­
racial character of the population at large. Appointments to 
the Advisory Board have been no exception.
Racial equity, however, has never been the main basis for 
selecting appointed community representatives, from the days 
of the Sanitary Board. Race has merely been a criterion for 
distribution of seats within a very small class of racially- 
mixed economic elites. The evidence of past and recent nomin­
ations to the Advisory Board illustrates this singular point. 
Despite their varied racial origins, what all the unofficial 
members of the Board except Nayagam particularly have in 
common is a common ideology of conservatism; they are represent­
atives, not of their ethnic groups, but of the propertied 
class .
The power of nomination in the hands of the Alliance was 
clearly designed and used for political purposes, to control 
the Board and ensure that no action was taken which might 
adversely affect the fortunes of the party.'*' On the major 
issues which have come before the Board since 1961, this has 
meant taking no action at all.
Before any of the Advisory Board members had been inter­
viewed, some informants suggested that the five unofficial 
members had been appointed to represent the ratepayers and the 
interests of the residents of K L . It therefore seemed approp- 
priate and important to ask the members of the Board how they 
perceived their representational role and to determine both 
through interviews and documentary material whether there was 
any convergence between the members' perception of their role 
and actual behavior.
The interview data quite clearly indicated that all of the 
respondents saw their role as fundamentally advisory; i.e.,
1 . No normative connotations are implied in this 
statement.
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they saw themselves essentially in the legal role to which 
they had been assigned by virtue of the enabling legislation. 
Three of the members, while seeing themselves as playing 
mainly an advisory role hedged their answers to the question:
Do you think unofficial members have any real power to get 
things done? with the following provisoes:
...to a limited extent, yes...I have 
made certain recommendations as a member 
of the XXX Committee;...initiated 
certain moves in connection with the 
XXX Survey;...made suggestions on low 
cost housing.
I feel we have a persuasive basis to 
get things done even though persuasion 
has yielded few results.
. . .we have no power. . .but the Commissioner 
would be foolish to dismiss our 
sugges tions.
But even the members who felt that it would be proper for 
them to initiate discussion on various topics and suggest 
courses of action which might be adopted rarely did so. On 
the few occasions when they had temporarily abandoned their 
predominantly advisory role and had tried to champion a 
particular cause, they were unsuccessful, a state of affairs 
which prompted one of them to describe his experience on the 
Board as frustrating. His two similarly inclined colleagues 
were more circumspect, but they too left little doubt of their 
basic dissatisfaction. A question designed to elicit inform­
ation from all eleven informants on what they thought was 
their most important contribution to the Board revealed that 
nine of them could not think of anything important that they 
had contributed except for their physical presence at meetings. 
One of them described the Board's 'rubber stamp' approval 
function in Malaysian fashion: 'We just put the chop, lah.'
None of the respondents had any contact with ratepayers 
or citizens of KL in general or made any efforts to establish
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such contact. Except for two who said that occasional 
representations were made to them by some of the 'bigger 
ratepayers', the informants said that individual citizens 
and interest groups seldom approached them for anything.
Several members pointed out that they doubted very much if 
more than a handful of people like lawyers, politicians and 
businessmen even knew of the existence of the Federal Capital 
Commission, much less of the unofficial members, either 
individually or collectively. Despite this almost total lack 
of contact with the citizenry in general there was at least one 
member who felt that it was important for him to keep in touch 
with local opinion, which he did by reading the daily news­
papers in English, Tamil and Malay. He deplored the fact that 
there were very few civic bodies in K.L. and the general lack 
of political sophistication, and implied that if this were 
somehow remedied better contact between the unofficial members 
of the Board and the citizenry might result. This was not a 
point of view that the majority of his Advisory Board coll­
eagues shared.
The informants were asked to rate their own interest in 
the problems of K.L. and that of their official counterparts.
As was to be expected they rated themselves as either 'highly 
interested' or 'interested' and rated most of their official 
colleagues as either 'not interested at all' or 'mildly 
interested'. The general feeling seemed to be that officials 
had other problems on their minds, were more hesitant to 
critically review problems, and were by and large less well
1. This is an interesting fact and is an indication of the 
extent to which the Advisory Board in general and 
the unofficial members in particular were out of touch 
with 'the people' . It is all the more interesting when 
compared with the elected members of the former Municipal 
Council all of whom said they had established regular means 
of communicating with their respective electorates. Three 
of the members of the Board who had been elected Councillors 
and had kept in touch with their constituents, no longer 
felt that this contact was necessary.
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prepared to do so, partly because they turned up at meetings 
so seldom and sent along ill-prepared junior officers who were 
not in a position to take independent stands on issues.
The following table sets out the attendance record for 74 
meetings of the Board from April 1961 to September 1968:
Officials
Sec., Min. of Interior1 *3
Sec., Min. of Treasury
Sec. , Min. of Education
Princ. Est. Officer
Sec. , Min. Health & Soc. Welfare
Sec., Min. Works, Posts, Telecoms
Uno f ficials
Leong Hoe Yeng 
Lim Hee Hong 
Abdul1ah 
Tharma Ungarn 
N ayagam
Chan Keong Hon 
Haji Mohd. Syed 
Gurdial Singh 
Shamsuddin 
Nahappan 
Michael Chen 
Teh Yew Weng 
James Lee
aFrom August 3, 1964, Sec. to Min.
Absent Deputy
Sent
Total n o . 
of meetings
4 14 74
13 45 74
27 12 74
7 45 74
26 24 74
16 26 74
2 11
13 49
12 21
0 2 1
6 29
18 60
0 8
0 9
19 45
16 45
7 9
1 2 5
8 20
of Local Govt. & Housing.
Examination of the table reveals that the attendance record 
of the officials is anything but satisfactory. Their mean 
overall absentee rate is 58%, including the occasions when a 
deputy was sent.
Despite the generally unsatisfactory performance of the 
official members, the majority of the unofficial members who 
were interviewed rated the overall performance of the FCC 
since its inception as satisfactory or better.'*' One of the
1. Compare this with the overall 'poor' rating vrhich three
of the seven department heads gave in response to this
question.
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unofficials who had been a member of the Municipal Council and 
who had expended considerable effort in support of the 
establishment of the Federal Capital Commission said that in 
retrospect he felt that the whole project had been 'a great 
and tragic mistake'. At least four of the seven who gave the 
overall performance a satisfactory or better rating qualified 
their responses by saying that their evaluation referred only 
to the day-to-day routine administration, the implication 
being that the handling of problems associated with the town's 
development was less satisfactory.
In order to refine our understanding of the members' 
evaluation of the FCC, all respondents were asked to express an 
opinion on two related questions:
1) whether the FCC was better than the former 
partly elected Council; and
2) whether they would favor a fully elected 
or a partly elected Council.
Of the seven who had given the FCC a satisfactory or better 
rating only five said they felt the FCC was better than the 
former Municipal Council. One of the five said he didn't 
feel very strongly about this and that he would support a 
partly elected council with a majority of elected members. 
Another one of this group, one of the longest standing members 
of the Board and a man nominated by several knowledgeable 
informants as being very powerful, said he would not support 
the establishment of a fully elected Council, but that in a 
few years' time some form of partly elected Municipal government 
might be possible, when the population was better educated and 
more responsible, adding in the same breath that 'democracy was
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very inefficient and e x p e n s i v e . O f  the four who did not 
think that the present system was better, three favoured a 
fully elected Council, or failing that at least one that would 
be partly elected; the fourth would only lend his support to a 
partly elected council. In view of these responses, it seemed 
that there was sufficient dissatisfaction with the wholly 
nominated system that a majority of the unofficials interviewed 
would support a partly elected council.
The general feeling of the members was that the FCC had
better relations with the Ministry of Local Government and
2Housing than with the State. State/FCC relationships were 
usually described as 'fair'. One informant said specifically 
that the relationship 'was not as progressive or dynamic as 
it should be - communication was not very good and the State 
was never very receptive to the ideas or needs of the 
Municipality'. Two informants who would have taken exception 
to such a view explained the relationship between State 
government and Municipality by emphasising that one important 
reason for strained relations was the demand for cheap State 
land for municipal purposes, such as low-cost housing. They 
pointed out that land was the only asset which the State 
possessed and that it was unrealistic to expect ready concessions 
to be made to the Municipality, particularly now that the State
1. In the course of all the interviewing which was conducted 
after the May 13 riots in Kuala Lumpur many informants, 
almost all of them either members or supporters of the 
Alliance, held a similar view on the subject of elections: 
that the people were not sufficiently educated to vote 
intelligently and that a period of some years would have 
to elapse before they could be considered competent to 
vote. One informant said point blank that as long as they 
voted for the Alliance, it was fine but voting for irrespon­
sible opposition candidates could not be considered intelli­
gent. It was interesting that most of the spokesmen 
expressing these views had themselves demanded independence 
and elections in the early 1950s and had held or were
still holding elective offices.
2. In substance a point of view shared in large measure by 
the heads of departments.
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had been forced by the Federal government to relinquish what 
little legal control it once held over the Municipality.
One very experienced member of the Board surprisingly 
described the relationship between the FCC and the Ministry 
as 'poor' . In a very forthright interview he insisted that 
the Ministry interfered too much; instead of giving periodic 
policy directives as provided in the Federal Capital Act, 
the present Minister interfered too much in the day-to- 
day running of the Commission. Such interference resulted 
in the Commissioner getting very disgusted and depressed.
He went on to illustrate how this interference was particularly 
marked in planning matters and how this caused the Commissioner 
to feel frustrated. He felt that such a state of affairs 
had interfered with good administration and that this was 
one of the major problems facing the FCC. Two other 
informants confirmed this view, four said that things were 
either 'fair' or 'good', two said that the relationship was 
excellent, and two refused to answer the question.
The informants said the most important problems facing 
the FCC were squatters, hawkers, traffic and planning in that 
order. Lack of funds for certain projects, administrative 
problems and town cleaning were also mentioned. Here again 
the members of the Board identified virtually the same problem 
areas as the heads of departments.
The set of questions concerning interest groups and power­
ful men put to heads of departments was also put to the 
eleven members of the Advisory Board. There was a very high 
degree of convergence between the two sets of responses 
taken as a whole. Of the eleven informants two refused to 
answer this question; of the nine who responded only two said 
that hawkers as a group were powerful and one nominated both 
hawkers and architects as having the power to get things done 
in municipal politics. Fully seven of the nine said that 
there were powerful men who had influence and, sometimes, 
power over certain matters with which the FCC dealt. There
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were two points made concerning these individuals:
1) that they were mostly businessmen (developers, hotel 
owners, mine owners etc.) who worked largely in their own 
interests on specific matters; and
2) that they generally worked through the Ministry, 
or, when this failed, through highly placed politicians in 
the Government, sometimes those with Cabinet rank.
One particularly articulate and knowledgeable informant 
who had spent a number of years in municipal politics as a 
leading member of the ruling party put it this way:
The Municipal system is one that operates as 
a pressure system from the top. Individuals 
and not groups are important;...there is 
an interplay between individual businessmen and 
individual government officials (mainly 
Ministers and high ranking civil servants).
Businessmen have connections or are themselves 
represented in political parties or groups 
like the Chambers of Commerce which have direct links 
with the whole political apparatus, (parties, 
bureaucrats, politicians, ministers). Everything 
is highly individualistic. In the old days (i.e., 
the period of the Municipal Council) if developer 
A had a big project going and he ran into 
difficulties with plans, zoning etc. at the 
Municipal level he went to the Mentri Besar or 
other high ranking State bureaucrats and got 
approval there; now such people go to the Minister 
of Local Government and Housing and he tells the 
Municipality what to do; sometimes even cabinet 
level officials, (acting in their personal capacity 
of course), will direct the Municipality to do 
such and such. All that Municipal officials can 
do under these circumstances is wring their 
hands in frustration. The present system is now 
worse than before. The big men get bigger.
It gets increasingly difficult to touch the 
vested interests.
1. This is not a verbatim account of the interview but is 
taken from the interview write up made immediately upon 
completion of the interview. This informant had shown 
me a couple of letters from a highranking permanent 
official of the Alliance to illustrate the points he 
was making.
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Though the details might differ from respondent to 
respondent, the point on which there was a large measure of 
agreement was that pressure in municipal politics was pre­
dominantly an activity in which individuals were involved for 
particularistic reasons; there were very few interest groups 
pursuing either narrow group goals or more broadly based 
'public interest' ends.
As was to be expected, the members of the Advisory Board 
were generally more guarded than the department heads. More 
specifically, the currently serving members were more guarded 
than their retired colleagues. But all of them were co­
operative, some more so than others.
Only one official member of the Board, a senior represent­
ative of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing, was 
interviewed. At first it was thought that a random sample of 
all (both past and current) of the official members might be 
interviewed; this plan was abandoned because many of the 
former officials were either not readily available in K.L. 
after the May 13 disturbances or had been so peripherally 
involved in the business of the Advisory Board that interviews 
would not have had much meaning. A second plan to interview 
only those currently represented on the Board was also abandoned 
in late December 1969 after a detailed analysis of Advisory 
Board proceedings had been completed. This showed the very 
marginal involvement of the official members of the Board and 
it was decided that this plan should also be abandoned.
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CHAPTER IV 
TOWN PLANNING
Overview
Land use planning in Kuala Lumpur dates from 1915 rather 
than from 1921 as has often been supposed. C.F. Green,
Chairman of the Sanitary Board at the time, unsuccessfully 
tried to introduce planning legislation and a plan for the 
Central Area of Kuala Lumpur in March 1915. 'An Enactment 
to provide for the Improvement of Towns' was discussed in 1917 
but never adopted. With the appointment of Charles Reade as 
Government Town Planner in January 1921, a more professional 
campaign was waged in support of a town plan and, more important, 
town planning legislation. An extensive report was prepared 
by Reade in November 1922, and this eventually paved the way for 
the introduction and enactment of the Town Planning and 
Development Bill, 1923. Political pressures from unofficials 
in the Federal Council with support from bureaucrats antagon­
istic to town planning resulted in the revocation of the 1923 
law and its replacement by Town Planning Enactment No. 4 of 
1927. Reade himself had run afoul of vested interests, the 
High Commissioner, Guillemard, and other administrators.
Stripped of the executive power he wielded under the 1923 
Town Planning Enactment, Reade took his case to London where 
it was sympathetically considered; but, despite the fact that 
it received the personal attention of the Secretary of State, 
he eventually lost his battle. Effective town planning declined 
with Reade's loss of prestige and power. The town plan which 
was being prepared in the late 1920s was finally approved in 
1939. At this writing it is still the only approved land use 
plan in existence for the Municipality and applies to only 
40% of its present area.
After W.W. II, planing for Kuala Lumpur was recognised 
as an important problem. Steps were finally taken in January 
1952 to move the administrative responsibility for planning 
from the Town Planning Department, F.M.S., to a separate
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section within the Municipal Engineer's Department with a 
Municipal Town Planning Officer under the immediate juris­
diction of the Engineer but continuing to rely on the advice 
of the Federal Town Planning Department.
In 1955, because of concern over the backlog of planning 
problems which had built up over the years, Grenfell Rudduck 
came as a United Nations Technical Assistance Administration 
Adviser to do a preliminary study of town planning in Kuala 
Lumpur. This was completed in December 1955, and one of the 
recommendations was that an expert town planner should be 
hired to work on a new land use plan. Vlado Antolic arrived 
in 1958 to carry out the task, but the scope of his work soon 
encompassed a l.arger comprehensive plan for the Kuala Lumpur/ 
Klang Valley Region. Completed in 1961, Antolic1s plans for 
Kuala Lumpur and the Klang Valley Region have never been made 
public. His recommendations for Kuala Lumpur were shelved 
and his plans for the K.L./Klang Valley Region have been 
substantially amended by the K.L./Klang Valley Regional 
Committee established in March 1963.
During the period when Antolic's proposals were still 
under consideration, serious charges of corruption were 
levelled against the Municipal Town Planner who was eventually 
forced to resign. The Municipal Town Planning Section was 
integrated into the Federal Department of Town and Country 
Planning where it remained from January 1, 1965 until
December 31, 1968.
After the integration it was announced that a Master 
Plan incorporating Antolic's suggestions was being prepared, 
and in 1967 a Draft Town Plan was released for public 
inspection. There were strenuous objections from architects 
and property owners, and a Board of Inquiry sat to hear 
specific complaints and to make recommendations. In February 
1970 the Plan and recommendations were still in the hands 
of the Minister for Local Government and Housing who had not 
yet announced a decision.
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Meanwhile jurisdiction over town planning in Kuala Lumpur 
has reverted to the Federal Capital Commission, this time in 
a separate Town Planning Department, established on January 1, 
1969 .
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Development Planning and the Colonial Bureaucracy: 1915-1939
At the January 20, 1915 meeting of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary
Board two town plans, which had been previously circulated, 
were tabled for consideration. The Board decided to adopt 
Plan II, compiled by the Chairman. Plan I, prepared by a 
Mr. Hubbard, was rejected because it involved 'the demolition 
of the major part of the Town and the expenditure of several 
millions'."*"
Green described his own plan as 'strictly utilitarian',
providing mainly for an extensive road widening program,
diversion of the Klang River, the removal of Court Hill and a
number of other proposals for future land use within the
2central area and beyond. These projects Green argued, could
be implemented only by the introduction of new town planning
legislation. He specifically suggested that the 'fundamental
principles of the English Housing and Town Planning Act of 1909
would have to be incorporated either in the Sanitary Board
3Enactment or in a separate Enactment'.
In July, Green wrote to the Secretary to Resident,
Selangor, enclosing a Memorandum on his proposals for a Town 
Planning Act which corresponded in large part with the 
English Housing and Town Planning Act 1909. Also attached to 
his letter were several additional memoranda elaborating on 
the proposed road widening scheme, the diversion of the Klang 
River and proposed rules to go with the draft Town Planning 
Act. Besides this, Green had done considerable research on 
early Kuala Lumpur and on town planning generally and the 
results of this work were attached as further supporting
1. C.F. Green, Chairman, Sanitary Board, KL to the Secretary
to Resident, Selangor, (3) in 2171/14 in (1) in Sei. Sec. 
1521/15, March 20, 1915.
2. Ibid., and Green to the Secretary to Resident, Selangor, 
(9) in 2171/14 in (9) in Sei. Sec. 1521/15, July, 1915.
3. Green to the Secretary to Resident, Selangor, o p . cit.,
March 20, 1915.
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appendices. An itemised estimate of costs, amounting to 
nearly $M2,000,000 was also included."'"
As the rules required, these proposals were forwarded by
the Secretary to Resident to the Under Secretary, F.M.S.
2on August 5, 1915. Between August 20, 1915 and Apfil 16,
1917 the Secretary to Resident, Selangor sent a total of
twenty reminders to the Under Secretary asking for a reply
to his letter of August 5. Green himself wrote in December
31916 of the 'crying urgency of a Town Planning Enactment'• 
Although no record could be traced of a reply to the Secretary 
to Resident's letter of August 5 there is evidence that 'An 
Enactment to provide for the Improvement of Towns, ' dated
September 4, 1917 had in fact been discussed as a Bill but was
, a 4never adopted.
There were no immediate results which followed from 
Green's efforts. Higher authority may have been frightened 
off by the financial implications of Green's road-widening and 
bridge-building proposals. Green had made his point, however: 
he had shown the need for town planning and had ably demon­
strated that such planning could not be successfully and 
economically undertaken without adequate legislation. There 
is little doubt that subsequent steps taken by Government to do 
something about planning in Kuala Lumpur and the Federated 
Malay States generally were due in part to Green's initial 
efforts.
In January 1921 a Federal Town Planning Department was
1. Green to the Secretary to Resident, Selangor, o p . cit., July, 
1915 .
2. (11) in Sei. Sec. 1521/15, August 5, 1915.
3. C.F. Green to Secretary to Resident, Selangor, 1799/16 in 
(1) in Sei. Sec. 5751/16, December 1, 1916.
4. Sei. Sec. 2571/17. It should be noted that this piece of
legislation was quite different from the Town Planning Act 
proposed by Green. See also Memo to British Resident in Sei. 
Sec. 3603/1914, September 9, 1919.
122 .
established and Charles C. Reade, on loan from the Government 
of South Australia, was appointed the first Government Town 
Planner. Reade set to work enthusiastically. By the end 
of March the Selangor Advisory Town Planning Committee had 
been established, and by the beginning of September its first 
detailed report had been prepared and submitted to the Chief
o  ^  1S e cre tary.
The Report made a number of recommendations concerning the
siting of government buildings, reservation of State and other
lands and what amounted to layout proposals for factory and
2housing areas and public open spaces. It was on the subject 
of legislation, however, that the Committee made its strongest 
recommendation:
In consequence of detailed examination of the legal 
difficulties which exist at the present time with 
reference to the carrying out of subdivisiona1 
plans, and town planning schemes and proposals 
generally, the Committee is unanimously of 
the opinion that the Government should authorise 
at once the preparation of a preliminary Town 
Planning and Development Act on the lines set 
out in the Memorandum prepared by the Government 
Town Planner on 25th August.
1. Sei. Sec. 3724/21, September 1, 1921. The committee was
comprised of administrators only: The Acting British Resident,
Selangor (Chairman); The General Manager for Railways;
The Acting Director of Public Works; The Senior Health 
Officer; The Acting Surveyor General; The Chairman of the 
K.L. Sanitary Board; The Secretary to Resident and The 
Government Town Planner.
2. The Committee drew attention to the fact that Victoria 
Institute was going to be built off Batu Road and its 
present site was strongly urged as an alternative, a proposal 
which was accepted by Government despite the advanced state 
of plans for the Batu Road site.
3. Sei. Sec. 3724/21, September 1, 1921, p.8. Such a recommend­
ation had been made by Green seven years earlier.
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Incorporation of the recommendations contained in Reade's 
memorandum of August 25^ " by the Housing Committee was an 
indication both of the accepted urgency of at least interim 
town planning legislation and of the respect that the Committee 
had for Reade's technical advice.
The recommendations of the Selangor Advisory Town Planning 
Committee were forwarded to the Acting Under Secretary,
2F.M.S. under cover of Reade's letter of September 9, 1921. In
a separate memorandum which accompanied the letter, Reade sought 
to emphasize the universal nature of the problems likely to 
result from haphazard urban growth:
Generally speaking whilst there are vast differences 
in races and traditions between eastern and western 
countries and between their respective political and 
social usages, the fact is common to both that, as 
population multiplies,cities grow and expand, and that 
as land is developed and built upon by private persons, 
subject to Municipal control without efficient town 
planning powers, civic problems and difficulties 
multiply. Governments in eastern countries are 
increasingly being called upon to repair the defects 
of haphazard urban growth by the expenditure of 
large capital sums. This, when tried in different 
countries, (both old and new) has in most cases 
failed to achieve substantial relief or^provide a 
satisfactory solution for the problems.
Reade's main aim was to secure government support for the 
framing of new legislation without which effective town planning 
was impossible.
Reade's major statement, completed in early 1922, did not
4come before the Federal Council until November of that year.
1. Sei. Sec. 4355/21 , August 25, 1921.
2 . (1) in Sei. Sec. 4355/21, September 9, 1921.
3 . Ibid .
4 . Charles C. Reade, 'Town Planning and Development in the
Federated Malay States,' Federal Council Paper No. 15 of 
1922, Federal Council Proceedings, November 21, 1922,
pp . c221-c250.
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The first chapter reviewed the work done by the Government 
Town Planner since his appointment and the efforts of the 
Advisory Town Planning Committee, and discussed matters 
relating to Town Planning administration, the object of general 
town plans, the need for special detail surveys and for 
permanent town planning policy, but at the same time noted 
that 'the first and crucial step ... is, let it be repeated, the 
passage of effective legislation upon which permanent admini­
stration and action can be based'.  ^ The second chapter described 
existing conditions not only in Kuala Lumpur but in the 
Federated Malay States as a whole and emphasised, as Reade 
had done a year before, the dangers inherent in a policy of 
uncontrolled urban growth. The four principal recommendations, 
as summarized by Reade himself, were:
(1) Town Planning Legislation.
(2) Permanent and continuous town planning policy 
and administration by means of local or 
District Town Planning Committee and Central 
Department of Town Planning.
(3) Preparation of General Town Plans and 
improvement schemes (as required) in anticipation 
of town improvement or building or other develop­
ments in new or existing areas.
(4) Effective control of the giving out of State 
land, sub-divisions, resub-divisions, building 
operations and town developmental works in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
approved General To^n Plan, or improvement 
schemes thereunder.
These recommendations were for the whole of Malaya but 
at the same time applied particularly to Kuala Lumpur.
Reade emphasised that there was no existing administrative 
machinery for control and direction of the management of urban 
problems, which were dealt with at different times by
1 . Ibid. , p.c229. (Emphasis added) .
2. Charles C. Reade, op. cit., November 21, 1922, p.c235.
At this point in time a General Town Plan for Kuala Lumpur 
was being prepared (ibid., p.c247) but it was not approved 
until 1939, some seventeen years later.
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di ff er en t officers on an ad hoc and p iece-meal basis.
He urged administrative reform to cater specifically for urban 
areas, existing or proposed, in order that continuity would be 
ensu red  and that urban problems would receive the specialised 
at ten tio n that they deserved.
All in all, Reade had p r o d u c e d  a remarkable docum e n t  in 
just under two years. He outlined an aggressive policy of 
urban reform. He had correctly evaluated the pr o b l e m  and had 
suc ce ss fu lly carried the opinion of the impressive array of 
off ici al members on the Advisory Town Pl anning Committee.
Even the Federal Council gave its imprimatur to the Report.
In January 1923 R e a d e 1s pr o p o s e d  Town Planning legislation  
was referred by the Federal Council to a Select Committee 
which conducted public hearings on 'The Town Planning and 
D e v e lo pm en t Bill, 1922' and called for criticisms and 
comments from the Federated Malay States Bar Committee, the 
Cha ir ma n of the Sanitary Boards of Kuala Lumpur, I p o h , Taiping, 
Seremb an and Klang and from members of the public. As a 
result of a number of amendments were incor p o r a t e d  in the bill.
Parts of a m e m o r a n d u m  from the Chairman, Sanitary Board, 
Klang, hi ghlight some of the misg ivings to which the less well- 
inform ed subscribed:
(referring to a section on land acquisition for 
public purposes) This p r a c t i c a l l y  means that a 
title for land in a Town Planning area is no 
longer a security. It is probable that a title 
for Town Land has hitherto formed the prin cipal  
security which individuals in the Federated Malay 
States have had to offer. J refer more p a r t i c u l a r l y 
to Chinese who have d e v e loped our Towns in a 
marvellous manner.
A member of the earlier S ub-Committee on this Bill 
stated the true effect of this clause i.e. 'in 
future land was held for the benefit of the 
community not of the i n d i v i d u a l . ' Possibly Town 
Plannin g requires the extinction of private 
enterprise but is that the English idea of 
G o v e r n m e n t ? ... Again have Sanitary Boards failed 
entirely in their Town Planning activities in
1 . I b i d . , p . c 2 34.
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the past? - what can be better than the 
Residential area in Kuala Lumpur? A few 
trunk access roads are required, but is 
there no possibility that very wide roads 
will not be required in years to come 
when flying becomes the common means of quick 
transit.
Having conducted its hearings and considered comments 
such as those cited above, the Select Committee gave the Bill 
its endorsement:
The Committee has after full consideration 
come to the conclusion that the general 
principles embodied in the Bill are sound, 
and that it is a measure of legislation 
that is urgently required in order to 
secure the future development of our towns 
along properly organised and economic lines.
We feel confirmed in our general approval of 
the Bill by the fact that there is no 
important provision in it that has not its 
counterpart that has already been accepted 
in similar legislation passed either in 
England, Australia, New Zealand, Canada or 
I n dia.
We have given special consideration to 
objections based on fears of undue interference 
with the rights of owners of property, and 
we consider that subject to the amendments 
recommended below, such fights are sufficiently 
safeguarded in the Bill.
The Bill was duly considered by the Council and adopted.
It was not signed by the Governor, however, until September
320, 1923 and was finally gazetted on November 1, 1923.
Even before the Town Planning and Development Bill became law 
it was in trouble. In Reade's moment of triumph in getting
1. F.W. Douglas, Chairman, Sanitary’ Board, Klang, 'Criticisms
on the Town Planning Development Bill, ' in Sei. Sec. 
1377/23, March 7, 1923.
2. 'Report of the Select Committee of the Federal Council on
the Town Planning and Development Bill, 1922', Federal 
Council Paper No. 21 of 1923, Federal Council Proceedings, 
July 10 , 192 3 , pp . c187-c202, at p.cl87.
3. (5) in Sei. Sec. 2591/23, January 25, 1924.
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such a measure enacted less than three years after he had taken 
on the job, his real troubles were about to begin. The 
campaign to revoke the 1923 Town Planning and Development Act 
began even before it had been implemented.
First public indications of impending difficulties 
appeared in the form of an editorial in the Malay Mail early 
in January 1924. The editorial reviewed the circumstances 
surrounding the need for town planning legislation and went on 
to say: 'One of the main features of the Bill was the
constitution and appointment of a Town Planning Committee for 
each area in which the Enactment was to operate. As far as 
we know no such committee has yet been appointed anywhere.
Why?''*" The answer is best provided by the principal parties 
involved, Charles Reade on the one hand, and Sir Lawrence 
Guillemard, Governor of the F.M.S., on the other. Both had 
taken their respective cases to London, Reade writing a long 
memorandum to Colonel Freemantle (a Member of Parliament and 
Chairman of the Council of the Garden Cities and Town 
Planning Association) and Sir Lawrence replying directly to 
Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Reade 's private and confidential 'Memorandum regarding
Town Planning in [thej Federated Malay States and possible
official reaction against its further development and expansion'
2is dated December 1926.
The memorandum sets out the fact that 'a preliminary and 
incomplete Town Planning Enactment only [had been] passed 
during 1923' and that 'it became operative at the close of 
1924 for the purpose of enabling permanent departmental 
organisation to proceed and more extended legal powers to be
1. 'Why Wait?', (editorial) Malay Mai1 , January 5, 1924.
2. Reade to Freemantle, CO 273/539/28131, December, 1926.
The following summary and quotations are from this source. 
My thanks are due to Mr. Lim Teck Ghee for locating this 
correspondence in the Public Records Office, London.
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enacted at a later stage.' In April 1925 Reade had gone off 
on long leave, in the course of which he spent a considerable 
time at his own expense in Great Britain, America and abroad 
enquiring into legislation which he might use on his return to 
Malaya. During his absence a Committee of officials and 
unofficials chaired by 'a permanent official known to be 
a severe critic of Town Planning' enquired into the Town 
Planning Enactment before it had been given a fair trial and 
made a hostile report without allowing the Government Town 
Planner or anyone in his Department an adequate opportunity of 
presenting their case.
The Committee which investigated the working of the 
Enactment had been appointed as a result of 'a local newspaper 
campaign and other representations hostile and damaging to Town 
Planning. Matters were not improved by the fact that some of 
the protagonists of this campaign were agents or owners of 
property and other persons profiting by widespread over­
crowding and other abuses in the towns. '
The net effect of the Committee's recommendations was to 
seriously curtail 'Town Planning powers and activities, current 
abuses not withstanding' - a course of action actively supported 
by certain officials to whom the permanent appointment of a 
Town Planner was repugnant and who made use of their influence 
to belittle the work of town planning 'which had succeeded 
in many directions in spite of critics and other detracters ' .
Reade's conceptualisation of one facet of the political 
process is interesting. He says:
But it must be remembered that in this Tropical 
Dominion, there is no such thing as enlightened 
public opinion or an appeal to disinterested 
parties at large. Government is made up 
largely by permanent officials who, as they 
approach the ages of retirement and pension 
after a long sojourn in a debilitating 
climate, are not usually disposed to carry 
through and administer reforms like Town 
Planning or housing inaugurated by their 
predecessors especially where the bulk of
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the population is native and unofficial opinion is 
hostile .
This unofficial opinion is represented largely 
by land mining, rubber and legal interests...
Owners of property seeking wealth quickly are 
not disposed to tolerate reform of abuses by 
which money is sometimes made easily at public 
expens e .
Reade also noted that because of Sir Lawrence Guille- 
mard's serious illness it was impossible to appeal to him 
and that this state of affairs had facilitated other officials 
running the government, officials who did not appear to realise 
that 'by a policy of reaction now, untold harm and costly 
future expenditures may become inevitable in a short space of 
time in this country where towns and population are rapidly 
increasing under stress of commercial prosperity together with 
acute housing shortage, and other difficulties'.
Although he did not say so specifically in his Memorandum 
to Freemantle, Reade implied that he feared that under new 
legislation he and his Department would be deprived of the 
executive powers they held under the 1923 law which he felt 
might be watered down so as to make effective planning 
impos sible.
Freemantle sent a copy of Reade's memorandum to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, saying:
It seems to me that what is happening out there is 
what is always happening here, and would naturally 
happen anywhere if things were left to run their 
own course, namely, the vested interests want to 
take immediate private action where they lawfully can 
without regard to the distant needs of the community. 
Guillemard, the High Commissioner, has of course 
been ill and has therefore not been in close touch 
with the problem. I imagine this is a matter in 
which some timely enquiry from yourself would be 
most helpful.
Amery wrote Guillemard on February 8. He conveyed 
Freemantle's uneasiness about the report of the committee of
1 . Freemantle to Amery, CO 273/539/28131, January 25, 
1927 .
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officials and unofficials on the 1923 Enactment and expressed 
his own concern about the 'unscientific and ill informed 
prejudice and criticism' which had been directed against it. 
Amery went on to emphasise the importance of local bodies 
acting only on the best technical advice when it came to a 
matter like town planning and warned against irremediable 
serious errors if this were not done. He concluded by saying: 
'Naturally if you feel that you have no confidence in Reade 
it may be necessary to consider his replacement by another and 
stronger man, but meanwhile I feel that the control of his 
Department and of federal authority in this matter ought to be 
maintained.'^
Guillemard's reply to Amery can be reproduced almost 
wholly intact:
2. No one can realize more than I do the bad 
results of haphazard development out here in 
the past and the need for town planning (and 
district planning as well) today.
3. I welcomed the appointment of a Town 
Planner in the F.M.S., and the selection of 
Reade, who came with strong recommendations, 
and when he began to get into difficulties
I did what I could to help.
4. But I am horribly disappointed at the 
result. Though he has brains and knowledge and 
energy, he must be written down as a failure.
5. Much of the criticism of him is no doubt 
ignorant and unfair, but I fear most of it is 
justified. That is the considered opinion of two of 
my wisest advisors, Peel and Lornie, who have at
1. Amery to Guillemard, CO 273/539/28131, February 8, 1927.
Amery's concern was justified in the light of the follow­
ing note from Ormsby-Gore: 'I have twice seen Mr Reade
at your request and have...realised that the amount of 
support he gets from the Malayan Government and unofficials 
is inadequate. I think there is a great deal of truth 
in the contentions of this memorandum. As in rail­
ways - where the more I have gone into the matter the 
more unsatisfactory I find the situation - education and 
other departments so here I am impressed with the unsatis­
factory attitude of Sir Lawrence Guillemard.
I am definitely uneasy over things in Malaya, and shall 
continue to be so until you have appointed a new Governor 
and High Commissioner,' (CO 273/539/28131, February 1,
1927).
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my request looked into the whole case. I have 
also seen him more than once.
6. In a job like this much has to be done by 
persuasion, arrangement and compromise, and 
that is where he has shown himself conspicuously 
lacking. He has succeeded in making enemies
of everyone with whom he has had to deal.
7. We made a mistake originally in giving him 
too much executive power and I have had to 
correct this by a Bill just passed which will 
shortly be sent to you. The effect will be to 
leave him as Town Planner but with reduced 
activities.
8. That was the best we could do, and if we had not 
done it we should have been faced with what I regard 
as most dangerous, a united opposition by the 
Unofficial Members of Council.
9. Reade will be left rather in the air for a time at  ^
any rate and we may in the end have to pension him off.
Under cover of his Despatch No. 261, Guillemard sent
copies of the Town Planning Enactment, 1927 to Amery and said:
There can be no doubt that the 1923 Enactment which 
has been repealed was too complicated, and that 
its administration by Town Planning Committees who 
were independent of criticism and not concerned 
with the actual carrying out of many of their 
proposals, gave rise to dissatisfaction. The fact 
that it was not possible to do much in the way of 
town improvement owing to the slump gave some 
encouragement to the feeling that the Town Planning 
Department existed only to interfere with the 
wishes of property owners.
The Unofficial Members of the Federal Counci^ 
welcomed the repeal of the 1923 Enactment...
Reade was relegated entirely to the position of an Adviser.
His duties would not now ordinarily involve the preparation of
plans; he would only be called upon 'to criticise or advise
on plans submitted to him by the Sanitary Boards through the 
3Residents'. Federal control had been abandoned in this
1. Guillemard to Amery, CO 273/539/28131, March 17, 1927
(emphasis added).
2. Guillemard to Amery, CO 273/539/28131, April 26, 1927.
3. Ibid.
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process and decentralisation of sorts had replaced it.
Even Ormsby-Gore, Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, who only six months before had clearly supported 
Reade, could only muster a weak note of advice to Amery:
'I am not quite happy about it all and in writing I think it 
should be made clear that we hope the workings of the New 
Enactment will be watched and reports made from time to time 
as to what results it achieves - emphasizing once again the 
importance of far-sighted and progressive views in this matter.'
Despite what must have been a great letdown for Reade, 
he continued with his work. Indeed he probably had little 
choice in the matter, having resigned his permanent position 
in South Australia and being now in the sixth year of his 
employment in Malaya.
A memorandum prepared by Reade in April 1927 indicates
2that he was prepared to give the new Enactment a fair trial.
3He asked for professionally qualified staff which he never got. 
Piecemeal planning in Kuala Lumpur continued. The minutes of 
the Sanitary Board meetings indicate that draft layouts 
continued to be made on an a_d hoc basis prompted by applications 
to develop individual properties. The Town Planning Committee 
of the Sanitary Board became a holding operation; ill-equipped 
to deal effectively with the critical problems of planning 
which Reade had so clearly recognised, it tinkered with the 
urban problems at hand.
1. Minute by Ormsby-Gore, CO 273/539/28131, June 28, 1927.
2. 'Memorandum re Permanent Organisation and policy regarding
Town Planning in FMS,' (1A) in Sei. Sec. (Conf.) 46/1927
in Sei. Sec. 115/39.
3. Reade's Reports on the working of the 1927 Enactment stress 
this and he infers that staff problems were still unresolved 
See F.M.S. Despatch No. 328 in CO 273/546/52052, June 19, 
1928. See also W.C.S. Curry for Under Secretary to Govern­
ment, F.M.S. to The Government Town Planner, (2) in Sei.
Sec. 109/29, January 4, 1929.
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By 1936 the Draft Town Plan for Kuala Lumpur which
Reade had begun to work on in 1922 was still not ready.
H.B. Talalla referred in January 1936 to property owners'
dissatisfaction that there was still no approved Town Plan.'*'
The 1936 Annual Report of the Board notes: 'In March 1936
the Board decided that it should exercise its powers under
Sections 135 to 149 of the Sanitary Boards Enactment (Cap.
137 rev.ed.) relating to the preparation of a Town Plan and
directed the Town Planning Committee to proceed with the work.
2at the close of the year a draft plan had been commenced.'
Two years later, in 1939, the first and only Approved Town
3Plan for Kuala Lumpur was written into law.
1. KL Sanitary Board Minutes, January 8, 1936.
2. KLSB Annual Report 1936, p.7.
3. Though amended on several hundred occasions since 1939, 
it remains the only Approved Town Plan to this day.
(See Maps 2,3 and 4).
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Administrative Politics and the Planning Process: Post W.W.II
Administrative Organisation
With the resumption of civilian government in 1946 the 
Federal Town Planning Department was 'reconstituted under the 
former Town Planner together with all of the pre-war Asian 
assistants''*' and for the next two years spent most of its 
time putting records in order.
As in the pre-war years, the department handled all 
planning approval applications for the Kuala Lumpur Municipality 
as well as the rest of the Federation.
In 1948 a report by D.W. Grehan of the Public Works
Department pointed out that under such a system delay was
inevitable, and recommended that a Town Planner should be
seconded for full-time service for at least five years.1 2 345
No action was taken on the recommendation until 1950 when the
Municipal Architect complained to the President of the
3Municipal Commission. He, in turn, wrote to Concannon , the
Federal Town Planner, asking for the services of a full-time
4qualified Town Planner for Kuala Lumpur. In reply, Concannon 
suggested that the control of Municipal town planning work 
should remain within the Federal Department.^ R. Ramani, 
probably the most highly respected of the Municipal 
Commissioners, expressed strong disagreement with Concannon, 
and insisted that the Commission should have its own
1. Concannon to the Chairman, Town Board, Kinta, TPD416/46/41
in (4) in KLM. 1666/51, April 27, 1951.
2. D.W. Grehan, 'Report on Organisation and Staff Proposed for 
Municipal Engineer's Department Kuala Lumpur Municipality', 
(typescript) July 1948, p.14.
3. Jennings to President, Municipal Commissioners, (1) in
KLM(C) 42/50, September 29, 1950.
4. (2) in KLM(C) 42/50, September 30, 1950.
5. (3) in KLM(C) 42/50, October 3, 1950.
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planner. The matter came up for discussion at a meeting of
the Commission on November 8, 1950 and the President explained
the situation by pointing out that the Municipality merely
shared the services of the Federal Town Planning Department
by paying 30% of its entire annual budget, a fee which he
described as 'absolutely excessive and completely unrelated
2to the facts of the service given'. A motion to appoint a 
Municipal Town Planner was unanimously passed at this meeting.
Whether or not this decision was responsible is hard to
say, but two months later Concannon had changed his own position
and was postulating that 'the advantages of having a Planning
Department within the Municipality are considerable' and that
the task of planning for Kuala Lumpur 'warrant the employment
of staff on a full-time basis and under the control of the
3Commissioners'. In August 1951 a meeting of the President, 
the Municipal Architect and Concannon 'agreed that the 
Municipal Town Planner and his staff should work in the 
Municipal Office as a Branch under the President, Municipal 
Commis sioners. . . '^
Accordingly, the Municipal Budget for 1952 included a
provision of $M65,046 for setting up the Town Planning Branch,
5ultimately intended to become a Town Planning Department.
A meeting of the Town Planning and Building Committee on
1. Ramani to President, Municipal Commissioners, (6) in
KLM(C) 42/50, October 21, 1950.
2. KLMC Minutes, November 8, 1950, pp.4-5. According to the
President all that the Federal department did was to 
examine plans submitted for Municipal approval and 
certify whether they were in accordance with the Town 
Plan .
3. Concannon to President, Municipal Commissioners, (11)
in KLM(C) 42/50, January 1, 1951.
4. Minutes of Meeting held August 28, 1951, in KLM(C) 42/50,
August 28, 1951.
5. KLMC Minutes, October 25, 1951, p.3.
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January 31, 1952 considered the problems involved in the form­
ation of such a department. It was recognised that there would 
of necessity be a transition period while files were being 
built up during which the services of the Federal Town Planner 
would be required. The job of collecting the data fell to 
J.E. Jackson, newly appointed Assistant Engineer who had 
passed the intermediate examination of the Institute of Town 
Planners. On the suggestion of the Municipal Engineer it was 
decided that Jackson would remain under his control because 
'if he (Jackson) is removed entirely from his (the M.E.'s) 
control, he will not be available as relief in cases of leave 
or sickness . . . ' Almost accidentally, as a matter of admini­
strative convenience, town planning thus became a branch of 
the Municipal Engineer's department.
Eighteen months later Jackson launched a campaign to free
himself and his branch from the Municipal Engineer's control.
In a lengthy memorandum to York, the President of the Council,
he set out his case for a separate Town Planning Department
and a one-year study leave to complete his qualifications as 
2a Town Planner. The Engineer, to whom the memo was referred,
was most indignant at such a suggestion coming from one of his
subordinates and argued that in many large cities planning was
done by the City Engineer. He did, however, concede that a
fully qualified planning officer should be added to his 
3department.
York, concerned with the problems of town planning but 
unwilling to alienate his Engineer, decided to strengthen the 
section within the Municipal Engineer's Department and to sever 
ties and financial obligations to the Federal Town Planning
(31) in KLM(C) 42/50, March 7, 1952.
Jackson to President, Municipal Council, (38) in KLM(C) 
42/50, July 21, 1953.
Todman to York, (39) in KLM(C) 42/50, August 7, 1953.
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Department.^- This was accomplished at the end of 1955, but the
Municipality was continually plagued with the problem of staffing
the section. Jackson finally resigned because 'he was not
2satisfied with this marriage of convenience'. The two 
positions for Assistant Planning Officers remained unfilled 
for six ye ars.^
In July 1962, Fairbank, then Commissioner for Federal
Town and Country Planning, suggested that since town and country
planning in the Federal capital was a Federal responsibility
under the Constitution, consideration should be given to the
possible integration of the Municipal Town Planning Section
4with the Federal Department of Town and Country Planning.
This line of reasoning seems rather strange, since presumably 
everything that went on in Kuala Lumpur was of Federal concern 
and the Federal Capital Commissioner had been appointed to 
see that the responsibility was properly discharged, planning 
not excepted.Certainly no one had ever argued that the Muni­
cipal Treasurer's department or the Municipal Health Department 
should be integrated with their Federal counterparts. Why 
then planning?
The real reason seems to be that planning for Kuala Lumpur, 
unlike the other functions of the Municipality, had started 
out as a part of the Federal department and the areas of 
jurisdiction had never been properly defined, even after ties 
were severed in 1955. A study carried out by the Organisation 
and Management Division of the Treasury as a result of
1. York to Concannon, (55) in KLM(C) 42/50, January 18, 1954.
2. Ibrahim Musa to the Federal Capital Commissioner in PKL(C)
4/62, November 4, 1963.
3. Haji Ismail bin Panjang Aris, 'Proposed Re-organisation
of the Town Planning Section of the Commissioner of the 
Federal Capital', in PKL(C) 4/62. July 1, 1964.
4. Fairbank to the Commissioner of the Federal Capital,
TCPD HG/825/17 in (1) in PKL(C) 4/62, July 7, 1962.
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Fairbank's suggestion pointed out that coordination between 
the Town Planning Branch and the Federal Department of Town 
and Country Planning was unsatisfactory, and that the root 
cause of the problem was that the division of responsibilities 
and functions between the Municipality and the Federal 
Department was everything but clear.'*'
Rather than recommending that the confusion be clarified 
by delineating the areas of responsibility of the two 
departments, the Report suggested that the problem be solved 
by integrating the Municipal branch with the Federal department 
as soon as possible.
The recommendations contained in the O&M Report were
accepted in full by the Commissioner of the Federal Capital,
Haji Ismail, who wrote to the Minister of the Interior (then
2responsible for the Federal Capital), seeking his views.
An exploratory meeting of representatives of the Federal Capital
Commission, Treasury, Federal Establishment Officer, Minister
of the Interior and Town and Country Planning Department was
held on July 16. Two possible methods of integration -
'physical' and 'complete' - were discussed, along with other
3relevant matters, but no decision was reached. Despite the
oppostiion expressed by the Staff Union of the F.C.C. to any form
4of integration, a meeting of Federal and Municipal officers
1. Report No. O&M 10/70/4, ' KL Municipality Town Planning Branch
O&M Survey', (typescript) April 1963.
2. Haji Ismail bin Panjang Aris to Minister of the Interior,
(4) in PKL(C) 4/62, May 13, 1963.
3. Notes of a Meeting held in the Ministry of Interior on
16th July, 1963 to consider the Integration of the Planning 
Branch of the Kuala Lumpur Municipality with the Federal 
Department of Town and Country Planning, in PKL(C) 4/62, 
August 15, 1963.
4. Ibrahim Musa to the Commissioner of the Federal Capital,
in PKL(C) 4/62, November 4, 1963.
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held on February 1, 1964 decided on 'physical integration'.
In March 1964 the Minister of the Interior and the 
Commissioner of the Federal Capital had a meeting at which the 
Minister, having considered the proposed integration, made 
the following points:
(i) that in view of administrative difficulties, 
integration of the Planning Section with the Federal Department 
was unacceptable to him and that the course to be taken was for 
the Commissioner to build up the Town Planning Section into 
a full fledged department by recruiting new qualified staff 
to the strength necessary to cope with the nature and volume of 
work existing in the Federal Capital;
(ii) that in view of the shortage of local qualified Town 
Planners in the country, the Commission should consider 
recruiting expatriate officers on contract under the Colombo 
Plan or other technical assistance agencies; and
(iii) that the composition of the technical town planning 
committee which advised the Commissioner should be broadened
to include non-official interests connected with the develop- ^ , 2 ment of Kuala Lumpur.
Haji Ismail, who had agreed to physical integration a 
month earlier, now adhered to the diametrically opposed stand 
of the Minister.
In compliance with the Minister's views, Haji Ismail now 
arranged to have a qualified Town Planner seconded to the 
Municipality with a view to building up a full fledged
1. Minutes of a Meeting held February 1, 1964 in PKL(C)
4/62. 'Physical integration' would mean that the Municipal 
Planning Branch would function with the Federal Department 
under one roof, each department retaining its identity 
and remaining separate units with its own votes, etc.
2. Notes of a Meeting of the Commissioner of the Federal Capital
with the Y.B. Menteri Dalam Negeri on 12.3.64 (Confidential), 
(22) in PKL(C) 4/62, March 12, 1964.
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department. But by this time responsibility for the Federal 
capital had been shifted to a newly created Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing, following the elections in April 1964. 
On July 1, 1964 the new Minister, Khaw Kai Boh, rejected Haji 
Ismail's staffing proposal and reversed his predecessor's 
decision against integration.^
Such a dramatic reversal of policy over a three month
period cannot be explained by a change of the personalities
involved. Both Ministers, after all, were members of an
Alliance Government. The sudden switch in policy was, in fact,
a result of serious allegations of corruption levelled against
the Municipal Town Planner. The accusations were contained in
a letter purported to be written by members of the Municipal
Town Planning Branch staff which was sent to the Minister of
the Interior some time between April and July. A copy had been
sent to Dr Tan Chee Khoon, Opposition M.P., who also forwarded
3a copy to the new Minister. Thus the Government knew that the
Opposition was aware of the allegations. The newly appointed
Minister, addressing a conference of senior town and country
planning officers in July, took the opportunity to inform
them that he was worried over allegations of corruption and
malpractice in respect of planning approvals. He issued a
stern warning: 'Should it be found that there have been
irregularities of this nature, which I do not believe there are
Government will have no choice but to deal with the officers
4concerned with the utmost severity'.
1. Haji Ismail bin Panjang Aris, 'Proposed Re-organisation
of the Town Planning Section of the Commissioner of the 
Federal Capital', in PKL(C) 4/62, July 1, 1964.
2. Advisory Board Minutes (Confidential), August 30, 1966, p.6
3. Extract of speech made by the Hon'ble Dr Tan Chee Khoon at 
the Dewan R a 'ayat on 21st December, 1964.
4. 'Corruption Allegations Worry a Minister' , Straits Times,
July 18, 1964.
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The Opposition continued to bring pressure to bear and in 
October the Secretary to the Minister of Local Government and 
Housing wrote to the Federal Capital Commissioner:
I am directed to inform you that this Ministry has 
been the target of repeated attacks by the 
Opposition in the current sitting of Parliament 
relating to various subjects such as density, 
plot ratio and plinth control, etc., in the 
Federal Capital. There were also allegations 
of favoritism and corruption. In view of the 
above Y.B. Mentri (the Minister) has directed 
that all applications involving relaxation of 
present planning controls be submitted to him 
for decision. This directive will apply 
irrespective of whether objections are receive^ 
in respect of these applications or otherwise.
Two weeks later the Minister decided to delay implementation
of his July decision no longer and directed that integration
with the Federal Department of Town and Country Planning should
be undertaken forthwith, and that the Commissioner of Town
and Country Planning should be gazetted Chief Planning Officer
2of the Federal Capital.
It was this Chief Planning Officer who put on record without 
equivocation the reasons for integration:
. . .it was not intended, nor was it necessary now 
(1966) to proceed further with this physical 
integration which, in fact, arose because of 
complaints made in public, as well as in 
Parliament by the Opposition that there were 
inconsistencies and delays in approving 
planning applications. Serious allegations 
of gross inefficiency and corrupt practice 
had been made against the present Municipal 
Planning Officer. Because of this unhappy 
state of affairs, the Y.B. Menteri (Minister) 
had directed the Commissioner of Town and 
Country Planning to assume control over the
1. Dato' Lokman bin Yusof to the Commissioner of the Federal
Capital, KKTP(FC) 7084/3 in (1) in PKL(C) 17/64, October 
15, 1964.
2. Jagatheesan to the Commissioner of the Federal Capital,
KKTP 816/27 in (34) in PKL(C) 4/62, November 6, 1964.
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Municipal Town Planning Branch.
About a year and a half after integration had been
accomplished, Senator the Honourable Dato' Athi Nahappan, a
member of the Advisory Board, expressed dissatisfaction with
what he called 'an untidy fusion...a stop gap arrangement which
was not even a cure or a palliative for the existing inconsis-
2tent policies in Town Planning principles'. He suggested 
that as the establishment was now up to full strength, the 
Commissioner of the Federal Capital, as a body corporate, should 
assume full responsibility for planning in the Municipal area.
The usual a_d hoc committee was appointed by the Advisory 
Board to look into the situation. It was at that committee 
meeting that Watkinson, Commissioner of Town and Country 
Planning, gave the reasons for the decision to integrate quoted 
above. He went on to agree with Nahappan that town planning 
should become the concern of a full fledged department under 
the Commissioner of the Federal Capital. The chief stumbling 
block seemed to be the Municipal Planning Officer who was 
still in the department, despite the allegations which had 
been levelled aginst him. The Committee decided that an 
independent department of the Municipality should be established, 
and that the Municipal Planning Officer should be asked to 
resign.^
At its March 9, 1967 meeting, the Board agreed unanimously
4to implement the committee's recommendations, and the
Municipal Planning Officer finally submitted his resignation
5with effect from May 24, 1967.
1. Minutes of a Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Re­
organisation of the Municipal Town Planning Branch, in 
PKL(C) 4/62, November 15, 1966.
2. Advisory Board Minutes, August 30, 1966.
3. Minutes of a Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Re­
organisation of the Municipal Town Planning Branch, in 
PKL(C) 4/62, November 15, 1966.
4. Advisory Board Minutes (Confidential), March 9, 1967.
5. Advisory Board Minutes (Confidential) , April 27 , 1967.
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What of the Minister's brave threats that officers involved
in corruption would be dealt with with utmost severity?
The Municipal Planning Officer, whose alleged misconduct had
caused the transfer of the Municipal Town Planning Branch,
stayed on in his post for two and a half years after the
transfer had been affected, although virtually stripped of
all administrative power. He had continued to receive his
full pay. Along with other senior government servants, he was
given a ninety-nine year lease to a piece of state land valued
at $M102,000 for a token $M10,000.^ And finally, when his
continued presence hindered the establishment of a new
department, he was allowed to 'resign and go away quietly with
a clean record', - taking with him, of course, the Commissioner's
full contribution toward his Provident Fund (i.e., retirement
benefits) which he would have forfeited had he been fired.
This course was suggested by Nahappan so that 'it would be
easier for the officer to secure employment elsewhere, possibly
2with any other Local Authority in the country'. The officer 
in question in fact had no trouble in finding alternative 
employment and was quickly hired by a millionaire developer 
hotel owner.
With the offending officer finally disposed of, the way 
was clear to establish a new department. On January 1, 1969,
the Town Planning Department of the Kuala Lumpur Municipality 
was officially established on an equal footing with the six 
other departments already in operation.
As presently organised, the Town Planning Department is 
divided into two sections, development control and 
development planning, with each section headed by an assistant 
town planner. Development control deals with the day-to-day 
business of processing individual applications for planning 
approval.
1. Lease 2011 .
2 . Advisory Board Minutes (Confidential), December 2, 1966.
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Development planning, on the other hand, is concerned with 
long range planning for the entire area under the jurisdiction 
of the planning authority.
Development Planning
Development planning is the more important of the two 
functions of a planner.'*' Ideally, development control decisions, 
i.e., who gets permission to build what where, should be made 
on the basis of some wider plan for the entire area in question, 
and some general understanding and agreement between the planning 
authority and the developers and architects as to what is 
acceptable, at least in principle. Such a basis for granting or 
denying approval safeguards the authority against accusations 
of favoritism and corruption and tends to save time all 
around.
The history of development planning for Kuala Lumpur has 
been tortuous and largely unproductive.
In the pre-war period, the major accomplishment in 
development planning in Kuala Lumpur was the adoption of the 
Approved Town Plan in 1939, about eighteen years after the 
need for such a plan had been mooted. This Plan, which the 
Municipality still follows, was described by one exasperated 
Municipal Engineer as 'little more than a Zoning Map'.1 2 
The Town Planning and Development Bill which had been passed 
in 1923 was rescinded four years later because of strong 
objections from influential property owners. As a result, 
development planning became virtually impossible.
After the war, all of the technical officers who had 
anything to do with planning in Kuala Lumpur were unanimous in 
their criticism of what had occurred in the period before the
1. See Lewis Keeble, Principles and Practice of Planning 
(London, 1959) and T.J. Kent, The Urban General Plan (San 
Francisco, 1964) for further discussion of development 
planning and development control.
2. Todman to York, (39) in KLM(C) 42/50, August 7, 1953.
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Japanese Occupation. In 1950, C.O. Jennings, the Municipal
Architect, said: 'For more than 20 years the Town Planning
Department [i.e., the Federal Town Planning Department] has
been in existence, and to date we do not possess a Town Plan
worthy of the name...There must come a day when the system of
long range town planning must come and the Municipality take
unto itself the responsibility and control of planning its own
town...'  ^ Concannon, the Federal Town Planner said in 1951:
'During its life in the inter-war years...the work of the office
became more and more in advising upon interim development and
in preparing detailed layouts for sub-division and control of
property, principally in respect of shop houses and
terrace house areas in towns. Very little overall planning,
2in its widest and proper sense, was undertaken,...' In 1953,
he again made the point that 'planning as has been done for the
past 30 years, is generally little more than day to day control
3of interim development...' D.I. Todman, the Municipal Engineer,
emphasised the same point: 'The greatest need is for a
Planning Scheme to be developed with the accent on Development
Planning, as distinct from the present limited work done in the
control of development according to the existing Planning
Map, which is little more than a Zoning Map incorporating
4building layouts prepared as need arises' . The legacy of the
pre-war era was fundamentally what Jennings had referred to as
5'hundreds of jigsaw layouts' and what his technical colleagues
1. Jennings to President, Municipal Commissioners, (1)
in KLM(C) 42/50, September 29, 1950.
2. Concannon to the Chairman, Town Board, Kinta, TPD416/46/41
in (4) in KLM 1666/51, April, 27, 1951.
3. Concannon to York, TPD 922/51/137 in (41) in KLM(C) 42/50,
May 18, 1953.
4. Todman to York, (39) in KLM(C) 42/50, August 7, 1953.
5. Jennings to President, Municipal Commissioners, (1) in
KLM(C) 42/50, September 29, 1950.
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had variously described as inadequate.
The need for a Central Area Development Plan had been 
raised as far back as August 1951 by Concannon.'*' In 1954, 
when it became apparent that no progress was being made, 
Concannon raised the matter anew with the President of the 
Municipal Council, A.D. York: 'You will, I am confident, agree
a point has now been reached where lack of a comprehensive 
overall plan for re-development of this important heart of the 
town is hindering progress and cannot be longer delayed'.^
In response, York wrote to the Member for Local Government, 
Housing and Planning, drawing his attention to the magnitude 
of the Central Area problems and the urgent need for the 
establishment of a Planning Committee to provide maximum co­
operation between government departments in helping solve
3these problems. His letter was followed by a proposal
to appoint an outside consultant, a matter which had first been
4raised by the Municipal Engineer. The Central Area planning 
problem was put into temporary cold storage while the question 
of bringing in a consultant was pursued, until two months later 
the Municipal Planning Officer pointed out in obvious 
exasperation:
1. Minutes of a Subcommittee Meeting held August 28, 1951,
in KLM 1021/48.
2. Concannon to President, Municipal Council, in TPD 167/5 3/5
in (7) in KLM(C) 1119, March 22, 1954.
3. (10A) in KLM(C) 1119, May 26, 1954. Carrel, the Acting
Secretary to the Member for Local Government, had in fact 
suggested the establishment of a K.L. District Planning 
Committee to prepare a regional planning scheme for the 
whole District of K.L. in (18) in T.P. 29 in (11A) in 
KLM(C) 1119, February 23, 1954.
4. (11) in KLM(C) 42/50, January 2, 1951.
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The Municipal Council does not require any
further lengthy reports on what is required
to be done. The Town Planner, Federation
of Malaya and the Municipal Engineer and
all others connected with the development of the
Central Area of K.L., are fully aware that
it is necessary to prepare a comprehensive development
scheme for the centre of the town and it is not
necessary to bring eminent Town Planners 10
thousand miles to repeat what has already been
said.
With this in mind, York proceeded to negotiate with the 
Selangor State government, appealing for the help of an expert 
not as adviser but 'for the drawing up of a detailed develop­
ment scheme for the Central Area of K.L. This scheme [would be] 
required to form the basis for the Federal Government's 
development, the control of private development and the
expenditure of Municipal funds for public works over an
2extended period of years'. The State government indicated
that it agreed in principle with efforts to get an expert but
insisted on being fully informed of the description of the
work to be done and the extent to which benefits resulting
would accrue to areas outside of the Municipal limits. Pending
the receipt of this information, the question of financial
3assistance would have to be left open. Between August 1954
and April 1955 meetings were held, letters exchanged and
tortuous negotiations carried on between Municipal, State and
4Federal officials.
1. Jackson to Municipal Engineer and President, Municipal
Council, in KLM(C) 1119, Part I, July 27, 1954.
2. York to the Hon'ble State Secretary, Selangor, (17) in
KLM(C) 1119, Part I, August 2, 1954.
3. State Secretary, Selangor to Secretary to Member for Local
Government, Housing and Planning, (8) in Sei. Sec. 879, 
Augus t 11 , 19 5 4 .
4. In a Minute written to the Municipal Engineer and the
Planning Officer, York says: 'I have just returned from a
long meeting with both Federal and State representatives 
presided over by the member, in regard to obtaining the 
services of an expert Town Planner from the U.K. I found 
the going s omewh at difficult...', KLM(C) 1119, Part I, 
August 26, 1954.
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Part of the record of the meeting held on August 26,
1954, at which it was finally decided that 'the Municipal 
Council UNTAA expert be invited to visit K.L. for 3 months or 
so and consider and report upon problems of the region of K.L. 
and the related question of the Central Area', is worth 
reproducing here because it highlights Federal and State 
interests (Cottrell and Abdul Aziz) aligning themselves 
against Municipal interests (Concannon and York).
Concannon repeated the advice that what was required 
by the local authority was a detailed plan for the 
Central Area in particular, so that applications for 
individual development could be intelligently considered, 
and that this could not be prepared without 
consideration of the wider aspects: no expert in the
world would be expected to produce this result in 
the space of three months. Concannon reminded 
the meeting that he had originally proposed the 
Singapore Diagnostic Survey Team might be appointed 
or alternatively a private consultant. Concannon 
also suggested that extra staff be appointed to the 
Federal Town Planner's Dept, to collaborate with 
the local authority, and its planning officers.
Mr. Cottrell at once raised objection to the Fed.
Town Planner being concerned with K.L. Municipal 
domestic planning in that w a y , since he argued that 
there would be immediate shouts for similar 
assistance from Penang, Malacca and elsewhere in 
the Federation. Che Abdul Aziz for the State 
equally argued that the State should not pay part 
of the cost because they were not likely to be 
involved. This somewhat remarkable argument was 
retained by the State Secretary despite the view 
put forward by York and Concannon to the contrary.
Concannon's advice was ignored and UNTAA planner Grenfell 
Rudduck arrived in October 1955 to prepare a report on town 
planning in Kuala Lumpur. His terms of reference said: 'The
main purpose of the request for the Consultant's visit is to 
obtain his advice on the present plans for the redevelopment 
of the Central Area of the town of Kuala Lumpur which have 
been prepared in the Town Planning Branch of the Municipal
1 . TP D 167/53/19 in (22) in KLM(C) 1119, Part I, August 26, 
1954 .
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Engineer's Department'
Rudduck's report was completed by the end of the year and 
by July 1956 it was on hand in K.L. A special committee of the 
Municipal Council considered his recommendations and ended 
their deliberations late that year, without coming to any 
conclusions, and it was finally 'de-restricted' and made 
available to the public in 1957.^
By April 1959, after reconsidering the original plans in
the light of Rudduck's recommendations, the Municipal Planning
Section had crystallised its proposals for the layout of the
Central Area, and York wrote the State Secretary, Selangor,
asking for the permission of the Ruler-in-Counci1 to implement 
3them. By this time, however, Rudduck's recommendations that
technical aid be sought to revise the land use plan for the
4Municipality had been implemented. Vlado Antolic, UN Planner, 
had already arrived and was working on plans for Kuala Lumpur, 
including the Central Area, and the Kuala Lumpur/Klang Valley 
Region. The State Secretary, to whom York's letter had been 
addressed, wrote the Minister of the Interior in one of those 
rare instances of unequivocal State/Municipality co-operation, 
s aying :
...it is proposed by this Administration that the 
road proposals put up by the Municipality should 
be recommended for approval by His Highness the Ruler- 
in-Council notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Antolic 
is carrying on his land use survey...it is suggested 
that this particular area in the center of K.L. 
be excluded from the terms of reference that you
1. G. Rudduck, Town Planning in Kuala Lumpur (Kuala Lumpur, 
1957) , p .72.
2. Reference Notes for the Town Planning Committee, KLM(C)
1300/55, August 29, 1956.
3. York to State Secretary, Selangor, (21) in KLM(C) 1119,
Part III, April 7, 1959.
4. Rudduck, o p . cit., p.4.
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have given Mr. Antolic.
Both the Ministry of the Interior and Antolic expressed
strong disagreement with the State Government's suggestion
that the Central Area be excluded from the UN expert's terms 
2of reference. As a result of these objections there was
little that the Municipality could do, and at the Town
Planning Meeting held on June 5, 1959 it was decided that
'consideration of the Central Area Scheme be deferred pending
3finalisation of the overall plan for K .L . '
At the end of September 1959 Antolic told the Siting
Committee that he had now produced a Draft Development Plan
for the Central Area of K.L., and that this layout had been
integrated with the Master Plan for the whole of the Kuala
Lumpur Area. Antolic explained that he was obtaining estimates
of costs likely to result through the acceptance of his plan,
as well as other information relating to ownership of land,
4conditions of roads, water and electricity supplies, etc.
It was agreed that after these data had been gathered the plans 
would be discussed with the Technical Co-ordination Committee 
made up of the Director of Public Works, the State Engineer, 
the Municipal Engineer, the Commissioner of Town and Country 
Planning and the State Planning Officer. Further examination 
of the plans would then be undertaken by the Municipal 
authorities and after their approval had been secured, the 
plans would be transmitted to the State Government for
1. State Secretary, Selangor to the Minister of the Interior
and Justice, (4) in Sei. Sec. 930, Part V, April 11, 1959.
2. Haji Ismail bin Panjang Aris for the Secretary to the 
Minister of the Interior and Justice to the State Secretary, 
Selangor, 83131/108, May 18, 1959; Vlado Antolic to Con- 
cannon, T CP D HQ/167/5 3 Pt. II in (23A) in KLM(C) 1119,
Part III, April 23, 1959.
3. KLMC Town Planning Committee Minutes, June 5, 1959.
4. Siting Committee Proceedings (Confidential) , September 29, 
1959 .
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gaze tting.
This procedure was not strictly followed. When it became
apparent that the Technical Co-ordination Committee was delaying
matters the Municipal planners examined Antolic's plans and
prepared a schedule of proposed amendments to serve as a
basis for a compromise plan after discussions with Antolic and
2Federal Town Planning personnel. At the end of October such
3a meeting was in fact held and a compromise plan negotiated.
It was clear now that the Municipality was taking the initi­
ative with York seeking some kind of a breakthrough which would 
allow him to implement the compromise plan.
At the end of October a meeting of the Siting Committee
was told that the final approval of any plans for the Central
Area was a matter for the Municipality to decide. Such a
decision would not be taken until the Federal Government had
been consulted and the agreement of the State government 
4secured. Early in November the State Secretary endorsed
the procedures outlined above and urged York to impress upon
the Technical Co-ordination Committee the need for haste, as
further delays might leave Government open to claims for damages
from prospective developers whose plans for building in the
5Central Area were being illegally kept in abeyance. The 
State Secretary undertook to refer the plans, once endorsed 
by the Technical Co-ordination Committee, to the Federal
1. Ibid.
2. Municipal Engineer to President, Municipal Council (36)
in KLM(C) 1119, Part III, October 28, 1959.
3. Minutes of Meeting to discuss Antolic's Compromise Plan
No. TCPD HQ/4027/plan H in relation to the Municipality 
Plan No. CA112C, TCPD HQ 167/5 3/Pt.11/50 , October 30 , 1959.
4. Siting Committee Proceedings, October 27, 1959.
5. Hashim bin Mat Dris to York, (96) in Sei. Sec. (Secret)
731, November 11, 1959.
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Government for its agreement in principle and, after this, to 
the Executive Council for its approval.  ^ York himself wrote 
to both the Director of Public Works and the Commissioner of 
Local Government at the end of November on the subject of 
making financial allocations in the Federal Government's 
5-Year Development Plan for $M27,505,000 , the sum to be spent 
over five years if the planning proposals were to be implemented. 
By this time the ball was clearly in the Federal government's 
court in respect of acceptance in principle of the compromise 
plan and provision of funds to make its implementation possible. 
York had clearly done all that was in his power; he could only 
wait now and hope that something satisfactory would work out.
Towards the end of December 1959, Antolic went off on
three months leave. On January 26, 1960 the Federal Government
announced that 'because of a new situation created by Antolic's
recommendations, [it had] re-examined the Parliament House
3Scheme [which had been under consideration for some time]
4and now wish[ed] to put forward alternative proposals'.
The alternative proposals involved changing the site for
1. Ibid.
2. (43) in KLM(C) 1119, Part III, November 25, 1959.
3. In August 1958 a special Committee was appointed on the
orders of the Prime Minister 'to consider a proposal to 
site the new Parliament House in Brockman Road and relate 
the development of the Central area of KL to it.' The 
Committee's recommendation to Cabinet had been; 1) that 
Parliament House be situated on the 20 acre site of state 
land at Brockman Road; 2) that privately owned land right 
across from Brockman Road be acquired to provide sites for 
proposed CEB headquarters, GPO and other government 
buildings; and 3) that the 'Eastern Hotel' site be acquired 
for the new Municipal buildings. See (27) in MNRY. 263/57 
in Sei. Sec. (Secret) 731/10, August 1, 1958. Cabinet had
decided to accept the above proposals in early August 1958; 
see Edmonds to State Secretary, Selangor (28) in MNRY.263/57 
in Sei. Sec. (Secret) 731/10, August 11, 1958. The new CEB
headquarters, GPO and Municipal buildings have still not 
been built.
4. Kemp to State Secretary, Selangor, P.M. 11073/2, January 26, 
1960 .
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Parliament House from Brockman Road to where it is presently 
located and the location of the 'major traffic route of the 
future...from the Chinese Assembly Hall area...over the railway 
by a viaduct near the Cenotaph, along Victory Avenue, behind 
the Selangor Club, through the Brockman Road site and on over 
the Sungei Gombak to follow generally the line of the river 
and railway to meet Ipoh Road at the Segambut Road junction' .
It was not as if the Federal government were asking for advice; 
it had made up its mind and was simply informing the State 
and Municipal governments that whatever adjustments might be 
necessitated in already formulated plans for the Central Area 
had better be made as soon as possible.
At a meeting of top administrators held on February 10, 
these proposals were confirmed and agreement reached that 
previously gazetted land acquisition notifications be with­
drawn and that a site for the new General Post Office be
2considered further by a sub-committee. These new proposals
made York's carefully negotiated compromise plan redundant.
Undaunted, he wrote the State Secretary on February 17 out-
3lining how parts of the plan might still be salvaged. But
this had little effect. On April 14, Selangor Government
Notification No. 531 of October 17, 1957 concerning the
proposed acquisition of privately owned land in the Central
4Area, was formally withdrawn. On August 5, York formally 
notified the State Secretary that his amended compromise plan
1. Ibid. This impressive traffic route has recently been 
completed and follows exactly the path spelt out here.
2. Notes of a Meeting to discuss the acquisition of land in 
the Central Area of KL for Federal purposes held in the 
Ministry of the Interior Conference Room on February 10, 
1960, (12A ) in KLM(C) 1119, Part IV.
3. York to State Secretary, Selangor, (11) in KLM(C) 1119,
Part IV, February 17, 1960.
4. Selangor Government Gazette, April 14, 1960.
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for the Central Area was being withdrawn.1 234
Applications for planning approval for projects within the
Central Area continued to be suspended pending some decision
2on Antolic's recommendations for the area.
This decision came in September 1960 from the Minister of 
Works, Posts and Telecommunications who said:
Initial examination of... [Antolic'sj proposals 
revealed that the construction of these 
through routes across the Central Area 
represented the key to the whole plan and it 
was evident that early action had to be taken 
if the proper development of K.L. was to be 
ensured and if the traffic problems, 
which are rapidly becoming intolerable, were 
to be solved. The proposals, put forward 
by Mr. Antolic, were too advanced and costly 
to be capable of practical realization at the 
present time but it was evident that they could be 
introduced in a modified form which would solve the 
problem for the next 30 years which would 
ensure that the full plan c^uld be implemented 
ultimately if so desired...
In October the Commissioner of Town and Country Planning 
was told by the Director of Public Works that:
Mr. Antolic's proposals as a long term measure 
are admirable but, unfortunately, it will be 
impossible to recommend them to government 
for implementation within the next 5 years.
The schemes being put forward will follow the 
best features of Mr. Antolic's proposals as 
closely as possible and will be such that major 
elements in his recommendations can be inter­
preted at s^me later stage without too much 
difficulty.
1. York to State Secretary, Selangor, (26) in KLM(C) 1119,
Part IV, August 6, 1960.
2. 'Government Studies Scheme to develop Federal Capital in
Keeping with Status', Straits Times, December 30, 1960.
3. Memorandum from the Minister of Works, Posts and
Telecommunications, DPW R/17/6 (Secret) , September 12 , 1960.
4. Jewkes to Commissioner of Town & Country Planning, (8)
in DPW. (Secret) R/17/6/1, October 14, 1960.
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Antolic's substantive proposals incorporating extensive 
urban renewal features and calling for outlay of Federal funds 
were being set aside, ostensibly in the first instance only.
The core of Antolic's plans for K.L. were put into cold storage 
and left there.
The Antolic Plan
Antolic's terms of reference covered a great deal more 
than the central area of Kuala Lumpur. When his work was 
finally completed in June 1961, he had prepared a Comprehensive 
Regional Plan for the whole Klang Valley extending from K.L. 
to Port Swettenham.^ The proposals for the Klang Valley 
included 'the expansion of the Kuala Lumpur urban area to form 
"Greater Kuala Lumpur", the expansion of Klang and Port
Swettenham as a single urban unit, and suggested sites for five, 2new towns .
Antolic proposed that the population of Greater Kuala 
Lumpur should be about 800,000 with about 460,000 within the 
present Municipal boundary. New suburban units were proposed 
at Kepong, Segambut, Batu Caves, Setapak, Ampang , Salak North 
and South, Klang Road, and Sungei Buloh. The order of priority 
for the development of these areas was to be dependent on how 
soon the tin deposits could be worked out. Antolic had 
recommended that 'these suburban areas should be self contained 
as far as possible, each having its own industrial area, 
community facilities, schools, open spaces and recreation areas 
etc. They [were] not intended to be dormitory suburbs for 
wokers commuting to the town centre, but balanced communities,
1. W. Fairbank, 'Proposals for the Future Development of KL,
The Klang Valley, and Selangor' , (unpublished and confi­
dential) , May 1964 - compiled from V. Antolic, 'Klang Valley 
Plan Report', (unpublished and confidential), June 1961. 
Fairbank was Commissioner of Town & Country Planning at this 
time.
2. Ibid., p.7. The proposed sites for the five new towns were 
Sungei Way, Batu Tiga/Sungei Rengam, Serdang, Puchong and 
Kuchai. See Map 5.
156 .
in clu din g low cost housing for workers in the nearby industrial
a r e a s ' . 1 2*4 A total of eleven sites for industry, totalling 2,800
acres, in the Greater Kuala Lumpur area had also been proposed,
and it was expected that these sites should provide employment
for wor kers living within each n e i g h b o u r h o o d  in the hope that
this would reduce time and energy lost in the journeys to and
from work and alleviate further traffic congestion in the
2Fed eral Capital.
The An to lic Plan reviewed
An tol ic's plans for the 'Greater Kuala Lumpur' 
region and the Klang Valley were submitted to the C o m m i ssioner 
for Town and Country Planning, Fairbank. Together with Colombo 
Plan expert Franklin who was especially engaged for this
3project, they prepared an evaluation of Antolic's proposals.
The plans for the deve l o p m e n t  of the Klang Valley were 
also su bmi tted to the K . L . /Klang Valley Regional Committee 
whi ch had been esta b l i s h e d  as a result of Antolic's r e c o m m e n d ­
ations for a central pla n n i n g  organ i z a t i o n  for this area.
Its terms of reference were: 'To consider all major proposals
for the d evelopment of alienated and State Land in the 
Di str ict s of K.L. and Klang and to advise on the use of the land 
and form of development, having regard to the position of K.L. 
as the Federal and State capital p r o v i d e d  that in the case of
al ie na te d land, only major projects of national importance are 
4c o n s i d e r e d ' . At the second me eting of the Committee, Fairbank 
made his position regarding the UN expert's plans very clear:
. . .it was up to the Comm ittee to formulate a 
Plan for the region, in which those of Antolic's 
r e co mmendations wh ich were desirable and 
p ra ct icable could be adopted. The Antolic 
Plan was an advisory report and was in some
1 . I b i d . , p .9.
2 . I b i d . , p .10.
3. I b i d .
4 . TCPD. HQ(C) 69/15.
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ways incomplete. The Secretary to the Minister 
of the Interior mentioned that the UN Adviser's 
Plan was only Antolic's view of development 
in the Klang Valley and it was up to the 
Committee to accept or reject his recommendations.
A year and a half later a memo from the Commissioner of
Town and Country Planning noted that since the Antolic Plan
had been submitted to Government so many changes had been made
to it that it was no longer correct to call it the Antolic
Plan; he suggested that it be renamed the K.L./Klang Valley
2Committee's Regional Plan.
In any case Fairbank, on the basis of further research 
during his evaluation of Antolic's proposals, had concluded 
that :
(i) Antolic's population projections for the Klang
Valley had been underestimated. Antolic had said that the
population of the Klang Valley would reach one and a half
million by 1990 whereas Fairbank now argued that this figure
3would be reached by 1974-'77.
(ii) The five suggested new town sites were either un­
suitable, or must, because of tin mining, be long term 
projects.^
1. Kl/Klang Valley Regional Committee Minutes, April 9, 1963.
2. Kl/Klang Valley Regional Committee Minutes, October 20 , 1964..
3. Fairbank, o p . cit., Summary.
4. Ibid. Fairbank's opinion that one of these sites, known
as Sungei Renggam (where the new State Capital will be 
located), was unsuitable because 'a large part of the 
area now appears to be physically unsuitable, as much of 
the land is low-lying, swampy and the bearing strength of 
the sub-soil insufficient for building without expensive, 
uneconomic'piling and foundations', was rejected after a 
prolonged and bitter conflict within the Kl/Klang Valley 
Regional Committee; see Kl/Klang Valley Regional Committee 
Minutes, February 7, 1963 through December 22, 1964.
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Working from these premises, Fairbank argued that the future 
population of K.L. would logically have to be accommodated at 
greater densities within the proposed Greater Kuala Lumpur 
area provided also that the new suburban areas were simult­
aneously developed.^
The question of the Greater Kuala Lumpur Area has now been 
under discussion in the K.L./Klang Valley Regional Committee 
since 1964. As of May 1969 it seemed as if some decision 
was about to be made about where the urban fringe line of 
demarcation would be drawn but no firm conclusion had been 
reached. Map 5 shows the proposed Greater KL area and the 
accompanying list provides information on some of the larger 
estates within it. Owners of this and other land within the 
area stand to gain considerably if their property is reclassified 
as urban land.
One other major proposal in Antolic's Report was a
Transportation Study for Kuala Lumpur. Unlike other aspects of
the report, the study had commenced almost immediately and was
2completed in July 1964 at a cost of $M750,000. It recommended
a $M161 million twenty year program. At a special meeting on
October 6, 1964 the Advisory Board unanimously accepted the
report in principle and forwarded it to the Ministry of Local
Government and Housing 'with a view to seeking financial
assistance from the Federal Government for the implementation 
3of the plan'.
1. Fairbank, op . ci t .-, p.12.
2. R. Crooks, Mitchell & Peacock and Tippetts-Abbott-McCarthy- 
Stratton, Kuala Lumpur Transportation Study, Vol. I & II, 
October 1964.
3. Advisory Board Minutes (Confidential), October 6, 1964.
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The Commissioner wanted the Federal government to provide 
about $M50 million of the total sum as a aprt of the First 
Malaysian Five-year Development Plan. Instead, the Federal 
government indicated that $M18,400,000 would be provided for 
roads in Kuala Lumpur, of which $M10 million was to be spent 
by the Ministry of Works, Posts and Telecommunications for 
projects in connection with through routes. In his 1965 
Budget Speech, the Commissioner of the Federal Capital, having 
outlined these developments, said: 'It will be seen that I shall
not be able to carry out the scheme of road improvements to 
its successful conclusion 1 .^
A high-ranking Municipal official explained in 1969 
that the scheme had not really been abandoned. Pointing to 
several dozen beautifully bound copies locked in a glass case 
he said, 'We still have the Report and try to work to its 
general recommendations'.
Generally then, Antolic's Report had come to naught. It 
had never been released to the public, but had been considered 
piecemeal by various administrators, alone or in committee, and 
its proposals abandoned or altered beyond recognition. Antolic 
himself had warned against selective implementation - -e r f his 
plans, insisting that they stood or fell together as a unified 
whole. His warnings went unheeded, and bit by bit his plans 
went the same way.
After Antolic - Master Planning Attempts
By September 1961, the situation insofar as the central 
area was concerned had become so serious that York wrote to 
the Director of Public Works:
I may say that I am greatly relieved to know that a 
meeting will be convened early as I have been with­
holding planning permission for repairs and also the 
erection of new buildings in this area which I 
cannot do forever as I have no power in law to do so.
It is, therefore, a matter of considerable urgency
1. Advisory Board Minutes, November 1, 1965.
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from my point of view that a meeting ^e called to 
resolve this matter once and for all.
Meetings were held with representatives of the Federal
Government in October on the question of the central area and
a recommendation to the Cabinet was made supporting the view
of the Commissioner of Town and Country Planning that
certain sections of private property in the area be acquired
2for public purposes. In December, Cabinet ratified the
decision of the committee and the acquisition machinery was 
3activated. The property owners concerned protested both
individually and collectively through organisations like
4Chambers of Commerce. Lawyers interceded on behalf of
5clients affected by the proposed acquisition. In August it 
was publicly announted that the area subject to compulsory 
acquisition would be turned into a piazza with public 
buildings to house the General Post Office and the Central 
Bank.^ Newspaper patter on these and related proposals continued
1. (9) in KLM(C) 1119, Part V, September 29, 1961.
2. Notes of a Meeting held October 6, 1961, in KLM(C) 1119,
Part V.
3. I. L l . Phillips, to Haji Ismail bin Panjang Aris, MI. T S .
189/46 TOP SECRET in (17) in KLM(C) 1119, Part V., December 
11, 1961. See also '37 Shops Get Notices', Malay Mail ,
February 26, 1962.
4. A covering letter to a petition from sixteen affected
landowners to the Commissioner of the Federal Capital reads 
in part: 'It is hoped that your goodself would view the
matter on priority and let this Chamber know the position 
so that we may in turn ease the mental tension of our 
members'. (40) in KLM(C) 1119, Part V, July 27, 1962.
5. Gunn Chit Wha to the Commissioner of the Federal Capital,
483/3/62 in (23) in KLM(C) 1119, Part V, February 26, 1962.
6. 'Piazza Plans to include bank and civic centre', Malay
Mail, August 19, 1962.
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through March 1963.' There followed a period of newspaper
silence and then on November 1, 1963 the Malay Mail announced
that the piazza plan would be dropped mainly because of
2prohibitive costs. The property owners were delighted with
the news which indicated that their pressures had borne fruit
but the Federation of Malaya Society of Architects expressed
concern at the abandonment of the scheme and feared that
3piecemeal development of the town would continue.
The abandonment of the 'piazza plan' for the central area 
was followed by the administrative upheaval discussed earlier. 
When the Town Planning Branch was transferred to the Federal 
Department of Town and Country Planning, one of the main tasks 
of the new Commissioner for Town and Country Planning cum 
Chief Planning Officer was the preparation of a Master Plan 
for Kuala Lumpur. Besides all the usual reasons why such a 
plan was desirable, it was also hoped that the abuse of 
administrative discretion in granting planning permission could 
largely be curbed if there were^an approved town plan to follow.
Several months after assuming his dual position, Frank 
Watkinson told a committee of the Advisory Board that work on 
the Master Plan 'had progressed to an advanced stage and that 
the Hon. Min. of Local Govt, and Housing had directed that the
1. In November 1962 a hint had been dropped that the Government
would not implement Antolic's recommendations en bloc but 
that it would be the basis of a new blueprint to be made by 
the Department of Town and Country Planning;. see'New Plan 
for K L ', Malay Mai1, November 9, 1962; 'Antolic - and after
. . . , ' Malay Mail (editorial) , November 12 , 1962 .
2. 'Piazza Plan Dropped'. Malay Mail, November 1, 1963. See
also Government of Selangor, Gazette, No. 789, Vol. XVI,
No. 21, October 17, 1963, Supplement 1 for official
notification of withdrawal of acquisition of properties in 
the Central Area.
3. 'Architects concerned over future development of K.L. ' ,
Malay Mai1 , November 9, 1963.
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Master Plan be made ready by the end of 1965' . ^
No such plan was forthcoming at that deadline, but in 
February 1966, Watkinson made a public statement about his 
proposed new plans for the central area. The objects of the 
plan were to allow purchasers and sellers of land to know 
exactly what could be erected on the land, and to provide 
citizens with a better and more functional central area. At 
the same time, Watkinson said that suggested layouts were not 
final and that flexibility in development of large areas should 
predominate.^
This somewhat se1f-contradictory statement was followed
by another period of silence, broken by a public announcement
by the Commissioner of the Federal Capital in October. Tuan
Haji Ismail outlined the new plan which would soon be ready
for a radial circular garden city for two million people to be
3completed over a twenty year period.
The 1967 Draft Town Plan
Finally, in April 1967, at the Annual Dinner of the
Malaysian Institute of Architects, the Minister of Local
Government and Housing announced the publication of the new
Master Plan for Kuala Lumpur and invited the Institute, as
a competent and responsible public body, to offer objective
4and constructive criticism.
What was being called the Master Plan consisted of three
1. Minutes of the Continued Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee,
August 4, 1965.
2. 'Govt, to prevent KL skyline from being "jagged"',
Malay Mai1 , February 5, 1966.
3. 'Ready Soon, A New Master Plan for Kuala Lumpur',
Straits Times, October 6, 1966.
4. 'Capital's M-Plan based on trebled population', Straits
Times, April 7, 1967; Malaysian Institute of Architects,
'Memorandum on the New Master Plan of Kuala Lumpur',
(cyclostyled), 1967.
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documents:
i) Plan No. L886 - Central Commercial Area of Kuala 
Lumpur;
ii) Plan No. L887 - Density Zoning Plan;
iii) Plan No. L888 - Zoning Plan.
Plan No. L886 - Central Commercial Area of Kuala Lumpur:
This document delineated the area in question, showing 
permitted density of building which might be granted upon 
application being made to the Planning Authority. Land which 
might be used for special purposes, i.e. comprehensive 
redevelopment, was similarly delineated.
Plan No. L887 - Density Zoning:
This plan, as its title indicates, referred to density 
zoning and applied to the whole of the Municipal area outside 
of the Central Commercial Area which had been covered in Plan 
L886. Permitted densities, depending on size of lot and type 
of building, ranged from 10 to 200 persons per acre.
Plan No. L888 - Zoning Plan:
Here the broad land use zoning for the entire Municipal 
Area covering commercial, education, residential, limited 
commercial development, open space, institution and industry, 
was specified. A schedule of reference to zoning further spelt 
out, in respect of each zone, the class of buildings speci­
fically permitted, those which might be permitted and those 
not permitted.'*"
No written statement accompanied the drawings to explain 
the objectives of the Plan, its task and assumptions or its 
scope. There was no evidence of the radial garden city or the 
twenty year project of Haji Ismail's earlier announcement.
1. This summary description of each of the three plans is 
derived from Timothy Thim Fook Lam, 'A Critique of the 
New Master Plan of Kuala Lumpur' , Geographica, 3 (1967) ,
pp.60-65 at pp.60-61.
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Architects vs. Planners
First off the mark in criticising the plan was Goh Hock 
Guan, architect, prominent activist in the Malaysian Institute 
of Architects, Secretary of the Greater Kuala Lumpur City 
Development Association and Vice-President of the Democractic 
Action Party (DAP). At the end of April, wearing his DAP 
hat, Goh Hock Guan criticised the fact that only three plans 
had been made available for public inspection and drew attention 
to the absence of any accompanying report.'*" In the middle 
of May, this time wearing his architect hat, he referred to 
the failure to provide for a public library as 'an elementary 
but incredible omission' and went on to say:
Instead of maximum contact providing the facilities 
and the setting for a free intermingling of 
different races, cultures and peoples of different 
walks of life, the new plans showed a rigid compart- 
mentalisation of everything that was different.
Much more serious was the separation of the Malay 
residential area from those of Chinese and 
Indians. Thus you have places like Kampong Bahru for 
Malays, Chinatown for Chinese and Sentul for Indians.
All these in turn must be effectively insulated 
from that elite group of very rich Malays, Chinese,
Indians and Europeans who live in Kenny Hills and 
the Golf Course area. This kind of planning makes 
sense only if Malaysia is still a colony. In 
fact this was what the British did.
It was the Malaysian Institute of Architects, however, 
which sustained a vigorous battle against the plan.
The Institute's first letter in this campaign was written 
to the Minister of Local Government and Housing on May 11.
The Institute's position was that the plan was entirely 
inadequate as it stood, but that more information was needed
1. 'DAP hits out at Master Plan for Capital' , Straits Time s ,
April 26, 1967.
2. 'Master Plan for KL criticised by architect', Malay Mail,
May 19, 1967. Goh Hock Guan himself was living in this
elite are a .
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before a detailed and intelligent critique could be made.^
Before the Ministry had replied, the Institute convened
a public forum on the plan. At the forum in mid-June what
had heretofore been called the 'Master Plan' was referred to
as the 'Draft Town Plan' in the opening address by the Commiss-
2ioner of the Federal Capital. Speakers at the forum were
confused by this sudden change of nomenclature. Was the
Ministry back-tracking? Was there indeed any significance in
the switch from the Master Plan to the Draft Town Plan
designation? No satisfactory answers to these questions were
forthcoming, and the Institute's representatives were left
with the impression that the change to the Draft Town Plan
label constituted a strategic withdrawal from the clearly
indefensible position the government would be in if it
persisted in calling its three drawings a master plan. The
general consensus of the forum was that the new plan for K.L.
was not only inadequate but could not by any stretch of the
imagination be regarded as one by which the Federal Capital
3could be developed.
On June 24 discussions were held between representatives
1. Malaysian Institute of Architects to The Minister of Local
Government & Housing, May 11, 1967. See also 'Master Plan
for KL inadequate', Eastern Sun, May 15, 1967; 'Architects
want more details of plan' , Malay Mail, May 16, 1967.
2. See Appendix 'C' in Malaysian Institute of Architects to 
the Minister of Local Government and Housing, May 11,
1967, pp.20-22. The same source refers to the name change 
as a 'significant turn of events' (p.2) .
3. 'Criticism from Architects at Public Forum - Master Plan for 
KL "inadequate", full of mistakes', Malay Mai1 , June 15, 
1967. Speakers at the Forum were three representatives of 
the Malaysian Institute of Architects (Hisham Albakri, 
Chairman, Goh Hock Guan and Baharuddin bin Abu Kassim), 
Timothy Lam Thim Fook (a lecturer in Geography at the 
University of Malaya), and Senator Dato' Athi Nahappan 
(unofficial member of the Advisory Board of the Federal 
Capital Commission).
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of the Institute and a delegation of representatives of the
Town and Country Planning Department, the Secretary to the
Minister of Local Government and Housing and the Commissioner
of the Federal Capital. Watkinson was forced to concede that
the Draft Town Plan was really a 'cut and paste' job and that
his department had bungled in calling it a Master Plan in the
first instance. Under further questioning he admitted that the
planning team did not include anyone from the P.W.D. or any of
the other government departments obviously interested in the
Federal Capital and most importantly, that he had not at any
time consulted the Municipal Engineer or the Municipal
Architect.^ When asked about financial arrangements for
implementing the plan, Watkinson had to admit that there
were none. A number of other questions put by the architects
either could not be satisfactorily answered or answered at
all, which led the architects to observe that this amounted to
2'an ignorance that [was] most alarming'.
When the Ministry finally replied to the Institute's
letter of May 11 it was simply by way of an 'aide memoire'
which set out the Ministry representative's version of the
3answers provided at the meeting held on June 24. Although
1. The Commissioner of the Federal Capital, Watkinson, the 
Municipal Engineer and the Municipal Architect at this 
time together comprised the full membership of the Town 
Planning Committee through which all applications for 
planning permission had to pass. One informant described 
how Watkinson treated his two Municipal colleagues with 
disdain and contempt, gradually turning the committee into 
what was described as a 'fighting committee'. It is 
reasonable to have expected that an important matter like
a new Town Plan should have been discussed in this Committee 
but as far as has been ascertained, the Committee was not 
consul ted.
2. Notes of a Meeting with the Commissioner of Town & Country
Planning and others held in the Municipal Chambers, June 24, 
1967, in the Minutes of a Meeting of the Town Planning 
Committee of the Malaysian Institute of Architects held 
June 27, 1967.
3. Ramli bin Abdul Hamid to President, Malaysian Institute of
Architects, June 1967, Appendix B in Malaysian Institute of 
Architects to the Minister of Local Government and Housing, 
May 11, 1967.
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this differed in style as well as in emphasis and content 
from the notes of the same meeting made by the Institute's 
representatives, it remained a record of the fundamentally 
unsatisfactory nature of the Ministry's replies.
In keeping with the Ministry's undertaking to publicly 
exhibit all reports, analyses and surveys which had been used 
in preparing the Draft Town Plan, an exhibition was organised 
early in August for one day only but extended to a week after 
protests had been made.'*' What was actually displayed were
2'free hand sketches, overlays, unrelated graphs and analyses'. 
In place of the comprehensive report which the architects 
had asked for when the three plans were first exhibited, a 
new document, prepared by the Federal Department of Town and 
Country Planning and entitled 'Report and Analysis - Introduct­
ory Statement', made its appearance, and thirty copies were
3on hand for public distribution.
This document was an afterthought and an attempt to 
explain and justify various aspects of the Draft Town Plan.
In a section entitled 'Contents of the Plan' the nature of 
the Draft Town Plan was outlined as follows:
A plan for a large urban area can be broad or detailed 
in character. A broad plan deals only with matters 
which are of importance to the whole urban area.
These include, for example, major highways but not 
local roads serving local requirements. Zoning 
proposals for residential, commercial and industrial 
areas are confined to broadly defined areas within 
which more detailed zoning proposals can be made 
for smaller unit areas. Open space recommendations 
are confined to larger playgrounds such as stadia, 
national parks and exclude minor proposals for
1. 'Master Plan - with more details', Straits Times, August 11,
1967; '"One day only" show of K.L. Master Plan "ridiculous"', 
Malay Mai1 , August 12, 1967.
2. Malaysian Institute of Architects to the Minister of Local
Government & Housing, May 11, 1967, p.4.
3. Ibid.
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children's play parks and small reserves...
It was agreed by the Planning Team that the 
Draft Town Plans should contain proposals of 
a broad character, which would provide a 
framework for the preparation of local 
detailed plans at a later date and when 
development was considered imminent. This 
view was adopted for several reasons. The 
plan is the first of its kind since that 
prepared in 1939 and is in many ways an 
improvement in both presentation and context.
The authorities have to make decisions on the 
major proposals and until these decisions are 
made, preparation of development proposals at a 
more detailed level, particularly in areas 
outside of the Central Commercial Area, would 
be impracticable and unwarranted. Further, 
it was also felt that if proposals of a purely 
local nature was [sic,] included, the £ocus of 
the major proposals would be obscured.
This made it quite clear that Watkinson's plan represented 
a return to the principles of the 1939 Approved Town Plan.
The new plan if approved would mean the perpetuation of the 
old system of making hundreds of the detailed jig-saw layouts 
to which Jennings had referred in the early '50s. But this 
would not be all; most importantly, administrative discretion, 
and with it administrative control over applications for 
planning permission, would be preserved intact. This would 
mean, in effect, that Watkinson, or whoever replaced him, 
would continue to wield great power.
After the appearance of the document entitled 'Report and 
Analysis - Introductory Statement' the Malaysian Institute of 
Architects (MIA) countered with 'Memorandum on the New Master 
Plan of Kuala Lumpur' in which they recapitulated all of the 
previous arguments in support of their principal contention 
that on technical grounds the so-called 'Master Plan' was not 
a master plan at all, and that even as any other kind of 
plan it was fundamentally unsound. About the Planning
1. Federal Department of Town & Country Planning, 'Kuala 
Lumpur Draft Town Plan, 1967 - Report and Analysis - 
Introductory Statement' (cyclostyled) , 1967 , pp.16-17.
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Department's newly published statement, the MIA said:
The "Introductory Statement" which the Town Planning 
Department has prepared is indeed truly introductory and 
the reader wonders whether or not he is reading an 
essay on what town planning is all about. There is 
hardly anything in this report which is substantial 
either quantitatively or analytically, or which is 
relevant to Kuala Lumpur in particular, or to the 
proposals which are purported to be contained inside 
the 3 sheets of plans ... Indeed the impression one gets 
from reading "Report and Analysis" or "Introductory 
Statement" points to the inadequacy in its preparation 
and content. It was hoped that the report would have 
established our confidence in the 3 sheets of drawings. 
However, it has only confirmed our fear that the 
planners have not understood in depth the problems of 
Kuala Lumpur nor have they posed anything like a 
solution to these manifold problems.
The memo called for modern planning legislation to replace
the obsolete 1932 Enactment, 'the preparation of a New Master
Plan on a proper basis to replace this hastily prepared and
inadequate set of plans' and the appointment of 'a team of
planners consisting of varied and experienced staff' and the
immediate publication of the Kuala Lumpur Transportation Study,
the Antolic Report, Franklin's 'Looking Ahead Selangor' and
all of the other reports upon which the Draft Town Plan was
2allegedly based.
This brought to a climax the confrontation of the 
proefessional community of architects in private practice and 
the government planners. The debate between the two parties, 
initiated at the invitation of the Minister, had lasted from 
April to August. Public attention had been focused on the very 
obvious inadequacies of the plan. The only concession that 
the architects were able to obtain was the change of design­
ation from 'Master' to 'Draft' Town Plan. Their protests, 
however, had laid bare the technical weaknesses of the plan.
1. Malaysian Institute of Architects to the Minister of Local
Government & Housing, May 11, 1967, pp.9-10.
2. Ibid., p .14.
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Planners vs. Property Owners
After the plan had been open to public inspection for the 
statutory three month period, objections from many individuals 
were lodged. In June, the Selangor Property Owners and 
Ratepayers' Association (SPORA, an organisation representing 
some of the biggest landowners in Kuala Lumpur) wrote to the 
Commissioner of the Federal Capital saying that:
1. Plan L.886 was impracticable and not comprehensive 
e n o u g h ;
2. the plan had not been accompanied by a report 
explaining to owners cf property and the general public how 
the proposed future development of the Central Area was 
envisaged;
3. alienation of land and properties by the elimination 
of existing buildings and premises would cost the government 
millions of dollars and no provision for compensation in 
respect of such acquisition of properties was foreseen;
4. in view of the obviously long time it would take to 
implement the proposals contained in Plan L.886 it would be 
more expedient to allow areas on the outer circumference of 
the Municipal area to be opened up for commercial purposes.1
In late December when objections to the Plan were being 
heard, the SPORA submitted a memorandum, this time concentrating 
on the proposals for the Central Commercial Area. The 
Memorandum covered basically the same points contained in the 
letter of June 23: the setback proposals in the plan were
unfair and unrealistic in view of the compensation that 
Government would have to pay; the 4-storey limit on building 
heights was unduly restrictive and uneconomic from the point 
of view of the landowner and, finally, that the whole plan
1. Selangor Property Owners and Ratepayers' Association to
the Commissioner of the Federal Capital, S/I/6306, June 23, 
1967 .
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should be reconsidered.
Other representations were also made. Mr. Chua Boon
Guan, Vice-President of SPORA and executor of the Estate of
Chua Cheng Bok (perhaps the biggest single owner of land in the
Central Area) wrote the Commissioner of the Federal Capital
in June, raising the same points which the SPORA had posed in
its letter a few days before, but quoting in addition an
article in the Malay Mail of June 19 in which an ECAFE
expert had said that the master plan approach for cities was 
2obsolete. In December, Mr. Chua presented a memorandum to
the committee appointed to hear objections to the plan and
3simply enlarged on his letter.
Senator the Honourable Dato' Y.T. Lee, President of
the Incorporated Society of Architects and Surveyors, Malayan
Branch, led a delegation to see the Commissioner of the
Federal Capital asking for information on the government's
proposals for implementation of the plan, including what
measures were in hand to compensate owners for property acquired
for road construction. The delegation also expressed
reservations about the provisions for density control in the
Central Area, and urged relaxations in this respect in order to
4encourage development. Tan Soo H a i , former Selangor State 
Planner who had become a private planning and landscape 
consultant, urged in a lengthy letter to the Press 'that the 
Draft Master [sic] Plan be accepted as a guide for the time
1. Selangor Property Owners and Ratepayers' Association,
'Memorandum: Draft Town Plan of Kuala Lumpur - Central
Commercial Area' (typescript) , December 21 , 1967 .
2. Chua Boon Guan to Commissioner, Federal Capital, C.953,
June 22, 1967.
3. Chua Boon Guan, 'Memorandum: Draft Town Plan of Kuala
Lumpur - Central Commercial Area' (typescript), December 
13, 1967.
4. '4-Man architect-surveyor delegation see Commissioner of
the Federal Capital', Eastern Sun, July 16, 1967.
172 .
being' and that immediate steps be taken to enact modern
planning legislation, appoint a Planning Team drawn from
various fields and provide financial support for 'a really first
rate Master Plan. ..to be prepared in 18 months 1 .  ^ C.V.
2Devan Nair, DAP Member of Parliament for Bungsar, announced
that he would ask the Minister of Local Government and
Housing 'whether a new Master Plan for K.L. would be drawn up,
as the proposed plan was generally condemned as a disgraceful
3piece of town planning'. When the hearings for objections 
began in December a stream of property owners and their 
spokesmen appeared before the tribunal with a potpourri of 
ideas and objections.
Goh Hock Guan appeared for twenty owners of property in
Batu Road and Jalan Ampang and urged that Batu Road should
be closed to traffic from Mountbatten to Campbell Road, that
Kuala Lumpur should adopt a linear development plan towards
Port Swettenham, that the size of K.L. should not be limited
by the traffic problem, that the proposed density limit of four
storeys be abandoned and that developers be allowed to build
as high as possible, saying: 'I am sure that if you have a
few more skyscrapers this problem {traffic] would not become 
, 4any worse .
Ng Tian Meng, architect son of a millionaire developer 
and landowner, represented three landlords owning property in
1. Tan Soo Hai, 'In defense of the Kuala Lumpur Master Plan',
(letter to the Editor) Eastern Sun, July 27, 1967.
2. Bungsar is one of the Parliamentary constituencies in 
Kuala Lumpur and is the largest in the country.
3. 'Parliament will be queried on Master Plan for K.L.',
Malay Mail, August 15, 1967.
4. 'Property owners want "restrictions" lifted', Malay Mai1 ,
December 13, 1967; 'Call for "unlimited" K.L. - "Include
P J , Batu Tiga and Port Swettenham in Master Plan",
Inquiry Told' , Straits Times, December 13, 1967 .
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the heart of the Central Commercial Area, and said that if
landlords were only allowed to build up to four storeys, then
nobody would develop their properties. Another architect
r e p r e se nt ing Bee Seng and Co., one of the largest rubber
exporters in Malaysia with considerable interests in urban
land, o b j ected to height and setback r e s t r i c t i o n s .  ^ Ki ngton
Loo, pr o m i n e n t  member of the Malaysian Institute of Architects
and an important figure behind the scenes in framing protests
about the technical shortcomings of the Plan, now appeared for
Barlow Bou st ead Estates, Sime Darby Malaysia Ltd. and ICI
Holdings Malaysia Ltd., and urged that greater density should
be allowed if the area of the lot increased, as this would
enc ourage owners of individual lots to come together in order
to get higher densities resulting in more economic and better
buildings. Other spokesmen made submissions in support of
gre ater d e n s i t i e s . 1 2 34 Just to make certain that its complaints
would be written into the record, the Malaysian Institute of
Ar ch ite cts  came before the tribunal, emph a s i s i n g  that the
plan was inadequate and sugg esting that a number of steps be
3taken to rectify the situation. Baharuddin bin Abu Kassim,
an archi tect and activist in the MIA, told the three-man
committee that the absence of a civic centre in the Master Plan
was a glaring weakness and urged that any plan should include
pro vi si on s for a town hall, a library, concert hall and art 
4gallery. Civil Engineer and Town Planner R. Bailey, speaking 
on behalf of Boustead Holdings Ltd. and Chung Khiaw Bank L t d . , 
sug gested some new approaches to t r a n s portation p l a nning
1. '"Dead Town" Warning - A r c h itect hits out at Capital
Maste r P l a n ' , Straits T i m e s , December 19, 1967.
2. 'Master Plan offers no incentive for r e b u i l d i n g ' , Straits
Time s , December 21, 1967.
3. 'KL Plan "not adequate"', Maiay M a i 1 , December 22, 1967.
4. 'Civic Centre for KL "a must", Board of Inquiry told',
Malay M a i 1 , December 23, 1967.
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including better utilization of railway services for K.L.
commuters.''" Goh Hock Guan appeared for Dato' Low Yat , 
proprietor of the Federal Hotel and a well-known speculator 
in real estate, to object to low densities in the Ampang and
Circular Road areas, upper class residential areas generally
2restricted to one house per acre. Sidney Woodhull, former
Singapore trade union leader, political detainee and now a
lawyer employed by the prestigious law firm of Drew and Napier,
appeared for Socfin, seeking an assurance that the company
would be allowed to retain its business premises in what the
3plan had zoned as a residential area. Gunn Chit Wha, lawyer
and former Municipal Councillor, called for consistency in
4zoning on behalf of two landowner clients. Alex Lee, a
lawyer in the prominent law firm of Skrine and Co., appeared
on behalf of thirteen landowners making representations on the
subject of assessments of land 'struck with sterility', i.e.,
5land required for public purposes.
The above constitute a fair cross section of the jumble 
of representations made to the committee hearing objections.
Most frequently raised was the question of height and setback 
requirements and the related matter of government compensation. 
The range of objections also included questions relating to 
residential density, land use zoning, land affected by road 
proposals and requests for industrial and commercial zoning.
What is also of relevance and well illustrated by the cases
1. 'KL Rail Services Urged', Malay Mail, December 29, 1967.
2. 'A Dead City after Dusk - The danger that faces Kuala Lumpur
by a Town Planner', Straits Times, December 29, 1967.
3. 'Assurance to KL Landlords - Draft Plan will not affect
their rights, B d . of Inquiry told' , Malay Mail, December 
30, 1967.
4. '"Extend Capital's night life centre"', Straits Times,
January 10, 1968.
5. 'More incentives to be urged for KL property development',
Malay Mai1, January 11, 1968.
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cited is the array of spokesmen, notably lawyers, architects, 
a few engineers and a small number of brave souls who represented 
themselves, who appeared to lodge objections. The technical 
objections made by the Malaysian Institute of Architects 
acting as a professional group and the objections based on non­
technical criteria, i.e. infringement of property owners' 
rights, made by these same men acting as agents for landowners 
and developers are noteworthy. This dual role of some 
architects for quite obviously different and even mutually 
eclusive ends is an interesting anomaly. On the one hand it 
appears that when some architects speak on behalf of their 
professional organisation they want a technically sound and 
aesthetically acceptable plan complete with effective legislation 
to go with it; on the other, these same architects give the 
impression when representing clients that any plan which 
effectively curtails the interest of landlords and developers 
is to be deplored.
The Planners Retreat
The major effect of the objections became apparent on the 
third day of the proceedings of the Board of Inquiry when the 
Commissioner of the Federal Capital announced somewhat pre­
maturely that if 'the compensation payouts were too heavy, it 
would be practical to re-examine the whole draft plan for 
Kuala Lumpur'.  ^ By this time Watkinson himself had begun to 
retreat. 'Judging from the number of people who have come 
before the board so far asking for compensation at market value', 
he said, 'it may very well be a little too much for the
government to bear. We might have to think again about the 
2roads program'. It was all reminiscent of other occasions
1. '"Re-thinking necessary if the compensation costs are 
high - capital may have to review the Master Plan":
Dato Lokman', Straits Times, December 14, 1967.
2. 'Too Costly, Master Plan may be altered', Malay Mai1 , December
14, 1967. It is remarkable that Watkinson could have
imagined owners asking for less than market value for 
property acquired by government.
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when the government had revealed its weakness: the case of
the urban renewal 'piazza plan' which was dropped as too 
costly, and the amendments to the 1963 plot ratio proposals 
which were revised following strong representations made by 
architects and developers.^
Even though the government had prematurely indicated a
change of heart, procedures to consider the plan could not be
abandoned at this stage. Consequently, after the Board of
Inquiry had completed its public hearings early in January
1968 it processed the objections which had come before it, but
made no public report of its findings, despite a call from the 
2DAP to do so. In light of the objections lodged and its own 
deliberations, the Board of Inquiry announced early in 
August that certain amendments to the plan had been made 
and, in accordance with the law (Section 138(iv) of F.M.S.
Cap. 137), property owners affected by the revised proposals 
could lodge objections within fourteen days. At the end of 
this statutory period, 258 individual objections had been lodged, 
covering very much the same ground as the first' set of 
objections. The procedure for hearing the objectors or their 
representatives was repeated. Six meetings were held and by 
September 16, 1968, it was time for the committee to begin
dilberating again. Early in 1969 the Board of Inquiry's 
Report was sent to the Minister but it was never made public, 
despite questions asked in Parliament and other representations. 
During 1969 the question of what should be done with the plan 
on the basis of the Board of Inquiry's still secret Report 
was not even discussed in the Advisory Board of the Federal 
Capital Commission. In the 1969 elections for Parliament 
and the State Legislative Assembly neither the Draft Town Plan 
nor planning in general were issues that were seriously
1. 'Rules will cut values' , Straits Times, March 8, 1963;
'Plot Ratio Proposals for KL may be amended', Malay Mai1 , 
November 4, 1963.
2. 'Disclose Objections to Draft Town Plan, KL Urged',
Malay Mail, April 22, 1968.
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raised by candidates running for office in the constituencies 
which fall wholly or substantially within the Federal Capital. 
Towards the end of the year 'something' was being done with the 
Draft Town Plan but for all practical purposes it was still 
in limbo.
Planning Legislation
It has always been stressed by town planners that any 
attempt at town planning must be backed up by strong enabling 
legislation. It has been shown how Reade in the pre-W.W.II 
period was rendered virtually ineffective in his attempts at 
planning by the repeal of the Town Planning Enactment of 1923, 
which was replaced by an enactment more to the tastes of 
property owners.
After the war new planning legislation had been generally 
considered within the larger context of a New Municipal Ordinance 
in 1953 when a special Committee was appointed. This Committee 
completed a draft Ordinance in 1957, but 'due to pressure of 
work on other legislations [sic] in the Attorney-General's 
Chambers, it was not considered until 1965'.'*" The matter 
was taken up again after this six-year lapse at a meeting of 
the Consultative Committee of Municipal Corporations held on 
September 6, 1965. The Commissioner of Local Government in­
dicated that he had no record of any proposal for new legislation 
in his office but would look into the matter. There is some 
doubt as to whether he did anything, but there is evidence of 
a Committee of the Secretaries and Treasurers from the four 
municipalities holding several meetings during 1965-1966 in 
an effort to update the Draft Municipal Ordinance which had
L. Minutes of a Meeting of Secretaries and Treasurers of the 
four Municipalities regarding the Draft Municipal Ordin­
ance, July 29/30, 1966. See also the following correspon­
dence with the Attorney-General: (8) in PKL. 5466,
April 30, 1958; (10) in PKL. 5466, July 15, 1958;
(11) in PKL. 5466, August 20, 1958; (13) in PKL. 5466,
November 7, 1959.
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been completed in 1957. These efforts yielded no substantive 
results and in 1969 the whole matter was still unsettled.
As far as separate planning legislation was concerned,
Antolic had repeatedly emphasised that legislation was an
essential basis for successful town and regional planning, and
he had outlined as an integral part of his report certain broad
2proposals for a planning enactment. It was very clearly
understood by the official planning fraternity that any new
Statutory Plan for Kuala Lumpur had to be accompanied by
new legislation. It was not surprising, therefore, that when
the first public announcement of the completion of the Master
Plan was made, it was accompanied by a statement that the
Ministry of Local Government and Housing was also drawing up a
3new Town and Country Planning Act. And it was not surprising
either that when Watkinson's plan was being criticised one of
the points made by the Malaysian Institute of Architects was
4that the question of new legislation had been ignored.
The Ministry's announcement in April that it was drawing 
up a new Town and Country Planning Act was not wholly true.
In July, Frank Watkinson wrote to the Ministry, not about a 
new Town and Country Planning Act, but about amendments to 
Section 145 of the Town Boards Enactment so as to enable the 
control of certain matters associated with planning by the use 
of by-laws.  ^ He argued that 'without the by-laws the Draft 
Town Plan [would] be prejudiced and the criticisms in 
Parliament...[would] continue. The intention of the amendment
1. See PKL. 5466, Parts I - IV.
2. 'Summary of the Recommendations by the United Nations
Adviser on Legislation', (extracted from the Klang Valley 
Plan Report, June 1961) , (cyclostyled) .
3. 'Capital's M-Plan based on trebled population', Straits
Time s , April 7, 1967.
4. 'KL Plan "not adequate"', Malay Mai1 , December 22, 1967.
5 . (63) in PKL. 307/59, July 6, 1967.
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[was] to legalise or empower the Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota (the 
Commissioner of the Federal Capital) to issue planning 
approvals for the control and use of land by the application 
of by-laws'.'*’ The advisability of pursuing this course of 
action was referred to the Municipality's legal advisers, 
Messrs. Shook Lin & Bok. In a letter dated October 13, 1967
they tendered the following opinion:
We are instructed that, over the years, it was found 
that the existing laws were inadequate to compel the 
observance and performance of town planning 
requirements set out by the Pesuroh Jaya Ibu Kota.
We are asked to consider whether the problem may 
be remedied by any amendment to existing laws or 
by new 1aws.
In the first place, we think, it is important to 
bear in mind that there are two broad aspects in 
respect of town planning. Firstly, the 
requirement for planning permission or user approval 
in respect of a piece of land. Secondly, the 
conditions to be attached to Sjuch user of land...
We had on an earlier occasion ...given an opinion that an 
owner of a piece of land is under no statutory require­
ment to apply for planning permission to develop his 
land. It follows, a fortiori, that the PJ Ibu Kota has 
no power to impose conditions in respect of such user 
of land.
From this it becomes obvious that the existing 
legislation is completely inadequate to compel the 
observance and performance of town planning requirements. 
Therefore, either the existing legislation should be 
amended or new legislation should be enacted to deal
1. Ibid.
2. Shook Lin & Bok Opinion RH/813/PIK/LOT 131, August 26,
1967 in which it was said: 'It is significant to observe
that there is no statutory requirement for a person,
who intends to develop his land, to apply for planning 
permission. The only legal requirements to be complied 
with by the developer are (i) to submit plans of new 
buildings in conformity with the Approved Town Plan and (ii) 
the building plans must comply with the Municipal Ordinance 
and By-laws. However, the practice, which has no express 
statutory basis, has grown that a developer has first to 
apply for approval of planning permission before the 
submission of building plans and, neither is there any 
express or implied legal requirement that planning 
approval must be obtained'.
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with the problem...
Although, we think that it may be convenient to 
amend Sections 143 or 144 of the Municipal 
Ordinance to compel the owner of a piece of land 
to obtain planning permission before developing 
his land, yet, for the reasons given earlier we 
do not think such an amendment would be suitable 
to empower the Pesuroh Jaya Ibu Kota to attach 
planning conditions to land development. As we 
have said earlier, the ideal would be a new Act of 
Parliament relating to Town Planning as a whole...
Earlier, we stated that to deal with substantive 
Town Planning matters by way of By-laws is not the 
best manner to deal with the problem. This is 
because a by-law is a subsidiary legislation which 
must necessarily inter vires the principal legisla­
tion. Secondly, we think that further consideration 
should be given as to whether any such by-law 
can impose a condition for surrender of land (free 
of compensation?) in respect of planning permission 
and approval.
Despite this excellent summary of the position, it was
this method of tinkering with the obsolete legislation which was
pursued; Section 145 of the Town Boards Enactment was amended
in March 1968.2 The amendment simply provided for insertion of
a new section in the principal legislation as follows:
'145A. The Board may - a) make by-laws to regulate and control
the development and use of land or buildings within the Town
3Board area; and b) approve and impose conditions thereof' .
By-laws framed under this new provision were drafted and
sent to the Municipality's legal advisers; they were returned
4in September 1968 with many questions raised about them.
In July 1969 the by-laws together with the legal adviser's 
comments were considered at a Heads of Departments Meeting when
1. Shook Lin & Bok to Pesuroh Jaya Ibu Kota (Opinion) 
RH/8318/PIK/TP 145 in (70) in PKL. 307/59, October 13, 
1967 (emphasis added).
2. Town Boards (Amendment) Act, 1968, Malaysia, Act of 
Parliament, No. 7 of 1968.
3 * I b i d .
4. (28) in PKL. 307/59, Pt. II, August 23, 1968;
(35) in PKL. 307/59, Pt. II, September 21, 1968.
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it was decided that the matter should first be examined by 
the Planning Officer and the Municipal Engineer and their 
comments should then be further considered in detail by a 
Sub-committee consisting of the Planning Officer, the 
Engineer, the Architect, the Treasurer and the Municipal 
Secretary. At the end of 1969 the question of the by-laws 
was still being considered.
In preceding sections the dominance of administrative 
institutions in Kuala Lumpur local government has been stressed. 
Not only has the bureaucracy been ascendant in the case of the 
Sanitary Board, Town Board, Municipal Commission and Council 
and the Federal Capital Commission, but it was also in State 
and Federal bureaucracies where many decisions affecting the 
city were made. Inter-bureaucratic conflict has been as much 
a part of the administrative political process as intra- 
bureaucratic conflict. The 1923 Town Planning Act was the 
result of successfully resolving inter-bureaucratic dis­
agreements at Federal, State and local levels; the repeal 
of this legislation exemplified the resolution of conflict 
within the upper reaches of the Federal bureaucracy and between 
these officers and bureaucrats in the Colonial Office.
The first and second Central Area Plans represented Municipal 
decisions being endorsed by the State government and later being 
vetoed by the Federal bureaucracy. The rejection of the 
Antolic Plan was a unilateral decision of the Federal 
bureaucracy.^ Only the 1967 Draft Town Plan can be said to 
have been sent back to the drawing board by forces outside of 
the bureaucracy (the result of pressures from architects and 
landlords).
All of the major planning proposals for K.L. since 1915 
have been initiated within the bureaucracy and decisions
1. See, for example, S.E. Jewkes, Director of Public Works to 
Commissioner of Town and Country Planning, (8) in DPW. 
(Secret) R/17/6/1, October 14, 1960.
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concerning them made within administrative institutions.
Development planning is an attempt to expand the 'net 
scope of government.'  ^ The planner is the primary agent in 
initially determining the extent to which the net scope of 
government should be increased. But a planner is never a free 
agent. Having decided on a particular plan (i.e. , on a 
specific proposed expansion in the scope of government) 
he must then persuade various people within and outside of the 
bureaucracy of its feasibility; he has to make his planning 
proposals politically acceptable. In the U.S. for example, 
Altshuler points out that when planners propose novel or 
expensive projects that cannot be justified by their benefits 
to property owners, they run afoul of several powerful social 
mechanisms. Among these are:
(1) the necessity of gaining support from 
politicians who avoid controversy and co­
operation from officials in the operating 
departments who are jealous of their powers;
(2) the legal and financial restraints upon the 
city governments which operate to prevent
even more activities in which politicians and 
agency heads are willing to engage; and (3) 
the lack of executive authority within the 
planning agency itself.
The social, political and economic factors upon which 
successful development planning in Kuala Lumpur has depended 
have included the following: (1) the effect of planning
proposals on property owners' fortunes; (2) the extent to 
which inter- and intra-bureaucratic conflict can be 
successfully resolved; (3) costs of planning proposals to 
government, and (4) legal and financial restraints upon the 
agency of local government.
1. Robert E. Agger e t .al., The Rulers and The Ruled, (New York, 
1964) , pp.6-14. The term 'net scope of government' is 
borrowed from the authors and is here employed strictly
in the sense used by them.
2. Alan A. Altshuler, The City Planning Process, (Ithaca, 1965), 
pp .361-362 .
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Bureaucrats in both the colonial and post-colonial
governments have shared one important characteristic. They
have both recognised the dependence of their respective
governments on the support of the mercantile community for
an important measure of political survival.1 2 This perception
of the critical importance of support from the business
community is most highly developed and most strongly held
at the Federal level in the upper reaches of the bureaucratic
hierarchy. Though no precise measures are available it can
be said that neither the perception of nor actual dependence
on the business community has diminished in the post-independence
period. In development planning, for example, no substantive
encroachment on the fortunes of land owners has been permitted
for fear of alienating the support which has been crucial
for maintaining both colonial and post-independence
governments in power. The British colonial bureaucracy gave
2private landowners free rein to acquire urban land in K.L. 
and substantially unfettered rights to use it, although a 
section of the bureaucracy under prodding from town planners 
has tried to modify this tradition in the post-independence 
period it has constantly failed to gain the support of key 
sections of the Federal bureaucracy and, of course, the 
legislative branch of the Federal government. The Antolic 
Plan for K.L. was vetoed by the Federal bureaucracy partly 
because of its extensive urban renewal features, the implement­
ation of which would have cost land owners millions of dollars. 
The 1967 Draft Town Plan was put into cold storage for similar 
reasons. This is not to deny that the cost factor to 
Government in each case, and technical considerations in the 
case of the 1967 Draft Town Plan, were also taken into account.
1. The Alliance government has always depended on a substantial 
measure of financial support from the business community and 
has been beholden to it to no small extent for getting
out the vote; this fact of political life has not been 
lost on the bureaucracy.
2. A quick survey of the Selangor State Land Records tended 
to confirm this.
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Planners have increasingly recognised the inescapable 
political aspects of planning and their role within such a 
context. All of the planners who were interviewed (most of them 
had worked on both the Antolic Plan and the 1967 Draft Town 
Plan) unhesitatingly pointed out that planning and politics 
could not be separated. All of them said unequivocally that a 
planner must be a salesman of planning ideas and be able to 
educate administrative and political superiors in the 
importance of planning. One informant said in exasperation:
'One of the greatest problems in dealing with politicians is 
that they cannot see the results and goals of planners ... they 
are worried about the next election rather than the next 
generation. ' It must be admitted that it is a considerable 
task for planners to successfully educate politicians 
heavily committed to landowners in the city, and so far the 
fledgling efforts which have been made have yielded negligible 
results. A disinterested citizenry has left the planners and 
bureaucrats sympathetic to their cause with little prospect of 
political leverage from that quarter.
Urban affairs, it must be emphasized, has not ranked very 
high in the government's scale of priorities. This has been 
true for both the colonial government and its successor. The 
party in power throughout the post-independence period established 
a Ministry of Rural Development, but there is no counterpart 
specifically concerned with urban planning in particular or 
urban affairs in general. As far as Kuala Lumpur is concerned 
unless legislators of the majority party in the Federal 
Parliament are prepared to give urban planning a higher 
ranking in their scheme of priorities and to pay more attention 
to sections of the bureaucracy which already support such 
measures, no substantive progress will be possible in the future.
1. Interview No. 514, November 19, 1969. See also Hugh
Stretton,Ideas for Australian Cities, (Adelaide, 1970) and 
A.F. Davies, Private Politics, (Melbourne, 1966) .
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Development Control
Unlike development planning which was attempted in fits and
starts, development control in Kuala Lumpur after the Japanese
occupation proceeded steadily if somewhat slowly. A Town Planning
and Building Committee was one of the standing committees
of the Town Board when it was reconstituted in 1946, and it
met eleven times in nine months . In that period the Committee
scrutinised 528 plans for new buildings, additions and 
2alterations. With the creation of the Municipality in 1948 
the Committee continued to function, with the Commissioners 
acting on the advice of the technical staff, at that point the 
Federal Town Planning Department. The job was complicated for 
everyone concerned because the Approved Town Plan of 1939 
which was the basis for planning did not cover the entire 
Municipal area. In addition, the authorities were only able 
to exercise control over the plans submitted for approval; 
hundreds of unauthorised buildings were springing up in town 
overnight and generally no action was taken against these 
builders, in view of the Emergency and the acute housing 
shortage.
At the inaugural meeting of the Municipal Council in 1952 
the only real discussion concerned the membership of the Town 
Planning and Building Committee when it was decided that 
practising architects who were councillors should not serve 
on the committee, in order to avoid conflicts of interest.^
Seven months later, Councillor S.C.E. Singham (Ind.) was demand­
ing to know the reason for delay in planning approval beyond 
the statutory two months. The delays were laid to the lack of 
a comprehensive plan to cover all land within the Municipality 
and the fact that planning approval and building approval
1. 'Report of the Kuala Lumpur Town Board 1946', 
(cyclostyled), p.ll.
2. Ibid. , p .37.
3. KLMC Minutes, February 19, 1952, p.6.
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both had to be given, and one often delayed the other.
This explanation did not still critics, and the Council held a
special meeting to consider allegations regarding bribery and
corruption in connection with the delay in approving plans.
While no one seemed willing to admit the possibility, there was
agreement that there was a serious problem of delay, which the
2President said would not occur in the future. It was with this
end in mind that the Town Planning and Building Committee
proposed that it transfer consideration of building approval
to the Housing Committee. This was done in August 1953 and
the committee became known as the Town Planning Committee with
its jurisdiction limited to only those matters concerning 
3planning. This Committee continued to function until the 
establishment of the Federal Capital Commission in 1961.
The re-structuring of the Town Planning Committee did not 
solve the problem of planning approval delay.
The situation was aggravated by a serious shortage of 
technical staff, the lack of development planning and deferment 
of decisions while Rudduck's and Antolic's plans were being 
considered.
The Committee's minute show that its main concern was 
development control, acting on the recommendations of the Federal 
Town Planning Department and later the Town Planning Branch of 
the Municipal Engineer's Department. The Committee's 
decisions were subject to the approval of the Council as a 
whole. In effect, then, the development control system that 
operated from 1952-1961 was one whereby the recommendations of 
the technical bureaucracy were considered by the legislators for 
final decision.
In 1961 the situation changed considerably. With the
1. KLMC Minutes (Addendum) , September 30, 1952, pp.1-4.
2 . KLMC Minutes (Secret) , May 12 , 195 3 , p .4.
3 . KLMC Minutes , August 31 , 1953, p.l.
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establishment of the Federal Capital Commission the committee 
system of the Council days was abandoned. The new Town Planning 
Committee was made up of technical officers, i.e., the Municipal 
Engineer, a representative of the Federal Department of Town 
and Country Planning, and the Municipal Planning Officer.^
There were no members of the Advisory Board, official or 
unofficial, on the Committee. It was the Committee's function 
to advise the Commissioner on planning applications, and he in 
turn acted upon its recommendations. Unlike the previous 
situation, where the recommendations of the technical staff 
were scrutinised first by a committee of Councillors and then 
by the Council as a whole, a total of eighteen 'watchdogs', 
the Commissioner was the sole decision-maker, advised only by 
a committee which had made the original recommendations. This 
concentration of power in the hands of the technical staff 
had obviously been abused and had led to the allegations of 
corruption which resulted in the integration of the Municipal 
Town Planning Branch with the Federal Department of Town and 
Country Planning.
Another direct and more far reaching result of charges of
corrupt practices in development control matters by the
Municipality was the directive from the Minister for Local
Government and Housing issued shortly before the decision to
integrate, requiring that all applications involving relaxation
2of present planning controls be submitted to him for decision.
No sooner had the Minister's directive been issued then 
he received a lengthy memo from the Greater Kuala Lumpur City 
Development Association complaining about the handling of
1. Notes of a Meeting of the Commissioner of the Federal
Capital with the Y.B. Menteri Dalam Negeri on 12/3/64, No. 
22 in PKL(C) 4/62, March 12, 1964.
2. Secretary, Ministry of Local Government & Housing to the
Commissioner of the Federal Capital, S u l i t , KKTP(FC) 7084/1 
in (1) in P K L ( C ) . 7/64, October 15, 1964.
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planning applications and listing specific examples of 
inconsistencies and delays in approvals.1 2
On January 1, 1965 development control, along with all
other aspects of planning for Kuala Lumpur, became the respon­
sibility of the Commissioner of Town and Country Planning. 
Twenty-one months later he reported that work was being carried
out properly and ably and the backlog of planning applications
2had almost been cleared. His neat 'procedure for planning 
applications' chart laid down the steps to be followed by the 
technical staff in processing applications through the stage 
of the Commissioner's decision to the point of informing the 
applicant of the decision, a procedure which presumably applied 
until January 1, 1969.
There are two broad categories into which applications 
for planning permission might be classified:
(1) where the application conforms in all respects with 
the planner's interpretation of what is allowed by the zoning 
plan and the application is routinely approved, and
(2) where the application is at variance at one or a number 
of points with the planner's interpretation of what is allowed 
by the zoning, density or other regulations.
It is obviously in this second category that there is 
room for manoeuvering and manipulation and it was with these 
decisions that the Minister's directive dealt.
An examination of a number of specific cases which involved 
such variations shows some of the ways developers handled the 
problem.
1. Greater K.L. City Development Association to the Minister,
Local Government and Housing, November 26, 1964.
2. Frank Watkinson, 'Memorandum on the Re-organisation of the
Municipal Town Planning Branch', (Confidential), JPBK(IP) 
Sulit 77(113) , September 26, 1966.
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A. In May 1966 Dato' Foo,-1 a prominent member of the Malayan
Chinese Association, applied for planning permission to build
a one-block fifteen-storey hotel in a very congested section of
Kuala Lumpur on the periphery of the Central Area proper.
Planning permission was opposed by the Municipal Engineer on
the grounds that a hotel of this size in this particular area
would generate a great deal of traffic, which was already a
2problem reaching unmanageable proportions. Frank Watkinson, 
Chief Planning Officer at the time, supported the application,
3arguing that the Engineer was being his usual 'obstructionist'
self, and that a fifteen-storey hotel could not possibly add
4to the traffic problem. The applicant's architect, himself a 
Dato' and a close friend of Watkinson, prevailed upon the 
Minister to approve the application. The Commissioner of the 
Federal Capital, faced with conflicting advice from two of his 
senior technical officers, decided to throw his lot in with 
Watkinson. The application was duly approved.
In April 1968 the applicant, through his architect, 
submitted an amendment to the previous approved application 
asking for a ten-storey building comprised of a seven-storey 
hotel, a restaurant and a cinema in lieu of the fifteen-storey 
structure which had been approved two years previously. At 
a meeting on May 9 this amended application was refused by the 
Town Planning Committee and a month later an appeal was rejected 
by the Committee. On both occasions the reason for the 
refusal was based essentially on the traffic argument advanced
1. Not his real name although the person in question is a 
holder of the title of 'Dato'', and at this point in time 
held elective office.
2. Interview No. 519, January 8, 1970.
3. A favourite word used by Mr Watkinson to describe the 
Engineer and his Department.
4. It has been alleged that this individual had been made 
a Director of the company involved in the project. A 
search for the Company's file in the records of the 
Registrar of Companies failed to locate the file concerned.
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by the Engineer and accepted by the new Commissioner. Mr 
Watkinson persisted in arguing that a ten-storey hotel/ 
restaurant/cinema could not possibly generate any more traffic 
than a fifteen-storey hotel would.
In October , an appeal to the Minister was lodged by the 
applicant's architect and that was finally rejected in 
December.
Dato' Foo, the applicant, then secured the intervention of 
a member of ro'yalty who wrote to the Commissioner of the 
Federal Capital on March 11, 1969 requesting that the matter
be reconsidered. Upon receipt of this letter the Commissioner 
convened a special meeting on April 10 at which the Deputy 
Engineer, the Deputy Municipal Architect, the Municipal Town 
Planner, Dato' Foo and his architects were present.
During the course of the meeting Dato' Foo said 'his 
community (the X Clan) were [sic] a "forgotten race" in the 
economy as they had not had the opportunity to develop buildings 
other than coffee shops. He was therefore taking the initiative 
to develop the hotel and cinema which would help the image of 
the community'.  ^ Dato' F o o 'S architect reiterated his old 
objections to the traffic hazard argument. The Municipal 
technical officers, including the new Town Planning Officer who 
had replaced Watkinson, refused to budge. The Commissioner 
then decided that 'a meeting be arranged between the Municipal 
Engineer and the applicant to see if the traffic problems could 
be resolved realistically'. Such a meeting was held with the 
Municipal Engineer without any change in the situation.
Towards the end of October 1969 the same highranking member 
of royalty wrote to the Commissioner again, and commanded that 
the application be reconsidered favourably.
The Commissioner passed the matter on to the Minister for 
reply, suggesting that the Minister write to the party concerned
1. Minutes of the meeting held on March 11, 1969; precise
source cannot be cited here. To be made available to 
examiners under separate cover if requested.
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that he had given the matter of Dato' Foo ' s appeal the most 
careful consideration and that for reasons of traffic congestion 
and hazards the request to reconsider favourably could not be 
entertained.
In June 1970 the matter was still at this stage.
B. In January 1962 Synn Cheong Development C o . , through their 
architects Eric Taylor Associates, applied for planning perm­
ission to construct a four-storey building with twenty-five 
flats on each floor, on lots 791 to 815 totalling 1.2 acres 
net and 1.6 acres gross.1 In July 1962 this application was 
approved by the Town Planning Committee and building commenced 
shortly thereafter.
Things began to go awry and in September 1962, the Town 
Planning Officer, Chan Peng Fook , sent the following memorandum 
to the Engineer and the Commissioner:
There have been refusals to recent planning 
applications for 2 flats per floor in typical 
20'xl00' terrace house lots in order to maintain 
a density of 200 persons per acre.
In this case on lots 791 to 815 totalling 1.2 
acres net and 1.6 acres gross (including half 
street and lane widths) a total of 100 flats were 
(sic) approved - i.e. density of 312 persons per 
acre .
Please see enclosure brochure advertising flats 
in which the applicant is attempting to provide 
for a total of 175 flats, i.e. a density of 547 
persons per acre.
The applicant should have been entitled to 64 
flats but he was allowed 100 flats. He is going 
to increase this to 175 flats. This is a contravention 
of the prescribed density. I raise this point 
because applicants who were refused planning pe r ­
mission recently for 2 flats per floor on 20'xl00' 
lots have pointed out that if the development in this 
case at Tiong Nam Settlement could be approved 
then there is no reason why similar application 
of theirs should be refused. You may wish to 
consider this since a matter of policy is involved.
1 . All the material for this case is to be found in KLM 
809/62.
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Acting on this memorandum the Commissioner of the Federal 
Capital wrote to the applicant's architects who insisted that 
only 100 flats were being built. On September 18, the Planning 
Officer made further investigations and repeated that 175 flats 
were being constructed and strict penalties should be enforced. 
When the matter was again referred to the architect he replied 
saying that as far as he was concerned building was proceeding 
according to the plans for 100 flats only and that any further 
questions should be addressed to the owners.
When the Municipal Engineer made inquiries of the owner, 
Synn Cheong Development Co., the following reply was received: 
'Provided that the buildings are constructed in accordance 
with the approved building plans, we fail to see how the manner 
in which we decide to sell portions of the said buildings 
could be of any concern to your Department'.
The other developments in this case will simply be outlined 
in chronological sequence:
Dec. 6, 1962: The Commissioner of the Federal Capital
writes to the Attorney-General outlining the facts of 
the case suggesting that proceedings be initiated under 
Section 144, Sub-Sec. 10(C) of the Municipal Ordinance 
to have the building demolished.
Jan. 4, 1963: Attorney-General replies saying no grounds
for intervention at this stage.
Feb. 28, 1963: Municipal Engineer to Waterworks Engineer
and Central Electricity Board (CEB) requesting the 
installation of one meter for each of 100 approved units 
only .
March 5 & 6, 1963: Waterworks and CEB reply that they
are really not in a position to refuse installation of 
meters for lights and water if their conditions re: 
separate entrances, etc. are met.
May 20, 1963: CEB notifies the Federal Capital Commission
that 175 separate applications received for supply of 
meters for flats.
July 29, 1963: Town Planning Committee meets and is 
apprised of the situation; it is decided to refer the 
matter to the public prosecutor for investigation as a 
possible commercial crime.
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August 19, 1963: CEB confirms that 175 'portions' of the
building were to be supplied with meters.
May 20, 1964: The Municipal Architect issues Certificate
of Fitness No. 302B for occupation of 100 flats.
October 10, 1964: Joint inspection made by Assistant
Commissioner for Town & Country Planning, Deputy 
Municipal Architect and Municipal Planning Officer 
confirmed that from the first floor upwards, each flat 
had been converted into two separate flats.
Nov. 12, 1964: The Municipal Valuer confirms that the
100 flats have been converted into 175.
June 9, 1965: Whole matter placed before Shook Lin &
Bok , legal advisers, in a letter from the Municipal 
Secretary in which he does not ask for action to be 
taken against the owners but points out why action 
cannot be taken (because there have been no violations) 
and he therefore asks that new Municipal By-laws be 
framed.
June 1, 1966: Shook Lin & Bok reply saying that
action can be taken under Section 144(10) (a) though the 
question is complex. Proposed new building by-laws 
appended to prevent repetition.
July 5, 1966: Minute by Deputy Municipal Secretary saying
'I believe that the consensus ... was that action should 
be taken for occupation with a Certificate of Fitness by 
the Municipal Architect's Department'. The next entry 
in the file dated March 31, 1969, three years later,
reads: 'This file was taken from the miscellaneous tray
in the P O 's r o om'. A note dated April 4, 1969 reads:
' . . .1 cannot see that any further action is necessary' .
C. When the Federal Hotel extension was completed in November 
1968 the usual application for a certificate of fitness was 
made to the Federal Capital Commission.1 Investigations 
revealed that an unauthorised tunnel had been constructed 
across a strip of State Land and that adequate car parking 
space had not been provided. Over the next six months a 
series of meetings were held to resolve these problems.
1. All the material for this case is to be found in PKL 844/61 
- S.J.I. The Federal Hotel is located on Jalan Bukit 
Bintang a few blocks away from the heart of town.
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Some of the people involved in the meetings ought to be 
identified. The owner of the hotel, millionaire Tan Sri Low 
Yat, is reputed to be a man with extensive connections, particul­
arly with high officials of the ruling party to which he is 
alleged to be one of the biggest contributors. Several 
knowledgeable informants nominated Low Yat as one of the 'top 
ten or twenty powerful men' in Kuala Lumpur and it is common 
knowledge that he is one of the Prime Minister's poker playing 
friends. Low Yat's legal representative in the negotiations 
was R.C. Hoffman of the firm of Allen and Gledhill in which 
Khaw Kai Boh, the Minister of Local Government & Housing was 
a partner. Goh Hock Guan was the architect for this project.
The Federal Capital Commission was represented by the Minister, 
the Commissioner, several members of his staff and Yong Pung 
How, representative of the legal advisers, Shook Lin & Bok.
The process of negotiating some kind of a settlement had 
begun in November 1968 when certain conditions for issuance of 
the Certificate of Fitness specified by the Federal Capital 
Commission were rejected by Allen and Gledhill. A meeting was 
then held to see if some agreement could be worked out and the 
company agreed:
(a) to provide public liability cover for death, injury to 
the public or anyone using the tunnel;
(b) to indemnify and keep the Commissioner indemnified 
for all or any claims, damages, demands, costs, expenses etc. ;
(c) to undertake to demolish the tunnel as and when asked 
by the Municipality or any competent authority to do so;
(d) to provide car parks as hitherto agreed for the hotel 
c o mplex;
(e) to obtain a licence from the District Officer to carry 
the tunnel through State Land;
(f) to complete the re-distribution scheme so that all 
areas affected in this complex will be determined by survey 
and title;
(h) meanwhile to close the tunnel and prevent it from
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being used.
When a formal legal agreement incorporating these points 
was drawn up by the Federal Capital Commission's lawyers and 
presented for the owner's signature it was rejected. At this 
point the Minister entered the picture and a series of four 
meetings were held on March 18, 19, 20 and 21. Agreement was 
readily reached on the question of sealing the tunnel and the 
surrender free of charge of portions of land required for the 
purpose of roads. The provision of parking space became the 
sticky issue. On March 18 it had been agreed that (1) the 
owners would agree to re-zone lot 170 to be used for car parking 
purposes; (2) that no development would be permitted on this 
land until the loan from the E.P.F. had been settled in full; 
and (3) that any future development of the land after that 
period would only be permitted subject to the provision of 
adequate car parking facilities for the hotel. At the meeting 
held the following day Low Yat appealed against the re-zoning 
condition attached to lot 170 requiring that it be used exclus­
ively as a car park. The Minister said:
...that on reflection he was also of the view 
that the imposition of this condition was somewhat 
harsh and he was prepared to review it on condition 
that Messrs Low Yat & Sons should enter into a legal 
agreement with the Municipality stipulating that Lot 
170...would be used exclusively for car parking 
purposes only and no dealings would be permitted 
without obtaining the prior permission and agreement 
of the Pesuroh Jaya Ibu Kota. Furthermore, in the 
event of any development taking place without 
permission, the Pesuroh Jaya Ibu Kota reserves the 
right to take injunction proceedings against the 
owners. On application, consideration would be given 
to Messrs Low Yat & Sons to develop any or the 
whole portion of the land on condition that adequate 
car parking facilities for the hotel would continue 
to be provided.
On this basis the matter was finally settled and appropriate 
legal documents drawn up by the Federal Capital Commission's 
legal adviser were signed on May 9. On May 13 the Federal 
Capital Commission received a bill from Shook Lin & Bok in
196 .
the amount of $1435 for legal fees. It is presumed that this 
sum was paid from public funds.
To the three detailed examples others might have been 
added: The Hotel Malaya on Cecil Street in the heart of the 
town, mysteriously built without adequate parking facilities 
and in clear violation of zoning and density regulations; 
the East Asia Realty Building on Mountbatten Road, built 
partially on a road reserve; the Kowloon Hotel on Batu Road, 
also jutting out onto a road reserve; the South Pacific Hotel 
at the corner of Maxwell and Ipoh Roads, built without provision 
for adequate car parking and allegedly without planning per­
mission; the Lien Lian Building on Mountbatten Road, with a 
plot ratio of 6:1 in a 2:1 area; the Malaysia-Hong Kong 
Land Development Co.'s twenty-six storey building presently 
under construction, with a plot ratio of about 5:1 in a 2.5:1 
area and planning permission granted despite strong objections 
raised by municipal technical officers concerned about the 
traffic which will be generated in an already congested area.
A whole series of similar cases are contained in the Appendix 
attached to the Greater Kuala Lumpur City Development Assoc­
iation's letter to the Minister of Local Government and Housing 
dated November 26, 1964, and further examples were cited by 
the Honourable Dr. Tan Chee Khoon in his speech to Parliament 
on December 21, 1964.
The location of petrol filling stations has long been a 
matter of keen competition between the principal oil companies, 
and a matter of considerable controversy as far as planners have 
been concerned. One Municipal official long associated with 
this problem said that getting planning permission for the 
location of a service station was like winning the first 
prize in the Social Welfare Lottery ($M400,000) . Approval 
of a given site for a service station is eagerly sought and 
there have been constant complaints of favouritism and of 
corruption. An attempt was made in 1968-1969 to formulate a 
'petrol filling station policy' and one had been worked out, 
but was being subjected to change to accommodate certain
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Specific applications.
Chan Peng Fook was forced to resign as Municipal Planning 
Officer because he is alleged to have been involved in some 
decisions similar to those listed above. If Watkinson and the 
Minister, Khaw Kai Boh, had been as thoroughly investigated 
as Mr. Chan, their responsibility for certain similar decisions 
might also have been established.
This state of affairs is not limited to planning in the 
Federal Capital. In the case of at least three major Selangor 
State Planning Department decisions involving millions of 
dollars, examples of similar instances can be cited and fully 
documented.
One important factor in this whole process is the absence 
of a statutory Master Plan. For the developer this means 
uncertainty as to precisely how he can use his land. One 
prominent architect put it this way:
Our main problem is that under the present 
circumstances we have to work blind. We are really 
not sure what is going to be the position from one 
application to another ... there is no Master Plan.
What counts under these circumstances is the ability 
to argue a lot; working for the owner of land 
who has political connections helps a great deal 
and the influence of the landowner and his 
architect with eithe^ the planner or the Ministry 
helps matters along.
The planner has three things going for him at least one
potentially working against him. He has a great deal of 
3discretion; he can hide behind his technical expertise and 
he has always been subject to a minimum of political supervision
1. PKL. 112/57.
2. Interview No. 516, December 19, 1969.
3. Between 1952 and 1964 discretionary power was vested in the 
Town Planning Officer and the Municipal Engineer; from 1964 
through 1968 similar powers were shared by Watkinson and 
Khaw Kai Boh, the Minister of Local Government and Housing.
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(as opposed to interference on behalf of certain applicants).
The one potentially effective curb on the abuse of his 
discretion is the possibility that he may be taken to court 
by an applicant. One important attribute of this system 
is that both sides have a vested interest in keeping out of 
the courts;'*' from the applicant's point of view it is expensive 
and time consuming; from the planner's point of view it is 
embarrassing and he is on shaky legal ground. Under these 
circumstances both sides have tacitly agreed on an informal 
system of negotiations.
Major participants in the process are architects and
lawyers representing developers on the one hand, and the Town
Planner or the Minister on the other. If an application for
planning permission is refused it is usually done in the name
2of the Town Planning Committee. Upon rejection the architect 
tries to get the Commissioner or the Planner to agree to 
changes in the plans so as to meet some of the objections 
raised.
If the first architect fails to achieve what his client
considers a reasonable compromise, the client may take his
plans to another architect who is more prestigious and therefore
3more influential. He will then present the same plan for 
approval, perhaps some months after the first application 
was lodged. For a number of possible reasons, not the least 
of which might be the special relationship between the 
architect and the planner, Commissioner or Minister, the plan 
may be approved.
1. To my knowledge there has been no single instance of an 
aggrieveddeveloper taking the Municipality to court - 
there having been instances of threats of litigation 
but no case of actual court action. The process of 
settlement by negotiation is exemplified by the Federal 
Hote1 case.
2. There are no members of the Advisory Board on the Town 
Planning Committee.
3. In the days of the partly elected Municipal Council Y.T.
Lee was reputed to be such an architect.
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When the architects fail, lawyers take over and are 
often successful. Some lawyers, because of their prestige 
and knowledge of planning matters and their relationship with 
bureaucrats responsible for approving plans, are more 
successful at bargaining. All parties concerned, including 
the legal advisers to the Municipality, prefer out of court 
s e ttlernen ts.
The whole process is expensive: it costs money to have
your plans held up, and it may cost money to have your plans 
approved. A little bit of give and take here and there can 
expedite matters; going to the right architect or lawyer can 
help in getting things done.
Informality is a crucial aspect of this process.
Written records are avoided. Discussion is encouraged. 
Compromise is a virtue; everyone must give a little, and if 
enough is given by all sides, even the stickiest problems can 
be settled. This aspect of the bureaucratic political process 
thrives on wide-ranging administrative discretion which allows 
the Minister, the Commissioner and the planner the necessary 
leeway to give and take. It is a game played by individuals; 
groups are not involved.
The really big developers operate in slightly different 
fashion. One informant put it thus:
Most of the big developers or power brokers 
on their behalf are all financial supporters 
of the Alliance. Applications that come in for 
big schemes inevitably get tagged as being 
sponsored by so-and-so company or individual 
who is a big man in the Alliance or has access 
to big guns in the Alliance; there is usually no 
directive for special treatment but the hint is 
firmly dropped that expediting matters would be 
appreciated. 'Expedite' generally means 
'approve' and if the technical officer does not 
recommend approval the Minister^usually sees 
to it that approval is granted.
1 . Interview No. 513, November 14, 1969.
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Another informant, a former Municipal Councillor, 
described the role of 'big men' as:
...not a conspiracy of the rich against the poor or 
anything like that; it was simply a system in which 
powerful rich men wanted to get certain things for 
themselves and were quite prepared to let their 
colleagues do the same. These people invested in 
the Alliance - a very low risk investment - not 
gilt edged, but very low risk - and they expected, 
like all good businessmen that this investment 
should pay dividends. One acceptable form o£ 
dividends was favourable planning decisions.
Another informant who had himself been very close to the 
planning process explained that 'vested interests', big land 
owners and developers who are financial supporters of the 
Alliance (the MCA specifically) consider their support to be an 
investment, the returns on which they are prepared to accept 
in the form of favourable planning decisions, either for 
themselves or their business associates. This applies not only 
to planning permission within the municipal limits but also 
on the fringe between the present municipal limits and the 
proposed greater K.L. area, where there has been a great deal 
of speculation.2
Yet another informant, also at one time an important 
figure in the planning fraternity, explained that specific 
planning control decisions could not be separated from politics.
Planners only give technical advice which may 
or may not be accepted by the politicians and 
rejection of advice is often determined by 
pressures that come from vested interests, 
business groups, developers. Politicians, 
landowners, architects and planners are all 
involved in this aspect of the planning process.
This is all political. Politicians will reject 
the advice of planners if developers who are 
concerned have chipped in money for t^e party 
funds or for the politician himself.
1. Interview No . 314 , J anuary 7, 1970
2 . Interview No . 518 , January 7 , 1970
3 . Interview No . 520 , January 9, 1970
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There is a temptation for the analyst looking at such 
a system characterised by far reaching administrative discretion 
to leap from instances of decisions based on particularistic 
considerations to a conclusion of corruption . ^  James C. Scott, 
in a perceptive article, makes an important point which is 
relevant to the discussion at hand. He says:
1. 'Corruption' in the context of these interviews meant that in 
return for special concessions in planning decisions, the 
applicants paid off someone in authority in either cash or in 
kind. There were frequent references to one individual who 
was referred to as the 'millionaire planner' - he had been 
allegedly paid off in both cash and grants of freehold land; 
all of the informants who had at one time or another been 
associated with the planning process talked of how other 
planners had made money and some of the developers who were 
interviewed specified how much they paid to get things 
done and how the sums so expended were written off as 
business expenses. One particular informant listed off a 
whole string of people who had made money but disclaimed 
ever making a penny himself by peppering a two and a half 
hour interview with statements like:
'Never took a penny - cross my heart' .
'I was once offered $7,000 but never took a penny'.
'Never asked one cent from anyone - am very proud of 
that. I have helped everyone. I had good relations with 
people'.
'......... made money but I didn't; best thing
is to have a good conscience' .
'I could have made a fortune but no regrets that I 
didn't '.
'Lots of temptations - but I never accepted a penny'.
'......... had me under his thumb; I didn't have the
power to make decisions and to make money'.
There were certainly no 'tell me about corruption' 
questions in the interview schedule used but in keeping with 
what I considered to be a good interviewing technique a 
series of indirect questions were asked in such a way 
as to facilitate the informant discussing the subject 
if he wanted to do so.
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Much of the expression of political interests in 
the new states has been disregarded because Western 
scholars, accustomed to their own politics, 
have been looking in the wrong place. A large portion 
of individual demands, and even group demands, in 
developing nations reach the political system, not 
before laws are passed, but rather at the enforce­
ment stage. Influence before legislation is passed 
often takes the form of 'pressure-group politics';
form of 'corruption' and has seldom been treated
as the alternative m^ ans of intere s t articulation
which in fact it is.‘L
The cases just cited are examples of interest articulation
at the enforcement stage. To label all such interest articu­
lation as 'corruption' would be a generalisation which the
data presented here do not support. It would, nevertheless, 
be naieve to say that there was no corruption at all; some 
of the material suggests that bribery may indeed be one of the 
means employed by some of the actors in the system.
What the information does clearly indicate is that 
pressure is brought to bear at the enforcement stage, and 
that this pressure almost exclusively involves individuals 
and not groups.
The informality which characterises the bargaining process 
is made possible by the absence of rules (i.e., a Master Plan 
and accompanying legislation) specifying universa1istic 
criteria for the processing of planning applications. Adequate 
bi-partisan political supervision of the functions of the 
bureaucrats, technical or otherwise, would help to ensure 
enforcement according to universalistic principles, once they 
were provided by statute. So far this has not been accomplish­
ed, although the need has been clearly recognised.
The interview data, documentary sources and personal 
observation allow one major generalisation to be made. Quite
1. James C. Scott, 'Corruption, Machine Politics, and
Political Change', The American Political Science Review, 
LXIII, 4 (December 1969), pp.1142-1158 at p.1142.
Emphasis in original.
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apart from the interesting question of corruption as a form of 
interest articulation, 'questionable' planning decisions can 
be looked at within the context of the urban political system 
and the larger national political system of which it is a 
part, as a system of spoils necessary for the maintenance 
of support for a party in power. Such a hypothesis might be 
useful in explaining the functionality of 'corruption' for at 
least short run maintenance of stability.
Inquiry into the politics of this aspect of the planning 
process is revealing for yet another reason; it sheds light on 
some aspects of the structure of power in the community. If 
one examines an inventory of those who have had a reputation
for being powerful in matters connected with planning in K.L.
1 2 from Dato' Y.T. Lee in the mid-1950s to Dato' Lim Jew Siang
of the late 60s, there is a marked convergence between their
reputation for power, their involvement in the planning process
in either elected or appointed capacity and the holding of
formal positions of leadership in political parties and other
quasi-po1itica1 organisations (Boards of Directors of
Companies, Chambers of Commerce, etc.). Moreover, they are
men honoured by the King and various Sultans with titles such
as Dato' , Tan Sri, P J K , etc. It is no secret that the
individuals who comprise this 'interlocking directorate of
1. Senator; President, Incorporated Society of Architects 
and Surveyors, Malayan Branch; Elected member, Council of 
State Selangor and member Selangor Executive Council;
Elected member, KL Municipal Council 1952-58; Chairman,
MCA; K L ; Vice-Chairman, MCA, Selangor Branch; Member,
Alliance National Council; Member, Central Working 
Committee, MCA; Vice-President, Selangor Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce (1969) - J. Victor Morais (ed.) Who ' s Who in
Malaysia (KL, 1967), p.156. These data were checked
by the informant when he was interviewed and verified by him.
2. Elected member, Selangor State Legislative Assembly (1964-
69); Member, Executive Council, Selangor State Legislative 
Assembly; Deputy President, MCA, Selangor Branch; Chairman, 
MCA, Damansara Ward; Elected member, KL Municipal Council 
(1957-61) - Morais (ed.) o p . cit., p.164. Dato' Lim was
defeated in 1969 in his bid for re-election to the Selangor 
State Legislative Assembly.
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influence' have in the main been closely associated with the 
Malayan Chinese Association, the second wing in the ruling 
party coalition. This point cannot be emphasised too strongly 
as it is a finding that must have considerable importance for 
future research in the general area of urban politics and 
community power structure.
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CHAPTER V 
SQUATTERS
The Municipal Town Planner has recently defined 'squatter 
as 'a person who settled on land without title or right'
Such a definition omits the street-sleeper, a figure still 
common in some parts of Asia but very rarely seen in Kuala 
Lumpur and Malaysia in general.
The squatter problem in Kuala Lumpur dates from the 
Japanese Occupation. While there had been squatters living in 
the town in the pre-war period they had not been considered a 
major problem, and the situation had been kept in check by the 
Land Office and Sanitary Board inspecting staff and private 
landowners.1 2 34
By 1946 when the newly established civilian Town Board
replaced the British Military Administration, the increase in
squatter housing was considered the worst result of the
Japanese occupation. The Board's main concern was with the
health aspects of the situation: the possibilities of an
epidemic, the spread of tuberculosis, and the absence of adequ
3ate sanitary facilities. The Annual Report for 1946 sets 
forth two general principles which were adhered to by the K.L. 
administration ever after:
1) immediate and wholesale demolition was impractical as 
it would result in large numbers of homeless people; and
2) it was the administration's responsibility to 
provide alternative accommodation for those people whom they 
de-hous ed.^
1. Ministry of Local Government and Housing and Pesuroh Jaya 
Ibu Kota, 'Report on Squatters in Kuala Lumpur, (Su1it) ,' 
1969, Appendix I, p.ll.
2. H.G. Hammett, 'An Appreciation of the Squatter Problem in
Kuala Lumpur,' (typescript), Apri1 5, 1949, p.l.
3. Kuala Lumpur Town Board, Annual Report, 1946, p.36.
4. Ibid.
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As a first step toward solving the problem, the Board 
designed and built single unit dwellings to be rented out to 
people of the 'poorer classes'. However, there is no 
information available as to the number of houses built, nor 
is there any estimate of the number of squatters who needed 
to be re-housed.
A year later, it was estimated that there were approx­
imately 2,000 squatter houses in Kuala Lumpur, with one or two 
more being built every day, espite the Board's policy of 
preventing further unauthorised building.'*’ Because of the
lack of legal accommodation available, the Town Board deemed
2it 'neither practicable nor politic' to demolish these un­
authorised dwellings without first providing alternative 
accommodation for the displaced. As a start, Government 
was prevailed upon to build 200 wood and attap houses, and 
the inhabitants of the worst slums in Kuala Lumpur were 
relocated and their houses demolished.
This slight improvement in the situation was very quickly 
nullified in 1948. With the start of the Emergency, people 
who had been living in more dangerous areas than Kuala Lumpur 
converged on the town to join relatives already living there 
or to establish their own squatter houses. In addition, the 
sudden large increase in Government staff, mainly police,
3meant that existing government accommodation was insufficient.
As a result, some of the illegal squatters were not the 
traditional marginally employed who could afford nothing better, 
but were in fact relatively well-paid Government servants who 
could find nothing else. Where in the past the main concern 
had been one of health and sanitation, the pressing problem now 
from the Government's point of view was that of security. The
1. Kuala Lumpur Town Board, Annual Report, 1947, p.39.
2. Ibid.
3 . Kuala Lumpur Municipality, Annual Report, 1948, p.23.
207 .
problem seemed to be two-fold:
1) Communist terrorists were using the squatter areas 
as hiding places and as a source of food and other necessary 
supplies, obtained from the residents either voluntarily or 
otherwise;1 23 and
2) the fear on the part of Government that the Communists
could recruit active supporters from among squatter dwellers
who were discontented with the status quo or who might be
2alienated by being forced to move.
Whereas in the past the K.L. administration had hesitated 
to demolish squatter housing on humanitarian grounds, it now 
became a matter of 'winning the hearts and minds'. The 
President of the Municipal Commission of Kuala Lumpur wrote 
in a confidential letter to the Selangor State Secretary on 
November 17, 1948:
Eviction of squatters without giving alternative 
sites and assistance in moving their houses and 
goods, would, I think, be unwise. As I mentioned 
above it is probable that the majority of these 
people are quite harmless and will remain so if 
they are reasonably treated. If they are evicted 
without alternative sites being provided they are 
quite likely to become disaffected and will be 
almost forced to put up t^heir huts again on some 
other unauthorised site.'
This laissez faire attitude, albeit based on largely pragmatic 
considerations, was not universally held by government officials. 
The Officer-in-Charge, Traffic Branch, K.L., wrote a letter to 
the President of the Municipal Commission and stated his 
position with a candor most uncharacteristic:
...this town was suffering an influx of Chinese 
of a very low type. . .Something has got to be 
done to clear the hundreds of semi-permanent
1. Extract from Minutes of 9th Meeting Selangor Emergency
and Defence Committee, December 30, 1948.
2. Notes of a meeting held in the Council Chamber, Selangor
Secretariat, January 20, 1949.
3. (4) in KLM(C) 43/48, November 17, 1948.
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sheds, stalls, huts and tents which have sprung 
up during the last three years and now seems to 
be the time to start a properly organised campaign.
If this is not done soon, I can visualise a 
definite set back. The Chinese lower orders are at 
the moment quiet and easily handled, thousands 
of them being undecided whether to hang on or return 
to China. I think we can tip the scale if we 
act quickly...I feel sure that you will agree that 
the absurd philanthropic attitude sponsored by 
Government before the Emergency cannot now be 
tolerated and when such a favourable opportunity is 
now presented, immediate steps should be taken to 
formulate a drastic programme. It is obvious that 
the town requires a thorough cleanup of these 
insidious individuals and any opposition likely to 
be met will certainly not be from Government.
These squatters have not the slightest right to 
impose their will upon the town authorities as they 
contribute nothing and represent a serious drag 
on any form of construction or progress within the 
Municipal limits.
It has been realised at last that only by getting 
rid of squatters can the bandit war be won; this 
applies ncj> less to half the troubles at our own 
doorstep.
There is no record of a reply to the Officer-in-Charge.
Five months later, H.G. Hammett, the Deputy President 
of the Municipal Commission, put the case for a reasonable 
approach even more strongly. While he reiterated that the 
Municipality's main concern was with the health and fire 
hazard aspects and with the systematic flouting of authority in 
erecting these illegal structures, he pointed out that the 
State and Government's main problem was that of security.
Thus, while the Municipality's campaign to demolish squatter 
housing continued, it was essential that the State and Federal 
Government initiate some form of resettlement:
If this is not done and the work of destruction goes 
on without some compensating constructive plan, then 
the 'problem', so far from being solved, will present 
even greater difficulties, with even more danger to 
health and security. People who, at the moment, are 
not actively against the Government, would, with some 
reason on their side, nurse feelings of hatred - and a
1 . (3) in KLM 624, November 30, 1948.
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hatred which would doubtless find expression - 
against a Government which merely pulled down 
their houses without offering them an 
alternative site.
Hammett estimated that there were in the vicinity of 10,000 
squatter houses with a population of about 50,000 people who 
would need to be re-housed.
As a possible solution to the problem, B. Davis,
Secretary for Chinese Affairs suggested building more attap
2and plank houses on the lines of the 1947 development. The
Municipality requested a $M700,000 grant from the Government
to finance such a scheme but was told that no funds would be
granted for attap and wood constructions because of the rapid
3deterioration of such structures.
The Annual Report for the Municipality of Kuala Lumpur for 
1949 summed up the situation succinctly:
Nothing further has been heard from the Government 
regarding the construction of temporary houses 
at Kampong Dua for the alleviation of the housing 
shortage .
No further resettlement scheme is being considered 
by the Municipality owing to the fact that 
the Municipality does not own land, and 
Government appear to be unwilling to transfer or to 
grant State land to the Municipality for this 
purpose. The housing situation is, therefore, if 
anything worse than in 1946.
In any case, the success of the 1947 attempt at squatter 
resettlement is open to question. In February 1949 the Chairman 
told the Municipal Commissioners: 'The Municipality took
several hundreds of squatters out to Kampong Satu, and they 
have all come back into town again. In 90% of the cases the
1. Hammett, o p . cit.
2. (16) in KLM 624, July 1949.
3. 'No Attap if K.L. Gets $700,000 Grant for Houses,'
Straits Times, September 23, 1949.
4. Kuala Lumpur Municipality, Annual Report, 1949, p.38.
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people now living in Kampong Satu are not the people originally 
put in . ' ^
Whether they were discouraged by the results of the
Kampong Satu scheme, or distracted by the more pressing
problems of the Emergency, the Selangor State and the Federal
Government did nothing in the following two years to make
either land or money available for the resettlement of
squatters. The problem was allowed to grow until by 1952
there were between 4,000 to 5,000 familites living on State
2land alone within the Municipality.
These squatters consisted of a wide variety of persons,
unlike the rural squatters. There were people with moderate
incomes, Government servants, clerks and so on who were not
able to find other accommodation; there were labourers and
hawkers who could not have afforded anything better, even if
it had been available and 'all classes of persons descending
3the social scale until one reaches the criminal class'.
The settlementspresented a number of problems: from the
Emergency aspect they were suspected of supplying the bandits 
with food and of harbouring couriers; from a social aspect 
they were centres of vice and gambling and their haphazard 
layouts effectively prevented surveillance; this same 
inaccessibility and their dilapidated condition made the danger 
of a fire a real risk.
It was mainly the Emergency ramifications of the problem, 
however, which led the Selangor War Executive Committee to 
initiate the Petaling scheme, designed initially to re-house 
2,400 squatter families from the K.L. municipal area by means 
of Government Emergency funds. In discussing who was to be moved 
to the new site which was located some seven miles west of
1. KLMC Minutes, February 16, 1949.
2. (13) in KLM (C)7/52, Pt. I, May 5, 1952.
3. Ibid.
K.L., the development officer in charge said:
Persons to be accommodated are those on the 
fringes of the Municipality who are vulnerable 
and valuable to the Communists and those who are 
in slums hindering the development of the town.
Policy with regards to them is hardening into 
removing (a) the vulnerable, (b) those who 
volunteer to go in batches and to demolish their 
houses and (c) those whose presence is holding 
up development or menacing the health and 
security of the town. The easiest and most 
dangerous areas have been visited and people 
talked to. No one wants to move. Psychological 
preparation, a Teutonic idea, must be done with 
Teutonic thoroughness. The people must be 
visited at least four or five times and persuaded that 
no matter how they are adjusted to their present 
surroundings or how they have built up a small trade 
or how they have a circle of friends and put their 
children to school, they are on a bad wicket and 
can be bowled out at any time , and that they can 
profitably and prudently make a fresh start in 
their own house and own land at Petaling with its 
amenities of schools, clinics, padangs and the 
rest. The M.C.A. is being helpful and I feel that 
a number will move voluntarily. The rump of recusants 
will have to be kicked out if they make no attempt 
to better themselves ancjl become good citizens with 
a stake in the country.
The Petaling scheme developers realised that the housing 
needs of all the squatters in K.L. were not identical, and 
that there was a wide range in the quality of housing which 
squatters could afford to buy. They estimated that a small 
percentage, if given access to land, would be prepared to 
build houses worth $15,000 and up. Needless to say they 
were not included in the Government resettlement scheme. The 
scheme was designed to provide for three classes of housing:
(a) a 'better' type of house, costing $ 3,000-$ 4,000
(b) the 'very simplest' type of structures
(c) an intermediary type.
The available land was divded into six sections, two for 
each of the three classes of housing, thereby creating three
1 . (2 8A ) in KLM (C) 7/52/Pt.I, July 15 , 1952 .
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different living zones determined by the quality of the 
housing. The simplest structures were to be located adjacent 
to the factory area which was in turn situated alongside the 
railway tracks.'*' Ostensibly this was to provide a convenient 
solution to the employment problem but it also reflects a 
deliberate planning of the classic situation of 'the poor 
people living by the railway tracks' . One wonders if those 
who could afford the 'better' type of houses would have willing­
ly built them next to the factories, alongside the tracks.
The initial cost of land and improvements such as roads,
waterlines and drains, for rehousing 2,400 squatter families
2was over $M3 million and was provided by Emergency funds.
From the security aspect, however, moving 2,400 families didn't 
even begin to solve the problem.
The Municipal Architect estimated in early 1953 that in 
order to house the present population of K.L. on the basis of 
one family per living unit an additional 36,000 units would 
have to be provided. This figure did not take into account 
any population increase.^
In October 1953 the Chief Police Officer, Selangor,
estimated that there were between 70,000 - 80,000 squatters
in and on the fringes of the municipality, and that they were
4deeply infested by Communists. The discovery of six armed 
terrorists who had been living in the Cheras Road squatter 
area yielded information that the squatters had been 
providing subscriptions, and that a 'masses organisation' 
existed in the eastern squatter fringe of K.L., providing the 
basis for the M.C.P. open intelligence organisation for
1. (13) in KLM(C) 7/52, Pt.I, May 5, 1952.
2 . Ibid.
3. Eric Taylor, 'Housing,' (typescript), KLM 624, March 24, 1953.
4. OCPD, Selangor, 'K.L. Squatters, (Secret),' (cyclostyled),
(77) in KLM(C) 7/52, pt. I, October 1953.
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Selangor and beyond. Thus the importance of moving the 
squatters was driven home.
It was with this in mind that the High Commissioner
organised a Committee on the K.L. Squatter Problem which first
met on September 15, 1953. Its members included the Mentri
Besar of Selangor, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, the
President of the Municipal Council, the Chief Police Officer,
Selangor and the District Officer, K.L. Its purpose was 'to
consider the problem posed by the substantial number of
squatters living within and bordering the Municipal boundaries 
2of K.L.' The High Commissioner felt that the squatters in 
KL could be divided into five categories:
(a) Government servants of all grades - they were being 
dealt with under the Government housing program and did not 
concern the committee;
(b) persons of a certain financial standing - these 
would be catered for by the Housing Trust with houses costing 
$M5,000+ and houses costing less than $M5,000;
(c) cubicle dwellers - the High Commissioner felt
that there could be no 'final solution' to this problem since 
it was not entirely a matter of economic circumstances but 
partly derived 'from the gregarious instincts of the Chinese 
race'.
(d) the urban squatter - 'not prone to disease with the 
exception of T B ' but the layout of settlements made Police 
supervision a matter of great difficulty and interfered with 
public and private development.
(e) the fringe squatter - 'a considerable producer of 
food whose conditions of life were socially tolerable ... a
3real problem only from the point of view of the Emergency.'
1. Ibid.
2. Notes of the 1st Meeting of His Excellency the High Commission 
er's Committee on the K.L. Squatter Problem, September 18,1953
3. Minutes of the Second Meeting of H.E. the High Commissioner's
Committee on the K.L. Squatter Problem, October 21, 1953.
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It was decided that the Committee would deal with 
the problem of the urban and fringe squatter, the two groups 
about which action could be justified on Emergency security 
grounds. Without this justification no Government financial 
support could be expected.
Over a period of about a year and a half, the Committee 
considered a number of schemes to handle these squatters 
including resettlement in new villages, resettlement in already 
existing new villages, stabilization and 'cleaning up' of 
squatters in areas where they were presently residing and re­
housing in multi-storey flats. But despite wholehearted 
financial support, by the time of its last meeting in September 
1955, only 2,000 families had been resettled, at a cost of 
approximately $M750 per family. According to a University 
of Malaya survey, there remained some 19,000 families to be 
dealt with. The committee had been able to cope with only 
10% of the squatter problem.^
However, the problem was now considered to be a long­
term sociological one rather than an Emergency problem, and 
as such could no longer be financed by Emergency funds or even 
be considered by the committee. The group was therefore 
dissolved by the High Commissioner on the understanding that a 
new committee would be established, with representatives of 
the Ministry of Local Government and Housing, the Selangor 
State Government, the K.L. Municipality, the Housing Trust and 
the Petaling Jaya Authority. Financial help from Emergency 
funds would be forthcoming only for projects required solely 
on account of the Emergency, e.g., the erection of 'security 
fences'.^
As its part in the Petaling Scheme (later known as 
Petaling Jaya) , the Municipality was given the job of clearing
1. Notes of the final meeting of the K.L. Squatter Problem
Committee, September 12, 1955.
2. Ibid.
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the slums in K.L. It was obvious that the Petaling project 
could not absorb all the slum dwellers in K.L. and that any 
slums that were cleared would soon revert back to squatter 
housing unless immediately developed. The problem of which 
slums to clear was thus simplified. The Municipality under­
took to clear those areas which were immediately desired for 
development. As it turned out, despite the often reiterated 
statement that the squatters were hindering devleopment, there 
was only one area which the Municipality itself desired to use 
right away. It was therefore decided to offer to clear priv­
ately owned lands, provided the property owners would agree to 
pay the costs of removing the squatters and to build permanent 
housing on the cleared site within two years. Although the 
proposal was first mooted in October 1952,1 it was allowed to 
drift until H.E. 's Committee was convened a year later. Even 
then, it was only at the request of the High Commissioner that 
the views of large landowners were sought. This was done at 
a secret meeting of the President of the Municipal Council, the 
District Officer, K.L., the Municipal Architect, the Asst.
Town Planner (Fed. of Malaya), the Municipal Planning Officer 
and Y.T. Lee and T.Y. Lee, 'architects for practically all the
big landowners and present schemes in the most important areas 
2of town'. The architects submitted a list of property
owners whose plans were being held up by squatters. After
preliminary negotiations it was agreed that landowners would
be asked to pay $M500 per squatter family removed and they
were asked to notify the Municipality if they wished to take
3advantage of the offer. It is interesting to note that all 
communication on this matter was labelled Secret and Confidential 
and that the offer was made only to those property holders 
represented by the architects consulted. Other owners who got
1. (46b) in K L M (C) 7/52 ts r+ I , October 195 2 .
2 . (88) in K L M (C) 7/52 , pt. I, December 3, 1953.
3 . (20) in K L M (C) 7/52 , r+ II, February 22, 1954
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wind of the project wrote to inquire and the offer was extended 
to them, but no general attempt was made to contact or inform 
all property holders in K.L., or for that matter, all the 
architects who might have been in a position to know what land- 
owners required help. Almost all those invited accepted the 
offer because it meant a considerable saving of time and money 
for them.
Strangely enough, at the same time the Municipality was 
laying plans to remove hundreds of squatters from private land, 
the Municipal Council passed a resolution instructing the 
Municipal Architect not to take any action against unauthor­
ised buildings once they were inhabited. This decision was 
duly reported to the High Commissioner's committee. His 
reaction was clear; he instructed York to see that the resolution 
was rescinded. Moreover York was ordered to create a special 
demolition squad under the direction of the Municipal Architect. 
The High Commissioner, had, in effect, vetoed the Municipal 
Counci 1 .
The following month he inquired as to what action had
been taken to carry out his orders: 'The P.M.C. stated that
he had been unable to put this matter to the Council during the
last month owing to the abstention of Alliance members from
meetings. It would have been inadvisable to revoke the decision
during this period but he would put the matter to the Council
at the next opportunity (and was confident there would be no
2further difficulty.)' The words in brackets have been inked 
out of the copy on file in the Municipality; perhaps such 
official confidence seemed unseemly over a matter not yet 
brought to vote. Nonetheless York was able to report at the 
next meeting: 'his Council had approved the policy of
authorizing him to instruct the Municipal Architect to 
demolish unauthorized buildings even though occupied. The
1. (70) in KLM(C) 7/52, pt.II, June 9, 1954.
2 . (77) in KLM(C) 7/52, pt. II, July 16, 1954.
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Council, however, had added the condition that the D.O. would 
be requested to offer him an alternative site before the 
actual demolition. So the High Commissioner had his way and
the Council got in a little face saving footnote.
After the disbanding of H . E . 's Committee in September 1955,
the squatter problem in K.L. appears to have been shunted
aside by the State and Federal Governments. A few months
earlier, the Legislative Council had passed the Municipal
(Amendment) Ordinance 1955 empowering the Municipal Council to
demolish slums. The Ordinance was vigorously attacked by Tan
Tuan Boon, a Labour Party candidate in the forthcoming Federal
elections who called for a public protest meeting of wooden house
2dwellers in K.L. He told a preliminary meeting:
The UMNO-MCA Municipal Councillors talk about 
fighting for the welfare of the poor people, 
but actually their so-called new achievements 
consist in expending the people's blood and 
sweat in planting trees and flowers on Batu 
Road and in concentrating their efforts towards 
glamourising the appearance of the city in 
order to procure the admiration of Europeans 
and Americans. The welfare of th^ poor people 
has long been forgotten entirely.
This brought an immediate response from the Council. It 
quickly passed a motion to the effect that it was aware of 
the anxiety being caused by the Ordinance and of the difficulties 
of the situation. The motion further promised to urge the 
Federal government to provide low-cost housing. The lengthy 
debate on the motion proved to be no debate at all as all 
the speakers to the motion supported it vigorously and deplored 
Tan Tuan Boon's 'political' attack on the motives and 
performance of the Alliance Councillors. One of the 
nominated members, Inche Mansour b. Osman, was the only person 
to speak against the motion, pointing out that it really was
1. (86) in KLM(C) 7/52, pt. II, September 5, 1954.
2. Sin Chew Jit P o h , June 27, 1955.
3 . Ibid .
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'just dealing with words here with no practical solution to 
the big problem of housing 100,000 people' . His speech pro­
voked Ong Yoke Lin into saying, 'That was one of the main 
reasons why the Municipal Council should have fully Elected 
Councillors,' and the motion was passed with only one dissenting 
vote.1
In an effort to pay something more than lip service to
the problem, a memorandum was drawn up for a pilot scheme to
provide low-cost housing for which the Federal government would
2be approached for a $M3 million loan. The proposal met with 
a notable lack of enthusiasm on the Minister's part and brought 
the following thinly disguised reprimand:
The Minister has asked me to mention especially 
one point. He detects a faint suggestion in the 
records attached to your letter that the Council 
feels that the State and Federal Governments are 
somehow opposed or unsympathetic to the Council's 
plans. For example, in one place, there is talk 
of the Council's 'challenging' the State and Federal 
Governments to provide the resources to carry out 
its plans. The Minister deprecates any such 
suggestion, and would like the Council to be 
assured that no such opposition or lack of sympathy 
exists. It is important that at all levels there 
should be a ready appreciation of the problem at 
all other levels and a realisation that all have 
a part to play in seeking solutions. Because 
a proposal does not receive immediate and ready 
acceptance by a higher authority it does not 
necessarily mean that there is opposition to the 
proposal in principle or a failure to appreciate 
its merits. The higher a proposal must travel, 
the wider the factors that come into play, and 
the more it must be fitted into a broader scheme 
of things. The Minister trusts that your Council 
in its enthusiasm and laudable desire to discharge 
its responsibilities to the full will not lose 
its sense of proportion and minimise the problems 
of other authorities. For his part the Minister 
assures the Council that its projects will always^ 
receive his closest attention and consideration.
1. KLMC Minutes , June 30 , 1955 ,
2 . (18) in K L M (C) 2079 , pt • I , undated.
3 . (19) in K L M (C) 2079 , pt • I , September 10
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Closest attention or not, the money was not forthcoming.
In any case, the loud cries of alarm raised by the wooden 
house dwellers under the guidance of Tan Tuan Boon were 
unnecessary. Unless where absolutely unavoidable, the Municipal 
Council chose not to exercise its powers to demolish. The 
following case study shows why.
The Jalan Perkins Fiasco
The Kuala Lumpur Municipality had always had at its 
disposal the necessary legal machinery to move squatters who 
stood in the way of development. But the case of the seven 
shop-stalls in Jalan Perkins (Perkins Road) is a classic 
study in the problems and pitfalls of implementing the 
decision to utilize such procedures to clear out squatters 
who are determined not to be moved and are vociferous in their 
determination. ^
In July 1954 it was decided that the Municipality would 
carry out a plan of private street works in Jalan Perkins, 
with the cost of such improvements to be borne by the frontage 
owners, as is provided for under Section 103 of the Municipal 
Ordinance. On being so informed, some of the owners refused to 
agree to pay because of the existence of squatter shop stalls 
on State land immediately in front of their property. They 
argued that the presence of the stalls meant that in effect, 
they had no actual frontage on Jalan Perkins and that road 
improvements would not benefit them, but would enhance squatter 
trade, and they were most emphatically not prepared to pay for 
that. In September the Public Works Committee at a Special 
Meeting, after hearing the owners' representations, offered 
to see that the stalls were removed and on that condition the 
reluctant owners agreed to pay their share of the costs.
Accordingly, the District Officer, because it was State 
land that was involved, instituted proceedings to inform the
1 . All data in this case study is taken from KLM 377/54.
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squatters that their Temporary Occupation Licences were to be 
cancelled. These licences had first been issued in September 
1950, at which time the stall owners had given a written under­
taking that they were prepared to demolish their stalls without 
any compensation whatsoever and without any claim for 
alternative sites should the site be required for any public 
purpose.
Undertakings not withstanding, the stall holders, upon 
notification of cancellation of their T.O.L.s, immediately 
sent off a petition to the President of the Municipal Council 
requesting that they be allowed to stay. Receiving a negative 
reply, they wrote again in December 1954, this time even offer­
ing to contribute their share towards the cost of the road 
works. They were informed that their buildings were in the 
way of the road works and thus had to be demolished, and that 
in any case, not being frontage owners, they were not involved 
in the problem of paying the costs.
At this point, January 1955, the District Officer started 
taking court action to evict the holders and remove the stalls. 
Undaunted the seven embattled stall holders continued to 
beseech everyone involved to reconsider the matter, particular­
ly in view of the fact that the road itself had been completed 
and their buildings were still standing and were obviously not 
in the way. In their efforts to avoid eviction, they even 
engaged the services of the prestigious law firm of Bannon and 
Bailey on their behalf.
Up to this point the Municipality had been adamant that 
the squatters must go immediately, and in June they informed 
Messrs Bannon and Bailey that ample warning had been given, as 
notice had first been served ten months previously and at 
least three adjournments had been granted.
Yet suddenly in August 1955 without any explanation, the 
Joint Public Works Committee/Town Planning Committee reversed 
its stand and agreed to give the stall holders a period of 
grace of one year in which to find alternative sites. The D.O.
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was requested to withdraw the case pending in Court.
One year later, in 1956, the stallholders were still 
there and the D.O. reinstituted legal proceedings. What with 
the usual delays, the hearing was not set until April 11,
1957 and then continued until October. Three years had now 
elapsed since the initial effort to clear the squatters had 
begun.
In January 1958 the Municipality decided it could not 
wait any longer and sent out bills for the road work to all 
frontage owners. As had been expected, the owner of the lot 
blocked by the stalls refused to pay because the terms of the 
original agreement had not been met. But still no action was 
taken and in October 1958 the Health Committee decided to revoke 
the licence of the only licensed stall in the lot. The 
minutes stated that the traders had been offered alternative 
sites and should they not accept, the D.O.K.L held Warrant to 
Dispossess. There is no mention of how long he had held such 
warrant or why it had not been used.
Even at this stage the committee still seemed to believe 
that the offenders could be trusted to move voluntarily. At 
the request of one of the Councillors, they decided that the 
stallholders be allowed to continue to trade until after the 
Chinese New Year in 1959, and that a written undertaking be 
obtained from them that they would vacate the site after the 
Chinese New Year.
The undertaking was duly obtained and after the Chinese 
New Year in February 1959 the Municipal Engineer tried to 
find out what had happened. Needless to say, the squatters 
were still there. For the Municipal Engineer anyway, the 
time had come for decisive action. 'This situation has 
become a farce, ' he wrote to York. 'Please have the D.O. 
institute action. ' York replied, 'the D.O. informs me that 
he has received instructions direct from the M.B. (Mentri Besar) 
to postpone action on all squatters and stall removal until 
after the Federal Election. ' Another seven months went by while
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the squatters squatted, the owners refused to pay and the 
Municipality was unable to close the account and declare Jalan 
Perkins to be a public road. But finally the elections were 
over and on November 9, 1959 the seven stallholders were
evicted and the buildings demolished. The next day an urgent 
memo went from the President to the Municipal Engineer:
These stalls were demolished yesterday and I have 
been informed privately by the State Secretary 
that the Mentri Besar was advised that one of the 
reasons for removing them was the importance of our 
tidying up the street.
2. While I do not wish to obtrude on your depart­
mental works programme, I feel, however, that you 
should actually do some improvement works or make an 
appearance of doing some improvement works forthwith 
on this street.
Workmen were dispatched immediately and one can only assume that 
appearances were satisfied.
The real reason, of course, for the ultimate demolition 
of these buildings was the need to fulfill the agreement with 
frontage owners in order to collect the outstanding debt.
On March 5, 1960 the reluctant owners were informed that the
points at issue had been settled and payment was requested.
A month later a check was received and the Jalan Perkins opera­
tion was ove r .
It had taken a total of five years and ten months from 
start to finish. Over one hundred pieces of correspondence 
regarding the matter were dispatched in that period and count­
less man hours consumed in the effort to move seven stall­
holders who had no right to be there in the first place. The 
episode points up two facts:
(1) that legal position notwithstanding, the 
Municipality because of its political vulnerability can 
be made to respond to pressure from even seemingly 
insignificant sources; and
(2) that even when determined to carry out its policies 
of demolition, the legal delays and expenses involved make
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it p r o h i b i t i v e  and i m p r a c t i c a l  to a t t e m p t  any w h o l e s a l e  
c o m p u l s o r y  s q u a t t e r  c l e a r a n c e .
L o w - c o s t  H o u s i n g  and S q u a t t e r s
In J a n u a r y  1956 the dire p r e d i c t i o n s  of d i s a s t r o u s  fires 
in the s q u a t t e r  ar e a s  were f u l f i l l e d .  A f la sh  fire in a 
larg e s e t t l e m e n t  b e h i n d  the m a i n  s t r e e t  of K u a l a  L u m p u r  d e s t r o y ­
ed 267 h o u s e s  and lef t 2,000 p e o p l e  h o m e l e s s . “*" F o r a change,  
n o b o d y  d r a g g e d  his feet. F o ur  days a f t e r  the fire the C o u n c i l  
met to c o n s i d e r  a p r o p o s a l  f rom  the M i n i s t e r  for L oc al  G o v e r n ­
ment, H o u s i n g  and T o w n  P l a n n i n g  for a l o w - c o s t  h o u s i n g  s ch e m e  
r e l a t e d  to s l u m  c l e a r a n c e .  The h o m e l e s s  s q u a t t e r s  w o u l d  be 
t e m p o r a r i l y  h o u s e d  in b a r r a c k  style  b u i l d i n g s  w h i l e  p e r m a n e n t  
a c c o m m o d a t i o n  of v a r i o u s  ty pe s was b ui lt . T h e s e  i n c l u d e d  50 
d e t a c h e d  w o o d e n  h o u s e s  for M a l a y s ,  150 t e r r a c e  or s e m i - d e t a c h e d  
h o u s e s  for all r a ce s , and a s e v e n - s t o r e y  b l o c k  of 200 flats to 
be e r e c t e d  on the si te of the fire. The M i n i s t e r  i n f o r m e d  
York  that if the C o u n c i l  a c c e p t e d  his sch e me ,  he w o u l d  a d v a n c e  
the n e c e s s a r y  funds; if it did n ot agree, he w o u l d  r e l e a s e  
the funds for use e l s e w h e r e .  F a c e d  w i t h  this 'take it or leave
it' p r o p o s a l ,  the C o u n c i l  t ook  t w e n t y - f i v e  m i n u t e s  to d e c id e
2to a c c e p t  it w i t h  t h a n k s  and c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s .  N e i t h e r  the 
M u n i c i p a l  A r c h i t e c t ,  E n g i n e e r  nor  P l a n n e r  w e r e  c o n s u l t e d ,  
a l t h o u g h  the s c h e m e  i n v o l v e d  a m a j o r  c h a n g e  in a p r o p o s e d  road  
system. No d i s c u s s i o n  was d e v o t e d  to the w i s d o m  of p l a c i n g  
a h i g h - r i s e  (for K.L.) l o w - c o s t  h o u s i n g  p r o j e c t  in the m i d d l e  
of a b u s y  c o m m e r c i a l  ar e a on w h a t  was a p o t e n t i a l l y  v a l u a b l e  
p i e c e  of p r o p e r t y .  N o r  was any t h o u g h t  g i v e n  as to the e f f e c t  
of such a b u i l d i n g  on s u r r o u n d i n g  p r o p e r t y  v a l ue s.
In a d d i t i o n ,  the M i n i s t e r ' s  o f f e r  was m e r e l y  to a d v a n c e  
the funds. T h e s e  m o n i e s  we re, in fact, a loan and h ad to be
1. P e s u r o h  J a y a  Ibu Kota, Low C o s t  H o u s i n g  E s t a t e s , 1966. 
See als o K L M C  M i n u t e s  ( E m e r g e n c y  M e e t i n g )  , J a n u a r y
8 , 1956 .
2. KL MC  M i n u t e s  ( E m e r g e n c y  M e e t i n g ) , J a n u a r y  12, 1956.
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repaid with interest. Since neither the Municipality nor 
State Government could see its way to absorbing the costs, the 
tenants had to. In other words, the low-cost housing would 
have to pay its own way, with the tenants footing the total 
bill, including administrative costs. The question of subsidies 
was not even raised.
Six months later, Y.T. Lee, who had said at the emergency 
meeting that 'his appeal for the so-called dream houses was a 
dream no l onger', woke up to the fact that 400 units were not 
going to solve the problem. He proposed a $M50 million 10-year 
plan, and suggested obtaining a $M2 million loan as a start.
The President, by now resigned to the facts of life, replied 
that 'the Council looked to the Minister for Natural Resources 
and Local Government to provide funds for the clearance of 
slums and the provision of low-cost h ousing'.  ^ The Minister 
was not looking back, and organised attempts to deal with the 
squatter problem pretty much came to a standstill for several 
y e a r s .
At the August 1956 meeting of the Council, the President
announced that the Council had been recognised as the
authority for low cost housing in Kuala Lumpur by the Minister
2for Natural Resources and Local Government. What he did not 
say was of greater importance: that the Council was dependent
on the will of the Minister for loan funds and was not permitted 
to raise money on its own. Nor did it own any land; in 
this matter it had to seek the help of the State government.
Its true position was that if it could borrow the money through 
the Federal government, it could proceed with low cost 
housing, provided the State would sell it some land.
In his October Budget speech, the President estimated 
that approximately 600 units would be completed by the end of
1. KLMC Minutes,
2. KLMC Minutes,
J une 2 9 , 1956.
August 31, 1956
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1 9 5 7 . ^  In v i e w  of the 3 6 ,0 0 0 u ni ts  w h i c h  the A r c h i t e c t  
h a d  e s t i m a t e d  as n e c e s s a r y  in 1953, this was a v er y m o d e s t  
start.
Th e s i t u a t i o n  was  e n t i r e l y  o ut of hand. W i t h  M e r d e k a  in 
1957, K u a l a  L u m p u r  b e c a m e  the F e d e r a l  C a p i t a l  of the n e w l y  
i n d e p e n d e n t  n a t i o n ,  and e ve n  m or e  p e o p l e  w e r e  a t t r a c t e d  to the 
a l r e a d y  o v e r c r o w d e d  city.
By 1958 t h e r e  wa s ca u s e  for alarm. The S e l a n g o r  S e c r e t a r y  
of W o r k s  w r o t e  to the P r e s i d e n t :
The ra te of s q u a t t e r  h o u s e s  b e i n g  b u i l t  on 
St at e la nd and  R e s e r v e  is a l a r m i n g .  It is 
p o s s i b l e  th a t this is the w o r k  of p l a n n e d  
u n d e r t a k i n g  b e c a u s e  the h o u s e s  are not of 
s q u a t t e r  type. T h e s e  h o u s e s  a p p e a r  to be 
s u b s t a n t i a l  as the m a t e r i a l s  are b e i n g  p r o v i d e d  
by a c e n t r a l  so u r c e .  C o m p l e t e d  h o u s e s  are 
b e i n g  s ol d  to s q u a t t e r s  w ho g e n u i n e l y  b e l i e v e  
that p e r m i s s i o n  has b e e n  o b t a i n e d  f rom  the 
a u t h o r i t y .
The s i t u a t i o n  h a d  o b v i o u s l y  c ha ng e d .  W h e r e  s q u a t t e r  
h o u s i n g  d u r i n g  the E m e r g e n c y  had  b e e n  b u i l t  by p e o p l e  w h o  
c o u l d  not fi nd a l t e r n a t i v e  a c c o m m o d a t i o n  for t h e i r  own use, 
it wa s no w b e i n g  b u i l t  an d s o l d  by p r o f e s s i o n a l  b u i l d e r s  as 
a p r o f i t  m a k i n g  v e n t u r e .
The M u n i c i p a l  A r c h i t e c t  was a s k e d  to s u b m i t  his v i e w s  on 
the a b n o r m a l  i n c r e a s e  in u n a u t h o r i s e d  b u i l d i n g s  o v e r  the p a s t  
t h r e e  years;  i . e . , f r o m  1955 to 1958. He p ut fo rt h  a n u m b e r  
of r e a s o n s  for the i n c r e a s e :
a) the d e l e t i o n  of B y - l a w  1(b) w h i c h  a l l o w e d  for 
s u m m a r y  d e m o l i t i o n  - the c o u r t s  h a d  d e c l a r e d  it u l t r a  v i r e s ;
b) the n o m i n a l  c o u r t  fine s i m p o s e d  on s q u a t t e r s  by a 
s y m p a t h e t i c  Court;
c) the i n c r e a s i n g  n u m b e r  of r e t r e n c h e d  m i n e r s  and 
u n e m p l o y e d ;  and
1. KL MC  M i n u t e s ,  O c t o b e r  23, 1956.
2. (7) in K L M  624, O c t o b e r  9, 1958.
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d) the erection of unauthorised buildings by opportunists 
for s a l e .1
It was at this time that the distinction began to be made 
between the 'old' squatter and the 'new'. York said in a letter 
to the Municipal Architect:
Again, one of the points I continue to press, which 
is my own view, is that the old established 
squatter is not a problem. The time to remove him 
will come in due course as and when the land is 
required for development purposes. The real 
problem is the new squatter and every step must be 
taken to stamp out new illegal squatting as, in my 
opinion, it may have themost serious result of 
defeating the^proper planning and development of 
Kuala Lumpur .
The 1959 elections seem to have given York a surge of 
hope that something might finally be accomplished. With 
great optimism he wrote to Tharmalingam:
I have been greatly heartened by the views of the 
newly elected Members of the State Legislative 
Assembly on dealing with the squatter problem in 
K.L. particularly. They seem to be very keen to 
formulate a policy and also to put a stop to 
further squatting.
As you know we have been faced with this problem 
for years and I think the main reason why we have 
not been able to make any headway with it is because 
of lack of complete co-operation with the State and 
the matter of finances to provide either alternative 
accommodation or developed sites...I feel sure that 
if you and Mr Y.T. Lee secure the co-operation of both 
the Municipal Council and the State government 
on this matter, we shall not only be able to make 
headway for the first time but we shall be doing 
a duty to the class of persons who is compelled to 
squat whether by force of circumstances such as 
lack of accommodation or too long delay^ in 
applications for sites for houses, etc.
As a first step York sought to replace the power to 
demolish summarily without recourse to a court of law unauthor-
1. (9) in KLM 624 , November 1 , 1958 .
2 . (10) in KLM 624 , February 2, 1959
3 . (11) in KLM 624 , July 9 , 1959 .
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i s e d  b u i l d i n g s  in the co ur s e  of c o n s t r u c t i o n .  In M ay 1959 
he a s k e d  the S e l a n g o r  State G o v e r n m e n t  to g a z e t t e  an a m e n d m e n t  
to the M u n i c i p a l  O r d i n a n c e  g i v i n g  h i m  t hat  p o w e r ,  and to m a k e  
l a n d o w n e r s  l i a b l e  for any u n a u t h o r i s e d  b u i l d i n g s  on t h e i r  
p r o p e r t y ,  ev e n th o se  b u i l t  w i t h o u t  t he i r  c o n s e n t  or k n o w l e d g e . 1 
The S t a t e  G o v e r n m e n t  took nine m o n t h s  to r e p l y  d u r i n g  w h i c h  
time the M u n i c i p a l i t y  sent out five r e m i n d e r s  p o l i t e l y  r e q u e s t ­
ing the h o n o u r  of a reply. W h e n  it came it was w r i t t e n  in 
M a l a y ,  the e x c e p t i o n  r a t h e r  than the rule in t ho se  days.
It r a i s e d  a n u m b e r  of o b j e c t i o n s  w h i c h  it c r e d i t e d  to the 
A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l  who  ha d b e e n  c o n s u l t e d .  It m a d e  no e x p l a n a ­
t i o n  or a p o l o g y  for the ni ne  m o n t h  d e l a y . 1
T wo  w e e k s  la t er  York r e p l i e d  that:
1) the p o w e r s  r e q u e s t e d  w e r e  n o t h i n g  new; the P r e s i d e n t  
of the M u n i c i p a l  C o u n c i l  had h ad t h e m  u n d e r  the f o r m e r  
B u i l d i n g  B y - l a w s  1(b) w h i c h  h a d b e e n  r e p e a l e d ;
2) the r e c o u r s e  to the c o u r t s  w h i c h  the St at e  
s u g g e s t e d  was p r e c i s e l y  w h a t  he s o u g h t  to a v o i d  b e c a u s e  of 
the long and c u m b e r s o m e  p r o c e d u r e  i n v o l v e d  and the 
u n c e r t a i n t y  of the o ut c om e;
3) the m a t t e r  was of s u p r e m e  i m p o r t a n c e  to the S t a t e  
b e c a u s e  m o s t  u n a u t h o r i s e d  b u i l d i n g s  w e r e  on S ta t e  land;
for h i m s e l f  he s o u g h t  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o nl y o v e r  p r i v a t e  l an d w i t h ­
in the M u n i c i p a l i t y ,  w h i l e  the D . O . K . L .  or the S ta t e  S e c r e t a r y
3s h o u l d  be g i v e n  p o w e r  o v e r  St at e lands.
Two w e e k s  la t e r  the St a t e  S e c r e t a r y  w r o t e  to i n q u i r e
r a t h e r  b e l a t e d l y  as to w h y  B u i l d i n g  B y - l a w  1(b) h a d b e e n  
4r e p e a l e d .  He was p r o m p t l y  i n f o r m e d  tha t 'the p r e s e n t  b y - l a w  
1(b) is u l t r a  vi r e s  si nc e  it is in d i r e c t  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  s e c t i o n
1. (12) in KL M 624 , May 28 , 1959 .
2 . (73) di m . Sei. Sec. 1894 , Vol. 2, F e b r u a r y  11, 1960
3 . (18) in KL M 624 , ts r+ III , F e b r u a r y  27, 1960.
4 . (76) in Sei . Sec,. 1894, Vol. 2, M a r c h  16, 1960.
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144(10) (c) of the Ordinance (S.S.Cap. 133) which only
authorises demolition on a Court Order' .
There ensued another long silence of nine months which
provoked seven reminders requesting to know what action had
been taken. Then in December I960, eighteen months after the
Draft Amendment had first been sent to them, the Selangor
Secretariat forwarded an alternative proposal which would
require a written order from the Commissioner to demolish any
unauthorised structure and a written order to the builder, if
2known, to cease construction.
York informed the State that the proposed draft missed
the whole point of his conditions: that some officers should
have the power of directing the immediate demolition of
3unauthorised buildings.
Four months later the reply came in the form of a legal 
opinion from the Attorney General's Chambers:
I am nevertheless of the opinion that any law 
passed for the purpose of destroying property 
should provide some form of notice to the owner 
of such property before any act of demolition is 
begun. In this connection your attention is drawn 
to Article 13(2) of the Constitution which, although 
concerned merely with compulsory acquisition and 
use of property, requires compensation to be paid 
for compulsory acquisition. The drastic steps you 
require go even further than the mere acquisition 
or use of property. It involves the deprivation of 
property. It is desirable that notice, at least, 
should be given to the owner or th«| occupier 
before the building is demolished.
York's next step was to write to the Minister of the 
Interior who had just taken control of Kuala Lumpur. He
1. (20) in KLM 624, p t . III , March 2 3 , 1960 .
2 . (91) in Sei. Sec . 1894, Vo 1. 2, December 16, 1960
3 . (40) in KLM 624, r+ H I  , January 21, 1961.
4 . LG 454/55, April 20 , 1961
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explained that he was quite aware of Article 13, but that the 
solution to new squatter erections had to be quick and drastic 
action. Since legislation was considered inappropriate, did 
the Ministry have any advice on the problem?”'"
In his reply, the Secretary to the Minister was explicit 
as to why the Government was so careful of the legal niceties 
involved:
...bearing in mind that any legislation of the nature 
you propose would be hotly resisted by the Opposition 
in Parliament, it is therefore essential that we 
should explore all means for arriving at a reasonable 
solution...we might discuss this at a suitable 
opportunity and see if there is any possible 
acceptable compromise which we could put to the 
lawyers with a view to amending the legislation 
on the subject whilst always bearing in mind the 
explosive political implications.
One of York's strongest points as an administrator was 
his adaptability. Only three weeks after getting the message 
from the Ministry, he came up with a compromise:
. . .on the assumption that most of the illegal 
squatting takes place on State land, it seems 
to me that it would be better to attempt to shift 
our ground and to endeavour to obtain more drastic 
powers for the Collector of Land Revenue.
Alternatively, if the Collector of Land Revenues would 
only enforce Section 250-252 of the Land Code it 
would act as a sufficient deterrent, in my opinion, 
to prevent squatting generally in Kuala Lumpur.
I quite appreciate the point of view of both the 
politicians and the legal officers and I am ^
prepared to bow to their opinion in this matter.
This ingenious suggestion did not provoke any response, 
but in June 1952 the Minister himself gave the first indication 
that there had been a change of attitude. Speaking at the 
opening of the Municipal low-cost flats in Sungei Besi, he
1. (50) in KLM 6 2 4, p t ., III , May 9, 1961.
2 . L . G . 454/59 , August 19 , 1961 .
3 . (6) in KLM 624, p t . IV, September 9, 1961
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said that while the Government had some sympathy for squatters 
left over from the war days and the Emergency, it was d e t e r ­
m i n e d  to put a stop to new squatting. New and extensive 
p o w e r s  wo uld soon enable the C o m m i s s i o n e r  of the Federal 
C a p i t a l  to deal with the m e n a c e .^
The M i n i s t e r  was referring to a bill intended to enable 
the C o m m i s s i o n e r  to demolish squatter huts, a step they had 
r e j e c t e d  as impolitic the year before. York, having retired, 
was de ni ed  the p l e asure of having his views confirmed, but the 
new C o mm is sioner, Haji Ismail, was quick to act on the suggestion 
and fo rw ar ded a draft bill to the M i n ister a month after his 
spee c h .
As was usual, even with legislation agreed on in
pri nc ip le , the time from conception to completion was long
indeed. As an interim measure, York's earlier compromise
p r o p o s a l  was implemented; the C o m m i s s i o n e r  and the Municipal
S e c r et ar y were gazet t e d  as A s s i s t a n t  Collectors of Land
Revenue, and were thereby empowered to deal with squatters on
2State land w i thin the Municipal limits.
In March 1963 P a r l iament p a s s e d  the Municipal Act 1963
e m p o we ri ng  the M i n i s t e r  to make by-laws to provide for the
d e m o li ti on  of squatter huts and the puni s h m e n t  of persons
ere ct in g them. In d i s c ussing this po wer at the next Advisory
Bo ar d me et ing the C o m m i s s i o n e r  stressed that it wo uld apply
only to squatting on State land. Old squatters would not be
d i s t ur be d unless the M u n i c i p a l i t y  could provide alternative
acc om m o d a t i o n  in low-cost housing estates, which were in very
short supply. New squatters w o uld not be extended similar
opp or t u n i t i e s  and the by-laws would be intended mainly for
3dea lin g with them.
The by-laws which were u l t i mately conf irmed in August 1963,
1. (35) in KLM 624, pt. IV, June 11, 1962.
2. Selang or State Gazette No. 2 of 1963, January 17, 1963.
3. Adv is ory Board Minutes, March 28, 1963.
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provided that, except where land was required for a public 
purpose, the right to demolish would apply only to huts which 
had been occupied by the person in possession for less than 
a year immediately preceding the date of notice of demolition.^
In other words, anybody who had been squatting in one particular 
hut for more than a year was generally exempted as being an 
'old' squatter. Such a definition obviously included many 
people who had begun their squatting careers after the 
Emergency had ended, and was a startling extension of the 
category usually considered as deserving sympathetic treatment 
as involuntary squatters.
Low-cost housing
Because of the Municipality's long established commit­
ment to offering alternative accommodation when moving 'old' 
squatters, any plans to clear squatter areas had to be linked 
with low-cost housing projects. Hence in 1958, with the 
renewed interest in the squatter problem, the provision of 
housing had become a major topic of discussion. In his Budget 
speech toward the end of the year, York reported that the 
Municipality had a total of 893 low-cost housing units, and
that a new Housing Section to administer these properties had
2been established in the Municipal Treasurer's department.
But already the question of whether this housing met the needs
for which it was intended had been raised, and by an Alliance
Councillor at that. Chong Shih Guan, speaking at a Finance
Committee meeting, said that flats renting for $32-50 per
month 'did not appear to meet the object of providing low
cost housing because they were not low enough for the lower income 
3groups'. At the Council meeting a few days later, the 
Opposition joined in with the view that the real purpose of 
building low-cost flats had been defeated, since the rentals
1. KDN(FC) 7020/F, Legal Notice 211, August 29, 1963.
2. KLMC Minutes, October 27, 1958.
3. KLMC Finance Committee Minutes, September 24, 1958.
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of $30 -$50 were obviously too high for the people for whom the 
flats were intended who earned $3-$4 per day."1' Strangely 
en ou g h  no one suggested that the rents be subsidised.
An O p p o s i t i o n  motion in April 1959 that the Council 
seek loans to build low-cost housing was defeated, the Alliance 
Whip p o i n t i n g  out that under the Municipal Ordinance the Council 
had no pow er to raise loans without Federal Gov e r n m e n t  
a p p r o v a l  . 2 34
The number of housing units remained constant in 1959 and
I960, an i n d i cation that after the rush of bu ilding following
the 1956 fire disaster, Federal Gov e r n m e n t  had cut off access
to funds, and that no new projects had been u n d e rtaken after
the or ig in al lot, which had been completed in 1958. The budget
p r o p o s a l s  included an application for a loan of $M1,000,000
3to b u il d more housing. This request was granted and the 
M u n i c i p a l i t y  embarked on another estate of flats, this time 
loca ted  on less expensive land on the fringes of K.L., in 
order that these flats could be let at less than $20, to cater 
to the needs of those who could not afford the existing  
a c commo d a t i o n .^
In June 1960, one of the newly n o m i nated Councillors, 
who was an U.M.N.O. official, p r o p o s e d  a thor oughly muddled 
mo ti on  in favour of the provision of low-cost housing by the 
Mun ic ip al it y. In the long shambles of a debate that ensued, 
Al l i a n c e  Coun c i l l o r s  valiantly tried to make sense of the 
moti on which they felt bound to support out of party loyalty.
The real value of the motion was that it pr o v o k e d  P.G. Gilmour,
1. KLMC Minutes, September 30, 1958.
2. KLMC Minutes, April 30, 1959.
3. KLMC Minutes, App e n d i x  A, October 20, 1959.
4. KLMC Minutes, A p p endix A, N o v ember 9, 1960. These flats, 
which involved community kitchens and bathrooms with two 
families to a flat, have since been wr itten off as a 
failure and in most cases are being rented as single units 
at $36 per month.
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the C o u n c i l l o r  nominated by the F.M.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
to state openly what had long been the p r i v ately held view of 
the r a t e p a y e r s  he represented:
. . .it was not the function of the Municipal Council 
to pr ovide low-cost housing for the public. The 
rev enue of the Council was p r o v i d e d  by the 
ta xpa yers of Kuala Lumpur town and they did not, he 
submitted, pay this money so that the Municipal 
C o u n c i l  could erect low-cost housing for just one 
se cti on of the population. The money was 
c o n t r i b u t e d  by way of rates and was ^ m e a n t  for the 
b e t t e r m e n t  of the town generally. . .
The motion, e s s e ntially m eani ngless though it was, was carried.
In the following months in the flurry of disc ussions  
about the c hangeover from the Municipal Council to the 
Fe de ra l Capital Commission, the subject of low-cost ho using  
for sq uat ters was forgotten by the Councillors. But the 
State Secretary, Selangor, saw the Federal G o v e rnment takeover 
as a s h o u l d e r i n g  of full r e s p o nsibility for housing and r e ­
set tl in g all squatters in the Federal Capital, many of whom  
were e n s c o n c e d  on State land. The A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  qu ickly 
bur st that bubble, po inting out that squatters were persons  
in unlawfu l o c c u pation of land and that their removal was a 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of the landowner, and that the Federal G o v e rnment  
had no pow er to deal with the matter. However, close c o n s u l t ­
ation be tw een the State and Federal G o v e r n m e n t  on all matters
2aff ec ti ng  h o u sing and r e - s e t t l e m e n t  wo uld be most desirable.
In an effort to effect such cons ultative co-or d i n a t i o n
at least two meetings were held during the early months of the
FCC be tw een State and Federal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to discuss low-
3cost ho usi ng in the state. It was p r o p o s e d  that a housing 
board  with Federal, State and Municipal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  be 
es ta b l i s h e d  to study housing problems in K.L. and find solutions
1. KLMC Minutes, June 29, 1960.
2. A.G.F.M. 1202 SF35, August 10, 1960.
3 . (30) in Sei. Sec.(C) 1331, August 8, 1961; (4) in
DOKL 2 7 / 6 1 ( 0 ,  August 29, 1961.
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for them, but there is no evidence of such a committee actually 
g e t ti ng  to work.
The M u n i c i p a l i t y  itself had no ho using depa rtment 
per se; a Ho using Section under the Municipal Treasurer h a n dled  
the day to day ad ministration of the units already erected; 
the Mu n i c i p a l  E n g ineer was responsible for deve loping sites 
and p r o v i d i n g  facilities, and the Municipal A r c h itect pr e p a r e d  
b u i l d i n g  layouts and oversaw the actual construction. The 
most im por tant matter of long range policies was in an 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  n o - m a n 's - l a n d , although ultimate responsibility, 
as in all M u n i c i p a l  matters, lay with the Commissioner. Early 
in 1963, the d e p a rtment heads embarked on a discussion regarding 
the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a separate housing department.
The Engineer, the Architect and the Valuer all pressed  
the case for adding housing to their respective depa rtmental 
duties. The result was an impasse, and the matter was 
d r o p p e d .^
The C o m m i s s i o n e r  continued to attack from another angle.
Wri ti ng  to Y.B. Dato' Y.T. Lee, a State Senator, architect and
former Mu n i c i p a l  Councillor, he asked for help in obtaining a
numb er of sites from the State G o v e rnment for low-cost housing
schemes. It was suggested that the Senator might use his good
offices to prod the State S ecretariat and Land Office to a
2quick decision. Whether or not he did is not on record, but
three of the six pr o p o s e d  sites were later disc arded as
3unsu it ab le  by the Munic i p a l i t y  itself.
Besides p l e a d i n g  for help from p o l itical i n f l u e n t i a l s , the 
C o m m i s s i o n e r  wrote directly to the State Secretary, Selangor, 
rem in di ng  him that in December 1960 there were an estimated 
9,500 squatter huts in K . L . , half of them on State land.
1. (1) - (6) in KLM(C) 6/63, March 27, 1963-May 25 , 1963.
2 . (36) in K L M (C) 2079 , p t . I I , October 10, 1963 •
3 . (52) in KLM 1674/56, February 28, 1964; (54) in KLM(C)
2079, pt. II, July 3, 1964.
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He made his reason for writing explicit:
The pu rpose of this letter is to p i n - p o i n t  the 
fact that in order to undertake a vigorous 
ho u s i n g  p r o g r a m  which the C o m m i s s i o n e r  intends 
to do, he must have sites and these should be 
made available for purposes of p l a n n i n g  and 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  as to their suitability and, above all, 
they must be low cost. The key to Jow cost housing 
is cheap land and cheap loan funds.
This letter also el i c i t e d  no traceable reaction.
Six months later at a meeting of the C . C . M . C . , financing
of ho us ing  proje c t s  by local authorities was discussed. The
C o m m i s s i o n e r  said that K.L. accepted no pro f i t - n o  loss as the
basis for financing low-cost housing, and gave his solution
to the p r o b l e m  of those people who could not afford to pay an
econom ic rent of $50 for a low-cost flat: nobody should live
in K.L. who could not afford to pay a rental of $50 per month
for a flat. In reply to a suggestion that rents might be
sub sid ise d he said, ' . . .the a d m i n i strative work entailed wo uld
be most di fficult and cumbersome in that it would give rise
to d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  as to the methods and grounds for selection
of the p r i v i l e g e d  class who would qualify for subsidy. K.L.
did not therefore agree to this since it was obvious that the
2a d m i n i st ra tive d i f f i c u l t y  was insurmountable.'
The m e e ting d e c i d e d  to ask the Federal G o v e rnment to
assist local a u t h o r i t i e s  in the form of ho using loans fixed at
32% payable over forty years. More than a year later they 
received a reply from the C o m m i s s i o n e r  of Local Gov e r n m e n t  that 
the Central G o v e r n m e n t  was already p r o v i d i n g  subsidised loans 
and that local a u t h o r i t i e s  must share the burden of subsidies. 
The letter made a very clear statement of the unde rlying  
ph il os op hy  in support of this idea:
1. (44) in KLM 1674/56, January 9, 1964.
2. C.C.M.C. Minutes, June 1, 1964.
3. Ibid.
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The M i n i s t r y  does not agree with the view that it 
is un fair to pass the burden of subsidy to the 
ratepayer. Low cost housing clears slums and 
squ atters, permits development and in the final 
ana ly sis enhances the value of ratepayer's 
pro pe rties. Mu nicipalities should accept the p r i n ciple 
that the burden of low cost ho using should to some 
ex ten t be borne by the rate payer.
It mus t be noted that the Ministry dis p e n s i n g  this advice is the 
same M i n i s t r y  which has subsequently refused to implement new 
and more realistic valuation figures for K.L. or to increase 
rates, alt ho ugh the figures now in use are based on 1960 values. 
This p o li cy would seem to be in direct contradiction to its 
stand on ratepayers' responsibilities.
The squatter p r o b l e m  was also c o n s idered by the S e l angor
State A s s e m b l y  in October 1964. The Mentri Besar, re-plying
to O p p o s i t i o n  criticism, said that the State G o v e rnment had a
scheme to build low-cost houses and flats, a programme he was
not able to explain in detail at the moment. The FCC and the
M i n i s t r y  for Local G overnment and Housing also had plans which
2he had no right to explain. The Co m m i s s i o n e r ' s  worries about 
land a p p a rently were not shared by the Mentri Besar who said,
'We have enough land here (in K.L.) to build low-cost houses and 
flats. ' ^
All of this commun i c a t i o n  and d i s c ussion on various 
levels had thusfar y i e l d e d  little tangible results. The 
Ministry, which had long been silent on the issue, roused itself 
in 1965 and directed the FCC to prepare low cost housing 
scheme plans based on the neighborhood pri n c i p l e  to be erected 
on land which the Federal Government had acquired in the 
W a r d i e b u r n  Estate. It was further req u e s t e d  that the ma tter be
1. C LG 249/2 , Au gust 14, 1965.
2. Se lan gor State L egislative Assembly Debates, Oc tober 1964, 
pp . 30-42 .
3. I b i d .
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treated with some urgency.
Perhaps the Commissioner did not respond with enough 
urgency, be cause four months later he received a very stern 
letter from the Ministry referring to a squatter survey c o m p l e ­
ted a year p r e v i o u s l y  and demanding to know 'what concrete 
action had been taken by the Federal Capital to abate the 
squatter problem. The Ministry would like to see the 
Federal Capital's blueprint in this respect. If no action has 
been taken, this Ministry would like to know the r e a s o n s . '
The letter also outlined the kind of blue print which the Federal 
Capital should have drawn up, and p o i nted out that the proposed 
schemes p r e s e n t l y  on hand had been drawn up as a result of the
Ministry's initiative whereas they should p r o perly have emanated
2from the Federal Capital early in 1964.
The C o m m i s sioner's four-page reply described in some detail 
the advances made in housing from 1961 to 1965 (a total of 1500 
units) and some of its plans for future squatter resettlement
3and refuted the claim that the Ministry had taken the initiative.
The Min ist ry was not impressed and pointed out that rehousing of
squatters could not be done on an ad hoc basis but must be done
systematically. The obvious solution, of course, was to
establish a committee to deal with the p r o b l e m  on the lines
4of the one in Singapore.
The C o m m i s s i o n e r  lost no time and by the end of the month 
the Board had disc ussed the matter, and r e c o mmended that the 
propo se d Squatter Clearance Committee should be comprised of 
the D.O.K.L., the Permanent Secr etary to the Ministry of Works, 
Posts and Telecoms., The Secretary to the Ministry of Local 
Govt, and Housing, Chan Keong Hon and Lim Hee Hong.^ After
1. K K T P . H. 354/1, March 31, 1965.
2. (5) in KLM 601/64, July 31, 1965.
3. (6) in KLM 601/64, August 17, 1965.
4. KKTP. 2085/A/3 in (7) in KLM 601/64, September 8, 1965.
5. Advisory Board Minutes, September 30, 1965.
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the first burst of efficiency and enthusiasm, things bogged 
down and the Committee did not hold its first meeting until 
J an uar y 1966.
The M i n i s t e r  had intended the committee to formulate a
new p o l i c y  of squatter clearance on both State and private
lands. He had suggested squatters on State land not immediately
r e q u i r e d  for development should receive no consideration for
low cost housing, and that in the case of private land, a
scheme should be devised whereby the committee would assist the
owner in clearing squatters in return for a portion of the land
c l e ar ed  bei ng used for building flats for the squatters who
had been m o v e d . 1 23 Since the Municipal Valuer was in the process
of w i n d i n g  up a survey of squatters on State land in K . L . ,
the newly formed committee turned its attention to private
dev elopers. It immediately found an inte rested landowner who
had plans to develop a piece of land in the heart of downtown
K.L. and there was much intensive n e g o tiation between the
com mi tt ee  and the owner's representatives, culminating in an
agr ee me nt  between the F.C.C. and the company that the company
w o ul d give free of charge A h  acres of land to re-site the 
2sq uat ter s .
On April 12, 1966 the FCC wrote to the Minister to ascertain
3his views on the proposals in principle. The Minister, who had 
o r i g i n a t e d  the whole thing in the first place, did not reply, 
and six months later the company informed the Muni c i p a l i t y  that 
it did not require its assistance in clearing squatters from 
its land because it was dealing directly with the squatters
1. I b i d .
2. Min utes of a Meeting re: Squatter Area be hind Malayan
Mansion, January 13, 1966; Minutes of Meeting No. 2,
Squ atters Clearance Committee, February 10, 1966;
Secretary, United Malayan Realty Ltd. to P J K L , March 
4, 1966; PJKL to United Malayan Realty, March 10,
1966; United Malayan Realty to PJKL, March 26, 1966;
all in PKL 440/65.
3. PJKL to Secretary, K K T P , in PKL 440/65, April 12, 1966.
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t h e m s e l v e s .
After that p r o ject fizzled, the committee turned its
attention to the State land survey being carried out by the
Valuer and a u t h o r i s e d  him to do a similar survey on pr ivate
land in order to obtain a complete picture of the overall
2squatter situation in K.L. Having done that, the committee 
went into a very long recess, me e t i n g  once in December 1967 to 
hear the final results of the State land survey. It did not 
meet again until July 1, 1969 when the survey of squatters on
private land had been completed. By that time, in view of the 
Emergency, the squatter pr o b l e m  had become a matter for the 
Nation al O p e r ations Council and the Squatter Clearance 
Com mittee ceased its normal functions.
The co mbined squatter surveys give the first s y s t e m ­
atically collected and evaluated data ever available on the 
para met ers  of squatter settlements in K.L. Some of the more 
per ti ne nt  info r m a t i o n  may be found in App e n d i x  D. It was 
estimat ed that as of July 1, 1969 there were 26,500 squatter
families with a p o p u l a t i o n  of 175,000 within the Federal Capital, 
comprising a p p r o x i m a t e l y  30% of the total population. The 
racial br eakdown was: Chinese 67.2%; Malays 20.4%; Indians
11.5%. The m a j o r i t y  of these squatters were under twenty years 
of age and were hawkers, small traders, skilled labourers, 
clerks and drivers. The majority of the families earned less 
than $M200 per month and consisted of five or more members.
The maj ori ty of them indicated that they wo uld be w i l ling
to live in t w o - b e d r o o m  flats for which they could not pay more
3than $M40 per month rental. It was esti mated that in order
1. Squatter Cle a r a n c e  Committee M e e ting No. 7 of 1966,
Nov emb er 29, 1966.
2 . I b i d .
3. This is s u b s t a n t i a t e d  by the fact that the Circular Road 
flats, the most ambitious of the M u n i c i p a l i t y ' s  low-cost 
housing projects, actually had large numbers of 
vacant flats at $78 per month, intended for rental as 
low cost flats for families making less than $300 per 
m o n t h .
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to cope with the problem the Municipality would have to
provide approximately 3,500 units per year over a period of
ten years.^ In view of the fact that in the fourteen years
from 1956-1969 there had only been a total of 7994 living
units, an average of 571 per annum, an increase of 3000 per
2year for ten years seemed unlikely.
The squatter problem, if left solely to the FCC was likely 
to remain unsolved, and not entirely because of its own short­
comings. In the twenty-five year history of squatters in K.L. 
the Municipality had been hindered repeatedly in its attempts 
to cope by lack of co-operation on the part of both State and 
Federal governments in matters of land, finance and legislation, 
over which the Municipality had no jurisdiction. While it 
must be admitted that the squatter problem was allowed to grow 
virtually unchecked from 1946 to 1969, it should be remembered 
that the Municipality, through no fault of its own, was power­
less to deal with the situation. In recent months particularly 
the Municipality has come under much criticism from within 
and without for not having had a clear cut, dynamic policy for 
squatter clearance. If the critics had any understanding at 
all of the position the Municipality has occupied over the years, 
it would be obvious to them that policy without power is futile, 
frustrating and finally, unproductive.
1. All data taken from 'Summary of the Reports on the Surveys 
of Unauthorised Buildings on State Land and Private Land,'
( cyclostyled) , 1969.
2. Ministry of Local Government and Housing and Pesuroh Jaya
Ibu Kota, o p . cit., Appendix IV. After May 13, 1969, 1,973
of these units were given over to the Federal Government 
for occupation by police and military forces.
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CHAPTER VI 
HAWKERS
The hawker problem arised (sic) primarily from 
Chinese individualism - the desire of the ordinary 
man to work on his own account and be his own 
master. Hawking provides an occupation in 
which the whole family can work as one economic 
unit...the Chinese has an outstanding talent for 
retail trade. For many who have little or no 
capital, hawking is almost the only way in 
which this talent can be exercised.
Report of the Hawker Inquiry 
Commission of Singapore, 1950
Introduction
Almost all of the informants interviewed for this project 
nominated hawkers as one of K.L.'s important problems and 
frequently mentioned them as one of the few interest groups 
having the power to get things done. This section will describe 
some aspects of the political life, struggles and tactics of 
the hawkers, a capsule account of an urban Malaysian interest 
group in action.1 2
The earliest reference to hawkers in the post-W.W.II
files of the Municipality is dated October 8, 1945, less than
a month after the Japanese swords had been handed over in 
2surrender. The British Military Administration was anxious 
to keep the hawkers both under control and under observation 
because of their alleged involvement in blackmarketeering.
The hawkers resisted this attempt to curb their activities 
and by November 1946 the 'K.L. Stall Owners, Hawkers and
1. This discussion is fundamentally concerned with the 
group known as the Selangor Hawkers' and Petty 
Traders' Association; as shall be explained this 
group has evolved in the post W.W.II period under 
different names. Its membership is wholly Chinese.
There was another group called the Persatuan Ahli2 
Perniagaan Melayu whose membership was exclusively 
Malay. It is not included in this analysis, as it 
has been inactive for a long time, and was never as 
persistently involved as the group under discussion.
2. (1) in K L M . 699, October 8, 1945.
I
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Pedalers (sic) Association' had been organised. Writing to the 
Town Board that consideration be given to establishing certain 
areas where hawkers could ply their trade, an official of the 
Association said:
In the previous meeting, you have decided to carry 
out the mop up of all hawkers. We wish that you 
would sympathise with difficulties and hardships 
of the hawkers at this bad time...
In order to earn a living and to support the 
family, we have but to become a hawker and to 
make a little money. If it is resolved to mop up 
all the hawkers, we assume that we will be driven 
to the road of death...If you insist in mopping 
up all hawkers, we are afraid that when they 
cannot live on peacefully, they would be forced to 
the jungle and they would become adventurous.
Undoubtedly, this is not the desire of the British 
government. The maintenance of peace and order 
might also be then hampered.
The drastic mopping up action which the Town Board and
the Police were contemplating at the time was deferred.
Partly as a result of the newly formed Association's
representations, the Chinese Consul was brought into the hawker
question; in response to his mediation the Town Board agreed
to 'devise different ways of solving the...vexed problem of 
2hawkers'. This represented an important victory for the 
Association, official recognition that it existed and that it 
had a legitimate grievance which the local authority was in 
duty bound to consider.
In time the Hawkers' Association has carved out for itself 
a permanent place in the urban political system and there is 
no longer any question of the right of hawkers to trade in the" 
city; much of the effort of law enforcement agencies is now 
directed at unlicensed hawkers and the activities of those 
licensed hawkers who violate the conditions of their licences. 
The Hawkers' Association now retains lawyers, has politicians
1. (24) in KLM. 699 (Part I), November 13, 1946.
2. 'Truce declared in Police Drive Against Hawkers,' Tribune,
January 12, 1947.
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to speak for it in Parliament and the State Legislative Assembly 
and although not represented on the Federal Capital Commission's 
Hawker's Committee, it has the opportunity of making its views 
known to i t .
The Problem as perceived by the Municipal Bureaucracy & Police
Hawkers were by no means a new problem thrown up out of 
the chaos of the Japaneseoccupation. There have probably always 
been hawkers in Kuala Lumpur and even in the early records of 
the proceedings of the Sanitary Board there are references to 
the hawker problem.
After the end of the war the question of hawkers occupied 
the attention of the Town Board and, later, the Municipal 
Commission.'*' The controversy over the hawker problem spilled 
over into electoral politics with the establishment of a 
partly elected Council and there were frequent debates on the 
subject with the 'law and order, keep the streets clear, 
sanitation wallahs' on the one hand, and the 'hawkers have 
a right to earn a living' politicians on the other. In these 
encounters the dominant official police view has always been 
that hawkers are a nuisance and a hazard to the health of the 
community demanding constant policing and that violations of 
either health or other regulations must be dealt with 
severely. The following description of the hawker problem by 
the officer-in-charge of Traffic Police summarises a view 
which, although expressed over a decade ago, is still current:
These traders have been condemned by the Municipal
Health Officer as the major cause of disease and
1. See for example KLMC Minutes, December 20, 1950;
KLMC Minutes, January 17, 1951; Health Committee
Minutes, April 2, 1952, Health Committee Minutes,
October 16, 1952; Douglas K.K. Lee, Memo on Street
Trading within K.L. Municipal Area, February 24, 1953,
in (92A) KLM. 699; Devaki Krishnan, Memo on Hawkers
within K.L. Municipal Area, March 16, 1953. These
are just a sample of references to major debates or 
references on the subject of hawkers.
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deaths from bowel diseases. They have been 
condemned by the Traffic Advisory Committee as one 
of the major causes of traffic congestion, which 
threatens to strangle the economic life of the 
Federal Capital. The Public Works Committee has 
agreed unconditionally that they must be removed.
It remains now to give effect to an agreed decision,
The foregoing statement incorporates, in somewhat 
exaggerated terms, the hardline view consistently adhered to 
by the police.
On the other hand, most of the politicians and some of 
the bureaucrats took the more pragmatic view that hawkers and 
street stalls are all components of Chinese life, and are 
therefore necessary in a predominantly Chinese town. For them 
the problem was one of regulating a social necessity rather 
than eliminating a social evil.
The approach to the problem
Long before the establishment of the partly elected 
Municipal Council in 1952, the extreme attitude of the police 
that hawkers should be mopped up had been abandoned as a basis 
for action. As early as November 1946 the system of licensing 
hawkers in operation before the war was reactivated, and 
official attempts to come to terms with the problem on a more 
rational basis were already being considered. A memorandum 
prepared by the Health Officer of the day formulated the problem 
in these terms:
(a) Is it reasonable to issue further licences?
(b) In what areas of the Town should we permit 
hawkers to trade?
(c) What types of food should we permit hawkers 
to sell?
(d) If further licences, how many?
(e) What equipment should a hawker be allowed?
1. (25) in KLM. 699 (Pt.II), April 30, 1957.
2. W.E. Holmes, Hawkers (mimeo), (23) in KLM. 699 (Part
and
evil.
our town of a long standing social
I ) , November 1946.
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The system of licensing became the principal instrument 
of control. But licensing only solved part of the problem. 
Those licensed to hawk their wares often infringed the terms 
of their licences by establishing fixed stalls and those 
licensed to provide certain kinds of goods and services in 
specific areas relocated their stalls at more lucrative trading 
sites. To these problems were added the need for enforcing 
health standards and the larger problem of the completely 
unlicensed hawkers and traders of whom there were several 
thousand. All told, the problem was one of quite serious 
proportions.
Arrests and confiscation of hawker property did not solve 
anything. The victims of police clean-up campaigns simply 
returned to the streets to set up shop again, once they had 
paid their fines or served brief terms of imprisonment.
By 1953 the Municipal Health Officer, in response to 
queries made on behalf of the Hawkers' Association by an 
elected member of the Municipal Council, described the whole 
hawker situation by saying:
(i) The 'hawkers' problem is no problem at all.
The licensed hawker who sticks to his legitimate 
itinerant trade is serving a public need and 
causes little trouble.
(ii) The illegal stall, whether a licensed hawker 
or not and whether selling from a large stall 
or from a piece of board on the street is the 
main street vending nuisance. His food is likely 
to be contaminated, he causes street obstructions, 
he spoils any area he frequents by his slovenly 
dirt and litter and he is probably the focal 
point of much corruption.
(iii) Experience has shown that it is almost impossible 
to eradicate this unlicensed stall completely 
by fines and raids; he regenerates with the 
facility of an amoeba. If areas can be set aisde, 
with adequate sanitary facilities, for this class, 
then it is possible the police can^maintain 
control in the rest of the town...
1. Municipal Health Officer, Street Trading, (typescript), 
(9 7 A ) in K L M . 699 (Part I), March 31 , 1953 .
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But this was only one point of view, an important one 
because it was expressed by the Municipal Health Officer, but 
not one which was to prevail unchallenged as a basis for 
dealing with the problem. Even after this careful evaluation 
of the whole issue of street trading and the accompanying 
recommendations calling for municipal and police co-operation 
in dealing with all unlicensed vendors and enforcing the by­
laws where licensed vendors were concerned, neither the number 
of unlicensed vendors nor the frequency of by-law violations 
seemed to diminish.
The return to a hard line attack proposed in the O.C.
Traffic's letter of April 30, 1957 quoted earlier expressed
the exasperation and impatience the police felt at the
Municipality's approach. At this time it was estimated that
there were about 3,500 licensed hawkers and 7,000 illegal
vendors trading within the municipal limits.^ The traffic
officer's demand for action was received by several committees
2of the Council, and by the full Council itself where it was 
decided that no harsh action should be taken, a response 
dictated in large part by the fact that elected politicians 
cannot afford blatantly to ignore 10,500 actual or potential 
voters. This decision was another step in the gradual movement 
away from harsher measures towards a more lenient policy of 
containment.
By September 1958 the Acting Municipal Secretary was
writing to the K.L. Hawkers' and Petty Traders' Association
asking for its co-operation in keeping the town clean, an attempt
at co-opting the Association into working with the Municipality
3rather than against it.
1. KLMC Minutes, May 6, 1957.
2. Traffic Advisory Committee Proceedings, May 6, 1957;
Health Committee Proceedings, May 15, 1957. The matter
was also discussed at a special six-man sub-committee 
comprising three representatives each from the Health 
and Traffic Committees.
3. (50) in KLM. 699 (Part II), September 22, 1958.
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This is not to say that licensed and unlicensed street 
traders were no longer prosecuted; they continued to be 
harassed by the police. Prosecutions simply added to the number 
of cases pending on Court calendars. Convicted offenders and 
those awaiting trial returned to street trading, substantially 
because of economic necessity. The deterrent effects were 
practically nil.
By late 1959 Socialist Front Councillor V. David had
become the chief spokesman for hawkers within the Council.
He frequently raised questions concerning the handling of the
hawker problem and made speeches appealing to the police for
humane treatment of street vendors on the grounds that they
were taxpayers and free citizens engaged in making an honest
living.'*’ When David was joined by fellow Socialist Front
Councillor Nayagam they jointly raised the question of street
traders, arguing now not just against the futility of police
arrests and prosecutions but also for the licensing of all
those who wished to earn a living by street trading and by the
provision of facilities, from public funds, which would allow
this. There were, of course, certain councillors like Lim
2Hee Hong, Lim Jew Siang and Mrs. T.R. Marks who vigorously 
opposed these views and who pressed for and believed in a law 
and order approach and solution to the problem.
By the end of 1960 there were 4,146 licensed hawkers and
street stall holders in K.L. and an unknown number of illegal 
3traders. There had certainly been no lack of discussion of 
the problem. A policy which combined frequent police raids,
1. See for example KLMC Minutes, December 22, 1959;
KLMC Minutes, February 29, 1960; KLMC Minutes,
March 24, 1960.
2. Both Lim Hee Hong and Lim Jew Siang are prominent hoteliers 
and leaders of the Hainanese community and coffee shop 
associations with whom hawkers are in direct competition. 
Mrs. Marks was a nominated Councillor without election 
worries.
3. (3) in K L M . 699 (Part IV), November 23, 1960.
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arrests and prosecutions together with gradually increasing 
the number of licences issued left the problem fundamentally 
unresolved as far as the Municipal bureaucracy was concerned.
The police operations against the hawkers continued 
despite resolutions adopted by the Council asking for suspension 
of the increasingly frequent police raids.''" Appeals for 
restraint made by political parties were not uncommon and the 
following made by the Peoples' Progressive Party captures the 
essential pitch of such representations:
Before we condemn a hawker for being a nuisance 
on the road let us pay a visit to his home, and 
we will find that he has a wife and young 
children to support. Then we will realise 
that he is not a criminal but a hardworking man 
trying to earn an honest living for his family.
The trouble is that administrators in air- 
conditioned offices usually fail to appreciate 
the difficulties of the hawker who has to brave 
the rain and the hot sun in order^to earn a few 
dollars by the sweat of his brow.
The Hawkers' and Petty Traders' Association, of course, 
added its own voice to the chorus of protest asking that the 
hawker problem be 'viewed with sympathy and understanding' 
and pressed for the provision of more sites for legal street 
trading.^
While the police raids and the protests against them
continued, a new policy was being actively pursued. The
Municipal Health Officer recommended that a special Hawker
Control Force along the lines of the one existing in Hong
Kong should form the basis of the main effort to enforce the 
4by-laws. There were some misgivings at first, and the
1. (8) in K L M . 699 (Part IV), December 3, 1960; KLMC
Minutes, March 31, 1961.
2. (4) in KLM. 699 (Part IV), November 25, 1960.
3. See for example (15) in KLM. 699 (Part IV), January
6, 1961.
4. MHO (Confidential) 7/62, March 22, 1962.
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proposal was considered for four years before it was accepted.
A letter written to the Ministry of Local Government and Housing 
in June 1966 urging the establishment of the Hawker Control 
Force was not even acknowledged until April 1967, despite 
seven reminders from the Municipal Secretary/ More delays 
followed and it was not until 1969 that approval from the 
Ministry was finally received with a part of the force actually 
being put to work in November of the same year.
During the same period steps were taken to increase the
number of legal sites for trading. In the last two or three
years, night trading in certain areas has been introduced,
but only two main areas have been taken up with enthusiasm.
Of the two new multi-storey hawker emporia completed in 1967
at a cost of over $M1.25 million, one of them can be described
as a very limited success and the other a spectacular failure,
2partly because of location and rental costs.
In sum, then, the policy pursued since the end of 1961 
was based on two essential factors, the continuation of 
punitive measures and the gradual expansion of street trading 
opportunities .
The Hawkers ' response
When it was first organised in 1946, the Hawkers' 
Association faced the threatened mopping up action of the 
police head on. Their letter clearly hints at direct action 
although the situation never quite came to that. It is a 
measure of the sophistication of the leadership of the 
Hawkers' Association that it quickly moved away from a policy 
of direct mass action in the streets to a more potent political 
strategy of opening up lines of communication with the 
Municipal bureaucracy and then seeking to influence policy 
regarding hawkers both by their own direct representations
1. (42) in PKL. 699 (Part VI), June 27, 1966; (63) in
PKL. 699 (Part VI), April 14, 1967.
2. KLM Annual Report, 1967, p.33.
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and also by efforts made on their behalf by lawyers, poli ticians ,  
po lit ica l parties and sections of the Chinese daily press.
From its very inception the Hawkers' Asso c i a t i o n  sought 
to be r e c o gnised as the competent agency to represent hawkers 
and street vendors in all matters concerning their welfare.
It desired to be consulted before decisions on matters a f f e c t ­
ing hawkers and petty traders were made, and in recent years 
has achiev ed its goal to some extent.
Gen er ally the Hawkers' Asso c i a t i o n  has dealt directly 
with the M u n i c i p a l  bureaucracy, mo stly after action against 
hawkers has been taken. In all such representations, the 
Hawkers' A s s o c i a t i o n  has p e r s i s t e n t l y  claimed to represent 
all hawkers, licensed and unlicensed alike. Moreover, it has 
always opposed police search, pick up and destroy o perations 
as being futile and e ssentially negative and c onsistently  
argued for p r o v i s i o n  of more trading licences and e x p anded 
areas where legal trading might be carried on.
Quite apart from its own representations, the l e a d ership  
of the Hawkers' A s s o c i a t i o n  over the years has skilfully 
deploy ed other forces to speak on its behalf. Once elections 
were introduced, the Asso c i a t i o n  not only addressed its 
grievances to the Municipal bure a u c r a c y  but wo rked closely 
with certain elected members upon whom they p r e v a i l e d  for 
pr ot ect ion and support. Both Alliance and Socialist Front 
Council lor s r e c o g n i s i n g  the capacity of the Hawkers'
As so cia tion and its m e m b e r s h i p  to influence their pol i t i c a l  
fortunes, and being convinced to some extent of the essential 
merit of the hawkers' case, competed with each other as the 
'true' spokesmen for the best interests of the petty traders.
Even before the Municipal Council was abolished in 1961, 
there were spokesmen for hawkers in the Selangor State 
Legis lat ive A s s embly and the Federal Parliament. This is not 
to imply that the mani p u l a t i v e  skills of the Hawkers' A s s o c i a t i o n  
were so great or that its other resources were so extensive 
as to facilitate ha ving such contacts at state and national
251.
levels of government. What is probably closer to the truth
is that at least seven State constituencies and four Federal
constituencies fall substantially within the limits of the
K.L. Municipal area and representatives from these areas,
Opposition and Government alike, recognise the hawkers as a
political force. Put simply, the hawker issue has for a long
time been considered a sensitive political problem and has been
so approached.^ This is perhaps best illustrated, as far as
State and Federal representatives are concerned, in the handling
of hawkers several months before the 1964 elections when the
police agreed, on instructions from the Ministry, to suspend
2action against hawkers until the elections were over. Only 
after the completion of the elections was there a resumption 
of arrests and prosecutions.
In 1965 the Hawkers' Association was partly responsible 
for the appointment of a special committee of the Selangor 
branch of the Alliance to inquire into problems confronting 
hawkers. The committee published a lengthy report incorpor-
3ating both findings and proposals for dealing with the problem.
The Report had a catalytic effect on the establishment of 
the Hawkers' Control Force which had been mooted three years 
earlier, and also on the allocation of funds for the two 
hawkers' emporia. This may not have been what the hawkers had 
bargained for, but it was what they got from the efforts of the 
Alliance on their behalf.
The rejection of most of the recommendations of the 
Selangor Alliance Hawkers' Committee left the most crucial
1. For example see loose minute in (33) in KLM. 699
(Part IV), July 8, 1961: 'The Minister is very
interested in the hawker problems and he attaches 
indeed some importance to their being tactfully 
handled so that matters will not become a political 
issue. '
2. 'Record of Decisions with Chief Police Officer, 
Selangor on 18.2.64,' in (39A) in KLM. 699 (Part V).
3. The Report is a mimeographed document dated 1.8.65.
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problems facing petty traders fundamentally unresolved, and
the Association continued to press its case with vigour.
The Alliance, notably the MCA, was now firmly on side and in
Tan Toh Hong,'*' the Federal MP for Bukit Bintang, the K.L.
Hawkers and Petty Traders' Association had a powerful ally
and articulate spokesman who pursued the demands of the hawkers
2with skill in the Federal Parliament, with the Minister of
Local Government and Housing and within the councils of both
the MCA and the Alliance. Loong Foong Beng, Selangor State
Legislative Assemblyman for BukitNanas was also an official of
the Pudu Branch of the Hawkers' Association, and he held a
watching brief on their behalf, occasionally speaking out for
them. It was in response to representations from these people
that the Minister directed that a Federal Capital Hawkers'
Committee be formed 'to look into the hawker problem in the
Federal Capital and to find a satisfactory solution to this
3difficult problem'. The best index of the importance accorded 
the issue is the lineup of Committee members and those invited 
to give evidence. When two Senators, top officials of the 
Municipal bureaucracy, a high ranking representative of the 
Traffic Police and other well known citizens of K.L. are appoint­
ed to a Committee to deal with a local issue, it is a fair 
indication of its importance. When those invited to appear 
before such a committee include a member of Parliament, two 
State Legislative Assemblymen, two Political Secretaries, (one 
of them the Personal Secretary to the Prime Minister) and 
several official representatives of a pressure group and a 
political party, there can be no question at all of either the 
importance of the matter under discussion or of its urgency.
Not only had the Hawkers' Association succeeded in getting its
1. Also Chairman of the Selangor Alliance Hawkers'
Committee.
2. See for example his speech made in the Federal Parliament
on February 4, 1968.
3. Federal Capital Hawkers Committee Minutes, February
2 , 1967 (Confidential) .
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case heard at such high levels but it was also successful, 
at least on this occasion, in getting approval for an 
initial six new sites for night trading. Furthermore, it 
established the right to be consulted on matters affecting 
the interests of hawkers as they might arise in the future.
Sources which might have yielded other information on 
hawkers were not tapped. For example, it was not possible 
to interview officials of the Hawkers' Association or any of 
its members. Several informants who were being interviewed 
on other subjects dwelt at length on the alleged relationship 
between hawkers and gangsters and Chinese secret societies, 
with frequent references to petty corruption in the form of an 
extensive system of payoffs to members of the police force and 
certain sections of the inspectoral staff of the Municipal 
Health Department. These were merely unsubstantiated alleg­
ations which were not investigated further because of the 
specifically limited interests in the subject.
The primary concern here has been to take the only
example of interest-group activity over a long period and to
describe its various modes of operation: as reaction to
official policy, as attempts to modify such policy and as the
vehicle for making and channeling demands for governmental
action.^ In the late 1940s the very right of an individual to
earn a living as a petty trader in K.L. was seriously in
question, but by the early 1960s we find the Commissioner of the
Federal Capital saying: 'It is accepted that the Hawker is an
essential part of the economy of Malaya and that even if it
were desirable it would be impossible entirely to banish hawkers
2from the street. ' Part of the credit for this change in
1. Another group known as the Persatuan Perj aya2 Ibu Kota 
which has been particularly active under the leadership 
of Tengku Muhyideen after the May 1969 riots is not 
included in this discussion.
2. 'Memorandum Submitted by the Commissioner of the Federal
Capital to the Commissioner of the Royal Malayan Police 
on the Subject of the Hawker Control Force,' (21A) in
PKL. 699 (Part V), April 1963.
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off ic ia l policy, which had been tacitly accepted long before 
this p a r t i c u l a r  pronouncement, must go to the Hawkers'
Ass oc ia ti on. Progress on the pro v i s i o n  of additional 
tr ad in g areas within the city over the last ten years, an issue 
w h i c h  the Asso c i a t i o n  has c o n s i stently argued for, has not 
been sp ec tacular despite the fact that two hawkers' emporia 
have been built and extra sites for night trading have been 
esta bli she d. The A s sociatio n's demands for the issuance of 
more licences had no appreciable effect between 1958 and 1964 
when no new licences were issued;^ between 1964 and 1966, h o w ­
ever, the number of licensed hawkers increased from 1,862 to 
3,015, no doubt as a consequence of the re presentations
co n t a i n e d  in the report of the Selangor Alliance Hawkers'
2Committee. The A s s o c iation has, of course, always claimed to 
re pr es en t both licensed and u n l i censed hawkers and has p e r ­
sis te nt ly  argued that all those w i s hing to earn a living in 
this way should be licensed. Part of the reason for resistance  
to this p a r t i c u l a r  demand on the part of the M u n i c i p a l i t y  has 
been that they have been under pressure from shopkeepers and 
m a r k e t  stall holders who have cons tantly complained that 
'petty traders have an unfair advantage over traders in
3p e r m a n e n t  buildings in that their general costs are much lower'. 
Aside from these material considerations, in the long run the 
Hawkers' A s s o c i a t i o n ' s  most important gain has been its 
inc or p o r a t i o n  into the policy ma king pr ocess where it can 
react i mm ediately to p r o posed courses of action likely to 
affect its m e m b e r s h i p  and where it can make its claims; such 
access to the center of power is, after all, what most interest 
groups strive for. This is an important index of the a c h i e v e ­
me n t  of the Hawkers' Asso c i a t i o n  in the difficult and 
p e r il ou s business of group pressure politics in Malaysia; it is 
a reflection, too, of the political sophi s t i c a t i o n  of the Federal
1. (79) in K L M . 699, (Part V), 1965.
2. (4 2 A ) in PKL. 699 (Part VI), May 24, 1966.
3. Ibid.
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Capital Commission in facing the hawker problem squarely by 
opening up channels of communication with the representatives 
of an important section of the urban citizenry and by providing 
a forum for the discussion and resolution of conflict.
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CHAPTER VII 
RENT CONTROL
For many people living in K.L. rent control is an import­
ant form of protective social service legislation. The original 
purpose of both the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1948 and the 
Control of Rent Ordinance 1956 was to protect tenants from being 
charged excessive rents at a time when the availability of 
houses for rent was far exceeded by demand. Rent control 
legislation, though applicable to the whole of the Federation 
of Malaya, had its greatest impact in Kuala Lumpur, which 
had the greatest shortage of housing and the largest number of 
rent controlled premises. In 1961, in the Central Area alone, 
there were 901 business premises covering an area of 1,852,650 
square feet still under rent control, and in the rest of the 
Municipal area there were about 18,000 controlled domestic 
premises, including some 10,000 unauthorised buildings and 2,534 
business premises. ^  An estimate made by the Municipal Valuer 
in 1961 indicated that about 150,000 people living in K.L. 
were protected by rent control legislation.1 2 3
In June 1961, Leong Hoe Yeng, a member of the Advisory
Board of the Federal Capital Commission proposed an amendment
to the Control of Rent Ordinance 1956, the establishment of a
Tenancy Tribunal 'with the object of hearing appeals from
landlords applying for their property to be exempted from the
3Rent Control Ordinance'. This seemingly innocuous proposal 
set in motion a series of complex events which were to drag on 
over a five-year period at the end of which the 1956 Control of 
Rent Ordinance was repealed and new legislation enacted in its
1. (68) in KLM 2~CT2 / 61 ; Sunday Times , June 7, 1964.
2. (68) in KLM 202/61. See also 'Report of the Committee 
Appointed to Investigate Into the Possible Adverse 
Effects Resulting from the Sudden Abolition of Rent 
Control in the States of Malays,'1966, (unpublished),
p . 10 .
3. KLM. 202/61.
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place.
It is not surprising that the proposal to amend the Rent
Control Act was introduced by a representative of landlords,
Leong Hoe Yeng, then a member of the Executive Committee of
the Selangor Property Owners' and Ratepayers' Association,^
and later, from 1964 to 1967, its President. Mr Leong's proposed
amendment was inspired by provisions in the Hong Kong
legislation which incorporated procedures designed to accelerate
acquisition and demolition of rent-controlled properties requir-
2ed for rebuilding. The adoption of the Hong Kong legislation 
would allow a landlord to apply to a tribunal to evict tenants 
upon payment of fair and reasonable compensation because of 
impending plans to develop his property; the question of 
providing alternative accommodation would not be the responsi­
bility of the landlord.
When the subject was first raised, then, the elimination
of rent control was not being sought; what Mr. Leong was
arguing was that as the Rent Control Act stood, there were no
adequate provisions for recovering of rent-contro11ed properties
required by their owners for redevelopment. As a logical
extension he further argued that general redevelopment in
3the city was thus being held up.
York, who was Federal Capital Commissioner at the time,
1. Henceforth referred to as SPORA. While it has a 
relatively small membership of around 65, these members 
are the major land owners in Kuala Lumpur, particularly 
of Central Area properties. The name of the 
Association is somewhat misleading since it generally 
does not pursue matters which would be of interest
to ratepayers, e.g., increases in rates. This is 
understandable in that most of the members' property 
is rented out, and the rates are actually included in 
the rents. The Rent Control Ordinance allows 
increases in rates to be passed on to the tenants, 
even in the case of rent controlled premises.
2. Advisory Board Minutes, June 26, 1961.
3. As will be explained later, Mr Leong was not entirely 
correct in this view.
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pointed out that rent control was a complex matter and urged
caution in proceeding with it. His views prevailed, and despite
Mr. Leong's efforts to keep the issue alive at the July,
August, October and November 1961 meetings of the Advisory
Board, it was not until the end of January 1962 that these
efforts bore fruit. At the January 30 meeting of the Board
it was decided that the question of incorporating sections of
the Hong Kong legislation into the Rent Control Ordinance be
referred to the Consultative Committee of Municipal Corporations
(CCMC) and that after its comments had been received, further
steps should be taken towards actually amending the Rent
Control Act. In keeping with this decision the matter was
raised at the March, June and September meetings of the
Consultative Committee.'*' In September the representatives
from Ipoh, Malacca and Penang finally expressed the view that
the proposed legislation was not necessary as far as their
municipalities were concerned, and as it seemed to be a purely
local problem peculiar to Kuala Lumpur, they would be prepared
2to support it if it helped Kuala Lumpur's case.
In November 1962 the Ministry was asked to consider a
proposal by the Commissioner that he and a member of the
Advisory Board should visit Hong Kong to study the effect of
the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance and its amendments on
rent-controlled premises and obtain any other information that
would be relevant to the consideration of the proposed 
3legislation. Authority for the proposed visit was granted in
December and the Commissioner and the Municipal Secretary left
4on a week-long visit to Hong Kong on January 12, 1963.
1. The CCMC meets once every three months.
2. CCMC Minutes, March 19, June 25 and September 24,
1962 .
3. Federal Capital Commissioner to Secretary, Ministry of
the Interior, (26) in KLM 202/61, November 10, 1962.
4. (29) in KLM 202/61, December 26, 1962; South China Morning
Post, January 14, 1963.
I
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Upon their return the Commissioner and the Municipal 
Secretary submitted a report of their visit in which they 
strongly recommended that a tribunal should be appointed to 
deal with all applications for the recovery of rent-controlled 
properties in the Federal Capital required by their owners for 
redevelopment and that the Rent Control Ordinance be amended 
accordingly."*’ This recommendation differed in no way from the 
decision which had been made by the Advisory Board in January, 
1962 and was based on the same substantially false premise on 
which Leong Hoe Yeng had argued his case; namely, 'that 
development projects in the Federal Capital especially in the 
Central Area were being held up because of the inability of 
owners (who wish to redevelop their existing buildings) 
reaching agreement with their tenants on terms of compensation 
to be paid and other conditions for the recovery of possession 
of their properties'.^
At its meeting on May 30, 1963, the Board discussed the
1. 'Visit of the Commissioner of the Federal Capital to
Hong Kong, (cyclostyled),' Apri1 3, 1963, pp.10-11.
2. Ibid., p.l. The legal advisers to the Municipality, 
writing a year later, said by way of comment on this 
point, 'In paragraph 3 of your Report you have referred 
to development being held up in the Central Area of 
the Federal Capital by the difficulty of recovering 
possession of premises. In our considered view, formed 
from our accumulated experience in actual practice, 
overall development is held up by at least 2 other 
major factors, neither of which will be resolved by 
amendments to the Control of Rent Ordinance. First, 
investigation has shown that a large number of lots
of land adjoining each other in the Central Area is 
held by different owners, some of whom are hindered in 
any redevelopment by the terms of various trusts, and 
none of whom appear in the context of present day 
circumstances to have the combined resources both 
of finance and energy, necessary to carry through 
substantial redevelopment. Secondly, the continued 
absence of a comprehensive Master Plan for the Federal 
Capital, coupled with piecemeal town planning like the 
current proposals in regard to plot ratio and plinth 
control can only result in conditions which discourage 
comprehensive redevelopment.' (Shook Lin & Bok to 
Pesuroh Jaya, Ibu Kota, YPH/8318/PJIK. in (56) in 
KLM. 202/61, May 5, 1964.)
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report on the Hong Kong visit and merely noted that there was 
merit in the suggestion that an independent tribunal should be 
established.  ^ For a full year no further action was taken 
although discussions were held between the Commissioner and the 
representatives of SPORA. It appears that the association had 
now begun to change its position by arguing for complete repeal 
of the rent-control legislation rather than a mere amendment to 
it .
After the April 1964 Federal and State elections but
before the establishment of the new Ministry of Local
Government and Housing, the Minister of Home Affairs prodded
the Advisory Board into acting on the problem which had been
pending for a full year since the Commissioner's report on his
2Hong Kong visit had been discussed. At its meeting on May
28, the Board resorted to a favourite ploy; a sab-committee of
three was appointed 'to examine the entire question of the
application of rent control in the Federal Capital in its widest
context, including considerations relating to the development
of the Federal Capital and to make recommendations as to:
(a) whether rent control should be discontinued and, if so, to
what extent; and (b) the proper measures for the imp lernen tation
3of recommendations including suitable legislation.' The 
questions to be considered covered far wider ground than the 
originally proposed changes.
Before the sub-committee could meet, however, the 
Federal Cabinet decided on June 10 that the enforcement of rent 
control be discontinued with immediate effect from July 1,
1964, in all States of Malaya including the Federal
1. Advisory Board Minutes, May 30, 1963.
2. (61) in KLM 202/61, May 18, 1964. The Minister had
acted as a result of press criticism which had in 
effect suggested that the Board was vacillating on the 
question of establishing a rent control tribunal;
see editorial, Straits Times, May 18, 1964.
3. Advisory Board Minutes, May 28, 1964.
__
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Capital. This surprise decision was obviously made at the 
instigation of the newly appointed Minister of Local Government 
and Housing, Khaw Kai-Boh, without prior consultation with the 
Federal Capital Commissioner.
Faced with such a dramatic turn of events the Advisory 
Board met in a specially convened session to discuss the 
implications of the Cabinet decision and by way of a reply 
adopted the following resolution:
That the Advisory Board is of the opinion that 
it does not at the moment possess sufficient 
facts and data to form a reasoned opinion of 
the Cabinet's recommendation that rent control 
should cease in the Federal Capital. The 
Advisory Board is of the opinion that the 
Committee which was set up at the last meeting 
should first complete its deliberations.
Meeting fourteen days later at its regularly scheduled monthly 
meeting, the Board made yet another change in its stance, this 
time incorporating its decision in the form of the following 
resolution:
In the light of government's decision to discontinue 
the provision of the Control of Rent Ordinance in 
the Federal Capital by 30.9.65, the sub-committee 
should now proceed to examine the status and 
position of Kuala Lumpur with a view to making 
recommendations to government as to what 
alternative legislative measures were necessary 
to protect the interests of both landlords and 
tenants.
For the moment anyway, the Advisory Board had capitulated 
to Federal Government pressure to accept as a fait accompli the 
complete abolition of rent control, as opposed to a mere 
amendment to the Rent Control Ordinance which had been its 
original intention. The resolution adopted at its June 30
1. Secretary, Ministry Local Government and Housing to
Commissioner, Federal Capital (Confidential), LG 132A/Pt. 
11/121, June 11, 1964.
2. Advisory Board Minutes, June 16, 1964 .
3. Advisory Bo ar d Minute s , June 30 , 1964 .
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meeting, however, constituted a last ditch effort to salvage 
some minimum legislative provision which would cushion the 
harsh effects of precipitately withdrawing the entire Ordinance. 
With this in mind, the Commissioner discussed the question on 
July 7 with Khaw Kai-Boh, under whose Ministry the Federal 
Capital now came. Learning of the Advisory Board appointed 
sub-committee for the first time, the Minister proposed that 
the membership of the sub-committee be broadened and that its 
terms of reference should be widened to include other urban 
areas in the States of Malaya.^
This amounted to a strategic withdrawal from the harsh 
position taken by the Cabinet only a month before and would 
require further Cabinet action to ratify the Minister's 
new proposal before the enlarged committee could proceed with 
its new terms of reference.
The decision reached at the July 7 meeting was confirmed
2by the Cabinet. The question raised by Leong Hoe Yeng three 
years earlier as a matter concerning the Federal Capital 
Commission had now become a national issue. A three-man 
sub-committee of the Advisory Board had grown into a nine-man 
committee appointed by Cabinet to look into a matter which the 
Federal Capital Commission had already spent three years 
investigating.
Although the Minister had somewhat unrealistically 
requested that the committee should submit its report by the 
end of August 1964, a matter of some six weeks, it was nearly 
two years before the report was finally submitted. The
1. Minute dated July 7, 1964; see PKL 2 389 (Pt. Ill) .
Those attending this meeting included the Secretary 
and Deputy Secretary to the Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing; the Commissioner of Local 
Government; the Commissioner of Town and Country 
Planning; the Treasury Valuation Officer and the 
Municipal Valuer.
2. Mr. Leong had ceased to be a member of the Advisory 
Board at the end of March 1962, but was now President 
of the SPORA.
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committee met on eighteen occasions over a fifteen-month period 
between August 7, 1964 and November 9, 1965 and submitted its
report early in 1966. The principle of rent control was 
retained and provision made for procedures to be followed in 
cases involving eviction of tenants occupying premises 
required for development. The final outcome, then, was a 
compromise which represented far less than the SPORA had hoped 
for; in fact, one officer of the association described the rent 
control battle as one that it had lost.
There is no doubt that when Leong Hoe Yeng first raised 
the question of amending the Rent Control Ordinance he was 
acting as a spokesman for the SPORA. After Mr Leong's term 
of office as a member of the Board expired at the end of 
March 1962, the Association kept in close touch with the issue, 
both before the appointment of the Cabinet committee and 
afterwards. It is interesting, however,that it neither 
submitted a memorandum to the committee nor sent a represent­
ative to appear before it to give oral evidence.
It is significant that the Association itself made no 
representations until the Commissioner and the Municipal 
Secretary had returned from Hong Kong and had submitted their 
report. Whereas the original proposal had merely been to provide 
for a Hong Kong type Tribunal to consider the eviction of tenants 
occupying premises which owners wished to respossess for 
redevelopment, a matter which the Commissioner's report 
recommended strongly, the Association indicated a broadening 
of its demands when it met the Commissioner on May 7, 1963
when it raised the following points:
1) that the annual standard rent of any controlled 
property should be raised to the equivalent of the annual value 
placed on the property by the Rating Authority;
2) that special attention should be given to the question 
of premises which although controlled are substantially sub­
let at figures considerably above the standard rent;
3) that in any recommendations on the subject of a Rent
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Control Tribunal it would be desirable to write in provisions 
to ensure that costs of appeal were kept at an absolute minimum 
and reference was made to the present rules of the High Court 
relating to taxation of costs in rent control areas.
Encouraged by the enthusiastic response of the Commissioner 
to the Hong Kong Tribunal idea, the SPORA had decided to cast 
its net wider by pressing for these additional claims, with the 
ultimate aim of abolishing rent control altogether. The delay 
in action after the Hong Kong visit can be explained in part 
by the fact that the Commissioner was reluctant to proceed 
without the full agreement of the SPORA which had now enlarged 
its goals. The Commissioner admitted as much to the Municipality's 
legal advisers: 'On the whole, the proposal to establish a
Tribunal seems to have considerable support although some 
quarters expressed misgivings. The Selangor Ratepayers'
Association met me and expressed certain reservations. I have, 
however, been waiting for their views in writing but to date 
have not received them.'^
The SPORA did not write to the Commissioner until June 12,
a week after the first sub-committee of three had been appointed,
and then only to request that the sub-committee receive a
2delegation to hear its views. By this time the Federal Cabinet 
had decided to discontinue rent control altogether, although 
this decision was not publicly announced. In the somewhat 
confused period which followed, the Association addressed 
reminders to the Municipality on July 4, September 17 and 
September 24 in a vain effort to be received by the committee 
of three, only to be told in a letter from the Municipal 
Secretary dated October 5 that the sub-committee had been replaced 
early in July by the enlarged committee of nine. It appears 
that the SPORA did not know of the Cabinet decision of June 10 
to eliminate rent control altogether and quite surprisingly
that i t did not press its case further by making representations
1 . (56) in KLM 202/61 , December 12, 1963.
2 . (49) in KLM 2 389 , June 12, 1964.
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to the nine-man committee. Perhaps the Association felt that 
the newspapers were doing such a good job that any further 
effort on its part would have been redundant. Or the Assoc­
iation may have decided that it would have been pointless to 
pursue the matter once jurisdiction over it had passed into 
the hands of the Federal Government. Whatever its reasons for 
apparently dropping out of the action after the appointment of 
the nine-man sub-committee, the fact remains that the SPORA, 
having first raised the issue, suddenly decided to withdraw 
when it might reasonably have been expected to most vigorously 
press its case. In the ensuing period it was the two English 
language daily newspapers which argued the case for the abolition 
of rent control.
Although the Malaysian Government maintains effective 
control over the Press through its annual newspaper licensing 
law which has no doubt curtailed criticism of the government 
to a considerable extent, it is very sensitive to whatever 
press criticism does occur. This is particularly true in the 
case of the Kuala Lumpur municipal bureaucracy which has been 
quick to respond to newspaper comment on the management 
of the affairs of the city. Since the takover of the Munici­
pality by the Federal government in 1961, there has been no 
other discrete local issue with which the two English language 
daily newspapers, The Malay Mail and The Straits Times, have 
been so conspicuously involved as the rent control controversy.
Almost immediately after the Commissioner and Municipal 
Secretary returned from their visit to Hong Kong the Straits 
Times suggested in an editorial that the tribunal system was 
worth trying.'*' In August 1963 an editorial on the subject 
emphasised restraint by saying that 'in this particular case, 
it may be wiser to proceed cautiously... Tenant eviction is an 
exceptionally sensitive question and to adopt radically new 
measures without far wider discussion than Tuan Haji Ismail's 
recommendations have so far received may invite unnecessary
1 . Straits Times (editorial), January 23, 1963.
266 .
trouble. It was only after obvious vacillation on the part
of the Federal Capital Commission that this conciliatory tone 
was dropped and a more militant posture adopted.
In May 1964, when the Federal Capital Commission still 
had not settled the matter the Straits Times referred to the 
difficulty of evicting tenants from rent-controlled buildings 
wanted for redevelopment as a great handicap to Kuala Lumpur's 
development. It was this editorial which prompted the Minister 
of Home Affairs, at that time still responsible for the Federal 
Capital, to direct the Commissioner to take final action within 
three months. On May 21, the Straits Times published a lengthy 
editorial which is worth quoting at some length:
The Alliance Government has promised to devote greater 
attention and resources to meeting the needs of 
Malaysian town dwellers...The needs of the towns 
are endless, the obstacles in the way of improvements 
many and diverse. One problem, however, is common 
to all programmes for urban renewal and growth.
This is the problem of land shortage...
The problem has two parts. First, there is the 
need to remove illegal occupants, or squatters, 
from strategically sited State lands...The 
considerations which stay summary eviction are 
humanitarian and political...
More challenging is the problem of freeing for 
development private land which is wastefully, but 
legally occupied...It finds its focus in the Rent 
Control Ordinance. Designed to provide tenants with 
security of tenure at a stable rent, this law works 
against development by forbidding landlords to 
repossess their properties unless they first provide 
acceptable alternative accommodation for the tenants...
In consequence, valuable mid-town sites in many 
Malaysian cities are occupied by tumbledown shophouses
1. 'Tenant Tribunal,' Straits Times, August 10, 1963.
See also 'Tenancy Tribunal for a New Deal,' Straits 
Times, August 8, 1963.
2. Straits Times (editorial), May 18, 1964. See also
'Getting out the Tenants,' Malay Mail, May 18, 1964.
3. (61) in KLM 202/61, May 18, 1964. The Straits Times
editorial was specifically referred to in the 
letter.
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and shacks when they should be given over to large 
modern buildings which would make more intensive and 
productive use of the space. A review of the Rent 
Control Ordinance has been frequently mooted, but has 
yet to be undertaken. It will have to be do^e if the 
urban renewal is to be attempted in earnest.
After the appointment of the nine-man committee, the 
Straits Times echoed the same sentiments expressed in May:
Such a demonstration of high level concern must give 
rise to hopes that this will be the last full year 
in which the Ordinance operates in its present, 
unsatisfactory form; and it is also to be hoped 
that the committee's work turns out to be a constructive 
first step towards urban rebuilding throughout 
Malaya...Most important is the fact that rent control 
is hindering the development of perhaps all Malayan 
towns by preventing many landlords from repossessing 
their property unless tenants are provided with 
'acceptable' alternative accommodation; in Kuala 
Lumpur at least this has given rise to th| process 
known as holding the developer to ransom.
This editorial once again emphasised the importance of
giving special consideration to the tenant and proceeded to make
an important distinction in distinguishing assistance due to
3developers as opposed to aiding and abetting speculators.
As the sub-committee proceeded with its public hearings and 
vigorous organised demands for the retention of rent control 
began to be launched in Kuala Lumpur and other areas, the 
Straits Times editorialised:
Calls for retention, without amendment, of the 
Rent Control Ordinance, are being made through 
guilds, associations and Chambers of Commerce 
in many parts of Malaya. The reaction is natural 
and must have been expected by the government...
Clearly, however, there are limits to the weight that 
can be given to pleas by those benefitting from 
the Ordinance. When petitioners press only their
1. 'Renewing the Towns,' (editorial), Straits Times, May 21, 
1964. Note the same fallacious argument linking abolition 
of rent control with development.
2. 'Rent Control,' Straits Times, August 22, 1964.
3 . Ibid.
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own interests, and completely ignore the broader 
issues, their views must count for even less.
At the height of the campaign in April 1965, the Straits 
Times and the Malay Mail gave extensive coverage to the various 
groups which expressed views contrary to their own, and the 
former steadfastly maintained its original position that the 
genuine developer must be allowed to develop his property in his 
own interests and those of the community at large; tenants' 
rights must be given all reasonable protection but the more 
pernicious aspects of the 1956 Ordinance must be repealed.
The language of caution in which its early pronouncements were 
made was now replaced by a more aggressive tone as the campaign 
developed, with the Straits Times particularly finding itself 
in the awkward position of fighting a rearguard action against 
the defenders of the status quo, Chinese Chambers of Commerce, 
guilds and associations and individual tenants, whose role in 
the controversy must now be examined.
Except for the part played by the SPORA prior to 
and slightly after the appointment of the Cabinet's committee, 
there were no other groups involved in the early stages of 
action. The problem, although unresolved at the time of the 
April 1964 elections, was not a campaign issue raised either 
by Alliance or opposition candidates contesting the several 
State and Federal constituencies within Kuala Lumpur. It 
was only after the committee's appointment that other groups 
became involved and then only several months after its public 
hearings had commenced.
The committee specifically sought representations from
State Governments, Town Councils and Municipalities with a
population exceeding 50,000, and of the 26 replies received, the
2majority favored the continuation of rent control. Memoranda 
were also received from the Penang Chamber of Commerce, the
1. 'Rent Control,' Straits Times , March 24, 1965.
2. Report of the Committee..., 1966, p.5.
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Nattukkotai Chettiars Chamber of Commerce (Penang and 
Province Wellesly) , Lembaga Wakaf 0rang2 Islam dan Hindu (Penang) 
and the Bar Council, States of Malaya. In other urban 
centres Chinese guilds and associations convened meetings and 
passed resolutions favoring the retention of rent control.^
In Kuala Lumpur the guilds, clan associations, clubs, the
Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, and the Associated Chinese
Chambers of Commerce became involved in the controversy,
supporting the retention of the Control of Rent Ordinance.
At the 18th Annual Meeting of the Associated Chinese Chambers
of Commerce, a resolution was adopted strongly urging the
retention of rent control on the grounds that the housing situ-
2ation in the country was still serious. The most lengthy
petition carrying over 200 signatures representing various
guilds, associations, shopkeepers and other interested parties,
was sent to the State Secretary, Selangor and the Commissioner
of the Federal Capital under cover of a letter from the
Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, signed by its President, the
Honourable Senator Dato' Y.T. Lee, former elected Municipal
Councillor and a leading member of the Malayan Chinese 
3Association. The meeting at which this resolution had been 
adopted had been preceded by several weeks of smaller meetings 
of individual groups, many of which were reported in the Chinese 
press. By the time the mass meeting under the banner of the 
Chinese Assembly Hall had been held, it was clear that opinion 
was running heavily against precipitate repeal of the Ordinance. 
As the guilds and associations comprise both landlords and
1. See for example: 'Government is urged to extend rent
ordinance to protect tenants,' Malay Mai1 , March 17, 1965;
'Rent Act Repeal will lead to severe hardships,' Straits 
Time s , March 23, 1965.
2. 'Chambers Want Rent Control to Stay,' Malay Mai1 , March 23, 
1965; 'Carry On Rent Control Appeal,' Sunday Mail, March 21, 
1965 .
3. (55) in PKL 2389 (Pt. IV), April 20, 1965. See also
'Keep the rent law for five more years,' Straits Times,
April 26, 1965.
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tenants, it is interesting how the landlords' case favoring 
repeal of the Ordinance was put to the meeting but voted down 
and how the covering letter accompanying the petition based 
its case on two essential points:
(1) Confrontation has brought with it a chain of 
factors adverse to business generally... These factors 
have already affected the large community of business­
men who are tenants of rent controlled premises and 
who are invariably 'small timers' depending on a small 
and delicate margin of profit. Any changes in the 
Ordinance will only upset the livelihood of many for 
the benefit and privilege cf a few;
(2) The repeal of, or significantamendments to, 
the Ordinance will undoubtedly lead to endless 
disputes and costly litigation between landlords
and tenants concerned. Such a situation will disrupt 
business as a whole and will aggravate the adverse 
factor brought about by confrontation.
There can be little doubt that the committee was impressed 
with the very substantial reaction in Kuala Lumpur and else­
where from the section of the community most likely to be 
affected by the abolition of rent control. When to this 
factor is added the substantial weight of official opinion 
expre s sed by the Town Councils and Municipalities also taking 
very much the same position, the impact of this collective 
view must certainly have counted for much with the committee 
and no doubt accounts for the retention of the fundamental 
provisions of the Ordinance.
Some of the tactics and the objects of group pressure 
politics have been examined here and highlighted. It has 
already been emphasised that few groups operate in the system 
and that the very few that do play what is largely a reactive 
role; i.e., they respond to proposed government action perceiv­
ed by them as threatening their interests. The guilds and
2associations represent this type of group. The SPORA is a
1. (55) in PKL 2389 (Pt. IV), April 20, 1965.
2. It has been suggested that these groups play a significant 
role in getting out the vote at elections, but there is no 
empirical evidence to support this.
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mixed type of group, involved in both reacting to government 
action impinging on its interests as in the case of the 1967 
Draft Town Plan, and in initiating action to advance or protect 
its interests as in this instance.
The setting of the rent control controversy after the 
appointment of the Cabinet committee constituted a situation 
that invited interest group action, particularly on the part 
of those most likely to be adversely affected by the government's 
proposals. If the question of rent control had been less 
publicly discussed, the chances of there being large-scale 
reaction prior to the final decision being made would have been 
much smaller. Under these circumstances reaction from groups 
affected would have come at the implementation stage, particul­
arly if the rent control provision had been wholly repealed.
The timing, extent and intensity of interest group participa­
tion often depends on a combination of circumstances, not the 
least of which are the perceived effects of the course of action 
being proposed, the numbers likely to be affected and the extent 
to which the proposed course of action is publicly known.
Inquiry by a government-appointed committee heightens specific 
and general public awareness of impending government action 
and generally evokes greater response than might ordinarily be 
the case. To a limited extent these factors explain the re­
action of groups in Kuala Lumpur not ordinarily politically 
active or interested in urban affairs generally, but capable 
of making a great deal of potentially effective political 
noise when their interests are likely to be affected.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to describe the role of the 
various actors (individual and group, governmental and non­
governmental) involved in making decisions concerning the 
authoritative distribution of goods and services within an 
urban area. Changes in the principal institution of local 
government have also been examined in detail.
The different issues chosen for examination were selected 
with an eye to covering as wide and as representative an area 
of decision-making as possible. The narrative incorporates 
some detail which is important not for its own sake but because 
it has helped to clarify the role of the plethora of actors 
involved in a diversity of situations in different historical 
periods and against different institutional backgrounds.
Careful consideration has been given to what Mackenzie calls 
'the element of political time, the span over which the game 
is played' . Though the study is firmly anchored in the 
bureaucracy it does not ignore the larger political environment 
of which it is inextricably a part.
The principal institution of local government has been 
examined over a long time span. The detail is justified only 
because it brings out the role of various actors at different 
points in time. The British colonial bureaucracy, for example, 
is clearly seen as painfully cautious, almost unbending 
in its commitment to petty legalisms. The first independent 
government which replaced British colonial authority is 
unambiguously portrayed as being primarily motivated by 
political expediency rather than by considerations of expanding 
and developing a participatory form of local government. This 
sheds some light on the attitudes of the party in power to 
opposition, a subject which is crucial to any discussion of 
parliamentary democracy and a matter of great importance in
1. W.J.M. Mackenzie, Politics and Social Science (Middlesex, 
1967) , p . 243.
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p r e s e n t  day Mal a y s i a n  politics.
Not all of the data pr ovided in the p r e c eding sections can 
be co nv e n i e n t l y  and neatly analysed wi thin the framework 
p r o vi de d by the three axes specified in the introduction. The 
reader is remin d e d  that analytical statements are made at the 
end of, or within, some of the sections in the main body of the 
study. These sub-conclusions, if they can be so labelled, 
should p r o p e r l y  be considered su p p l e m e n t a r y  to those wh ich 
f o l l o w .
The system of executive power; inter- and i n t r a - b u r e a u c r a t i c  
politi cs
Several students of non-western political systems have
stressed the p redominance of the b u r e a u c r a c y  in the p o l itical
process. Riggs, for example, has observed that in t ransitional
societies i n t e r - b u r e a u c r a t i c  conflict may become the main form
of p o l i t i c s . ’*’ Dealing more s pecifically with Malaysia, James
C. Scott has emphasised the long standing importance of the
bu re au cr ac y in the political process and the extent of support
2for an a d ministrative state. Both o b s e r vations are borne out 
by this s t u d y .
Urban po litics has been largely a d m i n i strative politics. 
The major issues of politics in Kuala Lumpur over the last 
fifty years (institutional change, town planning, urban 
renewal, urban transportation, valuation policy, squatter 
policy, housing, local government legislation) have all 
involved i n t e r - b u r e a u c r a c t i c  conflict.
Before the e s tablishment of the Federal Capital Commission  
many of the important decisions affecting the city de pended on 
the outcome of conflict between the local bureaucracy and that 
of the State; even before the formal takeover of the K.L.
1. Joseph La Palombara, Bure aucracy and Political Deve l o p m e n t
(Princeton, 1963), pp.16, 120.
2. James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (Singapore, 
1968) , e s p . p p .118-149 .
2 74.
M u n i c i p a l i t y  by the Federal Government the role pl ayed by the 
State b u r e a u c r a c y  began to diminish and the Federal b u r e a ucracy 
(mainly th rough what is now the Ministry of Local G overnment  
and Ho us in g and secondarily through the r e p r e s entatives of the 
Federal b u r e a u c r a c y  who constitute the majority on the Advisory  
Board) has now taken its place.
The nature and extent of the conflict between the local 
b u r e a u c r a c y  and b u reaucratic agencies at State and Federal 
levels can be unde rstood if the model of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  s u g g e s t ­
ed by Agg er and his colleagues is used. They have c o n c e p t u a l ­
ised d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  as consisting of the following six stages 
and one event:
1. p o licy formulation
2. poli c y  deliberation
3. o r g a n i s a t i o n  of p o l i tical support
4. authoritative c onsideration
EVENT: decisional outcome
5. p r o m u l g a t i o n  of deci sional outcome
6. p o licy effectuation
If this model is applied to the major issue areas of K.L. 
politi cs what is clear is the truncated nature of the inter- 
b u r e a uc ra tic p o l i tical process. Deve l o p m e n t  planning proposals 
have rarely got beyond the policy d e l i b eration stage. Before 
World War II all except two of the many proposals concerned 
with pl an ning fell through at the policy deli b e r a t i o n  stage. 
York's p e r s i s t e n t  attempts to win State and Federal government 
support for a whole range of pl a n n i n g  proposals all broke down 
at the same point. The 1967 Draft Town Plan, the result of 
nearly five years' labour, was set aside at the policy d e l i b e r ­
ation stage. Very much the same situation applies to urban 
tra nsp ort ation, valuation policy, housing, local government 
legis lation and squatter policy - all issues which the local 
b u r e au cr ac y has raised but which it has failed to get 
beyond the po licy d e l i beration stage.
The reasons for termination of any d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  process
1 . Agger, e t a l . , o p . c 1 1 . , p p . 40-51.
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at the policy deliberation stage are many but Agger and his 
colleagues offer one which is both relevant and compelling:
A decision-making process may be arrested at this 
point [policy deliberation] because those who 
started it believe that organisation in behalf of 
their demands would provoke counter organisation 
and defeat; or they may fear severe illegitimate 
sanctions if they were to organise. Demands of 
this sort may be suppressed or repressed as a result 
of correct or incorrect estimates of others' policy 
preferences, or of accurate or unwarranted fears that 
opponents will apply severe illegitimate sanctions if 
they push their demands.
The local bureaucracy has always been restrained in important
areas of policy by these factors. It has itself lacked the
2political resources necessary to win support for its demands 
and clearly recognised the sanctions and resources controlled 
by State and Federal level bureaucrats.
Most local administrators have accepted this situation 
as a fact of political life. This is as true of the Chairmen 
of the Sanitary Board as it is of today's Federal Capital 
Commissioner. The breakdown of decision-making at the policy 
deliberation stage is highlighted by the activities of two 
local bureaucrats, Green and York, who, though separated by 
more than a third of a century, failed to get local demands 
accepted for identical reasons.
These explanations are not at variance with Scott's 
observations of bureaucratic behaviour in Malaysia even though
3he is not specifically discussing inter-bureaucratic politics. 
He stresses the general low risk taking propensity of Malaysian 
bureaucrats but does not discuss, as Froman does for example,
1 . I b i d . , p .4 2.
2. See for example Wilma Krause, 'The Concept of Political
Resources in Political Science', Unpublished Paper, Depart­
ment of Political Science, University of Hawaii, 1966 ;
L.A. Froman, People and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 
1962), p .51.
3 . Scott, o p . c i t ., (1968), p p . 138-144.
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the key factor of political resources in political decision­
making.1 Termination of the decision-making process at the 
policy deliberation stage reflects both the political weakness 
of the local bureaucracy and its low risk taking characteristic. 
It also reflects an important behavioural pattern - conflict 
avoidance.
Some impressionistic statements can be made about the 
system of executive power within local government institutions. 
In the Sanitary Board system, the Chairman was both head of the 
Board and chief bureaucrat. He had to co-ordinate the work of 
his department heads and see to it that the little administrat­
ive machine of which he was a large part was run efficiently. 
This meant that it was his responsibility to resolve conflict 
between his departmental subordinates and act as conciliator 
in matters involving alleged or real transgressions of policy 
territoriality. It was his role to preside over discussions 
concerning the determination of the local bureaucracy's 
priorities. He was also charged with the responsibility of 
keeping in touch, both officially and unofficially, with higher 
level bureaucrats.
If as Chairman of the Board and titular head of the 
bureaucracy he can be described as a powerful figure within the 
local bureaucracy, within the larger Federated Malay States 
and State of Selangor administrative apparatus he was clearly 
a subordinate officer. His immediate superior was the British 
Resident whose clearance on many matters had to be obtained 
before he could proceed.
As Chairman of the Board it was his responsibility to 
work closely with his unofficial advisers, particularly when 
they constituted a majority of the Board's membership. He 
was expected to know his local community well and to recognise 
and keep in touch with its prominent citizens, particularly
1. Froman, o p . c i t ., p p . 49-58.
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those whose interests might be affected by any action taken by 
the local authority. Before any important decisions were made 
it was usually part of the Chairman's task to sound out those 
in the local community who might be affected and to assess the 
likelihood of the acceptance of such matters as were under 
consideration.
Immediately below the Chairman were his department heads 
of whom the Secretary was probably always his closest and most 
trusted colleague. The tendency for each department head to 
guard his 'policy turf' was always strong. What each department 
felt should constitute policy for those matters within its 
province was usually decided by the head of department in 
consultation with his immediate subordinates and sometimes, with 
other heads of department. The determination of priorities 
was generally a matter for inter-departmental wrangling. The 
power of a head of department to get his own way was probably 
dependent upon such factors as his relationship with the 
Chairman and with State and Federal bureaucrats, all of whom 
were important potential sources of support.
The system of executive power within the Municipal Council 
did not differ in any marked way from that of the Sanitary Board. 
A more precise image of the system of executive power is 
available in the case of the Federal Capital Commission and 
this emerges from the interviews and other data on which that 
chapter is based. The department heads can be arranged 
hierarchically with one clearly more powerful than the others, 
a fact recognised by them all and even conceded by the Federal 
Capital Commissioner. Where each department head falls in 
relation to the others is largely determined by his personal 
relationship with the Commissioner and the Minister of Local 
Government and Housing which is in turn determined by such other 
factors as length of service, reputation for efficiency, 
professional qualifications and his own propensity to assume 
the role of a leader.
Department heads are keenly aware of the political
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limitations under which they labour. They recognise that the 
Commissioner is himself a seconded officer of the Federal 
government, appointed to this potentially powerful position 
not for his independence of thought and action but because he 
knows where he fits into the system. They also realise that 
the Advisory Board is dominated by representatives of the Federal 
bureaucracy and that those who constitute the unofficial 
membership of the Board are not about to rock the boat. Faced 
with such a situation, department heads tend to tread warily, 
seeking more to avoid than to engage in conflict.
In terms of those who participate in the making of 
decisions in substantive areas such as planning and squatter 
policy, the Federal Capital Commission is not very different 
from the Sanitary Board. For fifty years the bureaucrats who 
ran the Sanitary Board were clearly subordinate to the 
bureaucrats who controlled the State government. The bureau­
crats who are now in charge of the administration of the 
Federal Capital Commission and their titular head, the Federal 
Capital Commissioner, are in very much the same position in 
their relationship with Federal civil servants. Local bureau­
crats have a free hand in certain routine areas of policy.
In other areas the heavy hand of Federal restraint and pressure 
is a fact of life with which most of the men who hold key 
positions in the Municipality have chosen to live.
The bureaucracy and the urban community
Despite the fact that decisions have principally been 
made by the bureaucracy there have always been forces within 
the urban community which have had an important, if indirect, 
effect on the issues which get 'organised into politics' and 
those which get 'organised o u t ' .^
Charles Reade clearly recognised the importance of land,
1. These terms are borrowed from E.E. Schattschneider , The 
Semi-sovereign people (New York, 1960) , p p . 62-77.
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mining, rubber and legal interests in colonial politics. The 
business community, in colonial times, was represented at all 
levels of government - in the Federal Council, the State govern­
ment, on the various Sanitary Boards and on the many advisory 
committees which were established by the British. In matters 
of local administration as in many other areas, the colonial 
bureaucracy at all levels was always anxious to avoid confront­
ation with the business community as it was felt that order 
and good government rested in large part in keeping it on side.
The influence of the business community in Kuala Lumpur's 
affairs has not waned. After the war its representatives were 
allocated seats on the Municipal Commission, and when elections 
were held for the Municipal Council the majority party's 
successful candidates were drawn largely from the ranks of 
landowning, mining and other business interests. The un­
official representatives on the Advisory Board of the Federal 
Capital Commission have been drawn almost exclusively from this 
group. The Alliance, like the British colonial government which 
it replaced, has clearly recognised the resources and sanctions 
which the business community controls and the importance of 
working in close co-operation with it.
When the term business community is used here it includes 
such organised groups as the various Chambers of Commerce 
which have long existed in Malaysia and more specialised groups 
such as the Selangor Property Owners' and Ratepayers' 
Association. Perhaps more importantly, the term also includes 
individual 'big men' in the business community whose views have 
always counted for much with the bureaucracy and with whom 
fairly close contacts have always been maintained.
The operation of a 'law of anticipated reaction'1 has 
rarely made it necessary for the business community to actually 
make demands on the system. The fact that State and Federal 
bureaucrats, and to a lesser extent, local bureaucrats, have
1. C.J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Politics
(New York, 1937).
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always recognised the resources and sanctions controlled by the 
business community has always been enough to determine the range 
and kinds of issues which have been 'organised into politics'. 
One student of community power has described how such a 
process works:
A mayor, in his attempt to find rational solutions
to various problems connected with an urban
redevelopment project, may exclude a whole range of
alternatives because he takes the existing socioeconomic
structure as something "given". This act of excluding
a whole range of alternatives need not be the result of
political pressures, or of a telephone call from
the "downtown magnates"; indeed, it need
not even be a conscious act. That is, he may do
this as a matter of course, as something which
is part of the "rules of the game". But can we
deny that in this case the downtown magnates
have exercised a significant degree of power in
the decision-making process merely by existing,
and certainly by being protected by the "consensus"
or the "rules of the game"? To ignore this "silent"
and "unseen" aspect of power (that is, the s trueture
of power) is to obscure our perception of political
reality, for every political system rests on a
specific "mobilization of bias" (embodied in
dominant values, political myths, rituals and
institutions) which, while allowing some issues
to be "organised into politics", "organises out"
other issues and problems.
Those issues which decision-makers in the bureaucracy (at 
either State, Federal or local level) have 'organised into 
politics' have been determined very much by anticipated 
reaction from the business community and this process has been 
very much as described above.
In more recent times a very small number of association- 
al interest groups has emerged. Associations representing 
architects and engineers have been organised but their role 
has been reactive and limited largely to the town planning 
process. The role of the Hawkers' Association has been spelt 
out in detail and requires no further elaboration here. The
1. Shin'ya O n o , "The limits of Bourgeois Pluralism', in
Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, Apolitical Politics 
(New York, 1964) , pp.99-123 at pp.108-109.
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rent control case study illustrates the role that n e w s papers 
and r e l a ti vely obscure groups such as Chinese guilds and a s s o c ­
i a t i o n s ,  small businessmen and others can play when their 
sub st ant ive interests are t h r e atened by p r o posed gove r n m e n t  
a c t i o n .
The universe of active groups is small. Except for the 
Hawkers' Association, the few groups which have recently  
emerged, play what is essentially a reactive role - they 
o c c a s i o n a l l y  respond to pr oposed courses of g overnmental action 
and are rarely involved in arti c u l a t i n g  their own demands. 
Perhaps s u r p r isingly neither the trade unions nor o ccasional 
groups of demonstrators, such as Myron Weiner describes in his 
Politics of S c a r c i t y , are active in Kuala Lumpur local 
p o l i t i c s .
Squatters, a large section of the urban community, have 
been the object of official po licy especially since the end of 
World War II. Once the security aspect had more or less been 
brou ght  under control, squatters were accorded the status of a 
'social p r o b l e m ' , solutions to which were to be found in r e ­
housing and re-l ocation programmes. Most of these p r o g rammes 
have either failed or simply not got off the ground.
Squ atters have never really organised themselves into a 
poli tic al action group. There was, for a very brief p e r i o d  in 
the 1950s, an o rganisation known as the Wooden House Dwellers' 
As so ci ati on which claimed to repr esent some squatters who were 
being t h r e atened with eviction, but it seems to have d i s ­
appeared once this part i c u l a r  p r o b l e m  was settled. Most 
squatters have simply wanted to be left alone. As long as 
of fi ci al do m adopted a hands off policy, the squatter p o p u l a t i o n  
has been quite content.
It has been argued by some observers that official policy  
towards squatters has been circumspect because they could 
affect the outcome of elections. There is some docu m e n t a r y 
evidence to support the view that the Alliance has always seen 
to it that imme diately pre c e d i n g  elections, squatter eviction
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programs are halted. Political party intervention, based on 
this perception of squatter effectiveness at the polls, has 
certainly been a factor in both withholding from the local 
bureaucracy the power to effect wholesale evictions and staying 
the execution of specific attempts at squatter clearance.
The 'law of anticipated reaction' can be seen to be at work here 
too .
Despite the fact that this is a system in which there are 
very few interest groups which operate at the level of city 
government either in their own right or as the adjunct of 
political parties, it is not a system which is closed to 
interest group participation in the political process. On 
some issues like planning groups could play a very effective 
role in making demands on the planning agency. Such activity 
would probably be welcomed and used by some bureaucrats as 
support for courses of action which under present circumstances 
have little chance of even being heard. But for local bureau­
crats to successfully exploit such actual or potential sources 
of support in the community they have to learn that theirs is 
not only an instrumental role. The development of political 
techniques is probably as important as efficient administrative 
practices.
The structure of power within the urban polticial system 
is more elitist than pluralist and this has changed little 
over time.
Elites have been of three kinds - economic, political and 
administrative. Economic elites are those which actually own 
property and are directly or indirectly engaged in land specula­
tion and/or property development. Political elites are those 
who hold formal positions of leadership in political parties and/ 
or interest groups. Economic and political elites are often 
the same people. There is a large measure of overlap between 
elites reputed to be powerful, those who are actually represented 
on government appointed bodies which serve administrative
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agencies in an advisory capacity and which legitimise decisions 
made by the bureaucracy, and those which hold formal positions 
of leadership in economic and political organisations. 
Administrative elites are those which hold the more important 
positions in local, State and Federal bureaucracies.
Economic and political elites are rarely engaged actively 
in making demands on the urban political system. The fact 
that these elites exist and that they are associated with certain 
discernible interests, has always been sufficient to determine 
the kinds of issues which get 'organised into politics'.
The most active form of behaviour on the part of economic 
and political elites is to veto proposals which they consider 
attempt to restrict the scope of their activities or which 
constitute intrusions, actual or perceived, on their interests. 
Proposed expansions in the scope of government (in such areas 
as planning, valuation and new local government legislation, 
for example) are vigorously resisted.
The economic/political elite is not an organised con­
spiracy of the rich but is, nonetheless, a loosely knit high 
consensus group with common interests to protect and advance.
Most of the implementation stage pressure which takes the 
form of bribery and to which reference has been made in the 
section on development control, is confined to members of the 
economic/political elite. The target of implementation stage 
pressure, in so far as planning is concerned, used to be the 
Town Planning section of the local bureaucracy but this has 
now shifted to the Ministry of Local Gvoernment and Housing.
The few groups which are active in the urban political 
system confine themselves to certain compartmentalised spheres 
of activity - architects' and engineers' associations 
(planning); Hawkers' and Petty Traders' Association (street 
trading); the Selangor Property Owners' and Ratepayers' 
Association (planning, valuation and rent control). These 
groups do not meddle in issue areas in which they do not have
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an immediate pecuniary interest.
The general population is largely unaware of what goes 
on in local politics which in recent years has received 
scant attention from the Press. There is little contact 
between those who are charged with the responsibility of 
governing the city and those who are governed.
No discussion of Malaysian politics is complete without 
some reference to race. I share the view expressed by those 
students of Malaysian politics who have argued that race is 
an important factor in the electoral process. I would go 
further and say that much more empirical research will need 
to be done before we are able to say how precisely race is 
important in the electoral process in Malaysia and in other 
'plural societies' . But given the importance of race in the 
electoral process what can be said about the importance of 
race in the decision-making process at the local level in a 
large urban area like Kuala Lumpur?
No systematic attempt was made to determine the importance 
of race in the decision-making process but some impressionistic 
statements can be made. The racial origin of decision­
making elites in the local bureaucracy is not an important 
factor in determining decisional outcomes. In 1968, for example, 
a large majority of the top positions in the Municipal bureau­
cracy was held by Chinese, but this fact in and of itself 
cannot be said to be an important factor in determining the 
kinds of decisions which were likely to be made. In short, 
despite the fact that Chinese bureaucrats in the Municipality 
'have the numbers' they do not use their numerical superiority 
to make 'pro-Chinese decisions'. If decisions favouring any 
particular group are made they are more likely to be pro­
landlord, pro-hawker or pro-developer, who might coincidentially 
happen to be members of a particular race. In the Federal 
Capital Commission, for example, bureaucrats of all three major 
races work closely together, except for one non-Chinese
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department head who distrusted all of his colleagues and felt 
that the Chinese were taking the Municipality over. These 
observations should not be interpreted to mean that the 
Municipality was free from latent racial antagonisms and pre­
judices which existed in the community at large.
Race does creep into the decision-making process in rather 
an interesting way. Administrative elites are very much aware 
that theirs is a multi-racial country and that Kuala Lumpur is 
a predominantly Chinese city. This fact is never lost on them. 
Increasing rates, for example, which might have a disproportion­
ate effect on Malays living in the city is a matter to be 
avoided, particularly by Chinese bureaucrats who might be 
blamed by those wishing to stir racial passions on the 
grounds that such a course of action has been racial in origin 
and intent. Administrative elites are fully aware of the multi­
racial character of their clientele and the need to avoid 
making decisions (conflict avoidance again) which might 
unduly antagonise certain ethnic groups or sections of them.
It is recognised that race is a very important factor to the 
man on the street. Such a perception of reality makes race 
an inescapable factor which decision-makers must take into 
account.
It is difficult to say how important Scott's 'constant-pie 
orientation'"^ is in local politics, but replicating his study 
at the local level could provide important information on the 
dynamics of the constant-pie orientation and how race enters 
into the calculus of decision-making. It would not be surprising 
if constant-pie thinking has increased since the riots of May 
1969 particularly in the light of recent government directives 
aimed at re-arranging the distribution of resources so that 
Malays have a greater share of what there is to go around.
The bureaucracy and the development of legislative institutions
The long discussions over municipalising the Sanitary
1. Scott, o p . cit., 1968, pp.118-149.
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Board did not embrace only questions of legal and fiscal 
autonomy. Municipalisation meant that the composition of 
the Board would be changed and also implied that its relation­
ship to the bureaucracy would be altered so as to change the 
function of the Board from merely being advisory to having 
legislative powers of its own, thus laying the groundwork for 
the legal supremacy of the legislative branch over the executive.
It is difficult to say whether this last point was so 
perceived by those in the colonial bureaucracy who handled 
the problem from time to time, but there is certainly more 
than a hint that the unofficial protagonists of municipalisation 
saw the problem, to some extent at least, in these terms.
Throughout its life the Sanitary Board was dominated by 
its own bureaucracy and, via constitutional and other provisions, 
by that of the State and F.M.S. bureaucracies.
What is significant is that, even with the establishment 
of the Municipal Council in 1952, the old supremacy of the 
bureaucracy remained intact.
Riggs has observed that the separation of politics and 
administration, by which he means the emergence of legislative 
supremacy over the bureaucracy, is one of the most difficult 
transformations to achieve in transitional polities and one 
of the most important for political development and for 
democracy.’*’ Bureaucrats, he argues, tend not to usurp but to 
refuse to relinquish the political role they have long played, 
and newly formed parties which come to dominate legislatures 
are weak and tend to 'become nothing more than an official 
seal to legitimate the will of the bureaucratic elite;... 
a "legislative drafting service" which helps put the finishing 
touches on "laws" originating within the bureaucracy
1. Fred W. Riggs, 'Bureaucrats and Political Development:
A Paradoxical View', in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.) Bure aucracy 
and Political Development (Princeton, 1963) , p p . 120-167;
Fred W. Riggs, o p . cit ., (1964), esp. p p . 206-237.
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itself'.
It was not as if the Municipal bureaucracy refused to 
relinquish its political role after the establishment of the 
Municipal Council; it was never asked to do so. The UMNO-MCA 
coalition (later, the Alliance) was what Riggs describes as an 
official party. He says:
Official "parties" are based on elite support and 
direction. They are not effective instruments for 
the recruitment of elites. Far from providing 
imperatives to guide the bureaucracy, they serve 
as transmission belts to popularise or legitimate 
policies favored by the bureaucratic elites.
Such "parties", in short, are constitutionally 
incapable of adopting any rules which impose irksome 
controls over bureaucratic behavior. They do only 
what their bureaucratic masters wish - which 
can scarcely be to impose a yoke upon their own 
necks.
These circumstances facilitated, more by default than by 
design, the bureaucracy continuing to run the show. This 
situation obtained for the whole period during which the 
Municipal Council was in existence.
The replacement of the Municipal Council by the Federal 
Capital Commission in 1961 underlined the fact that things 
had come full circle - the Advisory Board was a return to the 
principles on which the Sanitary Board had been established.
True, under the Federal Capital Act a Federal Minister was 
given broad supervisory powers over the administration of the 
Municipality. This might be interpreted as one man legislative 
control over the Federal Capital Commissioner, the Municipal 
bureaucracy and the wholly appointed Advisory Board. Thus 
what appears to be a return to the principles on which the 
Sanitary Board was based would actually be something quite 
different: the establishment, for the first time, of legis­
lative supremacy over the bureaucracy, even though this legis­
lative control was to be exercised by one man responsible to the 
Federal Parliament. The most generous interpretation of
1. Riggs, o_]D . ci t . , (1964), p.232.
2 • Ibid. , p .22 8 .
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the Federal Capital Act cannot sustain this argument. The 
main thrust of this legislation was intended to keep the 
Municipality firmly under the control of the Alliance, with 
the day to day operations being left to the Federal Capital 
Commissioner, his department heads and an Advisory Board 
dominated by appointees representing the Federal Civil Service. 
The action of the Minister in the last five years (a matter 
about which many informants complained bitterly) has not been 
in the nature of legislative supervision but Ministerial 
intervention, in response to pressures from Alliance supporters 
for patronage which they expect in return for financial and 
other support to the party.
The separation of politics and administration in K.L. 
has thus never been realised. It has been, as Riggs has so 
persuasively argued, a most difficult transformation to 
achieve. Another of Riggs' views is confirmed by what has been 
said above: that there is 'an inverse ratio between administra­
tive output and bureaucratic power - the more powerful 
officials become, the less effective they are as administrators. 
Hence the irony of many measures to strengthen public admini­
stration. ..indirectly...undermine public administration by 
blocking political development'.'*' It is certainly political 
development which has been retarded in Kuala Lumpur.
Promise and performance - an evaluation
All of the various institutions of local government which 
have served Kuala Lumpur have successfully provided a range 
of urban services. In colonial times garbage was regularly 
collected, night soil removed, malaria eradication programs 
launched, public health hazards kept under control and other day 
to day chores handled with competence. Public facilities, 
such as water and electricity (neither of which has ever been 
the responsibility of the local authority) have generally been 
of a high standard.
The colonial bureaucracy had a good record in revenue
1 . Ibid., p.227.
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col lection, in the keeping of internal records and the p u b l i c a t i o n  
of annual and other reports. The B r i tish recruited and retained 
an ef f i c i e n t  clerical service even at this level. The technical 
exp er ti se  available was generally competent by the standards 
of the day but almost always in short supply. The British 
coloni al ad m i n i s t r a t i o n  never went b e yond pro v i d i n g  care and 
m a i n t e n a n c e  services. Its greatest and most costly failure 
was in town planning.
Since World War II little p r o gress has been made in 
d e v e l o p m e n t  planning; sorely needed new legislation has failed 
to be enacted; d eadlocked n eg otations wit h  the State g overnment  
on the e x t en sion of the Muni cipal b o u n d a r y  have failed to be 
broken; S t a t e / M u n i c i p a l  co-o peration in plann i n g  matters is 
almost no n- existent; city traffic p r o blems have increased; 
en vi r o n m e n t a l  and other pollution cannot now be ignored and the 
local b u r e a u c r a c y  has been beset by serious divisions which 
have af fec ted both morale and e f f i c i e n c y .^
The ho using p r ogram has been p o orly p l a n n e d  and a c o n ­
sid erable number of unit rentals are simply too high for 
genu in el y low income earners. The fact that nearly o n e - third 
of K.L.'s popu l a t i o n  is still comprised of squatters provides 
a mea sure of the failure of the housing program. In capital 
expe nd it ur e p r o g r a m  areas such as sewerage, roads, drainage and 
urban renewal much has yet to be accomplished. No solutions 
are in sight to the staggering problems of urban sprawl and 
ga llo pin g ribbon development.
The elimination of elections in 1959 was a fatal blow to 
na sc ent  d em ocractic home rule. The return to a fully 
ap poi nte d system of local gove r n m e n t  has meant an almost total 
loss of contact between government and the urban populace.
There has been no appreciable net gain in gove r n m e n t a l  p e r f o rmance
1. This has been clearly r e c o gnised in a report issued by the 
Dev el opment Admin i s t r a t i o n  Unit after fieldwork for this 
proj ect  was completed - see 'Report on the Kuala Lumpur 
Mun ici pality, Vol. 1, Report on O r g a n i z a t i o n  and Management', 
(Confidential) , c y c l ostyled (July, 1970) .
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since the establishment of the Federal Capital Commission, 
and even if there were, this could not compensate for the 
loss of periodic accountability which would have been ensured 
under an elected system of local government.
Some recent accomplishments must, however, be noted.
A spectacular staff housing scheme at Gombak (5^ miles from the 
Municipal offices) has been financed by a $M5 million loan. 
Capital expenditure from loans totalling $M42 million have been 
spent in the last ten years on roads, sewerage and other 
projects. The low-cost housing program over the past ten years 
has been financed from loans totalling nearly $M37^ million. 
Improvements have been made to fire services and public health 
facilities; in the latter, revenue expenditure has increased 
from $M 1.1 million in 1955 to $M7 million in 1968. Total 
revenue expenditure has increased from nearly $M3 million in 
1948 to $ M2 2.2 million in 1968.
The urban problems which remain unresolved and which seem 
to be continually growing stem to a considerable extent from 
what is a universal phenomenon, urbanisation. Were this simply 
a case of more and more people moving from the country side 
to the city it would, in and of itself, constitute a problem 
of quite serious proportions. But when there is a racial 
element added to this shift of population, the resulting 
situation becomes more complex. In West Malaysia, this is a 
nationwide problem. In absolute numbers more and more Malays 
are coming into what are largely Chinese urban areas. Kuala 
Lumpur exemplifies this more than any of the other West Coast 
towns. Not only is there a problem of local government providing 
additional services but there is the more serious question of 
the availability of jobs, a matter which is only very marginally 
within the competence of the local authority to solve. Growing 
numbers of young Malays, Chinese and Indians in Kuala Lumpur 
cannot find work. Tensions will build up in any society 
where too many people chase too few jobs. In K.L. what is 
essentially an economic problem is perceived in racial terms;
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many Malays feel that members of their ethnic group are 
unemployed because employment opportunities are controlled by 
Chinese, the Indians feel that they are squeezed out of jobs 
by the other two races and Chinese who are unemployed attribute 
their problems to a Malay national government which looks after 
its own. Essentially economic problems are thus misperceived 
in racial terms. Urbanisation has facilitated what appears to 
be contact across racial lines but this is only superficial.
In the urban milieu there is increasing competition for scarce 
resources and this has bred discontentment, frustration, 
suspicion and a dangerous undercurrent of racial tension which 
lurks not too far below the surface. The chances of racial 
conflict, organised or spontaneous, are thus maximised. K.L. 
has become not only a focal point where Malaysia's three major 
races meet, it is also a highly charged environment where they 
compete and where, in May 1969, they killed each other. That 
could happen again and this time not only in the Federal 
Capital. What Malaysia faces is not the crisis of one city 
but a general urban crisis, the legacy of a do-nothing colonial 
regime and a post-independence government which has concentrated 
on rural development and scarcely recognised its crisis of the 
towns and cities and the new villages which surround them.
A case study such as this constitutes a 'data bank' from 
which an inventory of testable hypotheses can be derived and 
used in other similar studies and in comparative political 
research. In short, an important justification for a descriptive 
project is that it lays the groundwork for the development of 
theory and for methodological refinement.
Not unlike an increasingly large number of cities in 
North America, Europe and Australia, many of the larger urban 
areas in South and South-east Asia, Africa and South America 
already face problems of serious proportions. The tasks and 
challenges of research in the cities of both the 'developed' 
and 'under-developed' areas of the world are many. The study
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of the politics of developing countries stands to be considerably 
advanced if urban politics becomes a focus for disciplined, 
rigorous social scientific investigation set within a rich 
context of both political history and empirical theory.
While those engaged in studying urban politics in developing 
countries will have to develop their own techniques and learn 
how best to use, collect and interpret documentary and survey 
research data they are fortunate in that the theoretical and 
substantive contributions of such scholars as Agger and his 
colleagues, Dahl, Hunter, Banfield and Wilson, and Altshuler 
provide important guidelines for their work. The results of 
such research have important implications not only for the 
academic study of politics and comparative politics but also 
for those engaged in the equally, if not more important, task 
of policy planning. This study is a small, preliminary 
contribution towards these ends. The payoffs lie in a better 
understanding of urban politics (urban areas being 'micro' 
areas of research) and in the development of a theory, not so 
much of urban politics but of politics.
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APPENDIX A
ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR KUALA LUMPUR
In Table I are listed data on motor vehicle registrations 
(Selangor State) and electricity consumption for the Kuala 
Lumpur District, excluding use for mining.
TABLE 1
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION (EXCLUDING MINING)
FOR K.L. DISTRICT AND TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERS AND 
MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATIONS FOR SELANGOR STATE *
Year Million KWH Vehicles Telephone s
1960 164.4 53,651 16,253
1961 169.8 63,490 17,492
1962 188.5 74,692 19,863
1963 218.5 86,838 21,891
1964 245.6 100,941 24,531
1965 280.3 115,690 27,130
1966 314.4 131,142 28,334
1967 348.9 147,067 30,283
* Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya vehicle registrations
would be about 70 per cent of these totals while 
K.L. and P.J. would have 85-90 per cent of the 
telephone subscribers.
Land values in Kuala Lumpur Municipality are approximately 
as listed in Table 2.
TABLE 2
APPROXIMATE LAND VALUES IN KUALA LUMPUR MUNICIPALITY
Bungalow lots in inner s uburbs M $ 3 5 per sq. ft.
Bungalow lots in outer suburbs M $ 2 4 per sq. f t .
Terrace house lots M $ 1 0 - 15 per sq. ft.
Source: D.R. Stanley and J.W. Milliman, Report of Short-Term
WHO Mission to Review Sewerage Planning for the 
Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan Area (Confidential & 
Restricted) , 1968.
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Table 2 - c o n t 'd
Shop lots in city centre 
Shop lots near city centre 
Shop lots in inner suburbs 
Shop lots in outer suburbs 
U n d e v e l o p e d  land
A p p r o x i m a t e  rental values f 
are shown in Table 3.
M$80 - 100 per sq. ft. 
M$60 - 80 per sq. ft. 
M$50 - 70 per sq. ft. 
M$15 - 30 per sq. ft. 
M$20,000 - 35,000 per acre
p roperties in Kuala Lumpur
TABLE 3
A P P R OX IM AT E A N NUAL MARKET RENTAL VALUE IN KUALA LU MPUR 
(all on main roads with commercial buildings)
(M  $ )
Fringes on Inner
Town Centre Town Centre Suburbs
(sewered) (partly sewered) (un s ewe r e d )
P r e- wa r 2-4 storey 
bu ildings
groun d floor f ron t 0.50 -
groun d floor rear 0.20 -
first floor 0.20 -
second floor 0 . 15 -
third floor 0.20
Modern 2-4 storey 
bu ildings
ground floor front 0.60 -
groun d floor rear 0.25 -
first floor 0.25 -
s e cond floor 0.20 -
third floor 0.20 -
M u l t i ­ s torey buildings
ground floor front 0.60 -
ground floor rear 0 . 30 -
mez za ni ne  floor 0 . 30 -
first floor 0.20 -
second to fourth floors 0.25 -
fifth floor and over 0.30 _
1.00 0.40 - 0.50 0.25 - 0.35
0.40 0.15 - 0.20 0.14 - 0.15
0.30 
0.25
0.15 - 0.20 0.14 - 0.15
1 . 10 0.50 - 0.60 0.30 - 0.50
0.45 0.18 - 0.25 0.14 - 0.20
0 . 35 0.18 - 0.25 0.14 - 0.20
0 . 30 0.16 - 0.20 0.13 - 0.20
0.25 0.15 - 0.20 0.12 - 0.20
1.60 
0.40
0.90 
0.40
- 1.00 
- 0.45 0 . 1 8 -
0.42 
0 . 19
0.55 
0 . 55 0 . 30 - 0.35 0.18 -
0 . 19 
0.19
0.45 0 . 30 - 0.35 0.16 - 0.17
0.40 0 . 30 - 0.35 0.16 - 0.17
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APPENDIX B
POPULATION GROWTH OF STATE AND SELECTED URBAN AREAS
IN THE MALAY PENINSULA: 1921, 1931, 1947 AND 1957
CENSUS YEAR INTER-CENSUS PERCENTAGE INCREASE
1921 1931 1947 1957 1921-31 1931-47 1947-57
PENANG STATE - Total 292,485 340,259 446,321 572,100 16.3 31.2 28.2
397.8 sq.mis.- Chinese 45.37. 49.87. 55.47. 57.27. 27.9 45.9 32.3
George Town Total 123,069 149,408 189,068 234,903 21.4 26.5 24.2
9.4 sq.mis.- Chinese 67.17. 67.87. 73.97. 72.97. 22.6 36.2 24.2
Butterworth Total 4,100 13,540 21,255 42,504 230.2 57.0 100.0
1.92aq.mils.-■Chinese 36.67. 43.87. 46.37. 51.17. 295.4 66.0 120.7
Bukit Mertajam- Total 3,873 5,254 12,345 24,663 35.7 135.0 99.8
I.08sq.mis.- Chinese 69.17. 59.47. 69.87. 77.17. 108.3 176.0 120.7
Ayer Itam Total 1,173 2,268 13,478 22,369 93.4 494.3 66.0
1.46sq.mls.- Chinese 60.07. 65.57. 83.57. 82.77. 101.1 657.5 64.4
MALACCA STATE - Total 153,522 186,711 239,356 291,211 21.5 28.2 21.7
640 sq.mis. Chinese 29.87. 34.97. 40.2 * 41.57. 42.4 47.5 25.6
Malacca Town Total 30,671 38,042 54,507 69,848 24.0 43.3 28.1
4.22sq.mis.- Chinese 67.77. 69.77. 74.77. 76.17. 27.7 53.7 30.4
PERAK STATE Total 610,905 785,581 953,938 1,221,446 28.6 21.4 28.0
7,980 sq.mis. - Chinese 37.27. 42.37. 46.67. 44.27. 46.2 33.7 21.3
Ipoh Total 36,860 53,183 80,894 125,770 44.3 52.1 55.5
11.80sq.mis.- Chinese 66.37. 64.47. 70.17. 67.07. 40.1 65.7 48.6
Taiping Total 21,111 30,070 41,361 48,206 42.4 37.5 16.5
5.68sq.mls.- Chinese 57.87. 58.17. 61.87. 58.97. 43.5 46.1 11.1
Telok Anson Total 10,859 14,671 23,055 37,042 35.1 57.1 60.7
1.9 sq.mis.- Chinese 54.07. 53.87, 60.67. 62.97. 34.8 76.8 66.9
Kampar Total 12,325 15,302 17,499 24,602 24.2 14.4 40.6
1.6 sq.mis.- Chinese 85.07. 83.47. 84.47. 83.57. 21.8 15.7 39.1
Sungel Slput Total 2,512 3,215 5,967 15,337 28.0 85.6 157.0
0.47sq.mls.- Chinese 79.07. 80.77. 81.47. 72.77. 30.7 87.2 129.7
Kuala Kangsar - Total 3,369 6,030 8,350 15,302 79.0 38.5 83.3
0.94sq.mis.- Chinese 40.97. 45.17. 46.47. 49.97. 97.2 42.5 97.2
Batu Gajah ■ Total 5,093 6,759 7,480 10,143 32.7 10.7 35.6
l.68sq.mis.-• Chinese 46.37. 48.87. 44.97. 44.77. 39.9 1.9 44.2
SELANGOR STATE - Total 401,009 533,197 710,788 1,012,929 32.9 33.3 42.5
3,166.5 sq.mis. - Chinese 42.67. 45.37. 51.07. 48.27. 41.4 50.3 34.7
Kuala Lumpur Total 80,424 111,418 175,961 316,230 38.5 57.9 79.7
18.Osq.mis.- Chinese 60.47. 61.07. 63.57. 61.97. 39.8 64.4 75.5
Klang ■ Total 11,655 20,913 33,506 75,649 79.4 60.2 125.8
2.67sq.mis.- Chinese 53.17. 48.27. 60.87. 60.87. 61.5 102.3 125.5
NEGRI SEMBILAN-■ Total 178,762 233,799 267,668 364,524 30.8 14.5 36.2
2,565 sq.mis. -Chinese 36.57. 39.57. 42.77. 41.2 7. 41.7 23.9 31.2
Seremban • Total 17,272 21,453 35,274 52,091 24.2 64.4 47.7
3.54 sq.mis.-■ Chinese 70.17. 66.17. 69.17. 66.17. 17.1 71.9 41.2
Kuala Pllah ■ Total 3,024 3,999 7,305 12,024 32.2 82.7 64.6
0.11 sq.mis.-■ Chinese 59.47. 65.07. 62.77. 63.57. 44.7 127.0 29.4
PAHANG STATE -■ Total 146,064 180,111 250,178 313,058 23.3 38.9 25.1
13,873sq.mls.-■ Chinese 23.37. 29.07. 38.97. 34.6 7. 53.3 86.1 11.2
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Kuantan • Total 2,462 5,482 8,084 23,034 122.7 47.5 184.9
2.3 sq.mis. - Chinese 55.87. 52.17. 56.77. 51.17. 107.8 60.5 177.3
Bentong - Total 4,143 4,068 7,087 18,845 -1.8 74.2 165.9
2.1 sq.mis. - Chinese 84.37. 80.97. 83.27. 83.27. -5.8 79.4 165.9
Raub - Tota 1 1,413 2,195 3,616 15,363 55.3 64.7 324.9
0.4 sq.mls. - Chinese 62.87. 54.87. 61.07. 74.27. 35.5 83.4 416.8
Temerloh-Mentakab-Total - 3,168 5,169 12,296 - 63.2 137.9
3.3 sq.mis. - Chinese - 58.17. 57.07. 59.37. - 60.1 147.2
J0H0RE STATE - Total 282,234 505,311 738,251 926,850 79.0 46.1 25.5
7,330sq.mis. - Chinese 34.67. 41.47. 48.17. 42.47. 121.1 65.0 10.7
Johore Baru - Total 15,312 21,463 38,826 74,909 40.2 80.9 92.9
5.0 sq.mis. - Chinese 44.17. 41.57. 41.17. 44.67. 31.9 79.2 108.8
Batu Pahat - Total 6,392 13,329 26,506 39,294 108.5 98.9 48.2
5.5 sq.mls. - Chine8e 62.67. 60.77. 66.67. 62.27. 102.4 118.2 49.6
Muar - Total 13,327 20,338 32,228 39,046 52.6 58.5 21.2
4.69 sq.mis. - Chinese 49.07. 52.47. 59.17. 63.57. 63.1 78.8 30.0
Kluang - Total 1,441 6,473 15,954 31,181 349.2 146.5 95.4
4.0 sq.mis. - Chinese 81.27. 81.37. 74.17. 62.97. 350.0 124.6 65.8
Segamat - Total 1,320 4,332 7,289 18,445 228.2 68.3 153.1
1.0 sq.mls. - Chinese 66.47. 65.87. 65.47. 67.07. 224.9 67.4 159.1
KEDAH STATE - Total 338,558 429,691 554,441 701,964 26.9 29.0 26.6
3,660sq.mis. - Chinese 17.57. 18.27. 20.97. 20.57. 32.0 47.8 24.3
Alor Star - Total 11,596 18,568 32,424 52,915 60.1 74.6 63.2
2.82 sq.mls. - Chinese 47.47. 41.77. 47.97. 48.47. 40.9 100.7 64.7
Sungei Patani - Total 4,578 7,703 13,175 22,916 68.3 71.0 73.9
2.56 sq.mls. - Chinese 54.37. 53.77. 57.57. 57.97. 66.4 83.2 75.1
Kulim - Total 3,601 5,829 9,481 17,605 61.9 62.7 85.7
1.1 sq.mis. - Chinese 53.67. 56.57. 62.97. 61.87. 70.6 81.1 82.5
PERLIS STATE - Tota 1 40,087 49,296 70,490 90,885 23.0 41.4 28.9
310 sq.mls. - Chinese 9.07. 13.27. 16.77. 17.47. 80.5 23.7 33.f
Kangar - Tota 1 1,109 2,010 3,970 6,064 81.3 97.5 52.7
0.74 sq.mls. - Chinese 56.07, 45.27. 46.97. 48.07. 46.2 105.2 56.:
KELANTAN STATE- Total 309,300 362,517 448,572 505,522 17.2 23.7 12.7
5,750 sq.mls. - Chinese 4.17. 4.97. 5.17. 5.77. 38.1 30.2 25.(
Kota Bahru - Total 10,833 14,843 22,765 38,103 37.0 53.4 61 .L
1.95 sq.mis. - Chinese 14.17. 21.27. 30.17. 28.97. 105.9 117.7 60. i
TRENGGANU STATE- Total 153,765 179,789 225,996 278,269 16.9 25.7 23.1
5,027.5sq.mis - Chinese 4.77. 7.47. 7.07. 6.67. 83.0 19.7 15.(
Kuala Trengganu- Total 12,456 13,972 27,004 29,446 12.2 93.3 9.(
1.8 sq-mis. - Chinese 11.57. 13.87. 15.77. 19.27. 34.5 118.9 33.1
Dungun - Total - - 4,256 12,515 - - 194.1
0.1 sq.mis. - Chinese - - 18.87. 15.27. - - 138.:
NOTES: (i) Towns under 1Ined are State Capitals in 1957.
(ii) Areas shown are as in 1947-
SOURCE: Timothy Thim-Fook Lam, "The Growth of the Chinese Community and
Urbanization in the Malay Peninsula", (cycostyled, n.d.).
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APPENDIX D
SURVEY OF SQUATTERS ON STATE LAND AND PRIVATE LAND 
SUMMARY
STATE LAND PRIVATE LAND COMBINED
NO X NO X NO %
(1) No. of Questionnaire 
forms sent out 17,000 • 9,649 - 26,649 -
No. of Questionnaire 
forms returned 13,565 80 7 ,04 6 73 20,611 77
(2) No . of Units 10,698 - 4,409 - 15,107 -
No . of Famlllea 13,565 - 7,046 * 20,611 -
No. of Persons 93,664 - 46,303 - 139,967 -
(3) Ethnic Group: 
Malays 3,722 27 .4 487 6.9 4,209 20.4
Chinese 8,451 62.3 5,392 76.5 13,843 67 .2
Indians/Pakistan is 1,37 3 10.1 1 ,004 14.3 2,377 11.5
Others 19 0.2 163 2.3 1B2 0 .9
13,565 100.0 7 ,046 100.0 20,611 100.0
(A) Age Group:
Below 20 yrs . 45,144 48.2 24,510 52 .9 69,654 49 .8
20 - 50 yrs . 31,428 33.6 17,218 37 .2 48,646 34 .8
Above 50 yrs. 8,938 9 .5 4,575 9 .9 13,513 9.6
Not given 8,154 8 .7 - - 8,154 5 .8
93,664 100.0 46,303 100.0 139,967 100.0
(5) Income per Month: 
Below $100 1,094 8.1 728 10.3 1,822 8.8
$100 - $200 7,129 52.6 2,997 42.5 10,126 49 .1
$201 - $300 2,861 21.1 2,122 30.1 4,983 24.2
Above $300 1,533 11.3 1,194 17 .0 2,727 13.2
Not Given 948 6.9 5 0.1 953 4.7
13,565 100.0 7 ,046 100.0 20,611 100.0
(6) Amenities:
Electricity 397 3.7 2,556 58.0 2,953 19.5
Water (Tap in House) 782 7 .4 2,911 66.0 3,693 24.4
Night soil disposal 
(bucket system & better) 5,597 52.3 4,274 96.9 9,871 65.3
(7) Rent paid per
$10 & below
month:
449 14.1 194 4.9 643 9 .0
$11 - $20 (Note: this 1,592 49.9 1,119 28.5 2,711 38.1
$21 - $40
information 
refers only 923 29.0 1,807 46.0 2,730 38.4
Above $40
to families 
who pay rent) 223 7 .0 810 20.6 1,033 14.5
3,187 100.0 3,930 100.0 7,117 100.0
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STATE LAND PRIVATE LAND COMBINED
NO 7. NO 7. NO
(8) No. of persons per family: 
1 - 4  persons 2,532 18.7 1,962 27 .8 4,494 21.8
5 & above 11,010 81 .2 5,082 72.1 16,092 78.1
Not given 23 0.1 2 0.1 25 0.1
13,565 100.0 7,046 100.0 20,611 100.0
(9) No. of families per house: 
1 8,856 82.8 3,047 69.1 11,903 78.8
2 - 4 1,746 16.2 1,199 27 .2 2,945 19 .5
5 - 8 92 0.9 145 3.3 237 1.6
9 & above 4 0.1 18 0.4 22 0.1
10,698 100.0 4,409 100.0 15,107 100.0
(10) Employment:
Shopkeeper,
Professional,
Executive,
Landed Proprietor, etc.
119 0.9 819 11.6 9 38 4 .5
Hawker,
Small Trader, 
Skilled Worker, 
Clerk, Driver, etc.
9,321 68.7 5,090 72.3 14,411 69 .9
Unskilled labour, 
Part Time labour, 
Unemployed.
3,891 28.7 1,129 16.0 5,020 24.4
Not given 234 1 .7 8 0.1 242 1.2
13,565 100.0 7,046 100.0 20,611 100 .0
( H ) Distance to Work: 
On site 720 5.3 902 12 .8 1,622 7.9
Below 3 miles 5,635 41.5 4,148 58.9 9,783 47 .5
Above 3 miles 6,197 45.7 1,891 26.8 8,088 39.2
Not given 1,013 7 .5 105 1.5 1,118 5.4
13,565 100.0 7 ,046 100.0 20,611 100.0
(12) Mode of Travel to Work: 
On Foot, Bicycle 7,654 56.1 3,229 45.8 10,883 52.8
Car, Motorcycle 1,767 13.3 1,351 19.2 3,118 15 .1
By Hire Transport i.e. 
Bus, Train etc .
3,194 23.6 1,865 26.5 5,059 24.6
Not given 950 7 .0 601 8.5 1,551 7 .5
13,565 100.0 7,046 100.0 20,611 100.0
(13) Curtilage Use: Nil 6,991 51.5 5,190 73.7 12,181 59.1
For own Consumption 6,238 46.0 1,814 25.7 8,052 39.1
For sale 220 1.6 31 0.4 251 1.2
Not given 116 0.9 11 0.2 127 0.6
13,565 100.0 7,046 100.0 20,611 100.0
300 .
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STATE LAND PRIVATE LAND COMBINED
NO X NO X NO %
(14) Housing Preference:
1-Bedroom flat with a 
living room & kitchen
164 1.2 346 4.9 510
2- -do- 554 4.1 1,433 20.3 1,987
3- -do- 349 2.6 1,260 17 .9 1,609
4- -do- - - 619 8.8 -
Terrace House 2,034 15.0 - -
Plank low cost house 4,442 32.7 1,765 25 .0 6,207
Vacant Lot 5,681 41 .9 1,612 22 .9 7,293
Not given 341 2.5 11 0.2 352
13,565 100.0 7,046 100.0
(15) Rent Payable per month:
$20 & below 272 36.8 656 37 .5 928 37 .3
$21 - $40 374 50.5 933 53.3 1,307 52.5
Above $40 94 12.7 161 9.2 255 10.2
(Note:this information refers
to families who wish to rent 
their housing preference)
740 100.0 1,750 100.0 2,490 100.0
(16) Downpayment
$1,000 & less 5,178 93.0 3,485 73 .5 8,663 85 .1
Above $1,000 
(Note: this information
390 7 .0 1,132 24 .5 1,522 14.9
refers to families who 
can pay downpayment)
5,568 100.0 4,617 100.0 10,185 100.0
(17) Monthly Instalments:
$40 & below 5,382 83.0 4,026 76.0 9,408 79.9
Above $40
(Note: this information
1,100 17 .0 1,270 24.0 2,370 20.1
refers to families who 
can pay monthly 
ins talments)
6,482 100.0 5,296 100.0 11,778 100.0
(18) Area Preferred:
Outer Klang Road Area 1,680 23.8
Chera8 Road Area 832 11.8
Ampang & Ulu Klang Area 264 3.8
Outer Sungei Beal Road 
Area
416 5.9
Outer Ipoh Road Area 3,298 46.8
Klang Gates Road Area 345 4.9
Gombak Road Area 206 2.9
Not given 3 0.1
7 ,046 100.0
Source: Federal Capital Commission, 1969
_
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APPENDIX E 
Interviews
All seven municipal department heads were interviewed 
between July 15 and December 6, 1969. The first interview
was held four months after the examination of municipal documents 
had begun, and most of the department heads were familiar with 
the project. Five of the seven interviews were preceded by a 
brief meeting with the respondent during which details of the 
project were outlined and an appointment for the main interview 
was made. These pre-interview meetings lasted no longer than 
twenty-five minutes and preceded the main interview by five to 
ten days. Two of the seven informants were interviewed on one 
occasion only; two were re-interviewed once and three were 
re-interviewed on several occasions. The main interviews lasted 
from one to two hours with a mean of an hour and thirty-five 
minutes. The re-interviews totalled thirty-eight hours with a 
range from one to seventeen hours per informant, with the 
longest single session lasting four and a half hours. The 
interview guide for the main interview was designed to last from 
one and a half to two hours.
All of the principal interviews were held in the informants' 
offices, and the re-interviews were generally begun in offices 
but ended up in restaurants, coffee shops, private clubs or the 
informant's home. No mechanical recording device was used.
Brief notes were taken by hand as unobtrusively as possible 
during the interview and were written up within twelve hours of 
completion. All interviews were conducted in English.
The same procedure was followed with the unofficial members 
of the Advisory Board, excepting that there were no pre­
interview meetings and no re-interviews.
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Interview Guide
Bio-data (asked of all informants):
Sex; race; age; birthplace; length of residence in K.L.; 
father's race; father's birthplace; mother tongue; other 
languages spoken; no. of years of education and medium of 
instruction; degrees, diplomas and professional qualifications; 
father's occupation; marital status; number of children and 
ages; home ownership; monthly income; membership in associations, 
social clubs, professional groups, government boards, etc.
Advisory Board Members:
1. When were you appointed to the Board?
2. How long did you serve?
3. At the time of appointment, were you a member of a political 
party?
4. Why do you think you were appointed?
5. Do you keep in touch with ratepayers? How?
6. How did you feel when you attended your first few meetings 
of the Board?
7. How would you describe your experience of serving on the 
Board?
8. Do you think that unofficial members have any power to 
get things done?
9. What do you think was your most important contribution to 
the Board?
10. How would you rate the interest of the unofficial members 
in the problems of K.L.? the official members?
11. How would you rate the performance of the unofficial 
members? the official members?
12. Do you think there are powerful interest groups and 
individuals who can get things done in K.L.?
a. What groups or individuals do you have in mind?
b. Can you say what makes them powerful?
13. How would you describe the relationship between the Federal 
Capital Commission and the State government?
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14. How would you describe the relationship between the Federal 
Capital Commission and the Federal government, especially 
the Ministry for Local Government and Housing?
15. What are some of the most important problems facing the 
Federal Capital Commission?
16. How would you evaluate the overall performance of the 
Federal Capital Commission since it was established in 1961?
17. In your opinion is the present system better than the 
previous one where you had some elected members? Why?
18. Would you personally favor a fully elected Council? Why?
19. Would you favor a partly elected Council? Why?
Department Heads:
1. When did you join the Municipality?
2. At what level did you join? What was the salary?
3. Where did you work before joining the Municipality?
4. Why did you take a job with the Municipality?
5. If you had a chance to choose a career again, would you 
make the same choice?
6. What do you like most about your work?
7. Are there some things you don't like about your job? What 
things? Why?
8. How would you describe the job of being a department head?
a. What are some of the most important things you do?
b. Are there some things that you feel that you should 
do but that you cannot - why is this and what are 
some of these things?
c. What are some of the most important problems that you 
face as a department head?
9. How many people are there in your department?
a. Who do you rely upon most in your department?
b. Do members of your department get together to discuss 
problems of concern to the department or the Municipality 
generally? Who is involved in these meetings and how 
often are they held? How would you evaluate the 
usefulness of these meetings?
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c. Is t h e  n u m b e r  o f  e m p l o y e e s  in y o u r  d e p a r t m e n t
s u f f i c i e n t  to r u n  y o u r  d e p a r t m e n t  as e f f i c i e n t l y  
as y o u  w o u l d  l i k e ?  If m o r e  s t a f f  n e e d e d ,  w h a t
a r e  t h e  p r o b l e m s  in g e t t i n g  t h e m ?
10 . H o w  w o u l d  y o u  e v a l u a t e  t h e  o v e r a l l  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f t h e  
F e d e r a l  C a p i t a l  C o m m i s s i o n  s y s t e m  s i n c e  it w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
in 1 9 6 1 ?
11. In y o u r  o p i n i o n  is t h e  p r e s e n t  s y s t e m  b e t t e r  t h a n  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  o n e  w h e r e  y o u  h a d  s o m e  e l e c t e d  m e m b e r s ?  W h y ?
12 . W o u l d  y o u  f a v o r  a f u l l y  e l e c t e d  C o u n c i l ?  W h y ?
13 . W o u l d  y o u  f a v o r  a p a r t l y  e l e c t e d  C o u n c i l ?  W h y ?
14 . As a d e p a r t m e n t  h e a d ,  h a v e  y o u  h a d  m u c h  c o n t a c t  w i t h  m e m b e r s  
o f  t h e  A d v i s o r y  B o a r d ?  In w h a t  w a y ?
15 . D o  y o u  f e e l  t h a t  u n o f f i c i a l  m e m b e r s  o f t h e  A d v i s o r y  B o a r d  
k e e p  in t o u c h  w i t h  t h e  r a t e p a y e r s ?
16 . H o w  w o u l d  y o u  e v a l u a t e  t h e  o v e r a l l  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  
u n o f f i c i a l  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  A d v i s o r y  B o a r d ?
17 . H o w  w o u l d  y o u  r a t e  t h e  o f f i c i a l  m e m b e r s ?
18 . H o w  w o u l d  y o u  r a t e  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  B o a r d  
in t h e  p r o b l e m s  of K . L . ?
19 . Do  y o u  f e e l  t h a t  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  A d v i s o r y  B o a r d  d o  a g r e a t  
d e a l  o f w o r k  in p r e p a r i n g  f o r  A d v i s o r y  B o a r d  m e e t i n g s ?
20 . In y o u r  v i e w ,  h o w  i m p o r t a n t  a r e  d e p a r t m e n t  h e a d s '  
m e e t i n g s  ?
21 . Do  t h e s e  m e e t i n g s  d e a l  w i t h  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n s ?
22 . Do y o u  l o o k  f o r w a r d  to  t h e s e  m e e t i n g s ?  W h y ?
2 3 . B e s i d e s  t h e s e  m e e t i n g s ,  a re  t h e r e  a n y  o t h e r  o c c a s i o n s  
w h e n  d e p a r t m e n t  h e a d s  g e t  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r ?
24 . W h a t  d e p a r t m e n t  h e a d  do y o u  r e s p e c t  m o s t  o f a l l ?  W h y ?
25 . S o m e  o b s e r v e r s  h a v e  s a i d  t h a t  s o m e  d e p a r t m e n t  h e a d s  are 
m o r e  p o w e r f u l  t h a n  o t h e r s .  Do y o u  a g r e e  w i t h  t h i s ?  W h y ?
W h a t  m a k e s  a d e p a r t m e n t  h e a d  p o w e r f u l ?
26 . H o w  w o u l d  y o u  d e s c r i b e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  F e d e r a l  
C a p i t a l  C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  t h e  S t a t e  g o v e r n m e n t ?
27 .
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How wou ld you describe the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the 
Federal Capital Commission and the Federal government, 
esp ec ia lly the Ministry for Local Govt, and Housing?
28. In your view, what are some important problems facing the 
Federal Capital Commission?
29. Are there any pressure groups with which the Federal 
Capital C o m m ission has to deal? What groups did you have 
in mind? What would you say makes them powerful?
30. Besides pressure groups, one hears of po werful men who can 
get things done when dealing with governments. Is this 
true of K.L.? Could you name some of these people?
What makes them powerful? Do they have much to do with 
the Federal Capital Commission?
31. Do you feel that interest groups can play a useful role in 
mun ic ipal government? Why?
32. To your knowledge, have Federal and State elected members 
had much to say either directly to your a d ministration or 
in P a r l i a m e n t  or the State Legi s l a t i v e  Assem b l y  about 
mu nic ipal matters?
33. How would you rate the perf o r m a n c e  of the Federal Capital 
Co mm ission on the following issues in the last five years: 
public housing, planning, squatter clearance.
34. As a dep a r t m e n t  head, do you feel free to take problems 
to the Commi s s i o n e r  for discussion?
35. How would you describe the rela t i o n s h i p  between the 
C om mi ss ioner and yourself?
36. Do you think that some department heads are closer to the 
C om mi ssioner than others?
37. Does being close to the C o m m i s s i o n e r  make any kind of a 
difference to a d e p a rtment head? What?
38. Would you say that the C ommissioner and department heads 
work together as a team?
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APPENDIX F
1968 Work Force Data* 
(Staff: Divisions I through IV)
RACE
Department Malay Chinese Indian Others TOTAL
Secretary ) 25 12 10 2 49
Fire Services) 114 3 32 1 150
Planning 10 7 8 1 26
Architect 21 40 16 2 79
Valuation 10 19 3 2 34
Treasurer 52 61 38 4 155
Engineer 52 22 72 4 150
Health 144 70 76 11 301
428 234 255 27 94 4
Racial breakdown by Senior Positions in each Department
Secretary 1 1 3 - 5
Planning - 2 1 - 3
Architect 1 5 - - 6
Valuation - 4 - - 4
Tre as ure r - 4 2 - 6
Engineer 1 3 2 - 6
Health _ 1 5 — 6
3 20 13 - 36
(Industrial and Manual Workers)
Malay 466
Chinese 140
Indian 2024
Others 4 0
2670
*Data Provided by Personnel Officer, Federal Capital Commission.
I
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APPENDIX G
Federal Capital Commission 
Federal government Grants and Loans 1960-69*
$ M
Road Fund Grant 3,912,647
Loans
Low Cost Housing 37,488,000
Employees' Provident Fund (for Staff Housing) 5,000,000
Other (Roads, Sewerage, etc.) 42,169,009
Data Provided by Municipal Treasurer's Department. 
$ Ml = 30 cents Australian
Revenue and Expenditure*
Sanitary Board
1903
1911
1916
193 4
Town Board 
1948
Municipal Council
1955
1958
Revenue 
$ M
161,235 
328,763 
587,504 
1,150,073
2,449,088
8,126,170
8,780,212
E xpenditure 
$ M
197,510 
579,304 
666,942 
743,403
2,954,425
7,690,801 
8,579,764
Federal Capital Commission 
1962 13,493,114
1965 18,418,588
1968 2 3 , 341,573
13,272,849 
17,272 , 874 
22,218,644
Source: Sanitary Board, Town Board, Municipal Council and
Federal Capital Commission Budgets.
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G L O S S A R Y
K e t u a  K a m p o n g K a m p o n g  O f f i c i a l ,  a s s i s t a n t  t o P e n g h u l u
K a m p o n g H o m e s t e a d ;  v i l l a g e  m a d e  u p o f  s e v e r a l  
h o m e s t e a d s .  U s u a l l y  s e v e r a l  k a m p o n g
in a m u k i m .
M e n t r i  B e s a r C h i e  f M i n i s t e r
Me r d e k a F r e e d o m ;  i n d e p e n d e n c e
M u k i m S m a l l e s t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  u n i t  i n t o  w h i c h  
a d i s t r i c t  is d i v i d e d
P e n g h u l u V i l l a g e  h e a d m a n  in c h a r g e  o f a m u k i m
P e s u r o h  J a y a  I b u  K o t a F e d e r a l  C a p i t a l  C o m m i s s i o n e r
R a h  s i a S e c r e t
S ul i t C o n f i d e n t i a l
Y a n g  d i - P e r t u a n  A g o n g K i n g
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A Note on Sources
Pr im ary  source material from Municipal, State and 
Federa l records were used in the p r e p a r a t i o n  of this thesis. 
The following is a key to the abbreviations used in the 
footnote s :
SBKL
Sei. Sec.
Sei. Sec. (C) 
KLM
KLM (C)
PKL
T CP D 
DP W 
KKTP
Sanitary Board, Kuala Lumpur 
Selangor Secretariat
Selangor Secr etariat (Confidential)
Kuala Lumpur M u n i c i p a l i t y
Kuala Lumpur M u n i c i p a l i t y  (Confidential)
Pesuroh Jaya Ibu Kota, Kuala Lumpur 
(Federal Capital Commission, K.L.)
Town Co untry Plann i n g  Department
D e p a r t m e n t  of Public Works
M i n istry of Local G overnment & Housing
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